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By Simon Kerr 
The late 1960s witnessed an unprecedented interest in the environment. One of the intellectual 
characteristics of this period was the rise of ecocentrism, a form of ecological reasoning that 
challenged the domination of anthropocentric environmental thinking and practice. The thesis 
briefly reviews the evolution of ecological forms of reason, and then poses two questions. The 
first question asks: "What is ecological reason and how does the literature conceptualise it?" 
This leads to a theoretical analysis of the forms of ecological reason discernable in the 
literature, and results in a 'matrix of ecological reason'. The three primary forms of ecological 
reason are described as 'Technocentric Ecology', 'Discursive Ecology' and 'Eco-social 
Ecology'. They differ in respect to different dimensions of ecological reason, the forms of 
communication employed (drawing here on Habermas), and the level of commitment to 
anthropocentrism or ecocentrism. This 'matrix' highlights the contested nature of ecological 
reason in the literature, and demonstrates that there is, yet, no clear agreement on what it 
means, or should mean. 
The second question examines the ecological rationality of environmental practice. The 
'matrix' is employed in three case studies of environmental decisions that take place under the 
New Zealand Resource Management Act (RMA), and investigates the forms of ecological 
reason expressed in these decision processes. The results of this analysis show that Eco-social 
Ecology barely registers in these case studies, while the other two forms of ecological reason, 
Technocentric Ecology and Discursive Ecology, are both highly visible in the rationality of 
the RMA, but with two important qualifiers. First, although there is a commitment to 
Discursive Ecology on the part of many professionals, there is also much concern that this 
form of reason undermines quality environmental decisions. Thus, there is significant 
Abstract 
ambiguity as to the role of the community (an important dimension of Discursive Ecology). 
This leads to the second qualifier. There is an uneasy relationship between these two forms of 
reason, at both the theoretical and practice level. This tension underpins the competing visions 
of the RMA as a scientifically driven process and as a community process. This thesis argues 
that this tension does not provide for a secure marriage of these two visions. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
THE RISE OF ECOLOGICAL REASON 
It is commonplace to suggest that traditional indigenous cultures are closely connected to the 
non-human world and that they often make no meaningful distinctions between humans and 
non-human nature. But this has not been the dominant view in the West since the European 
Enlightenment. From the early 1 i h century with Descartes' radical doubt of existence and his 
dichotomy between mind and body, to contemporary reductionist science, humans, in the 
West at least, have been (largely) radically separated from 'nature' (Plumwood, 2002). The 
development oflarge scale urban settings ensures that increasing numbers of humans are 
experientially separated from the ecological processes upon which we all depend. 
Technological developments have granted humans unprecedented control over health, food 
production, sanitation, work and leisure that was unimaginable only a few hundred years ago. 
The rise of science and reason, hallmarks of the modem era, coupled with the Christian 
religious underpinnings of the culture (White, 1967), created a powerful worldview that was 
dominant for the last four hundred years, and still occupies a dominant position. Proctor (in 
Cronon, 1995, p.449) suggests we view environmental problems as a "point of departure in a 
larger critique of modernity". I take up this idea, although not to attempt a comprehensive 
analysis. Rather, my purpose is to suggest that this challenge to modernity by environmental 
problems reflects the rise of ecological reason in contemporary Western, and increasingly 
non-Western discourses 1. 
The development of ecological reason can be viewed as an expression of this increased 
environmental sensitivity. In the first part of this introductory chapter I briefly track the 
development of this novel, but increasingly influential, formofreason. This helps set the 
scene for what is to follow, and argues that ecological reason is a response to a set of complex 
social changes and can plausibly be viewed as an alternative world-view for an increasing 
secularised, post-materialist and sceptical culture that has seen the demise of religious 
1 My focus is primarily on Western thought, while acknowledging there are alternative ways of thinking about 
the environment. 
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explanations2 and increased scepticism about the role of science. Put another way, ecological 
thinking has become the new 'religion' for many in the environmental movements and 
presents the major alternative to existing political and ethical arrangements. 
Most writers locate the emergence of the ecocentric perspective around the late 1960s to early 
1970s (Hay, 2002, pp.26-31). But this does not mean there was no concern with the non-
human world prior to this moment. For example, in his analysis of the development of 
environmentalism in France, Bess (2003, p.74) notes that perceptions of hum ani non-human 
relationships have undergone three significant shifts. From a blatant homo-centric view that 
saw non-human life as existing simply to satisfy human needs, the 
"underlying set of assumptions changed ... first incorporating an appreciation of the natural world's 
intrinsic beauty, and then moving into a framework in which the diversity of nature's creatures, 
and the fragile balances among them, were valued for their own sake" (Bess, 2003, p.74). 
These early perspectives, whether it was acclimatisation, conservation or preservation efforts, 
were thoroughly anthropocentric. As Dominick (cited in Bess, 2003, p.66) puts it, "Most 
rationales presented by the early German conservationists appealed purely to the interests of 
homo sapiens .... Many human beings saw no significance in the demise of a species other 
than their own". Bess notes similar views in France and United States around the 1900s, but 
argues that despite the homo-centric language, this constitutes "a substantial shift from a 
world in which resources had been blithely taken for granted" (p.67). It was only in the late 
1960s that a non-anthropocentric view began to emerge in popular thinking. 
The development of ecocentric thinking, then, is very recent, dating back to the late sixties 
and early seventies (O'Riordan, 1976, pp.I-36; Buhrs, 1991, pp.56-111; Hay, 2002i. 
However, interest in 'environmental issues' certainly predates this. Conservation in New 
Zealand, for example, can be dated back as far as the 1860s (Buhrs, 1991, p.56), but 
developed as an organised conservation movement only since the 1920s. This environmental 
concern, as Buhrs explains, was interested in the rational management and use of natural 
resources. While environmental issues were not high on the political agenda, there was some 
attention being given to improving environmental management, largely by professionals 
2 This comment may appear rather overstated in light of increased religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world 
and in American Christianity. It is more accurate to say that religious world views no longer dominate the West's 
understanding of the non-human world. 
3 See also a fascinating account of one of the important debates in this early period of environmental thinking 
between Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich over the 'root cause' of environmental problems (Ellis, 1995). It 
demonstrates ecocentric thinking was not a unified project. 
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interested in development, such as planners, engineers, surveyors and academic scientists. 
Buhrs (1991, p.65) identifies three main areas of concern: the need to protect New Zealand's 
scenery; the need to protect quality of life; and the need to prevent serious pollution. The 
response to these three concerns was characterised by four elements in what is labelled the 
'technocentric approach' (O'Riordan, 1976, p.11) to the environment. These elements are 
summarised as follows: 
(1) Beliefthat sustained economic growth to provide for human needs is possible; 
(2) Belief that the problems in economic development and in meeting human needs can be 
solved by scientific and technical expertise and rational management, while avoiding 
debate over values and principles; 
(3) Suspicion about public participation; and 
(4) Belief that such goals can be achieved with the current social and political order. 
(Buhrs, 1991, p.20) 
For most of last century the techno centric approach was simply unchallenged, given that there 
was no emergent alternative. Faith in science was strong, as was optimism for the future, but 
things began to change in the late 1960s, and early 1970s. Pivotal at this time, some argue, 
was Rachel Carson's text "Silent Spring" (1962; see also Neimark & Mott, 1999, p.189), 
documenting the destructiveness of pesticides. Such was the impact of this text that Hay 
(2002, p.16) even suggests that the rise of the ecocentric response to environmental problems 
can be dated to this moment. 
Ecocentric thinking is complex and diverse, as Hay's (2002) useful overview illustrates (see 
also, Fox, 1988; Eckersley, 1992, 1996; Hayward, 1998; Goodin, 1996; Dobson, 1990, 1996). 
However it does have certain broad characteristics that can take the following form: 
(1) Lack of faith in modem technology; 
(2) Emphasis on the need for development to remain within ecological limits; 
(3) Ascribes intrinsic value to nature; 
(4) Emphasis on participation. 
(Buhrs, 1991, p.20; O'Riordan, 1976, p.7-11)4 
4 Many of these ideas were broadly shared among the civil rights and other protest movements of the 1960s and 
were not unique to environmental concerns. 
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Ecocentrism takes issue with the optimism oftechnocentrism5, believing that the 
anthropocentric assumptions of modern technology, political structures and ethical 
frameworks, undermine the capacity of humans to survive in the long term, while at the same 
time endanger or drive to extinction many other species. Central to the view was the need for 
significant value change in society (BUhrs & Bartlett, 1993, pp.6-7). The period from the late 
1960s to the early 1970s was in many ways a watershed in the development of an ecological 
perspective that, although varied, challenged the older and more entrenched techno centrism. 
This development expresses the rise of ecological forms of reasoning about the environment, 
a novel but increasingly influential way of thinking that is reshaping the way society relates to 
'nature'. 
This thesis accepts the general proposition that new forms of reasoning have recently emerged 
in the human struggle to deal with the anthropogenic impacts on the non-human environment. 
Ecological reason, it is argued in this thesis, is not a single vision and nor does it embody a 
common set of assumptions about the extent, causes and solutions to the environmental 
problematique (BUhrs & Bartlett, 1993, p.1). There has been significant attention given to 
enhancing the capacity of technology to address this problematique through the greening of 
industry and ecological modernisation, as well as alternative ecocentric approaches discussed 
above. Much of the debate centres on modes ofreasoning6, raising the question of what it 
means to be 'ecological rational'. This is the primary focus of this thesis. 
ORIGINS OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research is the result of many factors that intersect, and some of these intersections 
require explanation. I came to this research out of a longstanding interest and concern about 
the state of our environments. But I also come from a particular set of traditions that have not 
normally focused their attention on the environment in the way I do here. Although formally 
trained in sociology and resource management, I draw strongly from political science, in 
particular, policy studies, and philosophy. There are a number of potentially fruitful 
5 Ecocentric thinking, as described here, was not the fIrst pessimistic response to a technocentric approach. 
Malthus (1766-1864) was an important early example of this pessimism, and deeply influenced environmental 
writers such as Paul Ehrlich, who fIrst published The Population Bomb in the late 1960s. 
6 As a point of clarifIcation, 'modes' of reasoning does not refer to the focus on the rational capacity of humans 
to reason. The debates over rational-comprehensive versus incremental approaches to reasoning (see Parsons, 
1995, pp.271-303, for an overview) are important, but are not the main focus of this thesis. See, however, a brief 
discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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approaches to studying environmental or resource management. However, if forced to provide 
a convenient 'label' by which I can be located in the academic world, I am most comfortable 
with the term 'political ecology', indicating the convergence of political theory with 
ecological concerns (see Clark, 1998). 
The emergence of ecological forms of reason, and the specific development of literature on 
ecological rationality, prompted this investigation. The text that initially captured my 
attention was John Dryzek's (l987a) Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. 
Dryzek investigated the idea of ecological rationality and developed a number of criteria used 
to assess social decision mechanisms. While insightful, I felt that Dryzek' s criteria were too 
abstract to be applied to more prosaic environmental practices. I began puzzling over what 
ecological reason looked like in practice, and this became the overarching focus of the Ph.D. 
Coupled with this practical focus was the broader theme of reason, particularly in its 
'ecological' form. This puzzling, then, took two distinct but related paths. First, theoretical 
'puzzling' about what ecological reason could look like in practice, and second, practical 
'puzzling' over the extent to which it is actually manifested at more prosaic levels of 
environmental decision making. 
Research Questions 
The first step was to develop a clear picture of how ecological reason was understood within 
the literature. In order to assess the manifestation of ecological reason in the legislation, it is 
first necessary to know what, exactly, ecological reason looks like. The leads to the first 
research question: "How is ecological rationality constructed in the literature? JJ 
The second step involved selecting some legislation to test. I decided to focus the study on the 
New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) because it is the site of most 
environmental decisions and therefore is instrumental in how New Zealand's environmental 
issues are addressed. The second research question is: "How is ecological reason manifested 
in the New Zealand Resource Management Act? JJ 
5 
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Methodology 
r ~L~_ .. ~_L_'·"'"' ___ ; ___ '~ 
Figure 1.1: 
I 
I Flow Chart of Theory Development, Data Gathering Process, and Method of Analysis 
1 Theory Development 
Literature on Ecological Reason ... 
. . . leads to this conclusion: 
Discursive Ecology 
Eco-social Ecology 
Technocratic Ecology 
... which are placed within a ... 
Theoretical Framework: Forms of Ecological Reason 
1 Data Gathering 
~ ; 
Three Case Studies 
Beginning with 
Bromley& Consent Industry .. . 
. . . these questions were asked .. . 
What are the Criteria for Ecologically Rational Decision Making (CERD)? 
What forms of ecological reason are expressed here? 
How ecologically rational was the decision making? 
... then turned to ... 
Montgomery Spur 
Summary of CERD from the first two case studies 
What CERD are found in this case study? 
What forms of ecological reason are expressed here? 
How ecologically rational was the decision making? 
I Analysis 
The requirements for ecological rationality 
The forms of ecological reason in the case studies 
Ecological rationality under the RMA 
Reflections on theory and practice: 
a) The relationship between the Criteria and the Forms of ecological reason 
b) Is science for hire? 
c) Does public consultation help the RMA produce ecologically rational decisions? 
d) Making the consent process more ecologically rational 
e) Attitudes and the efficacy of the RMA 
Conclusions 
6 
Chapter One: Introduction 
A summary of the research and analysis process is provided in Figure 1.1 above. It depicts the 
relationship between theory development, data gathering and analysis, and is useful in giving 
an overall perspective on how the components of this thesis are integrated. 
The two research questions require different approaches. The first requires an investigation of 
the literature dealing with ecological reason, and the development of a theoretical framework 
of ecological forms of reason (what I call a 'matrix of ecological reason'). The second 
question requires an empirical answer. The approach that seemed most appropriate was to use 
case studies of specific aspects of decision making under the RMA. Three case studies were 
selected. The first was a site-specific resource consent application by the Christchurch City 
Council to continue to discharge waste water from the Bromley treatment plant into the 
estuary (referred to as 'Bromley'). The second was a much wider study examining what I 
have called the Resource Consent Industry. This consisted of interviews with professionals 
involved with resource consents in some way, some working with consent authorities and 
others as consultants who work for whoever employs them, usually consent applicants. The 
final case study did not deal with the resource consent process, but was one step removed 
from that. Montgomery Spur is Christchurch City's last undeveloped spur on the city side of 
the Port Hills. Three developers applied for a plan variation (what used to be called a zoning 
change) to allow residential development on the Spur. The resultant hearing declined the 
application and the decision was published. It was this document that formed the data set for 
the third case study. 
These three case studies were analysed in different ways (for a full account and justification 
of methodology, see the Appendix). The first two used semi-structured in-depth interviews to 
produce the data set for analysis, while the third involved a textual analysis of the Decision 
document. This produced a triangulated7 data set that helped to validate the research findings. 
There were a number of different dimensions to the case studies that added to the 
'triangulation'. First, the case studies represented different time frames: Montgomery Spur 
was a historic case, begun in 1998 and completed in early 2000. The origins of Bromley go 
back to 1996, but the decision on Bromley was finally given in April 2002, and was still very 
alive in the minds of interviewees when interviewed. Finally, the Consent Industry interviews 
7 See Appendix for an explanation and justification of triangulation. 
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reflected current concerns about a wide range of cases. Second, the scope of each study 
varies. Bromley and Montgomery Spur are site specific, while the Consent Industry addresses 
a wide range of cases, making some site specific observations as well as more general 
observations about the resource consent process. Third, the case studies also represented 
different media. Bromley was a highly ecological and localised site involving primarily water 
discharge. Montgomery Spur was also localised, but concerned land use issues and was low in 
ecological issues. The Consent Industry case ranged widely in the scope of cases and types of 
issues discussed. Fourth, the case studies represented different aspects of the RMA decision 
process. Bromley was a resource consent issue and the Consent Industry, as the name 
indicates, was mostly focused on consents. Montgomery Spur was a plan change application. 
Finally, the analysis draws on two different research methods. Semi-structured interviews 
were used for Bromley and the Consent Industry while a textual analysis was used for 
Montgomery Spur. Collectively, these different approaches strengthen the findings and 
analysis of this thesis. 
The research resulted in several hundred pages of interview text. While I read this text a few 
times during the analysis, and attempted to distil the views into a manageable amount of text 
to include in this thesis, many of the ideas were much better expressed in the interviewees' 
words. For this reason, Chapter's Four (Bromley) and Five (Consent Industry) are quite long 
and contain a large number of quotations. While adding to the length of the thesis, I felt this 
was justified because it was the best way of capturing or reproducing for the reader, the 
arguments of the interviewees. The results of this thesis are as much a product of my 
experience of sitting with all the interviewees for a combined total of over forty hours. This 
gave me a 'feel' for their views. Although 'subjective', hermeneutical interpretation involves 
beginning with one's 'prejudices' (pre-judgements) and testing this interpretation against the 
data (texts, in this case) to clarify, or correct, one's interpretation (Gadamer, 1975). In effect, 
this was what I was doing. Therefore, the only way the reader can also gain some 'sense' of 
what the interviewees believed or felt, is to reproduce some of this material. It then helps 
make more sense of the conclusions I draw in Chapter Seven. 
A detailed explanation and defence of the methodology for this thesis is essential in meeting 
the requirements of scholarly research. Rather than locate that discussion in this introduction 
or provide a separate chapter to discuss methods, I place most of this discussion in the 
8 
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Appendix. For those readers interested in the methodological process, the Appendix will 
better serve this function. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter Two: Ecological Reason 
The thesis argument begins in Chapter Two by exploring the critical literature on ecological 
rationality. It begins by suggesting that the rise of ecological thinking over the last forty years 
represents a significant social concern with humans' relationships with their environment. I 
then tum specifically to the development of ecological rationality, exploring the core 
theoretical assumptions and the areas of contestation. The key question posed is: "How does 
the literature conceptualise ecological reason?" Two texts in particular are given extended 
treatment, Dryzek's (1987a) Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy and Val 
Plumwood's (2002) Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. The result of 
this analysis produces three mainforms of ecological reason that can be discerned in the 
literature, what I call Technocentric Ecology, Discursive Ecology and Eco-social Ecology. 
These forms are expanded upon and placed into a theoretical framework, what I refer to as a 
'matrix of ecological reason' , that becomes the basis for the analysis that takes place in 
subsequent case studies. 
Chapter Three: The Resource Management Act 1991-0rigins, Contestations, and 
Structure 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the RMA and outline the structure of its decision 
making framework, which will provide the necessary background to the case studies and 
subsequent analysis. It begins by providing a historical overview of the Act and then 
examines the concept of the 'natural' environment. This involves a significant theoretical 
question concerning the boundaries between ecology and society (ecological and social 
systems). Can the RMA (and environmental decision making more generally) produce 
analytically crisp distinctions between ecological concerns and social concerns so that 'never 
the t'wain shall meet'? At what point do the interests of ecological rationality cease? This is 
especially important because it provides a methodologically interesting challenge in deciding 
9 
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at what point the concerns of my interviewees were no longer 'ecological' (that is, became 
'tainted' with social concerns). This theoretical focus leads to an examination of Section 5 of 
the RMA, which states the Act's purpose. Here the competing interpretations of the role of the 
RMA and of what the 'environment' ought to consist, are played out. 
Chapter Four: The Bromley Waste Water Discharge Consent Application 
This chapter presents the first of three case studies designed to answer the second research 
question: "How is ecological reason manifest in the New Zealand Resource Management 
Act?" The Bromley Waste Water Discharge Consent Application is the subject of the first 
case study and begins by contextualising the issues, starting with a description of the physical 
characteristics of the Christchurch waste water management system. I then outline the 
decision making context before turning to the resource consent application process itself. 
Central to this was a Wastewater Working Party set up by the Christchurch City Council to 
advise the Council of community views. After some years of deliberation, the Council made 
an unsuccessful application to the consent authority. This chapter examines both the 
application and the Commissioners' reasons for their decision. The Council then proceeded to 
investigate an ocean outfall pipeline discharge option. It was at this point that I conducted 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with sixteen people involved in some way with this issue. 
The rest ofthe chapter discusses and analyses their responses. This was a significant case for 
a range of reasons, among which were the highly ecological orientation of the issue, the role 
of the community and the profile that this issue had in the City. It therefore provided a very 
productive site on which to investigate the forms of ecological reasoning at work. 
Chapter Five: The Resource Consent Industry 
The previous chapter investigated the forms of ecological reason at work in a specific 
resource consent application. This chapter focuses not on a specific resource consent 
application, but more widely on the Resource Consent industry. The data come from nineteen 
semi-structures in-depth interviews with a range of professionals involved in some way with 
the resource consent processes in the South Island of New Zealand. A range of people was 
interviewed in order to determine what they considered to be necessary criteria for 
ecologically rational decision making, and to assess the extent to which they believed the 
resource consent processes under the RMA were ecologically rational. The sample was 
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designed to ensure a cross-section of professionals working either directly with resource 
consents, or where resource consents consist of an important part of their work. Most were 
interested, either professionally or through statutory obligation, to seek sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources (section five ofthe RMA). That goal is, in 
principle, their priority. For this reason I focused on those with this interest and responsibility 
because I believed this would provide a useful test of ecological reason under the RMA. 
Chapter Six: The Montgomery Spur Rezoning Application 
The previous two case studies focused on the resource consent process as the site of 
ecologically rational decisions. This chapter presents the third and final case study, but differs 
in its focus by examining a zoning change application made to the Christchurch City Council 
in 1998. Montgomery Spur is the last undeveloped spur on the western side of the Port Hills 
in Christchurch, and three developers applied to the Council for a change in the zoning of a 
large section of the undeveloped spur to enable residential development to take place on what 
was (and still is) rural land. The application caused considerable consternation among a wide 
section of the community, and was vigorously opposed. The Council declined the application 
in May 2000, arguing it would cause unacceptable adverse effects on the environment. The 
case study investigates this decision from the perspective of ecological reason and seeks to 
determine what forms of ecological rationality were employed in the decision. 
Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusions 
This chapter brings together the findings from each case study and seeks to draw some 
conclusions from it all. There are four primary sets of findings that are analysed. First, the 
case studies8 produced an interesting mix of requirements that interviewees felt were critical 
to sound or rational decision making; these findings are examined. Second, the theoretical 
framework consists of three primary expressions or forms of ecological reason. The case 
studies are each analysed to determine which of these forms is most prominent. This approach 
is then supplemented by another set of data from the findings. Interviewees were asked how 
ecologically rational they thought the RMA, and in particular, the resource consent process, 
was. Finally, I make some further reflections on the impact the cases studies have on the 
8 See discussion later in this chapter: only two of the case studies provided data for this analysis. 
11 
Chapter One: Introduction 
theory. A range of questions are dealt with here. For example, I discuss the issue of whether 
or not science is for hire. This addresses the argument that resource rich consent applicants 
can 'buy' a consent by hiring experts to do their bidding. I discuss whether public 
consultation helps the RMA produce ecologically rational decisions, and examine ways to 
make the consent process more ecologically rational. The issue of attitudes towards the RMA 
and how they affect ecological reason under the RMA is also discussed. 
Terms and Definitions 
There are a number of terms used in this thesis which require clarification. The central term is 
of course 'ecology', which is the foundation on which most environmental thinking takes 
place (Bess, 2003, p.63). Although commonly understood by the popular phrase, 'Everything 
is connected to everything else,9, the notion ofthe holism and unity of 'nature' has been the 
subject of much dispute in recent years. As Barbour puts it, "the language and perceptions of 
many oftoday's nature conservationists are considered to be "unnatural" by most ecologists" 
(1995, p.233). 'Nature' was viewed as simplistic and deterministic, but this view is now 
largely rejected by ecologists in favour of complexity and probability. Barbour (1995) argues 
that there is no single paradigm, such as holism or reductionism, which can adequately 
explain ecosystems. Rather, it is "only a convenient conceptual tool" (p.247). Furthermore, he 
quotes one of his interviewees who states: "The ecosystem is not more complex than we 
think, it is more complex than we can think" (ibid, emphasis in original). The impact ofthis is 
significant, because simple cause-effect explanations may not always be appropriate. If 
ecosystems are viewed as an organism, then an effect on one part will affect the rest of the 
system. In Barbour's example, if ecosystems are "considered tightly organised, 
interdependent, and highly coevolved" (ibid, p.233), then endangered species need 
preservation, because not to do so will undermine the whole system. Most ecologists no 
longer hold to this as a fundamental rule. 
The reason for this brief discussion of ecology is to introduce the complexity of ecological 
sciences, given their central role in any form of ecological reason. I also want to ensure that 
the term 'ecological reason' will not be automatically interpreted as an expression of the 
environmental 'movement' per se, but rather treated as a wider phenomenon that feeds into a 
9 To use Barry Commoner's phrase (see Barbour, 1995, p.233) 
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variety of perspectives on human/non-human relationships. Ecology, then, will be interpreted 
as the systematic study of: 
"the patterns of life as they emerge and develop over time; of the relations among different 
species ... ; of the global systems and meta-systems that affect the flourishing and evolution of 
life forms, spanning ... the microscopic level to climatic movements spanning continents; and 
finally of the impact human society has on these systems" (Bess, 2003, p.64) 
However, it will not be interpreted as describing a settled paradigm within which ecologists 
work with relative harmony. It is both internally contested (Peters, 1991) as well as externally 
controversial for some non-ecologists (see Kay & Schneider, 1994; Bocking, 1994). 
The term 'environment' is also employed throughout this thesis. This is a broader term than 
'ecological', but suffers from conceptual ambiguity, being almost on par with other 
'motherhood' concepts like justice and liberty (Buhrs, 1991, p.8) or democracy; Who today 
would be against it? (Giddens, 1994). But, as Buhrs (1991) argues, it has considerable 
political and cultural significance despite its analytical ambiguity. Buhrs defines it as "the 
sphere of interaction between ecosystems and human activity" (p.1 0). Environment is 
therefore an expansive term that can refer to social, economic, cultural and spiritual 
dimensions of human behaviour. These are all implicated in human interaction with the non-
human world 10. 
The focus of this thesis is on the forms of ecologically orientated reasoning that are employed 
in environmental decision making. Environmental decision making is more expansive in 
scope than ecological decision making in that it can encompass wider factors, such as social 
and economic concerns, than would strictly 'ecological' decision making. However, my 
interest is in the 'ecological' as opposed to the 'social', 'economic' and other overtly human-
centred concerns. For example, I am not interested in economic issues except where they 
affect ecological systems. Likewise, spiritual values are of no interest until they impact on 
ecological systems. Any concern with these other processes is only in light of ecological 
systems. Of course, the problem with such demarcations in this thesis is that they are very 
difficult to identify and sustain in practice. As discussed in Chapter Three, the boundary 
between the biophysical and human-social worlds is highly contested; this ambiguous 
10 I prefer to talk about the non-human world rather than 'nature', for two reasons. First, humans ultimately share 
the biophysical world with other species and do not stand 'apart' from other species in any particularly special 
biophysical way. Second, the concept of' nature' is socially constructed, although this is not the same as arguing 
there is no physical reality beyond our concepts. But, 'conceptions' of nature are also socially constructed. See 
Cronon (1995) for a fascinating account of some of these constructions. 
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boundary is a theoretical assumption employed in this thesis. Nevertheless, we must live 
within the limitations of language and make do. Therefore, except where the context makes it 
obvious that the wider use of 'environment' is being employed, the term 'environmental 
decision making' needs to be interpreted in light of the focus of this thesis on ecological 
processes. However, to avoid the implication that the decision making referred to in this thesis 
draws only on ecology, or has a narrow scientific focus, I do not use the term 'ecological 
decision making', but only the term 'environmental' decision making'. 
Postscript: The Structure of the Analysis 
The flow of argument in this thesis is a little more complex than is initially apparent from the 
chapter headings. In both Bromley and the Consent Industry interviews, I posed the question 
of the necessary requirements for ecologically rational decision making. One complication 
arises from the analytic methods used in the third case study, Montgomery Spur. Because this 
involved a textual analysis rather than interviews, I was not able to ask this question. 
However, I did want to assess how ecologically rational the decision was. Therefore, I used 
the results from this question from Bromley and the Consent Industry as the analytic criteria 
for the assessment of Montgomery Spur. This reflexive loop between the case studies creates 
a somewhat complex flow in the sequence of analysis. To make this a little clearer, Figure 1.1 
(above) depicts this flow. 
The criteria for ecologically rational decision making (CERD), derived from Bromley and the 
Consent Industry, are summarised in Chapter Six, the Montgomery Spur case study. This 
analytic summary is perhaps awkward from the reader's perspective, intruding a little into the 
Montgomery Spur discussion. However, this provides the closest link between the criteria 
from Chapters Four and Five to the analysis in Chapter Six, making it easier for the reader to 
follow. Ease of analysis for the reader was the overriding priority. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ECOLOGICAL REASON 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces and elaborates the concept of ecological reason. It begins by 
suggesting that the rise of ecological thinking over the last forty years represents a significant 
development in thought about humans' relationship with their environment. It then briefly 
reviews some important dimensions of rationality, in particular the idea of functional and 
procedural rationality as they relate to the performance of institutions. I then examine the 
relatively limited literature on ecological rationality, before turning to a detailed elaboration 
ofDryzek's (1987a) version, what I call Discursive Ecology. Dryzek developed a clear link 
between the key characteristics of ecosystems and human social choice mechanisms, 
producing a set of criteria for ecologically rational social choice. Drawing on primarily eco-
feminist philosophy, Plumwood (2002) takes a more radical approach to ecological reason, 
arguing that it ought to avoid the dominant forms of instrumental/technical rationality and that 
it must embody eco-social justice, not as an added extra, but as a fundamental dimension of 
ecological reason, what I am calling Eco-social Ecology. A third construction of ecological 
reason, Technocentric Ecology, focuses on technocracy, where the emphasis is on hierarchy 
of knowledge claims, reliance on expertise, an instrumentalist orientation and a primarily 
positivist notion of ecology. 
The chapter then turns to the differences between sustainable development and ecological 
rationality, suggesting sustainability draws on particular forms of ecological reasoning. I will 
argue that sustainable development is an expression of the emergence of ecological reason 
over the last thirty years. Finally, the chapter comes to its most important analytic conclusion 
in positing a theoretical framework, what I call a 'matrix of ecological reason', from which to 
analyse the forms and roles of ecological reason in decision making. This matrix is the 
culmination of this chapter and provides the mechanism for exploring ecological reason 
throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Before launching into the substance of the chapter, a contextual comment is needed. Planning 
theorists have given much attention to the issues of rationality and environmental 
management. This interest has taken a range of paths, as Friedmann (1996) shows. In his 
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discussion on planning theory over the last two hundred years, Friedmann includes the 
theoretical approaches of policy sciences and public administration, both of which drew, in 
their early formulations, on instrumental reason. Significant early theorists included Lasswell 
(see Parsons, pp.444-448), Lindblom l (1959) and Simon (1957), all of whom were interested 
in rationality. More recently, Forester (1985, 1989), Fischer (1990) and Fischer & Forester 
(1993), among others, have written much on the role of power, critical theory, reason, 
technocracy, and planning. There is a strong connection with Dryzek in this literature, for 
Dryzek has contributed significantly to the discursive approaches considered by some of these 
theorists (see in particular, Dryzek, 1990, 1993,2000; Parsons, 1995, pp.448-450). The 
ideological side of planning has also been subjected to much discussion. Paralleling some of 
my arguments in this thesis is Taylor (1998), who discusses the rise of rationality and 
technicism in planning, and the emergence of public participation. Harvey (1978) tackles the 
same issue from a Marxist perspective, arguing that the capitalist system produces a 
rationalisation in which planning takes place, and means "doing whatever must be done to re-
establish the conditions for a positive rate of accumulation" (p.228). 
There is, then, a rich and critical tradition in planning literature, dealing with themes similar 
to my own. While acknowledging this, I approach the issue of ecological reason from a 
different route. Readers familiar with planning theory might expect to see more planning 
literature in the arguments that follow (there is some discussion of planning in Chapter 
Three). However, this is not my background, and therefore I approach this thesis from the 
political ecology perspective, drawing strongly on political science and philosophy, with the 
conviction that this approach will provide different, although complementary, insights to that 
taken by a planning approach. 
Ecological Reason 
The rise of ecological reason is a particular characteristic of the last half of the twentieth 
century. Environmental problems were seen by some as a "point of departure in a larger 
critique of modernity" (Proctor, in Cronon, 1995, p.449) and, as I discussed in the 
introduction, ecological reason represents an increasing sensitivity to environmental issues. 
1 Lindblom is discussed briefly in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
16 
Chapter Two: Ecological Reason 
While elaborate intellectual traditions have pondered the notion of rationality from at least the 
fifth century BCE (Do briner, 1969, p.6), the idea of ecological reason is quite novel. In the 
last twenty years there been some interest in the idea from a small number of writers. 2 
Nevertheless, the concept of ecological reason has not made major inroads into the language 
of academics and others interested in environmental management. There may be a range of 
reasons for this. Ecological rationality suggests that ecological systems are subject to their 
own forms of reason. This appears to contradict what rational action is traditionally seen as; 
only humans have agency and can be legitimately called rational. The discourse (and 
terminology) of sustainability is much more developed and accepted than the concept of 
ecological rationality, despite its lack of definitional precision. It may be that familiarity goes 
some way towards the acceptance of an idea. Framing something as 'rational' suggests some 
analytic precision, and even though the idea of sustainability does not have such precision, 
calling it 'rational' makes sustainability more attractive to political debate. It is difficult to pin 
down the notion of sustainability, and this allows some latitude for claiming success or 
deflecting criticism by political actors. Another reason for the lack of explicit attention to 
ecological reason is that there may be major theoretical limitations with it. This chapter 
addresses this issue. To begin, I tum to the idea of rationality itself. 
Rationality 
The idea of rationality has historic roots in ancient Greece, particularly in the work of 
Aristotle, who helped formalise the concept (Dobriner, 1969, p.6). For the early Greeks, 
rationality was embodied in propositions that were consistently and logically related. Thus, 
the classic syllogism3 was the formal expression of rational thinking. Rational thought, 
however, has come to mean more than just syllogisms. Since the time of Galileo (16th 
Century) observation has also become part of rational thinking (ibid, p.7). To think rationally 
is to make statements that are logically sound and backed by observational evidence when 
those statements require it. However, this view is somewhat misleading, because it treats 
rationality as independent in principle from human action. While there is some philosophic 
value in this, for example, in helping clarify when statements are logically consistent, it 
2 These writers refer specifically to the term, 'ecological rationality',and it was here I began my thinking about 
ecological reason (Bartlett, 1986; Dryzek, 1987a; Conner, 1990; Siebert, 1993; Low & Gleeson, 1998; Leff, 
1995; Buttimer, 1998; Princen, 1996; Little, 2000, Plumwood, 1998,2002). 
3 That is, when something (a) is stated, then certain other things (b) follow by necessity. For example, "Every 
Boy Scout is a male. John is a Boy Scout. Therefore John is a male". See Speake (1984). 
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underplays the sociological dimensions of rationality-in-action. Rationality (and irrationality, 
for that matter) is acted out through human agents and institutions. It is a relative notion, as 
Weber realised. Espeland notes: 
"[Weber] is adamant that rationalization be studied historically, as a complicated series of 
interrelated processes. Weber knew too much history and was too good a theorist to portray 
rationalization as some ineluctable, monolithic process .... In law, commerce, religion, politics, 
and administration, he shows how bumpy and erratic its course was, how dependent different 
forms of rationalization were on the many irrational motivations that gave rise to it, and how 
many efforts to rationalize a sphere of life were impeded, even thwarted, by those it 
threatened" (1998, pp.36-3 7). 
Of course, Weber's preoccupation was with the rationalisation of life, leading, he feared, to an 
'iron cage' where humans are dominated by rationalised bureaucracy. Nevertheless, 
rationality is a contested and contestable set of ideas which takes a variety offorms4• 
Concern about rationalization rests in part on the threat rationality brings to traditional ways 
of living, which I shall not explore here. Of more interest to me is the contestation between 
different approaches to rationality5. Espeland's (1998) enlightening study of water politics in 
the United States' South-West provides an engaging insight into the ways in which different 
groups employ rationality. She summarises the conflict over the siting of the Orme Dam into 
three main discourses. The 'Old Guard' from the Bureau of Reclamation were mainly old-
school engineers and planners for whom substantive rationality6, embodied in the institutional 
purpose of the Bureau, meant that technical expertise of dam building was the solution to the 
water problems of the South-West ('Stand by your Dam' is the way Espeland describes this 
commitment). The normative assumptions of the group were deeply embedded in the Dam as 
a 'symbol of progress'. In the South-West, water is power (PA), and the West was still the 
frontier (p.56). Watering the West was the 'goal' of the Old Guard. 
However, their 'rationality' was incommensurable with other interests, such as those of the 
Yavapai People, whose reservation (and their only remaining tribal lands) was to be flooded. 
For the Yavapai, a different rationality was employed. Based on the principle of 
4 See Bartlett (1986) for a brief discussion of this issue. 
s Allison's (1962) classic treatment of the Cuban missile crisis is also recommended for an insightful analysis of 
reason. He ponders the question of how this crisis could take place, given the 'rational' calculations of the 
various actors (there was little to gain and much to lose by the various actors/states). Taken from three quite 
different perspectives, Allison shows how all of these perspectives can be considered 'rational' courses of action, 
~iven the fundamental starting point and (the variable quality of) information available. 
This and other forms of rationality are defined later in this chapter. 
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incommensurability, they argued that not all values could be traded off against each other. 
How does one rationally defend the sacred when "there is no dividing line that separates you 
from [the land]", as one young Yavapai man put it? (p.4) The third discourse, represented by 
the 'New Guard', made a concerted attempt to take commensurability seriously. This group 
comprised mostly of non-engineers trained in natural or social sciences. They were committed 
to improving the decision making of the Bureau through rational means, especially employing 
rational choice models of decision making. They were also strongly committed to the 
democratic involvement of the wider community. They believed their "specialized knowledge 
could become a powerful, neutral adjudicator of interests and conflict" (p.146). Unlike the 
Old Guard, who wanted political leaders to cede to their expertise as an 'enlightened elite' 
(p.147), the New Guard were committed to inclusive decision making. Where the Old Guard 
expressed a commitment to substantive rationality (the traditional goal of getting dams built)7, 
the New Guard expressed formal or procedural rationality. They were not committed to any 
particular substantive outcome, but rather process. It is to these different forms of rationality 
that I now turn. 
Rationality is commonly conceptualised as the pursuit of efficient means to achieve narrowly 
defined goals (Murphy, 1994, p.31; Simon, 1957, p.41). Economic conceptions of rationality, 
particularly rational choice theory, dominate public policy. Given the 'ubiquity' of economic 
rationality, it is tempting to think of rationality as being relevant only to means. Yet 
rationality can take a number of different forms. 
For Weber, rationality provides the distinctive character ofmodemity (Espeland, 1998, p.34). 
He provides a not altogether clear distinction between two different expressions of rationality 
(Wallerstein, 1999, pp.139-144). These two expressions can be characterised as subjective 
rationality that guides an individual's behaviour, and objective rationality, "an orientation that 
has become institutionalised as patterns of action regulated by various values, rules, or 
techniques within spheres such as law, religion, administration, or art" (Espeland, 1998, p.34). 
Weber begins his discussion of subjective rationality by specifying four types of social action 
(Weber, 1968, pp.25-25). He first makes a distinction between rational and irrational social 
7 The Onne Dam was never built. An alternative plan that produced similar amounts of water, flood protection 
and power for a similar cost was approved instead, but only after several years of protracted debate and political 
contestation. The Yavapai still retain their remaining ancestral lands. See Espeland (1998) for an infonnative and 
sociologically nuanced discussion. 
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action. Irrational social action consists of two types, being either derived from affections 
(emotions) or ingrained habituation (tradition). It is 'irrational' in that the motivation is not 
from some form of calculation as to goals or means to goals. It bypasses cognitive reflection 
and functions more like an instinct. In contrast, rational action can be viewed both in terms of 
individual behaviour (subjective rationality) and collective or institutional behaviour 
(objective rationality). First, subjective rationality, which Diesing (1962, p.235) refers to as 
the rationality of 'decisions', can be either instrumentally rational or value rational. 
Instrumental rationality is the most familiar form (see Dryzek, 1990), and refers to the 
evaluation of the means to some predefined end. It is action that is, in Weber's words, 
"determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other 
human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the 
actors own rationally pursued and calculated ends" (1968, p.24). On the other hand, value 
rationality is action taken in light of some desired value or belief, "independently of its 
prospects for success" (ibid). In other words, it is expressed when values or beliefs are viewed 
as commands or demands to which the person is bound. Means are not featured in value 
rationality because the values, not the rational selection of means, determine the action. 
Objective rational action is the realm of institutions. Diesing (1962, p.235) refers to this as the 
rationality of organisations, whereas Weber refers to the formal and substantive rationalities 
of economic action (1968, p.85-86). Formal rationality "will be used to designate the extent of 
quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually 
applied" (Weber, 1968, p.85). Weber emphasises that the character of formal rationality is 
calculability of means. On the other hand, substantive rationality concerns the degree to which 
action is orientated towards some ultimate value, for example, ethical, political, utilitarian or 
egalitarian (ibid). 
Following Weber, Mannheim distinguished between 'functional' and 'substantive' rationality 
(Bartlett, 1986), the former concerning organisations or systems and the latter, individual 
decisions (Diesing, 1962, p.3; Ricci, 1984, p.l3). These parallel the 'formal' and 'substantive' 
versions of Weber. "Organisations that achieve their ends efficiently are functionally rational; 
decisions leading to efficient goal achievement are substantially rational" (Diesing, 1962, 
p.ll). Espeland (1998, p.35) makes these differences quite transparent. Formal (or functional) 
rationality focuses on the calculation of means or procedures, that is, on a matter of' fact' . 
Substantive rationality focuses on some criteria of ends or purposes, that is, on values. Thus: 
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"economic action isformally rational for Weber when it is based on quantitative calculation, 
accounting, and deliberate planning; it is substantively rational to the extent that some 
ultimate value, whether it be hedonistic, utilitarian, egalitarian, or anyone of the infinite 
variety of possible values, provides the criterion for evaluating the results of economic action" 
(Espeland, 1998, p.35, emphasis added). 
On this view, institutions would be functionally rational to the extent that their structure 
allows or produces a clear capacity to calculate actions, plan activities and account for the 
results. They can produce substantively rational action when there exists clear goals, specific 
values or calculable ends by which the action may be assessed. 
The relationship between these two forms of rationality is complex. Weber saw a historic 
tension between the demands of formal/functional rationality, which demanded a 
rationalisation of ever increasing spheres of life, and the more concrete and varied value-
based demands of substantive rationality. These two rational forms did not sit easily with each 
other. Weber's emphasis of a methodology that separated facts from values reflects this 
contlict (Espeland, 1998, p.36). 
However, these do not exhaust the forms that rationality can take. Herbert Simon has 
discussed the idea of procedural rationality as "the outcome of appropriate deliberation" 
(1976, p.131). He distinguished between the classical economic notion of substantive 
rationality and the approach of psychology that concerns the rationality of procedures in 
decision making. Procedural rationality emphasises the processes of a decision, and not 
simply the substance or 'material' (Murphy, 1994, p.29) of a decision. Procedural rationality, 
therefore, is "the effectiveness, in light of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the 
procedures used to choose actions" (Bartlett, 1986, p.226). There are parallels.between 
functional and procedural rationality. 
In recent years, Habermas (1972, 1976) has added communicative reason to the growing 
lexicon of rationalities. Habermas works in the Critical Theory tradition and has sought to 
counter the rationalisation of the 'life-world' by developing a rational means to resolve 
normative differences. His argument is that instrumental reason is insufficient to act as a 
guide as to the values desired by the community. It can only determine the most efficient or 
effective means to already selected ends. This does not resolve the problem of establishing 
social goals. For this, he introduces communicative rationality, with its aim the establishment 
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of mutually agreed social goals through the function of the ideal speech situation (for 
elaboration, see Kerr, 1995, pp.73-82) 
All these various forms of rationality can be viewed as relevant to their fields of action. 
Between them they account for social action that is goal directed or value driven, but not 
social action that occurs from ingrained habituation or emotions8. These are the general forms 
that rationality can take, but they can also be expressed in terms of particular systems. Diesing 
(1962) illustrates this in his discussion of five types of reason in society (instrumental, 
economic, social, political and legal). He is careful to point out that while economic 
rationality is almost universally recognised, it must not be construed as the only form possible 
(p.14). That is, not all dimensions of human life can be "treated as utilities "without losing 
their essential characteristics as values" (p.64). He then argues that each of the remaining 
areas, social, legal, and political, have characteristic goals that set them apart from economic 
reason. Social systems are fundamental, their rationality largely unconscious (p.65) and "their 
basic trend ... when isolated, is towards greater integration" (p. 76). So, socially rational 
decisions enhance social integration. Likewise, legal rationality seeks to clarify and secure 
social norms. It is characterised by dependability, providing an assurance that others can be 
depended upon to perform their social duties (p.167). Finally, decisions can also be politically 
rational. The goal of this rationality is linked to the 'decision making structures' (p.l71); "A 
functionally rational structure is one which yields adequate decisions for complex situations 
with some regularity" (p.178). A politically rational system can actually produce decisions; 
political systems that get bogged down in dispute are not rational systems. They cannot 
achieve the goal of the system. 
While it can be argued that Diesing is arguing in a functionalist framework, reflecting a 
Parsonian approach, my point in relating this is to draw a parallel between these forms of 
rationality and ecology. If society, economy, law and politics can produce social decisions 
that can be evaluated for their rationality, it is legitimate to ask the same question about 
ecological systems. Bartlett in fact links Diesing's social rationality most closely with his own 
8 Iris Young (1995) has criticised the devaluation of emotion as irrational. She argues that emotion in discourse, 
"the entrance of the body into speech" (1995, p.139), has been viewed as weakness, a sure sign that irrationality 
is lurking nearby. It is helpful, I think, to separate this argument (that feelings are often disallowed in public 
discourse) from the requirements of rational action. As Weber noted, social action is not rational ifit is derived 
from affectivities. However, this argument does not require the elimination of emotions for rational action to 
take place. Emotion may be legitimately present in rational social action, so long as affectivities are not the only, 
or primary, motive for action. 
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concept of ecological rationality, suggesting that: "Diesing anticipates ecological rationality 
as a requisite of functional social rationality" (1986, p.235). A rational social system needs to 
be compatible with its environment, which includes the biophysical. Given that environmental 
concerns have only recently been give priority by researchers and policy makers, it is not 
surprising that Diesing was not thinking ecologically in 1961. It is also not so surprising that 
attention has more recently turned to the specific form of ecological reason. 
Ecological Rationality 
This form of rationality is a relatively recent addition to the lexicon of public policy, although 
by no means entrenched. According to Bartlett (1986), Lynton K. Caldwell touched on the 
idea a number of years ago, but did not use the term 'ecological rationality'. Bartlett published 
an article in 1986 titled 'Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy' and 
Dryzek producing a book length discussion (1987a). There has been little development or 
direct application of the concept since this original work (John S. Dryzek, 1999, personal 
communication; Robert V. Bartlett, 1999, personal communication). The only direct 
applications I have found are Conner's (1990) study of rational ecology in Samoa, and 
Siebert's (1993) case study of the ecological rationality of high-speed ground transportation in 
the United States. Both are explicit in their direct, though uncritical, use of Dryzek's (1987a) 
criteria, and both, incidentally, are Masters-level theses. Bartlett has also advised me that the 
United States Council on Environmental Quality is using the concept of ecological rationality 
in training its personnel in Environmental Impact Assessment (Bartlett, 1999, personal 
communication). Other writers have employed Dryzek's ideas in a very broad way (e.g., Low 
& Gleeson, 1998, pp.34-36), and others use the term 'environmental rationality' in their own 
way unrelated to Dryzek or Bartlett. Leff (1995) discusses ecological rationality, but does not 
specifically define it. Rather, he contrasts it with the economic rationality of capitalist 
development, arguing instead for eco-development that will internalise the social and 
ecological costs. Leffs focus of ecological rationality is very close to Dryzek's: "[IJn the last 
analysis satisfying human needs depends on conserving the complex biophysical structure 
that support life systems and global ecological balances and whose progressive 
disorganisation erodes nature's supply of productive resources" (Leff, 1995, p.84). Buttimer 
(1998) also discusses this clash of rationalities, but treats ecological rationality as part of the 
sustainability discourse. She makes no reference to Dryzek's work, unlike Thomas Princen 
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(1996) in his discussion of the political ecology ofthe zero option9. He argues that Dryzek's 
notion of ecological rationality allows us to focus on critical environmental issues 
characterised by irreversibility and non-substitutability. Such issues are "addressed virtually 
exclusively by ecological rationality" (Princen, 1996, p.160). Adrian Little (2000) also 
discusses Dryzek's work on ecological rationality. He argues that Dryzek provides a clear 
understanding on the limits of traditional institutional structures in providing for ecological 
rationality. However, he argues that Ulrich Beck provides a more thorough practical answer 
to institutional design than does Dryzek. He goes on to present an eco-social theory of 
economic rationality, arguing that the notion of rationality, in its ecological and eco-social 
forms, is increasingly vital in the political challenge to restrain the harmful effects of 
economic rationality. Val Plumwood (1998, 2002) has also engaged the idea of ecological 
rationality in a critical manner and I summarise her views later in this chapter. 
There have been a number of mostly positive reviews of Dryzek's principal text Rational 
Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. Sagoff, for example, says it "presents the most 
subtle, informed, and philosophically convincing study I know concerning the principle of 
prudence in environmental decision making" (1989, p.193), while Kraft says it is full of 
"penetrating insights" and could be taken "as an ... extended research agenda" (1992, p.716). 
While the particular versions of Dryzek and Bartlett have not led to detailed empirical 
research, the overall concept of 'ecological rationality' is not entirely unfamiliar to 
environmental thought in recent years. But what is it, exactly? 
Bartlett observes that "ecological rationality is not yet a precise and exact way of thinking" 
(p.231), and may in fact never resolve all its internal tensions. He argues that while science is 
essential to ecological rationality, it also draws as much from ethics, philosophy, religion and 
experience. Some of its elements are as old as the civilisations of India, Greece and China 
(ibid), and the idea of living in harmony with one's environment is not a recent invention. 
According to Bartlett, "Ecological rationality may be thought of as a rationality of living 
systems, an order of relationships among living systems and their environments" (1986, 
p.229). Although it draws on ecology, it is not tied to any single discipline, but is rather a way 
of thinking about principles of ecological organisation. It is a form of functional rationality 
9 The zero option refers to that class of environmental effects that are inappropriate at any leveL Many 
environmental actors "are deciding that, for ecological, political, and economic reasons, there is only one 
allowable level for many processes and substances-zero" (Princen, 1996, p.147). Bans on mining and military 
uses of Antarctica, trading in endangered species and the ban on driftnet fishing are examples. 
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(Dryzek, 1987b) that has as its organisational goal the requirements of ecological systems. 
Considering Diesing's (1962) analysis of varieties of social decisions, he argued that each 
form of social decision is rational insofar as it achieves or maintains the goals of the system. 
While he did not address ecological systems, it is perfectly reasonable to treat them in a 
similar manner. Ecosystems have certain functions in the same way social, legal, economic 
and political systems have their functional ends. Social decisions are therefore rational to the 
extent they are consistent with these ends. 
While it may not seem appropriate to call ecosystems 'rational', which implies (conscious) 
purposiveness, they are nevertheless defined by certain characteristics. It is these 
characteristics which determine whether human actions are 'rational' vis-ii-vis the goals of 
ecosystems. Given our very limited capacity to bend the rules of 'nature', our survival as a 
species may be dependent on our capacity to act consistently with the requirements of 
ecosystems. Therefore we must act ecologically rationally, recognising the requirements of 
natural systems. However, just what this means in practice is the critical issue. The extent to 
which there is objective reason attached to ecosystems will become more problematic as this 
discussion evolves 
Before turning directly to Dryzek's version of ecological reason, an important contextual note 
is required. Dryzek, and to a much greater extent Val Plumwood, are highly critical of 
'Western science', which is viewed by Plumwood (2002) as rationalistic, seeking to subject 
all things to the rigid rule of logic (see Diesing, 1991, chapter one). Although briefly touched 
on earlier, it is a mistake to consider this version of science as being the only child of the 
Western philosophical tradition. It may well be dominant, subjecting large domains of human 
life to 'scientific rule', but it is not the sum of Western thinking. For example, Western 
environmental thinking has drawn strongly from the romantic traditions of Europe, and later, 
American thought (see Hay, 2002, pp. 4-15). This was a reaction not against science itself, but 
a particular form of rationalistic science. As will be seen, both Dryzek and Plumwood share, 
to differing degrees, this alternative tradition. Therefore I provide a caveat with regards to 
what follows. The critique of science provided, most notably by Plumwood, relies on a 
particular construction of Western science. While providing a powerful critique, it needs to be 
noted that this is not a critique of the entire Western scientific tradition, but only a part, albeit 
a dominant part, of that tradition. With this caveat, I now turn to Dryzek's version of 
ecological reason. 
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Dryzek's Approach to Ecological Rationality: Discursive Ecology 
The clearest and most detailed articulation of ecological rationality to date comes from 
Dryzek (1987). While Rational Ecology deals with ecology and rationality, it is really an 
examination of social choice mechanisms 10, that is, "a means through which a society-
whether local, national, supra-national, or global--determines collective outcomes" (1987a, 
p.7). Dryzek's view is that it is the "nature of the collective choice mechanisms ... [that] 
largely determine the kind of world that ensues" (ibid: 9). This view contests a commonly 
held notion that social choice arrangements are "largely derivative" from other social 
conditions, such as Marxist's superstructure or some cultural or technological determinism 
(p.8). 
Perhaps the most persuasive example supporting his argument is the contention that economic 
systems increasingly hold governments to ransom. The argument is familiar in political 
science. Governments must balance two primary aims, provide the conditions for capital 
accumulation and ensure they maintain political legitimacy . In the context of a market 
economy, that particular form of social choice has a profound influence on social outcomes. 
In relation to political systems of decision making, Dryzek argues that the fragmented 
American polity responses to the oil crisis of the 1970s were quite different from the more 
centralised British system. In the former, action was directed more to the end sufferers, whilst 
the latter exerted centralised control through such mechanisms as increased taxation on oil 
products (ibid, p.9). Dryzek is not fundamentalist about the role of social choice mechanisms 
in shaping the type of societies we live in, acknowledging that societies are not "fully 
determined" by decision making structures. Nevertheless, the place he accords social choice 
mechanisms is a reflection of his view of their importance in producing environmental 
outcomes (his primary concern here). This fundamental assumption provides the logic for the 
rest of the text. In short, the types of decision making mechanisms we choose will have a 
significant influence upon the type of world we realise. 
But why bother with ecological rationality? The answer to this question depends largely on 
the type of world one believes we inhabit. Ecological rationality is only meaningful in a world 
in which (a) there are significant environmental problems and (b) something can be done 
10 To be differentiated from the much narrower field in political science and economics also referred to as 'social 
choice' (See Dryzek, 1987a, p.ix) 
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about such problems. Dryzek's perspective runs as follows. The world we currently inhabit is 
characterised by significant (though not necessarily irreversible) environmental problems. The 
usual contestation between Comucopians and Malthusians is briefly reviewed by Dryzek 
before he concludes that "the empirical evidence cannot conceivably be decisive. Mere 
examination of data does not allow one to judge the current severity of ecological problems, 
or the direction (let alone the slope) of trends in their severity" (ibid, p.16, emphasis in 
original). Even better data will not ameliorate this problem because of the complexity of 
ecological systems. Reduction of a pollutant in one medium or locality, a seemingly positive 
indicator taken in isolation, may be the result of problem displacement. This can occur across 
the three dimensions of displacement: across space, across media and across time to the 
future. 
Dryzek is again setting up his argument by moving from the concrete specificity of 
environmental problems to a more conceptual level. If we cannot draw a clear (empirically 
unambiguous) conclusion about whether we have a genuine environmental crisis, then 
perhaps we are better served by closer attention to the principles of ecology. Thus, Dryzek 
asks, "Are there ecological limits?" (ibid, p.20). While there are various forms of scarcity, the 
only absolute scarcity in the universe is low entropy (order). Even with the principle of 
substitutability, where one scarce resource is replaced by another, once energy is used up, it is 
not destroyed but changed into a less accessible form. It becomes, for all human purposes, 
unavailable. So, "the severity of ecological problems can, then, be captured in terms of the 
extent to which low entropy is being depleted" (ibid, p.22). The extent to which this is a real 
problem on earth is unclear. While there is no shortage of concerns (global warming, 
deforestation, and the currents rates of energy use), there are some ecosystems that are in very 
good order; others, though, are not. Dryzek therefore relies for his analysis not on the 
uncertain outcomes of detailed empirical accounts of the state of the world (a techno centric 
measurement), but on a much broader principle: 
"It is not easy to gauge how close we are to the edge. But ultimately, only populations and 
species that have a net positive effect on their own environment and the ecological communities 
of which they are a part can be expected to survive and flourish ... ; nature is unlikely to grant an 
exception to man" (ibid, p.23). 
By appealing to the level of high principle, Dryzek is able to sidestep the debate about the 
current environmental state of the planet and the likely future. There is no doubt that there are 
severe ecological problems in certain parts of the world, but the future prospects for the 
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amelioration of such problems are contestable. Dryzek is careful not to place himself "in the 
camp of those who see only doom in the human future" (ibid) and suggests the use of 
Lasswell's (1965) concept ofa 'developmental construct', a "projected and unwanted state of 
affairs which can be prevented through collective action based on its anticipation" (ibid). 
These can serve as 'self-denying prophecies'. Whether or not we are currently on the road to 
assured environmental destruction becomes less of an issue. What is critical are the types of 
social decision mechanisms that are used to resolve collective human problems, for these have 
a profound effect on ecological outcomes. Thus the question for Dryzek moves to the 
ecological impacts of social choice mechanisms. 
Ecological impacts of collective human behaviour could be assessed in a number of ways. At 
the micro-level, detailed empirical data gathering, monitoring and analysis could be used in 
site-specific ways to determine changes to ecological systems that are anthropocentric in 
origin. Detailed reports could be added to similar reports from other sites to build up a picture 
of ecological impacts and causation. In this highly inductive approach, a great deal may be 
discovered about a small number of sites. However, any generalisation from such findings is 
highly problematic. The applicability of site-specific research to other sites characterised by 
different sets of variables makes it very difficult to draw valid conclusions about the role of 
social choice mechanisms. In any case, most science is necessarily theory driven (see Kuhn, 
1996; Diesing, 1991, p.43-44) and therefore relies on a pre-existing construct about the nature 
of the world being investigated. Dryzek essentially develops a top-down theoretical approach 
to the issue of ecological impacts of social choice mechanisms. It is this interplay between 
problems and mechanisms that interests him, and having argued the very limited utility of 
treating these issues on a case by case empirical basis, he asks how one may best perform 
such an analysis. His answer is to develop the notion of ecological rationality. 
Drawing on the early work of Paul Diesing (1962), who himself drew from Karl Mannheim 
(1940), Dryzek describes ecological rationality as a form of functional rationality (Dryzek, 
1987a, p.25). Functional rationality is related to organisation (Diesing, 1962, p.3), and 
therefore an organisation or social structure is rational to the extent that it "consistently and 
effectively promote[s] or produce[s] some value" (Dryzek, 1987a, p.25). Applying this to 
ecology means that a functionally rational decision system will have the capacity to promote 
both values and means in relation to ecological systems. This leads Dryzek to next explore 
just what values and means are inherent in ecological systems. In other words, is there 
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anything special about ecological systems that demand particular forms of social decision 
making? 
Ecological systems are characterised by interpenetration, emergent properties and self-
regulation. Such systems do not exist in isolation from each other and can even be seen, on a 
grand scale, as a single system (e.g., the Gaia Hypothesis). Changes to one part of the system 
can impact on other parts of that system, or other systems. Ecological systems also exhibit 
emergent properties where some characteristic of a system is not predictable from knowledge 
of the elements of that system. Finally, ecological systems are self-regulating or cybernetic, 
and are capable of homeostasis, adaptation and succession. Dryzek sums up his brief (two 
page) discussion of ecosystems: "Human activity in the ecological realm proceeds, then, in 
the context of interpenetrated, dynamic systems which demonstrate emergent properties. 
Dynamism is manifested in homeostasis, adaptiveness, and succession" (p.28). Given these 
features, what implications do they have for ecological problems and, therefore, for social 
decision making? This brings us to the theoretical heart of Dryzek's thesis, for the particular 
nature of ecological problems will have a direct bearing on the capacity of social choice 
mechanisms to deal adequately with these problems. The goals (values) and means of 
ecological systems are derived from this analysis, after which the nature of ecological rational 
social choice can be determined. 
Dryzek suggests that there are six ecological circumstances in which ecologically rational 
social choice (decision making) takes place. The first is complexity. Ecosystems are simply 
too complex for humans to gain comprehensive predictive knowledge. While explanatory 
knowledge is possible at some levels, and usually after the fact, accurate predictive 
knowledge is not possible above all but the most elementary systems. Second, ecological 
systems are non-reducible. The predictive power of science lies in its ability to reduce systems 
to their component parts, and thereby forming an understanding of the relationship between 
the parts. While this works in many systems, such as mechanical engineering, this is not 
possible for ecological systems due to their capacity to produce emergent properties. Third, 
ecological systems exhibit significant variability over time and space. They are always 
·changing, and never reach homeostasis. This links with thefourth characteristic, uncertainty, 
resulting in difficulties with probability assessment in ecological systems. Fifth, they produce 
collective problems, in that large numbers of actors have stakes in the issues. Greenhouse 
gases, for example, affect a wide range of communities with a potentially wide range of 
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outcomes. This example is one of many sites for collective action. The problem for human 
communities, however, is the problem of rational choice, typified (theoretically at least ll) by 
Hardin's (1968) Tragedy of the Commons, and the dilemma's posed by the supply of public 
goods (Dryzek, 1987a, p.32). But despite some pessimism engendered by rational self-
interested social action in the environment, ecological systems have another dimension, 
spontaneity. This sixth circumstance of ecological choice is a direct consequence of 
homeostasis and adaptiveness. Spontaneity means that ecosystems can adapt to human 
intervention. Dryzek notes that some ecologists construe this as a policy of "nature knows 
best" (p.33). In other words, ecosystems will adapt to changing circumstances, regardless 
(more or less) of what humans do. In the absent of human interference in ecosystems, nature 
will tend towards the production of climax ecological systems: "Succession generally yields 
increasing homeostasis, and hence increasing ecological rationality" (PA4)12. Of course, 
spontaneous rationality has its flaws and Dryzek suggests doubters consult any dinosaur! 
While nature-knows-best works well for the protective and waste assimilative ecosystem 
functions, it is problematic for the productive capacity of ecosystems. Humans need to 
suppress the natural succession of ecosystems and therefore require an anthropogenic 
sub climax (PA5). 
These six features may describe the circumstances in which ecological choice takes place, but 
they do not prescribe a normative position about how we ought act in relation to the 
environment. As Dryzek puts it, "why should we care about ecology?" (p.33, emphasis in 
original). The argument Dryzek presents is purposely anthropocentric, and focused on human 
life-support capacity. Ecology is important because it provides the productive, protective and 
waste-assimilative functions required for human life-support. These become the values that 
his explication of ecological rationality is designed to secure. Dryzek offers two reasons for 
taking an anthropocentric life-support approach. First, it is a 'minimal' approach, and he 
wishes to avoid introducing other values for protection of natural systems because they would 
only make his arguments apply afortiori (p.35). He does not deny that there other powerful 
arguments for ecological rationality, but thinks that by making a minimal approach dealing 
11 It has been noted by some commentators that Hardin's example of medieval commons was unfortunate, 
because historically, they were not open 'free-for-alls' but were carefully regulated by communal norms. See 
Ridley, (1997, p.232). 
12 The idea that ecosystems move towards climax systems, and thus implied stability, is not one widely held in 
contemporary ecology (Barbour, 1995, p.233). While there is movement towards increases in biomass, the forms 
this can take do change over time, Thus, the idea that the inherent rationality of ecosystem production is to move 
towards a particular type of climax is no longer viewed as an accurate guide as to the necessary behaviour of 
ecosystems. 
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with some basic human needs, it is possible to meet other forms of functional rationality 
(economic, social, legal and political) 'on their own ground'. This is his second reason for 
taking an anthropocentric life-support approach. 
Given normative justification, what does ecological rationality look like? Dryzek builds 
(briefly) on the 'objective function' (p.35) ofan ecosystem to provide for the wellbeing of the 
whole system, rather than its individual parts. Ecological rationality for ecosystems means the 
"ability to cope with stress or perturbation, so that ... [it] can consistently and effectively 
provide itself with the good of life support" (ibid). Dryzek's focus is on what ecosystems can 
do for humans, and so he argues that ecological rationality is "the capability of ecosystems to 
consistently and effectively provide the good of human life support" (p.36). 'Consistently' 
refers to long-term sustainability, the wellbeing of future generations. The fact that we cannot 
predict future conditions is irrelevant; "all we need to do is conserve low entropy in human 
and ecological systems, so that we may pass on to our successors as much "order" as we 
ourselves started with" (ibid). 
Can one generalise in this across varying ecological contexts? Dryzek notes that some people 
prefer a case study approach to ecological and social interaction, believing that all cases are 
fundamentally different (pp.36-38). While not contesting the value of disaggregation, Dryzek 
takes an analytic approach, and looks at social choice mechanisms as analytic types. 
What does all this mean in practice? Ecological rationality engages both natural and social 
systems and is worked out within the circumstances of ecological choice, discussed above. 
Therefore Dryzek offers five criteria that, he claims, can test the ecological rationality of 
social choice mechanisms (see Figure 2.1). These consist of negative feedback, coordination, 
robustness, flexibility and resilience. 
The first requirement for a decision-system is negative feedback. A decision system needs to 
effectively feed back warnings into the system when human action threatens the life-support 
capacity of the ecosystem. Such feedback signals are inadequate unless they are co-ordinated 
both among actors within particular collective actions and across different collective actions. 
This is Dryzek's second criterion. He then argues that these two criteria are sufficient to cope 
with ecological conditions of uncertainty, complexity and non-reducibility, and possibly 
spontaneity. However, they are not able to guarantee ecologically rational social decisions 
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when confronted with temporal and spatial variability. Exogenous shocks may result from 
events in one part orthe ecosphere, generating either temporary or permanent alteration of 
environmental conditions. To cope with such problems, social decision systems need to be 
either robust enough to perform well over a variety of conditions, or fl ex ible enough to adjust 
their own structural parameters to changed or novel conditions. Dryzek suggests these criteria, 
his third and fourth respecti vely, are interchangeable. These four criteria are "sufficient to 
guarantee the maintenance of the ecological rationality of social choice" (p.52). However, 
severe ecological problems disrupt the equilibrium between ecological and social systems to 
such an ex tent that mail1lenance is no longer sufficient. Instead, social choice systems need 
the capacity to "steer human and ecological systems back to normal operating range" (p. 54). 
In other words, social decision systems require the quality of resilience, Dryzek's fifth 
criterion. He does note, however, that resilience is only needed in "conditions of severe 
disequilibrium". 
Figure 2. 1: Summmy o/Iillks be/weell ecosystems alld decision making-Adapted/rom Dryzek (19870) 
Dryzek goes on to argue that ecological rationality has, in principle, lexical priority over other 
forms of rationality (economic, social, political , and legal. See Diesing, 1962; Bartlett, 1986; 
Plumwood, 2002, p.69). Briefly, there is a case to be made, in principle, for the priority of 
ecological systems over the requirements of other systems (Bartlett, 1986, p.235; Dryzek, 
1987a, pp.58-60), at least where ' bottom line' ecological values are threatened. However, 
determining such bottom lines is highly problematic (see Pardy, 1996; Buhrs, 1991). There is 
a significant 'social value' component to such bottom lines. Values are implicit in defining 
what is detrimental to 'the life-supporting capacity of air, soil, and ccosystems' (RMA, 1991). 
But there are other issues as well. Social rationality, for example, seeks interdependence 
within the system, or in a more functionalist vein, system stability. Simplistic prioritisation of 
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environmental rationality could produce severe social instability; resource wars are not 
unknown and could produce far worse ecological outcomes than an environmental 
management regime that seeks to balance competing outcomes. While science is fundamental 
for continued understanding of environmental interdependencies and the effects of human 
actions, ecological problems will remain primarily political (Beck, 1995). However, there is 
nothing to suggest Dryzek does not accept this argument. All he is doing is pointing out that, 
at the level of principle, ecological rationality has lexical priority, meaning "that lower values 
come into play only when designs in pursuit of a higher value are totally complete" (p.59). 
Without the productive, protective and waste-assimilative functions of ecosystems, other 
forms of rationality will be incapable of expressing their values. Of course, as he notes, 
uncertainty as to the exact contribution of ecological rationality to institutional design reduces 
the practical value of the principle of lexical priority 13 • 
Having laid out in some detail the foundations of ecological rationality, Dryzek turns his 
attention to an evaluation of some of the more prominent forms of social choice. His 
particular taxonomy of social choice mechanisms is based on the characteristic of 
coordination, that is, what makes a social choice mechanism 'social' (p.65). He offers 
evaluations of markets, administered systems, polyarchy, law, moral persuasion, and anarchy, 
and then turns his attention to what he calls 'innovations'. I briefly review this section 
because it will help to further contextualise and illuminate Dryzek's approach. 
How do markets perform? The major feedback mechanisms of markets (price signals) are a 
form of positive feedback, the opposite of what ecological rationality demands. While 
markets can produce negative feedback, they require full allocation of property rights, as 
Coase argues (Dryzek, 1987a, p.7l), something difficult to achieve with many natural 
resources. Markets function by the logic of economic growth and suffer from myopia, an 
inability to respond to longer-term signals that ecological systems produce (p.74). Markets 
embody a great capacity to coordinate the actions of disparate actors. However, they do not 
easily produce collectively rational outcomes, as Hardin (1968) has pointed out. Individually 
rational decisions can result in collectively irrational outcomes. Markets also fall somewhat 
short on flexibility, even though they appear to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. 
13 Donald Beggs (1997) argues that lexical priority of ecological reason over other fonns of reason cannot be 
shown, prudential reasons aside. He makes his argument from a philosophical perspective, although he 
specifically addresses Bartlett's 1986 article. 
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However, the structural conditions of markets (nature of exchange relationships, private 
property and so on) are actually quite resistant to change (p.78). Dryzek concludes: 
"While private enterprise and consumer sovereignty markets may have their good points ... 
ecological rationality is not one of them ... [and] merit unequivocable [sic] condemnation for 
their failure to achieve negative feedback and coordination in their interactions with 
ecosystems" (p.86) 
Can administered systems do any better? Here, Dryzek is mostly referring to centrally 
administered systems that have to a large extent fallen out of favour since the demise of large-
scale socialist planning and its replacement by decentralised and market orientated 
approaches. He was writing prior to the collapse of the Iron Curtain, but his analysis is still 
instructive. While centrally planned systems are not without their strengths, they exhibit a 
number of weaknesses in relation to ecological rationality. Centrally controlled coordination 
often lacks effective control, particularly as the distance from the command centre increases. 
Developing a clear set of rules governing behaviour still runs the risk of local interpretation 
that may be at odds with central authority. As the complexity of problems increases, so does 
the difficulty in exercising adequate centralised control. Feedback also runs into problems. 
Effective feedback requires the ability to act reflexively, that is, evaluate the success of 
previous decisions. In a hierarchical system, admission of error, from which learning can 
occur, is difficult to institutionalise. Actors lower in the system are generally reluctant to 
admit error to their superiors, and thus negative feedback is effectively concealed (pp.l 00-
101). 
There are many other weaknesses in traditional bureaucracies that undermine effective 
negative feedback. Centrally administered systems claim to be the supreme form of rational 
organisation. Dryzek draws on Popper to question the rationality of such claims. For Popper, 
scientific problem solving was characterised by the open society (Popper, 1945) where open 
criticism is the norm. Dryzek summarises: "There is, then, no scientific justification for 
authoritarian central planning" (p.l 04). Knowledge relevant to ecosystems is not the sole 
possession of scientists or elite planners, but is scattered widely throughout the community. 
Where the assumption of superior knowledge of the technocracy (Fischer, 1990) exists, 
debate tends to be stifled (Dryzek, 1987a, p.104) and the information deficit grows. Finally, 
Dryzek argues that centrally administered systems lack robustness, in that any commitment to 
ecological rationality requires the controlling elite to be committed to ecological goals. 
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Should the elite change, the goals may well change. Administered systems are not well 
equipped to deal with the types of problems ecosystems present. When the problems are 
routine and static, and have clear and unambiguous goals attached, they perform well. But in 
the presence of dispersed and complex problems characterised by uncertainty, they perform 
poorly. 
Dryzek next turns to polyarchy, by which he means systems that are characterised by the 
qualities generally found in open, democratic, liberal and pluralist states. Collective outcomes 
are not the product of any single group or elite, but rather the product of 'mutual adjustment' 
between different interests (p.lll). Polyarchy has a number of strengths, but I recount here 
some of the limitations in relation to ecological rationality. In theory, polyarchy should 
enhance negative feedback because it allows free and equal opportunity for different interests, 
including environmental interests, to make their case. In practice, not all players are equal, or 
have equal access to resources needed to influence decision-makers. Interest groups will 
campaign for their interests, to the detriment of the general interests, such as environmental 
protection (p.122). Tradeoffs are an integral part of bargaining involved in a polyarchy, and 
this can further blight the information from negative feedback. Coordination can also be 
problematic. Special interests get special attention in polyarchies and as a result the 
coordination of actors for the collective good can be undermined. "Indeed, the closer one gets 
to free and open interplay of interests, the harder it becomes to secure the supply of public 
goods. Every group want benefits of collective political choices, but nobody wishes to pay for 
them" (p.128). However, Dryzek is not completely pessimistic about polyarchy. They do 
perform better than markets and administered systems with common property and public 
goods, and they do possess feedback mechanisms. However, "they are better at responding to 
signals from General Motors or the Daily Mirror than to messages from ecosystems" (p.131, 
italics in original). 
Maybe law provides an answer? Law has a number of virtues in relation to ecological 
rationality. For example, it can coordinate actors by creating a clear set of expectations and 
norms, backed by force if need be. It also exhibits resilience in the face of changing demands. 
If ecological principles are well entrenched in law, its resilience will act as protection14• 
14 Espeland (1998) describes the case of the United States National Environmental Protection Act 1969 and the 
way it altered institutional behaviour towards the environment. She says: "These new decision procedures took 
time to become institutionalised but, once they did, disrupted routines and redirected employers' attention. In 
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Conversely, if they are not, other interests will tend to take precedence and law's resilience 
becomes a hindrance to ecological rationality. Dryzek notes: "law is often a reinforcement of 
other forms of social choice rather than an alternative to them" (p.143). There is also the 
problem of legalism, whereby cases are decided by precedence, often on very narrow 
grounds. Given the complexity and contextuality of ecological issues, comparing a new case 
to a similar past case can easily overlook contingent features of significance to the new case. 
As for feedback, the language of law only allows certain types of evidence to be admissible, 
thus narrowing the types of feedback possible under law. Fundamentally, courts are restricted 
to the quality of the legislation; they do not make the law, only interpret it. Dryzek concludes 
by judging law as too rigid to meet the criteria of negative feedback and resilience (p.148). 
Dryzek next turns to moral persuasion, expressed, he argues, most succinctly by the 
communist period in China during the Mao era. If citizens internalise the correct way of 
living, then society would function in harmony, it was argued. Dryzek does not view this as a 
viable option, in part because of the repressive social mechanism required to produce an 
acquiescent society and its incompatibility with a liberal policy. He then turns to Anarchy as a 
final case study of a social choice mechanism. I shall not comment on this as I have covered 
the ones most relevant to New Zealand (the context of this thesis), and by now it will clear 
how Dryzek is employing ecological rationality. 
Two further points are useful. The first is the way Dryzek uses the criteria he has developed to 
systematically test the ecological rationality of each social choice mechanism. The analysis is 
broad and he does not break down the criteria into more operational forms. In other words, 
there is little more detail about the criteria that can be gleaned from the discussion that could 
be applied at a less general level. This observation formed part of my initial interest in 
ecological rationality; what would ecological rationality look like at the level of 
environmental decision making such as the resource consent processes under the Resource 
Management Act? It is apparent that this level of analysis was not Dryzek's interest. 
Second, all the social choice mechanisms Dryzek analyses fail the test of ecological 
rationality one way or another. While not surprising, the study does provide an excellent 
overview of the ecological performance of markets, bureaucracy, legal systems and so on. 
ways that neither legislators nor judges nor bureaucrats had expected, these consequences of the NEP A shaped 
both the political and the organizational context of environmental decision making" (p.90). 
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Dryzek concludes by arguing that various innovations are required in order to lift the 
performance of these social choice mechanisms. He turns to Popper' s concept of the Open 
Society where people can freely criticise each other's ideas and through adjustment develop 
better ideas. It is worth noting that Popper's text was published in 1945 at the end of the 
Second World War, and after some years of fascism. The Open Society was an antidote to 
dogmatism and blind obedience. Yet Popper's ideas have been criticised as being positivistic 
and committed to a form of instrumental rationality. Dryzek views this as problematic and so 
he searches beyond the Open Society for a form of reason that would be more consistent with 
ecological rationality. He finds this in Practical Reason (Chapter Fifteen). 
Of practical reason, Dryzek has this to say: 
"My intent is to demonstrate that there is more to practical reason than seemingly abstruse 
philosophy, and to work towards some concrete proposals for social choice. The resulting 
model departs considerable from the Open Society (and still further from the dominant kinds 
of social choice in today's world). I claim that this model promises enhanced ecological 
rationality in collective choice" (p.200) 
A central characteristic of practical reason, a term strongly associated with Aristotle, is the 
development of virtuous behaviour, as opposed to the instrumental reason of the Open Society 
which is concerned with 'means' rather than 'ends'. The question of 'how shall we live' taps 
into the underlying values and fundamental purposes of a community. Instrumental reason 
cannot address these issues, so Dryzek, in the spirit of critical theory, turns to Habermas and 
his theory of communicative rationality. The critical advantage which this expression of 
practical reason has over the instrumental rationality of the Open Society is that it allows for a 
'rational' resolution of normative and value-laden problems and disputes. Instrumental, or 
technical reason (Diesing, 1962, Chapter One), cannot address the question of the 
appropriateness of ends or values. As Diesing puts it, "ultimate ends, the basic aims of life, 
cannot be selected or evaluated by rational procedures; they must be dealt with by arbitrary 
preference, or intuition, or by cultural and biological determinism" (p.1). Diesing is thinking 
here of technical reason, and therefore Dryzek (and Habermas) would agree. But they would 
go further and hold to the idea that ultimate ends were amenable to the appropriate form of 
reason, that is, practical reason, or its modem descendant, communicative rationality. Dryzek 
then tentatively applies practical reason to ecology, suggesting that while there are few 
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concrete examples of ecological planning built around practical reason 15, the idea of a 
participatory, holistic approach, holds promise. He looks at the Green Revolution16 (with its 
technical instrumental rationality) and then paints an alternative approach that begins from an 
inclusive philosophy where all humans and other species are considered in the experiment. 
For example, in the alternative approach problems are not defined by external experts, but by 
all affected communities. Practical reason embodies the capacity to be sensitive to local 
conditions, cultural norms and traditional agriculture practices (Dryzek, 1987a, p.2lO). Much 
of this, he suggests, would only work on a relatively small scale, demonstrating the 
importance of decentralisation in ecologically rational social choice. 
Decentralisation is valuable over a range of conditions and issues. However, many 
environmental issues are regional or global in reach and impact. If coordination of actors at 
the local level is difficult, how much more intractable it is at the broader level. Dryzek accepts 
these difficulties and, in the spirit of practical reason (read 'being reflexive'), tentatively 
suggests two 'tactics' that may provide a way forward. The first is limited bargaining (pp.232-
233). While bargaining manifestly fails when attached to polyarchy, its coordinating device, 
formal negotiation, can be 'attached' to a range of social choice mechanisms, enabling the 
exercise of practical reason. Dryzek is cautious about making too many claims here, but 
thinks there exist some opportunities for a more ecologically rational social choice. His 
second 'tactic' is 'practical reason by functional area' (pp.233-237). Practical reason is 
generally expressed though direct or deliberative democratic mechanism, but this is generally 
considered to be limited to local or small-scale levels. Extending it to national or 
supranational levels is highly problematic. Nevertheless, Dryzek considers that there some 
possibilities lie in using practical reason in "specific functional areas (such as acid rain, 
fisheries management, nuclear wastes, and so forth)" (p.233). He provides two examples of 
the use of communicative rationality, American coal policy and the Canadian Pipelines 
Inquiry (Berger Inquiry). While the former was less successful than the latter, Dryzek argues, 
there is good reason to have some hope for the future of practical reason in such areas. 
IS It is worth noting that over the one and a half decades since Dryzek published Rational Ecology there has been 
significant attention given to exploring this issue, including an increasing number of case studies. 
16 The 'Green Revolution' refers to the revolution in agricultural production that began in 1945 in Mexico and 
went on to transfonn grain production in particular in many developing nations. It was technologically focused 
on the development of new strains of plants, and the use of chemical fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilGreenRevolutionforabriefsynopsis.Whileheavilycriticisedinrecentyears,it 
has been credited with saving over one billion people from starvation in India and Pakistan. 
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A few case studies of successful communicative rationality do not prove the point, however. 
Dryzek recognises this and concludes Rational Ecology with a discussion of the prospects for 
designing innovative, communicatively rational, social choice mechanisms. But to what 
extent can practical reason be seriously integrated into future social choice mechanisms? 
There is a long way to go, to be sure, but Dryzek is cautiously optimistic. In his final words: 
"Pending ecological crisis that might spur more decisive movement, the best one can hope for 
may be the piecemeal introduction of decentralised and discursive social choice structures. 
Innovations of this sort can make some immediate contributions to ecologically rationality in 
social choice; but their real contribution may be in terms of their promotion of the 
preconditions for more substantial institutional innovation directed towards enhanced 
ecological rationality. For in remaking our institutions we remake ourselves: who we are, what 
we value, how we interact, and what we can accomplish. And it is for this reason above all 
that such experiments merit an endorsement" (pp.246-247). 
This is Dryzek's vision and hope for an ecologically rational social choice. What are we to 
make of all this? My interest in this chapter lies in examining the ways ecological reason is 
conceptualised in the literature. What contributions have been made to the idea of ecological 
rationality by other thinkers? There has been only one significant attempt beyond the works 
cited above. It is to this I now turn. 
Val Plumwood and Ecological Rationality: Eco-social Ecology 
Eco-feminist philosophy is a flourishing literature, with numerous texts expanding on 
human/non-human relations. Among the contributors to this literature is Val Plumwood, 
whose perspective I refer to as 'eco-social ecology'. While not alone in analysing 
environmental themes, she has made specific contributions to the concept of ecological 
rationality. Plumwood's text Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (2002) 
addresses the role of Western reason in the world's ecological problems. Harking back to 
Descartes, Plumwood argues that Western reason became attached to the thinking mind, not 
the body. This dichotomous approach to reason/emotion, mind/body, and spirit/materiality 
has persisted to become the central obstacle to environmental and social justice in our times. 
Her text is a challenge to the core issues of contemporary Western culture. She seeks to 
expose the conceptual assumptions and foundations of the environmental issues facing the 
world. At the centre of her concern lies the dominance of rationalism. The problems of 
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environmental degradation and the social injustices that arise from this stem not from reason 
per se, but insufficiently theorised forms of reason. Contemporary forms of economic, 
political, scientific and prudential reason are human-centric (or andocentric if you prefer), and 
therefore come to dominate and oppress the 'Other' (in all their forms) (Kerr, 2002). 
Plumwood argues that the assumptions of rationalism are irrational, both ecologically and 
epistemologically. They are irrational ecologically because they presume a disembodied 
relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world. This results in a misperception 
of humans as radically separated from natural processes, able to rise above nature through the 
use of reason. It denies the embeddedness of human beings in the physical world, as members 
of the community of life. The problem with this, Plumwood argues, is that it produces 
ecologically irrational economics, science and political decisions, serious 'blind spots' in 
decision making and reasoning processes (epistemological irrationality). Only human interests 
are taken into account in decision making (and then only some human interests), thus 
minimising or totally ignoring the interests of other species. The irrationality of this 'culture' 
stems from what is left out of the decision equation and calculation; the feedback from 
ecological systems is blocked or seriously distorted since the human-centric rationalism 
measures human (and most often only economic) interests (Kerr, 2002). 
This is where Plumwood turns to ecological rationality (Plumwood, 2002, Chapter Three l7) 
and acknowledges Dryzek's contribution (pp, 67, 72). She accepts Dryzek's criteria but also 
offers: 
"another important axis with major implications for democratic and ecological politics-
remoteness ... A remoteness principle of ecological rationality is that, other things being 
equal, an ecologically rational form of agency would minimise the remoteness of agents from 
the ecological consequences of their decisions" (p.72). 
This idea ties into the democratic principle whereby those most affected by decisions ought to 
have a greater say in them (p.73). Remoteness is problematic because it distances us from the 
effects of our decisions and thereby undermines feedback and coordination mechanisms. 
Plumwood specifies some different forms of remoteness or distancing (p.72). Spatial 
remoteness is perhaps the most obvious. Consequential remoteness, where impacts of 
decisions fall systematically on some group other than the decision-maker, is also significant. 
Communicative and epistemic remoteness exist where communication between those most 
17 An earlier draft of these ideas is found in Plumwood, 1998. 
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affected and decision-makers is weak or blocked. This undermines relevant knowledge about 
ecological issues. Temporal remoteness concerns the effects that will manifest in the future 
and not affect the decision-maker. Finally, technological remoteness reflects a major theme in 
Plumwood's writing, that is, eco-socialjustice (see her Chapter Four). This is remoteness 
from ecological consequences produced by a technical capacity. She suggests the air 
conditioner is an example where people gain personal comfort without regard for the 
ecological consequences (p.72). 
Where Plumwood differs from Dryzek is not in the basic ideas of ecologically rational social 
choice, but rather an extension of these into eco-social justice as a precondition for an 
ecologically rational world. This explicit theoretical linking of ecological and social justice is 
the reason I refer to this view as eco-social ecology. Plumwood highlights the problematic 
role of instrumental reason and warns: 
"We better not try to understand ecological rationality or, as I shall show, any of its main 
~upporting concepts, in a rationalistic way that links it to the doctrine of the separateness and 
supremacy in human life ... Ecological rationality critiques those rationalist and dualistic 
forms of reason that deny the social and ecological grounds that support our lives, and are 
unable to acknowledge their own insufficiency or the material and ecological conditions of 
their own production or continuation ... Ecological rationality brings into question ordinary 
forms of rationality" (p.69). 
This is clearly a more radical conception than presented by Dryzek. Indeed, Plumwood argues 
that ecological rationality includes "the higher-order form of critical, prudential, self-critical 
reason which scrutinises the match of fit between an agent's choices, actions and effects and 
that agent's overall desires, interests and objectives as they require certain ecological 
conditions for their fulfilment" (p.68). Plumwood's text goes much further than Dryzek in the 
area of ethics. In Chapter Six she addresses the ethics debate over prudence and 
anthropocentrism and, in the book's conclusion, argues that we should care for the planet and 
other species because it is the right thing to do and in our own interests (p.238). This again 
stands in contrast to Dryzek's approach, who stays with an anthropocentric approach (Dryzek, 
1987a, p.35). However, he does this for pragmatic reasons, not because he is committed to an 
anthropocentric approach. 
Do these differences matter? They do to Plumwood, but given the purpose of her text, that is 
not surprising. One answer to this question is that the authors are addressing different things, 
41 
Chapter Two: Ecological Reason 
with quite different agendas, and therefore these differences are not particularly important. 
Dryzek wishes to test social choice mechanisms forecological rationality, whereas Plumwood 
critiques the ecological rationality of West em reason in toto. But there is another, more 
significant, issue that cannot be so easily dismissed. The heart of Plum wood's critique is that 
ecological rationality can only be rational when it takes an eco-centric position and links 
social and ecological justice. Dryzek's formulation does not require this. Plumwood's critique 
is therefore more radical than Dryzek's, as is her solution. I return to this theme later in this 
chapter, but note that these differences between Dryzek and Plumwood are best viewed as 
part of a spectrum of ideas about ecological reason. 
The only answer to the domination of ecologically insensitive reason is the development of a 
new way of thinking about and relating to the world. Plumwood's antidote therefore is not to 
reject reason and opt for mysticism or some form of irrationalism. Rather, her world-view is 
strongly grounded in material interests, that is, a spirituality that emerges from being 
embedded in this material world of rainforests, snakes, frogs and owls (she talks of these in 
her book). The 'spirituality of place' needs to replace the non-placed or dis-placed persons of 
economic theory where labour follows the market. This modem 'remoteness' from the 
physical world and the 'Other' disables the lines of communication and feedback inherent in 
ecological systems (and individual creatures and plants) and reinforces the epistemic distance 
between humans and others who live on the planet, and also between different human 
communities. New forms of reason need to be developed that are not embedded in an 
oppressive human-centrism, but rather open up new forms of communication. Dialogic 
interspecies communication (p.189) will act as a counter to narrow anthropocentric reason and 
enable a more ecologically rational approach to human action. This orientation, according to 
Plumwood, is not less scientific, nor less rational. Rather: 
"A world perceived in communicative and narrative terms is certainly far richer and more 
exciting than the self-enclosed world of meaningless and silent objects exclusionary, 
monological and commodity thinking creates, reflecting back to us only our own desires" 
(p.230). 
Plumwood's analysis is both radical (going to the core) and visionary. It points out a direction 
where we could (should?) head. Yet, this is no detailed programme of action. It addresses eco-
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social issues after the fashion of many critics of capitalism 18. The call for a 'new way' is 
important, for without such conceptual and principled challenges to the status quo, 
alternatives would remain hidden and their potential to shift human thinking and action 
unrealised. But the very nature of such visions, where the focus is on specific categories of 
error in thinking and practice, means that the sheer systemic complexities of moving an entire 
system are downplayed or ignored. Plumwood's vision has institutional implications, but they 
are not spelt out. Therefore, the remaining question is simply: what impact does Plumwood's 
critique have on Dryzek's approach? 
Both Dryzek and Plumwood conclude by advocating for a discursive or dialogic approach to 
communication in planning and problem solving. Yet, their conceptualisation of ecological 
rationality differs. Plumwood's argument has important implications for Dryzek's criteria for 
ecological rationality, in that they are insufficiently protected from the instrumental reason 
and exclusionary reason that Plumwood critiques. This makes them theoretically vulnerable to 
capture by forms of reason that undermine their capacity to be ecologically rational (at least 
in Plumwood's elaboration of this). The critical difference lies in the 
anthropocentric/ecocentric division between the two works. Dryzek casts his views in a (self-
consciously) human-centric approach. Ecological rationality emerges from social choices that 
meet his criteria and are derived via practical reason and, more generally, a decentralised 
decision system. For Plumwood, this is not sufficient in itself, because there is no certainty 
that practical reason will not be captured by an anthropocentric agenda. Rather, ecological 
reason emerges out of a decidedly ethical approach that begins with a philosophical critique 
of the limitations of Western reason and from there crafts an inclusive ethic built around 
limiting the ecological damage caused by remoteness of decision makers from the impacts of 
their decisions. 
Here, then, are two different visions of ecological rationality. They express different, and at 
times competing, assumptions as to what ecological reason means. It needs to be noted that 
such visions are not simply the products of these thinkers. They both draw on significant 
traditions which provide the basis for their views. For Dryzek, it is in part the tradition of 
practical reason, invoking thinkers from Aristotle to Habermas. For Plumwood, feminist 
18 The withering of capitalism is, in the medium tenn at least, highly unlikely, in my view. Much of the critique 
of capitalism, while insightful and valid, fails to engage in the practical problems of 'what realistic alternative?' 
Townshend (2000), for example, argues that: "virtually all contemporary political philosophers [that Townshend 
examines] ... ignore the real world of capitalism" (p.180). 
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theorists in particular have provided the tradition on which she draws. The more important 
result of this, beyond the actual writers, is that these ideas have not arisen in isolation; they 
reflect the development of ecological reason. What is also becoming clearer, though, is that 
there are alternative approaches to ecological reason. This is even more manifest as we tum to 
a third discernable approach to ecological rationality, which I call Technocentric Ecology. 
A Technocentric Approach to Ecological Rationality: Technocentric Ecology 
Both Dryzek's and Plumwood's versions of ecological reason accept a role for science in 
determining when a decision is ecologically rational, although they differ in their 
characterisation of that role. Both rely on practical or dialogic reason, the former to settle 
fundamental value differences within communities and the latter to incorporate values and 
interests of disenfranchised humans as well as other species. However, in reality, most 
environmental policy and practice is anthropocentric and only sporadically engaging of 
practical reason, let alone giving much time to eco-social reason. A techno centric approach, 
deeply embedded in Western scientific practices and paradigms, does not easily engage with 
the forms of ecological reason discussed above. While I characterise this as a techno centric 
approach to ecological reason, I emphasise that I am crafting a theoretical or ideal type, not 
providing an empirical account of this form of ecological reason. While most environmental 
policy is anthropocentric (see the discussion of sustainable development below), there is 
increasing emphasis on public participation in policy making, with significant developments 
over the last decade or two with various forms of practical reason (Eckersley, 2004; Dryzek, 
1990). In practice, as we will see in the case studies later, the boundaries between these 
approaches are permeable. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful analytic framework for 
thinking about how ecological reason expresses itself in practice. 
The concept of technocracy embodies a particular characterisation of science. Habermas 
(1972) has explored this theme extensively: 
''''Scientism'' means science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer 
understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identifY knowledge with 
science .... Thus positivism could forget that the methodology of the sciences was intertwined 
with the objective self-formative process (Bildungsprozess) of the human species and erect the 
absolutism of pure methodology on the basis of the forgotten and repressed" (ppA-5). 
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Those things which were 'forgotten and repressed' were the human interests that constituted 
knowledge; the technical interest (work), the practical interest (language or understanding), 
and an emancipatory interest (power) (pp.308, 313). Habermas's project seeks to uncover an 
error embedded in positivist science, and more generally in the ideal of scientific objectivism, 
which creates the illusion that the subjectivity of human interests can, in principle, be 
separated from the production of scientific knowledge. It is this "objectivist self-
understanding of science" (p.306) that Habermas critiques. This critique captures the essence 
of a debate that has very specific implications for the practice of science and the deployment 
of scientific knowledge through political institutions. The institutional expressions of the 
'objectivist self-understanding of science' are what can be referred to as scientific and 
technical rationalities. The extent to which these are expressed through institutional and 
hierarchical means is the extent to which technocracy functions. 
There is an important relationship between technocracy and ecological modernisation. 
Maarten Hajer (1996) offers a technocratic interpretation of ecological modernisation as 
representing the instrumental control of the sciences over nature: 
"The technocracy critique argues that the sciences have in fact to a large degree been 
incorporated into this technocratic project. [For example, systems ecology], a paradigm on its 
way out that during the 1960s suddenly got new institutional momentum as NASA engineers 
and politicians showed an interest in the science that could be integrated in the context of a 
wider cybernetic perspective. [The] consequence of the prevailing institutional framework is 
that engineers develop only those technologies that enhance control over nature and society 
rather than achieve ecological effects while making society more humane" (p.255). 
Institutionally, this control is exercised through hierarchy and centralisation (pp.255-256) and 
can be expressed in what Hajer refers to as the technicisation of ecology (p.262). Institutional 
arrangements produce new responses to the 'ecological crisis' such as the promise of 'smart 
highways', 'intelligent transport systems', renewable energies and socially engineered 
behavioural change (ibid). Ecological problems are defined as technical problems that can be 
dealt with by increased technological commitment (O'Riordan, 1976, p.12). Furthermore, 
ecological issues are not seen as social or moral issues (as the critics maintain) but as market 
issues. Ecological modernization, with its explicit commitment to technological advancement, 
opens up huge new market opportunities. The characterisation of markets, of course, is that 
they are less amenable to democratic, that is social, control (Dryzek, 1996). 
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Technocracy is the product of political and research institutions committed to a comprehensive 
and almost exclusive reliance on technique. For Ellul, (1964) technique is not synonymous with 
machines, technology, or various ways of achieving an end. Rather, "technique is the totality 
of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of 
development) in every field of human activity" (p.xxvi). This involves a number of 
characteristics, including rationality. In Ellul's words: 
"[T]his rationality, best exemplified in systematization, division of labor, creation of standards, 
production of norms, and the like, involves two distinct phases: first, the use of "discourse" in 
every operation; this excludes spontaneity and personal creativity. Second, there is the reduction 
of method to its logical dimension alone. Every intervention of technique is, in effect, a 
reduction of facts, forces, phenomena, means, and instruments to the schema of logic" (ibid, 
p.79). 
In Ellul's analysis, modem culture is fundamentally technologically based. Technique 
governs every aspect of human behaviour and therefore has come to underpin the norms and 
values of society. While this analysis may be too sweeping and does not account for the 
growing resistance to technocracy by social movements, such as environmentalism (e.g., 
Roger, 1985, p.213), it does indicate the instrumental orientation of much of modem culture. 
With reference to the administrative state, it reinforces the view that its epistemological 
orientation is instrumental and analytic (Dryzek, 1990, p.99) and governed by impersonal 
technique. Efficiency becomes the ultimate criterion in evaluation. The outcome of this is a 
methodological 'capture' of public policy by technique and the elimination of other forms of 
knowledge gathering and analysis, forms that do not fit with the assumptions of technocracy. 
Strictly speaking, technocracy is the governing of society by technical experts. However, this 
does not accurately describe Western liberal democracies, because the authority to govern is 
legally concentrated in the hands of elected representatives. More accurately, technocracy is the 
product of political and research institutions committed to a comprehensive and almost exclusive 
reliance on technique to produce public policy. This highly specialised professional class of 
expertise exerts a significant influence over policy research and advice. Fischer (1990, p.14) 
argues that technocracy sustains "increasingly undemocratic forms of decision making". 
Decision making power may largely lie in the hands of politicians, but technocrats can facilitate 
or limit the 'competence' of policies (Giddens, 1980, p.26). 
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Technocracy developed as the sheer volume of knowledge increased, particularly in the 
Twentieth Century. A corresponding intellectual division oflabour also occurred, leading to the 
creation of 'expert cultures', groups of people who share a common expertise that sets them apart 
from the 'lay person'. These are knowledge based cultures, a fact that permeates the "very form 
and content of advanced industrial society itself' (Fischer, 1990, p.13). This permeation affects 
public policy which is itself "becoming increasingly subject to expert cultures" (Dryzek, 1990, 
p.112). Specialization is a key attribute of these expert cultures, and this tends to produce an 
epistemological authority that is not easily challenged. In highly specialized and technical areas, 
the relevant knowledge may be held by only a small group of people. This can have the effect of 
the public, the non-expert community, deferring to the (perceived) greater knowledge of the 
experts. It can also result in an expectation on the part of experts that the public ought to defer to 
their greater knowledge (McMillin & Nielsen, 1991, p.553). However, the nature of specialized 
expert knowledge comes at the cost of integrated, comprehensive knowledge, for the nature of 
specialist knowledge leads to a focus on manageable data, comprehensible systems, but is not 
able to cope with the oftentimes profoundly complex systems that make up ecological and social 
life (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, pp.146-147; Bartlett 1990; Biihrs & Bartlett, 1993, p.lO). 
The professionalisation of expertise adds another dimension to technocracy. It can be argued that 
as policy experts carved out a niche for themselves in the intellectual labour market, they 
developed something in need of protection, namely their status and livelihoods. Typical of 
professional groups in general, this led to the protection or enhancement of their share of the 
intellectual market through "the systemic enforcement of controlled 'closure' of occupational 
entry" (Giddens, 1980, p.186; see also Diesing, 1991, p.193). Professionalisation has been 
charged with serving its own interests (Fischer, 1990, p.357). This introduces incentives to 
protect one's 'market share' of intellectual property and to resist challenges to its devaluation. 
These motives fimction regardless of the empirical 'facts of the matter at hand' and show how 
the culture of expertise adds a sociological dimension to the production of knowledge. The 
intellectual reliance upon technical approaches to problem solving and the sociological defence 
of those approaches (and their output) create technocracy. 
The relationship between technocracy and environment is highly contested. Concern over how 
best to protect environmental values is an ongoing debate within political ecology literature. On 
the one hand, some argue that an uninformed public cannot adequately deal with the 
complexities and serious implications of environmental problems, and that public concern is too 
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often short-term and linked too closely to political electoral cycles (Ophuls, 1992; see Gould, 
2002; Eckersley, 2004). On the other hand, others see environmental protection as being 
significantly enhanced through increased democracy. Capitalism, unrestrained by an active and 
effective democratic participation, will subvert environmental protection efforts due to the 
incentive for private economic gain at the expense of public goods (Dryzek, 1996). This 
polarisation is more ideological than empirical, for increasingly, decision makers must grapple 
with the technical complexity of many environmental decisions as well as the inevitability of 
increasing public involvement (Fischer, 2000). Yet this polarity expresses a very real tension in 
relation to the role of technocracy in environmental issues. The expert based systems of 
contemporary science and technology create what Fisher calls the technocratic ideology (p.12). 
The information society best expresses this ideology as increasing amounts of data are generated 
and the roles of expertise increase. 
A techno centric approach can be summarised therefore by a focus on scientific technique, an 
instrumentally rational approach to problem solving, a network of influential experts who have 
legitimacy and authority, institutional arrangements that are hierarchical and centralising, and a 
positivist orientation to knowledge production. Negatively, a techno centric approach minimises 
the role of the non-expert public in decision making and has little room for practical or dialogic 
communication. 
How does this translate into a form of ecological rationality? In theoretical terms, a techno centric 
form of ecological reason conceptualises environmental problems positivistically and 
instrumentally. Environmental problems are best understood through the application of scientific 
research techniques and are best resolved through the application of technology and the 
development of policy that is informed by scientific research. Much of this has been discussed in 
the section above on Plumwood's critique of scientific rationality. A technocentric form of 
ecological rationality is therefore hardly rational, according to her analysis. Yet this 
techno centric approach is rational by its own standards, and is deeply embedded in scientific 
practice. In an important sense, Plumwood's critique presupposes the functioning, if not the 
domination of, a techno centric approach to ecological reasoning. My purpose here, however, is 
not to empirically demonstrate technocracy but to characterise its critical dimensions and 
theorise its approach to ecological problems. 
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Nevertheless, an 'empirical' clue for developing a techno centric approach to ecological 
rationality came initially from a comment by Bartlett (personal communication, 1999), 
advising me that the United States Council on Environmental Quality was using the concept 
of ecological rationality in training their personnel in Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). While this is a growing field, it does to significant extent express a technocratic form 
of ecological reason. For example, Gilpin (1995) provides an extensive overview ofthe state 
of the art ofEIA throughout the world. Chapter Three of Gilpin's text discusses EIA 
methodologies, almost all of which are highly technical approaches such as cost-benefit 
analysis, opportunity cost, hedonic price technique, ecological evaluation and best 
professional judgement. EIA relies upon scientifically supported methodologies, albeit 
oftentimes based on economic theory. These are anthropocentric in the sense that they focus 
on impacts on humans, and on other species where these also impact on human communities. 
The Environmental Protection Act passed in the United States in 1969, the pre-eminent 
legislation that institutionalised EIA (see Espeland, 1998) and which influenced EIA 
initiatives around the world, also directed federal agencies to make 'diligent' efforts to 
involve the public in the assessment (Gilpin, 1995, p.63). The effectiveness of these 
procedures varies, as Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation suggests. To the extent that 
EIA involves the public in an open dialogue over the data, values, aims and methods of the 
investigation, EIA will increasingly move beyond the narrow confines of technocentric 
ecology. But its roots are in a technocentric assessment process that tends to be imposed 
hierarchically (e.g., via statute), relies primarily on highly trained specialists and attempts to 
quantify the results. In practice, a fair amount of professional judgement is required, 
judgement that is difficult to objectively assess (Gilpin, 1995, p.62). 
One final comment on techno centric ecology is required. Characterising ecology in this way 
is not to create an unbridgeable gap between the use of technique and environmental ethics. 
An environmental action rooted in eco-social ecology will still require the application of 
technique. Habitat for other species still has to be assessed, human waste dealt with, food 
production must continue and so on. Technique is therefore not dispensable. So in one sense, 
all three versions of ecological reason developed here require technique of some sort to ensure 
that practical action takes place. The primary difference between them is the place technique 
holds. In both discursive and eco-social versions, technique is subject to the normative and 
value constraints of the participants, that is, those beyond the direct application of technique. 
Determining what ought to take place and what are acceptable means for accomplishing this 
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are set prior to the application of technique, whereas, at least in its ideal form, techno centric 
ecology is itself the primary motivation. While techno centric ecology functions within a 
normative framework, these norms are not the product of wide community discourse but the 
product of its own internal rationality. 
Sustainability and Ecological Rationality 
Most discussions of environmental problems, especially in the popular media, employ the 
language of sustainability. What is the relationship between sustainability and ecological 
reason? I begin with a brief discussion on the meaning(s) of sustainable development as the 
most important expression of sustainability, identifying its key characteristics and then 
examine to what extent these match or express ecological reason. 
The contemporary emphasis on the sustainable use of resources only goes back to the 1960s, 
with a significant boost given at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the world environment 
(Brookfield, 1991, pA3). Until the late sixties, there was little serious attention given to 
environmental concerns. Then, in 1973, the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens, 1973), which, although methodologically flawed, 
dramatically drew attention to imminent environmental, economic and social collapse within 
one hundred years. This attention took a number of forms, but most significantly concluded 
that current industrial and social practices were unsustainable. The idea of sustainability 
entered public discourse and was institutionalised through the Brundtland Commission 
(1987). However, a key link had been made between the need for sustainability and the need 
for development. The original notion of sustaining the natural environment has been 
subsumed into the wider discourse of industrial development. Thus, the original critique that 
modem industrial society was the source of the problem has been inverted to implicitly 
suggest that industrial society is actually the solution. Torgerson concludes: 
"Despite continuing attempts to reduce the notion of sustainable development to technical 
terms, the discourse of sustainability thus contains ambiguities and uncertainties which, in a 
public context of differing interests and perspectives, renders the discourse inescapably 
political" (1995, p.l2). 
The discourse of sustainability is now so widespread that virtually no political, business or 
academic leader could oppose it (at least publicly) (Neumayer, 1999, p.l). Sustainable 
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development is commonly defined as that which "meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland 
Commission, 1987, p. 43)19. However, Stokke (1991, pp.8-9) suggests this only provides the 
general direction and requires greater elaboration. There is yet no consensus as to its meaning 
(Pearce, Barbier & Markandya, 1990, p.2), besides the broad support for the general aim. 
What does the idea of sustainable development actually mean? For one thing, it depends upon 
what one wishes to sustain2o• Some interpret it to mean ecological sustainability, while others 
view it more in terms of sustainable growth, economic sustainability or political 
sustainability. Again, others see it in terms oftechnical or administrative sustainability (Luke, 
1995, p.21). In New Zealand there is still considerable debate about Section Five (purpose) of 
the Resource Management Ace1 over whether it implies a balance between ecology and 
economic development, or grants priority to ecological processes (Dormer, 1994; Memon, 
1993; also, see Chapter Three of this thesis). As we get further into the debate, the inherent 
vagueness of the term emerges, where it means 'many things' and 'different things' 
(Torgerson, 1995, p.3). 
Sustainable development will always be inherently political, but lack of a universally accepted 
definition ought not to imply the idea has no value. Most academic disciplines contest the 
definitions and boundaries that constitute them, but this does not mean there can be no 
intellectual developments. In fact, such debate can act as a stimulus for new thinking. There 
is, then, a large and useful literature exploring the application of sustainable development, 
much of which is technicae2• 
With the risk of overly limiting the idea of sustainable development, I suggest that it exhibits 
at least the following characteristics. First, it embodies the idea that something (what is 
19 The New Zealand Government uses this definition (Statistics, New Zealand, 2002, p.3) . 
20 Timothy Luke (1995) raises a number of unresolved questions pertaining to sustainability: Sustainable for how 
long? A generation, one hundred years, one thousand years?; Sustainable for whom? Present generations, all 
future generations, all species ofthis generation, all species for all future generations?; Sustainable at what level? 
Families, cities, nations, globally, economies?; Sustainable under what conditions? Present western standards of 
living, small subsistence communities, some future 'Star Trek' culture?; What ought be sustained? Personal 
income, social and cultural diversity, GNP, bio-diversity, individual consumption, personal freedom and choice, 
material frugality? (Luke, 1995, pp.21-22). 
21 The New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991 uses the term 'sustainable management'. It is viewed as a 
means to, and not a replacement for, sustainable development (Johnson, 1995, p.78). 
22 Some examples are: Statistics New Zealand (2002), which seeks to develop a broad based monitoring 
programme to measure the degree of sustainability across a range of environmental, economic and social 
indicators; Johnson (1995), who analyses the use of Green Plans; and Pearce, Barbier & Markandya (1990), who 
take an economic/technical approach to maintaining a set of desired attributes a society may wish to achieve. 
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valued) needs to be sustained for future generations. Leaving aside the problematic questions, 
(Such as how long? At what level or quality?) the fundamental capacity to be sustained is the 
ability for humans to meet their needs over the long term. This goal is intimately connected 
with the resources supplied by nature, although it is not limited to that. (One of the critical 
debates in resource economics is the extent to which human-made capital can act as 
substitutes for natural capital (Neumayer, 1999)). Second, sustainable development is 
development orientated; its focus is on development that provides for human economic, social 
and cultural advancement. The interactions between various forms of capital (human and 
social, economic and environmental) collectively produce the sustainable development 
framework (Statistics New Zealand, 2002, p.13). Third, sustainable development is 
anthropocentric (Neumayer, 1999, p.206). Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration states that 
"Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to 
a productive and healthy life in harmony with nature" (cited in Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment, 2002, p.133). While care for other species and ecosystems in general is 
not precluded by sustainable development, the environment takes an instrumental role in 
meeting human needs. Finally, sustainable development provides a general orientation for 
human decision making. It does not provide an exact practice or unambiguous blueprint for 
action. 
How do these characteristics match with ecological reason? In a broad sense, sustainable 
development is a form of ecological reasoning. Ecological reasoning takes ecosystems 
seriously and environmental issues as critical. But, from this point, the perspectives diverge. 
Sustainable development, as discussed above, seeks to embody such reasoning, but which 
form? 
The focus of ecological rationality is on ecosystems, or more accurately, .on the quality of 
human action in terms a/its effects on the life-support capacities of the natural environment. 
These may appear same in effect. Sustainable development begins from human requirements 
in the long term (future generations) and works backwards to find ways of securing these 
goals, encountering the limitations of the natural environment to provide these indefinitely. 
On the other hand, some depictions of ecological rationality (particularly Dryzek) begin with 
the organising principles of ecosystems (rationality), this providing a means of assessing 
human action. Both end up addressing the limits of ecosystems to provide for human desires 
and needs. Yet this shared effect masks a more radical difference. Sustainable development is 
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really an attempt tornake development sustainable (Brookfield, 1991, p.55). It is therefore a 
broad idea that encompasses and seeks to harmonise all other forms of rationality. Societies 
whose goal is development (I assume this goal for all current nation states) need to focus on 
the complex interconnections between different aspects of social and economic life. To ensure 
the development objectives are met, sufficient environmental capital must be maintained (or 
substituted by human-made capital). An important focus of sustainable development is in 
measuring levels of sustainability (see Statistics New Zealand, 2002, pp.89-94). It appears, 
then, that sustainable development has quite a different focus or rationale than Eco-social and 
Discursive Ecologies, but would meet the requirements of Technocentric Ecology. 
Sustainable development is anthropocentric. So is technocentric ecology, as well as Dryzek's 
version of ecological rationality, what I call Discursive Ecology (although it need not be as 
the discussion to follow shall demonstrate). Yet, Plumwood argues that ecological rationality 
must go beyond just human interests in order to more fully rational. Eco-social ecology is not 
anthropocentric, and provides a radical alternative to the traditional notions of sustainable 
development. It also indicates that ecological reason lies, perhaps, in the eye of the beholder. 
It is determined by the particular framework in which it is cast. This theme is the emergent 
finding of this chapter and is examined more thoroughly in the final chapter. 
Finally, sustainable development works on a number of levels. At the most general level it 
provides an orientation or broad level aim for development (in all its forms). At operational 
levels, sustainable development takes on specific forms, often economic in nature, whereby 
specific measurements or indicators are developed to assess where we are at and progress 
being made (e.g., Statistics New Zealand, 2002; Pearce, et aI., 1990). Ecological rationality is 
the rationality of living systems (Bartlett, 1986). Both Technocentric and Discursive 
Ecologies are firmly focused on ecological processes and the life support capacity of the 
planet. In this, they have a narrower focus than sustainable development. Eco-social Ecology, 
on the other hand, broadens the scope of ecological reason to be inclusive of all living things, 
including humans. Thus, in this view, eco-social justice is a precondition for ecological 
reason. However, it is clear this vision, while not precluding development, subordinates 
development to the principles of eco-justice. Therefore, sustainable development is an 
expression of the emergence of ecological reason over the last thirty years. Its trajectory 
shadows the development of ecological reasoning, but only the more anthropocentric and 
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techno centric versions. In this sense, it reflects the dominant forms of ecological reason in 
contemporary society. 
Towards a Theoretical Framework 
This chapter introduced and elaborated the concept of ecological reason, ending up with three 
distinct forms: Discursive Ecology, Eco-social Ecology, and Technocentric Ecology. The 
outcome of this discussion is, however, a rather ambiguous picture of ecological reason. 
While there are certain themes, there appears no single perspective that can lay claim to being 
the rational approach. It is clear that there is no unified theory or theoretical construction of 
rational ecology. Having said this, some threads can be discerned that link the three 
perspectives. Environmental thinkers have often drawn upon two polarised perspectives in 
their analysis of environmental problems23 . O'Riordan (1976) provided one of the early 
statements in his discussion of the technocentric mode and the ecocentric mode, the former 
reflecting the role of technocracy, instrumentalism, objectivity and conservation and the latter 
reflecting bioethics and self reliant communities 24. One dimension of these perspectives 
concerns humans' relationships with the non-human world and consists of a spectrum 
between anthropocentricism and ecocentrism. I refer to this as a value dimension. Another 
dimension deals with the forms of social action that are engaged in ecological decisions, what 
I will call the action dimension. Drawing on Habermas, this social action can range from 
techno-instrumental to dialogical (I expand on this below). Taking these two broad 
dimensions, the level of anthropocentrism (value) and the forms of communication (action), 
we can develop a useful picture of contemporary forms of ecological rationality. 
Methodologically they are useful in the analysis of the case studies (see Chapters Four-Seven) 
because they not only help identify the value base of ecological decision making but enable 
this to be tested against how people act. In other words, what people say they value can be 
analysed against how they actually act. Thus values and action become useful poles around 
23 BUhrs (1991, p.21) notes that such boundaries "are very difficult to discern and draw" and therefore I use them 
didactically rather than as clear cut empirical phenomena. 
24 There are many statements in the literature seeking to understand the relationship of people with the 
environment (or the human to the non-human world). Fox (1988, pp.II-18) explores many of these in his PhD 
thesis on Deep Ecology. He discusses Leo Marx's position as conservationist versus ecological; Worster as 
imperial versus arcadian; Roszak as expedient versus sacramental; Rifkin as engineering/technological versus 
ecologicaVempathetic; Drengson as technocratic versus person-planetary; Meeker as homocentric versus 
holistic; Bookchin as environmentalism versus social ecology; Toulmin as anthropocentric versus cosmological; 
Grange as divided versus foundational; Rodman as resource conservation versus wilderness preservation versus 
moral extensionism versus ecological sensibility. (O'Riordan's typology I have just mentioned.) 
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which to investigate ecological reason. I will first discuss the value dimension in detail, before 
considering the action detail. 
The Value Dimension 
The value dimension expresses the degree of anthropocentrism, or rather the deviation from it, 
given its political and philosophical dominance in human (or more accurately, in Western) 
relationships to the environment. Thus, ecological rationalities can differ in their fundamental 
commitment to human-centred conceptions of nature. Anthropocentrism can be expressed in 
these terms: "What is valuable in the non-human world is what is valuable to humans" (Fox, 
1988, p.287). All species and ecosystems are valued instrumentally for their use to humans. In 
extreme form, this is simply an expression of economic utility; the environment is there for 
human need satisfaction. Moving along the spectrum away from this extreme position opens 
up space for other values, such as scientific or aesthetic appreciation of nature beyond its 
immediate economic utility. Landscape values, discussed in Chapter Six, are one expression 
of this. These are still primarily anthropocentric to the degree that the values attributed to 
other species or ecosystems are predicated on human interests only. For example, 
conservation, as O'Riordan (1976, p.12) points out, is historically rooted in a utilitarian ethic 
focused on the rational use of resources over the longest period of time. Similarly, arguments 
for the protection of biodiversity are often based on the potential utility for human wellbeing, 
such as drug development, that have yet to be discovered (the silo argument; See Fox, 1988, 
p.261). 
At the other end of the spectrum we have the position where the intrinsic values of all species 
are recognised and taken into account in human decision making. This other-centeredness, or 
ecocentric approach (see Eckersley, 1992), does not reject human needs,as do some strong 
versions of deep ecology, but is fundamentally inclusive of the interests of all species, 
including ecosystems25• A range of authors has investigated this position. For instance, 
Goodin (1996) explains that the green theory of value is premised on the idea that natural 
objects have value (p.836). To the extent such values are akin to interests, such interests 
require political representation, along with all other interests. There is a difference between 
25 I do not explore the anti-human perspective because this study looks at environmental decision making and is 
predicated on the assumption that such decision making is inescapable; the only question concerns the impacts of 
those decisions. Thus, the rejection of human rights and needs becomes uninteresting in this context. 
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taking an interest in something (a mentalist notion) and having an interest in something. New 
born babies have an interest in adequate food and protection, even though they can't yet take 
an interest in such provision. Likewise, whales have an interest in fulfilling their social life 
cycle, even though they may not take conscious account of it. The implication of this is to 
extend the political representation of interests beyond the human community. Eckersley 
(1992) has developed her ecocentric position by arguing that all organisms are constituted by 
their environmental interrelationships. This challenges the anthropocentric assumption of 
humans as separate from the natural order26• There exists a 'dynamic autonomy' (p.54) where 
neither relatedness nor delineation is prior. Dobson makes a similar argument from principle 
using Eckersley'S notion of autonomy. Eckersley argued that green interests can be secured 
by democracy, but only if the traditional notion ofliberal autonomy is extended to other 
species to allow "the freedom of human and non-human beings to unfold in their own ways 
and live according to their "species life"" (in Dobson, 1996, p.142). There is a wide literature 
on this but it extends too far outside my interests for me to provide any more than a brief 
insight into some of the key ideas. 
However, the value orientation is more complex than a simple anthropocentric/ecocentric 
dichotomy suggests, with a range of positions in between. Two versions of this have been 
developed by Eckersley (1992) and Fox (1988). Eckersley develops a richer differentiation 
along the anthropocentric/ecocentric spectrum by providing five subtypes: resource 
conservation, human welfare ecology, preservationism, animal liberation, and ecocentrism27. 
Resource conservation is, as Grendstad and Wollenbaek (1998) note, one step removed from 
the most blatant form of anthropocentrism, unrestrained resource exploitation. Each step 
progressively loosens the hold of this extreme anthropocentrism, opening up space for other 
considerations. 
26 Fox (1988) dispatches this notion early in his text. He argues that anthropocentrism fails for four reasons. 
First, it does not match reality as we currently understand it. We are not social, culturally or even 
psychologically different in kind from other animals, "we are not the end point of evolution" (p.ll) (See Gould 
1996 for a fascinating account ofthis argument). Second, anthropocentrism has been disastrous in practice (p.ll-
12), the work of Rachel Carson and others attesting to this fact. Third, it is not logically consistent because it is 
not possible to hold to a set of moral characteristics that can apply to all humans (including persons in a coma 
and the very young) that can simultaneously exclude all other species (p.12). Finally, any arguments that appeal 
to the special nature of humans (possessing souls and so on), can be just as easily claimed to represent "self-
serving anthropocentric projections upon the cosmos" (p.12, emphasis in original). 
27 In their analysis of Eckersley's spectrum, Grendstad and Wollenbaek (1998) replace ecocentrism with three 
varieties, transpersonal ecology, autopoietic intrinsic value and eco-feminism, ending up with seven rather than 
five subtypes. 
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Fox offers a similar typology in relation to the anthropocentric part of the spectrum in his 
discussion of instrumental value theory, of which he specifies three types. The first is 
unrestrained exploitation and expansionism (pp.257-258). The second, resource conservation 
and development, is again 'thoroughly anthropocentric' but recognises limits to growth and 
therefore builds in conservation practices. It takes in the interests of 'future generations', thus 
reflecting the dominant definitions of sustain ability (see Chapter Three). Both of these 
incorporate some of the notions I refer to when speaking of anthropocentrism, where human 
interests are the only focus of concern. The third position, resource preservation (pp.260-262) 
is also anthropocentric, and according to Fox, differs from resource conservation in emphasis. 
It seeks to protect particular species of value to humans against exploitation. It tends to stress 
non-material values and focuses on ensuring non-human species and ecosystems are enabled 
to "follow their own characteristic patterns of existence" (Fox, 1988, p.260). 
The reasons for this particular approach have been categorised by Godfrey-Smith (cited in 
Fox, p.261) in terms of four arguments: first, the silo argument as a stockpile for genetic 
diversity; second, for scientific study (science for its own sake); third, the gymnasium 
argument for recreation; and finally the cathedral argument for aesthetic pleasure or spiritual 
inspiration. It is clear that the motives for this level of preservation are still anthropocentric, 
but they reflect "progressively more sensitive approaches to environmental conservation and 
protection" (Fox, cited in Hay, 2002, p.33). Anthropocentrism therefore is not limited to one 
'type', but can move from strong to weak levels (Hay, 2002, pp.58-59), and thus reflect an 
important development in values. This approach has space for treating other species as a 
special type of utility where they can be conceptualised as needing to "follow their own 
characteristic patterns of existence" (Fox, 1988, p.261). More importantly, as Grendstad and 
Wollenbaek (1998, p.6) observe in their discussion of Eckersley's account, "Even though 
[Preservation] turns out to be clearly anthropocentric, a consequence ofthis soul-searching in 
sublime nature may be a reconsideration of the instrumental relationship between humans and 
nature, through which one may value it for its own sake". Therefore, the cusp of change from 
anthropocentric to ecocentric seems to me to take place between preservationism and animal 
liberation, between reflection on the sublime (and spiritual) qualities of non-human nature and 
the deliberate attribution to some non-human others of intrinsic value. 
These more nuanced approaches break away from what is more often described in terms of a 
simple dichotomy between technocentrism and ecocentrism, allowing greater sensitivity to the 
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gradients between these two positions. This is particularly useful here, because I wish to use 
this value spectrum to analyse forms of ecological reason. The simple dichotomy is too blunt 
and obscures value positions that are not easily categorized as simply anthropocentric or 
ecocentric. One alternative is to simply take up Eckersley's or Fox's position and use it in the 
analysis. However, this would add greatly to the complexity of the matrix (Figure 2.2 below), 
particularly when added to the three action positions (see discussion below). These three, 
coupled with the five of Eckersley, for example, result in a matrix with fifteen possible 
expressions of ecological reason. This makes the analysis unmanageable, adding too much 
complexity where it is not required. The alternative is to develop a middle position on the 
anthropocentric/ecocentric spectrum, thereby providing three analytic positions. This results 
in a matrix of nine potential forms of ecological reason, a more manageable number (as will 
be demonstrated below). 
Preservationism 
I have chosen to describe this middle position as 'preservationism' and prefer this term over 
the next most likely candidate in the spectrum, animal liberation, for the following reasons. 
The politicisation of the animal liberation movement means that it is likely to be construed in 
terms of a rather narrow and aggressive activism. Whether this is a fair reflection is not the 
point. The choice of terms is important not just for the semantic consequences but for its 
political or interpretive consequences28• The difficulty still remains that 'preservationism' 
may also be construed as anthropocentric. It is, but as I argued above, it occupies an important 
transitional space where the mode of reflection opens up the potential, more than any other 
anthropocentric position, to move towards a non-anthropocentric view (and of course, there 
are various degrees of this, as Eckersley points out). Thus the term 'preservationism' may 
infer an anthropocentric position and thereby alienate some readers fromthe 'other (eco) 
side' , but this is less of a problem in my view because the term is not nearly so politicised as 
animal liberation. Thus, it becomes the lesser of two evils. The term 'preservationism' is not 
altogether accurate in reflecting what I wish to describe, but in the absence of a better 
alternative I shall employ it, though granting it a particular meaning. It is anthropocentric only 
in the shallowest sense, that is, it does not reflect an aggressive utilitarianism present in most 
forms of anthropocentrism. It accepts non-material values as important and is very close (in 
28 See Fox's discussion of this in respect of the term 'deep' ecology (1988, pp.208-221). 
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my rendering of this) to accepting the intrinsic value of at least some species (whales, as an 
obvious example). While this is analytically vague, I argue that this position is being 
employed as a didactic device as much as an analytic device. It fulfils the function of creating 
a middle space between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, or at least the more radical of 
each of these views. It also makes the analysis more manageable than using either Eckersley's 
five subtypes, or Grendstad and Wollenbaeks' seven subtypes. But why is a 'middle space' 
needed anyway? 
There are some good reasons why I think there needs to be this 'middle space'. At a 
conceptual level, there is a clear-cut distinction between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism29, 
(the distinctions of Eckersley and Grendstad and Wollenbaek notwithstanding). However, 
such distinctions risk being overrun by the day-to-day practices of people who do not know of 
the dichotomy (and thus the 'need' for intellectual consistency!) and whose practices evolve 
over time. In other words, the ways people live and practice their relationship to the non-
human world will not always fit clearly into one camp or the other; they may live within 
contradictions, being anthropocentric on some things while holding to intrinsic values on 
other things. For example, ecocentrism accepts the intrinsic value of all species and seeks to 
incorporate that into practice. However, the extension of intrinsic value can be granted to a 
less than exhaustive list of non-human species. The concern many have about the protection 
of whales, for example, can be predicated on some concept of the intrinsic value of whales 
(they have the right to occupy the ocean in safety). But this does not mean that all species are 
therefore accorded the same rights that whales derive from their intrinsic value. Empirical 
research by Grendstad and Wollenbaek (1998) demonstrate that their respondents at times 
occupied contradictory positions on the anthropocentric/ecocentric spectrum. Ecocentrism (as 
well as anthropocentrism for that matter) can be viewed as a conceptual category that is more 
problematic inpractice3o• Practical problems with a concept do not necessarily invalidate that 
concept, but do suggest that theory and practice are not identical. One of the primary aims of 
this thesis is to examine the practice of ecological reason in some specific locations. To limit 
the analysis of values to only two positions risks missing some differentiation between the 
29 Even in popular thinking this distinction is often very marked. In an unpublished paper, Coyle (2004) quotes 
one participant in a focus group on biotechnology exploring the human/nature boundaries, who states: "Animals 
are animals. A human is a human. That's it". This was not an exception but an expression ofa common view 
within the focus group. 
30 Which is a reason Eckersley and Fox discussed the spectrum of values. But even a carefully constructed 
spectrum of categories does not ensure than any particular individual or group will fit neatly into such categories. 
The real world is inescapably messy, as anyone who has conducted social research will attest. 
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anthropocentric/ecocentric dichotomy. For this reason, I state again, I use a middle position, 
albeit technically anthropocentric but modified to some extent, sitting between 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism at the cusp of the dichotomy. 
To sum up, this spectrum consists of three broad positions: 
Anthropocentrism: In line with O'Riordan's techno centrism (1996, p.II-19), this position is 
focused exclusively on human-centric interests. Anthropocentrism is based on not only the 
ethical priority of human beings against all other species, but also that, in its strongest sense, 
other species have no value other than their instrumental value to human communities. 
Preservationism: This middle position is the weakest anthropocentric position, and in my 
rendering of it may in fact express a weak or imminent ecocentrism where some non-human 
species or ecosystems are valued for not only their aesthetic or spiritual value to humans, but 
also some weak acknowledgement of their own right to exist. Preservationism recognises that 
other species and ecosystems have non-material value to humans and may even "have value 
in their own right" as the Resource Management Act puts it (RMA, 1991, s2). This 'right' 
however is weak, and species specific (that is, only a few and only particular species). 
Ecocentrism: This position posits a set of a priori based rights for non-human species that, in 
its strong sense at least, takes a prima-facia position that all species (and ecosystems) must be 
accorded intrinsic rights. 
The Action Dimension 
The other dimension tracks the forms of rationality vis-a.-vis Habermas. For Habermas, 
human interests are fundamental in knowledge production; One fundamental interest is what 
Hahermas calls instrumental or strategic action (Bernstein, 1983, p.185). Instrumental or 
strategic action is orientated towards control in the non-social and social worlds and is 
directed towards the achievement of pre-defined ends (ibid, p.264). It is often technical in 
character, using language that is clearly understood and where consensus can emerge. This 
instrumental means-ends orientation is quite different from communicative action that seeks 
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understanding, not strategic or instrumental controe1• Where there is clear consensus on 
norms, values, goals and means, then communicative action is not required, because there is 
no fundamental disagreement. Any disagreement that exists can be rectified by careful 
(technical) analysis of the best means, usually the most effective or efficient, to reach the 
goal. However, where goals or values are not clear or agreed upon, communicative reason 
comes into play. In this sense it logically precedes instrumental reason. Dryzek discusses this 
in his work on discourse and democracy (1990). Such value-goal conflicts require open and 
unconstrained discourse, defined as "free and open communication in political life, orientated 
towards reciprocal understanding, trust, and hence an undistorted consensus" (Dryzek, 1990, 
p.38). 
Habermas has been criticised over his construction of communicative rationality because, so it 
is charged, it reduces communicative action to the ideal speech situation where resolution 
relies simply on the force of the better argument (Habermas, 1976, p.l08). The unconstrained 
communicative scenario where only better arguments prevail has been criticised by Iris 
Young (1995) as insufficiently radical, for it relies on a capacity to express arguments in 
verbal form. As such, some existing power differentials (verbal competence for example) are 
not overcome. Communicative capacity tends to assume a verbal ability and capability of 
constructing rational (non-emotive) arguments. This necessarily discriminates against both 
humans who lack this capacity and all other species which all have interests in the 
environment, but are not able to communicate such interests verbally32. This is the concern of 
Plumwood who argues such rationality alienates other species (itself an irrational act). Thus, 
in a radical turn, this implies that other species should be given legal standing and have their 
interests represented in a decision making process. Christopher Stone (1972) suggested some 
years ago that trees be given legal standing. Thus, this view is not without its supporters33. 
Plumwood's (2002) particular solution is dialogic reason. As discussed earlier, she takes on 
Western rationalism, arguing that it is largely to blame for the environmental crisis. Part of the 
solution is to extend the communicative ethic beyond the boundaries of anthropocentrism, 
which includes Habermas' communicative reason, to include other species. In her chapter 
titled 'Towards dialogical interspecies ethics', Plumwood explains how this works, with a 
31 There is a third interest, the emancipatory interest, which falls outside our concerns here. See Habermas, 1972. 
32 In response to this critique, Habermas acknowledges this concern, but suggests that this may nevertheless be 
the best we can do (Love, 1995, p.60). But also see Plumwood (2002, p.265). 
33 Smith (1999) discusses a range of authors exploring the moral standing of non-humans and objects. 
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variety of examples taken from her own experience about the forms of non-verbal but 
effective communication between herself and a wombat and tiger snake34 respectively (2000, 
p.195). The ethic is based on countering the dualistic construction of discontinuity between 
humans and non-humans, acknowledging difference and practicing non-exclusion in our 
interaction with 'others'. While the practical challenges of such a strategy are significant, 
including the need to rely on non-verbal forms of communication, this is no different inform 
from what Iris Young (1995) argues in relationship to the rationality of communicative 
reason. Relying exclusively on verbal articulation of reason, in other words the 'force of the 
better argument', ensures that certain classes of people-the educated and articulate who are 
trained in reasoned debate-have a communicative advantage. They do not possess any 
greater interest in the outcome of discursive deliberation than the less articulate or educated, 
but do have a structural advantage. The same principle applies to the non-human world as far 
as Plumwood is concerned. Exactly how this interspecies communicative effort (or 
partnership ethic, as she sometimes refers to it) is to proceed is a much more difficult question 
to answer. Plumwood does not attempt any more than some suggestive ideas, I suspect partly 
because her primary interest is in the articulation of the ethic (the text is pitched at a highly 
conceptual level) and partly because this practical application has yet to be developed. It is 
perhaps the most dissatisfying aspect of her text for those wanting a programme of action. 
MacGregor (2003) sums up Plumwood's text this way: 
"In spite of her commendable theorizing, I am left wondering how her proposed move toward 
partnership ethics helps us to imagine a different way of handling [the recent foot and mouth 
disease] crisis .... I suspect that if we were to apply Plumwood's partnership ethics to the real 
situation of the Cumbrian farmers (marginalized in an economy desperate to globalize) who 
had to kill all the sheep and cattle (with whom their families have had a relationship for 
generations) on their land (much of which is common property), we would find that it not only 
is founded on some unhelpful generalizations about "western culture" but also that it is unable 
to address the myriad conflicts and complications that it entailed. I think the book is an 
important contribution to environmental philosophy, but for a philosophical treatise to be able 
to inspire cultural change it needs to show how it can help us make better choices on the 
ground and in the field, here and now" (pp.114-115). 
This problem is not insignificant, but does not undermine Plumwood's theoretical 
contribution to this debate. Plumwood's arguments deserve to be taken seriously as an 
34 The 'communication' here involved a respectful means of showing her discomfort with the poisonous snake's 
decision to inhabit her porch. She threw her shoe in the direction of the snake, who responded appropriately by 
departing from the porch. 
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important, although rather unfinished contribution, to the project to alter the human-
nonhuman relationship. 
A Matrix of Ecological Reason 
We now have two dimensions along which ecological rcason can be mapped. These are 
depicted in Figure 2.2. The vertical dimension maps the types of communicative action 
embodied in the ditlerent constructions of ecological reason. It begins with technical-
instrumental problem solving, moving to the values-based human-centred focus of 
communicative reason , and finally towards more inclusive fonns of dialogic communicati on. 
Figure 2.2: A Matrix of Ecological Reason 
Dialogic Reason X I X Eco-social Ecology 
Communicative Discursive Ecology Discursive Ecology Discursive Ecology 
Reason (A) (P) (E) 
Instrumental- Tecllllocelltric Tecllllocelltric X 
I ,no Frnlnull ~(P) 
-c • 
The horizontal dimension maps the value orientation: anthropocentrism, preservationism and 
ecocentrism. These two dimensions comprising of three positions produce a matrix of nine 
positions where ecological reason could be potentially expressed, although three of these 
produce contradictory results that cancel out ecological reason. [ examine each position to 
consider where the three forms of ecological reason fit. The vertical positions are termed 
'left', ' centre' and ' right'. The horizontal positions are termed 'top', 'middle' and 'bottom'. 
Top-left: Dialogical reason and anthropocentrism cannot coex ist together because dialogical 
reason is non-anthropocentric in its commitment to inter-species dialogue. Thus it forms an 
empty space marked by an X. 
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Top-middle: Preservationism may express a weak commitment to the intrinsic values of 
ecosystems or some species, but it does not meet the criterion of interspecies dialogic reason. 
At best, it may only develop a partial dialogue with a small group of exclusive species. It 
therefore cannot be granted any meaningful inclusion in this position. Thus it is another 
empty space (X). 
Top right: Eco-social Ecology fits here. 
Centre left: Discursive Ecology fits best here because it is primarily expressed in 
anthropocentric terms (e.g., Dryzek's version). However, it is not the only possible position 
and could be placed in either of the other two positions on this vertical axis. Therefore, 
because this position is anthropocentric I will call this Discursive Ecology (A) (for 
anthropocentric). 
Centre middle: Discursive Ecology could also be expressed here where the 'social' norms 
expressed in communication embrace the preservationist value position. Therefore, I call this 
Discursive Ecology (P). 
Centre right: Likewise, Discursive Ecology may be expressed under an ecocentric position 
where all species are seen as having intrinsic value and rights. The difference between this 
and the Eco-social Ecology position is over communicative competency, that is between the 
view that other species are capable of expressing their interests and the view that this is the 
preserve of human judgement. To differentiate these views, this current position will be 
termed Discursive Ecology (E). 
Bottom left: This is the realm of Technocentric Ecology, anthropocentric and instrumentally 
rational in its approach to environmental problems. Although the next position may also be 
described as a variant of Technocentric Ecology, I will not add any distinguishing appellation 
here as I have done above because Technocentric Ecology is most at home in this position, 
and cannot easily be transferred to other positions. Therefore the absence of an appellation 
indicates that the fundamental orientation of Technocentric Ecology is to be found here. 
Bottom middle: This position may be characterised by a mild version of techno centric 
ecology, mild because it does not reflect a strong instrumentalism, but may well still approach 
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environmental issues in a technically orientated way35. I call this 'Technocentric Ecology (P),. 
Bottom right: This is a contradictory position because instrumental-technical reason is 
anthropocentric unless it is first harnessed to either communicative or dialogic reason. Of 
course, even ecocentrism requires practical techniques to express its ethical commitments, but 
as commented in the earlier section on Technocentric Ecology above, the unconstrained 
motive of Technocracy is anthropocentric. Therefore this position constitutes an empty space 
(X). 
One caveat is needed. It is easy to presume, at least implicitly, that these dimensions flow 
from the less desirable to more desirable, thus embodying a set of nonnative assumptions 
(eco-social ecology being the highest expression). The originators of these typologies often do 
imply this (Hay, 2002, p.32) and as difficult as it may be to avoid, it ought to be resisted, for 
two reasons. First, it is clear from the literature that serious presentations are made from all 
positions, from those who believe that technology in the fonn of ecological modernisation is 
the best hope for dealing with environmental issues to those who argue nothing less than an 
entire cultural and spiritual revolution is required. Readers will no doubt bring their own 
biases and theoretical commitments to this issue, but this does not undennine the seriousness 
of each perspective. Even within a perspective there are disagreements to be found, and they 
can be quite serious, as Fox's (1988) work on deep ecology demonstrates. Second, we ought 
to take heed of Eckersley's (2002) more recent work on environmental pragmatism and 
ecocentrism where she suggests that: 
"the different philosophical approaches and strategic practices preferred by environmental 
pragmatism and ecocentrism may be understood as two different and necessary "democratic 
moments" in the processes of environmental policy making, which carry with them different 
purposes, strengths and weaknesses". 
In other words, there is no single agenda at work in those who would seek to be ecologically 
rational. Pragmatic refonnists and radical theorists both have a part to play. For these reasons 
I do not impute (at least consciously36) any nonnative judgement on these positions but rather 
35 I noted in my discussion on technocratic ecology above that all three versions of ecological reason must apply 
technique. I am therefore not referring here to the simple use of technical means to achieve a goal, but rather the 
other more rationalistic sense of technique. 
36 I am not neutral as to what I consider the most convincing position, and in the interests of transparency, I note 
that I have some sympathy for ecological modernisation as a 'mechanism' for dealing with environmental 
problems. That is the pragmatic side of me being expressed. However, theoretically I am committed to a largely 
discursive approach that is broadly ecocentric, but am not convinced that the eco-social position is workable. It 
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use them as a means to track the forms of ecological reason in practice in New Zealand under 
the Resource Management Act (the focus of the next five chapters). 
To conclude, theories of ecological rationality indicate there is no single version or form that 
this may take37• As Bartlett noted nearly twenty years ago, "ecological rationality is not yet a 
precise and exact way of thinking" (1986, p.231). This still appears to be the case. Ecology 
has developed much as a science but is still nowhere near a precise way of thinking. Bartlett 
also suggested that while science is essential to ecological rationality, it also draws as much 
from ethics, philosophy, religion and experience. This much is clear from the more recent 
expressions in the literature. For example, Demeritt (1994) argues that appeals to foundational 
authority to accurately represent 'nature' should be abandoned in light of new findings that 
challenge the idea of stable, holistic, ecosystems. Rather, understanding 'nature' requires a 
wide range of frameworks drawing on diverse moral, political and aesthetic criteria. This 
view, I suggest, is supported by the literature discussed in this chapter and particularly in the 
diverse ways ecological reason is constructed. What exactly ecological reason is and what 
makes a social decision ecologically rational depends upon the assumptions employed. While 
there are likely to be other dimensions that could be fruitfully considered, these ones are 
prominent in the literature and ideas discussed. 
To this point the investigation has examined idea of ecological reason developed by theorists. 
What it does not tell us is about the empirical practices of those involved in making 
environmental decisions. The remainder of this thesis explores this practice. The matrix of 
ecological reason provides the frame for testing environmental decision making under the 
Resource Management Act, offering an analytic opportunity to determine where the Act fits. 
But before this analytic work can take place, the RMA requires examination. It is to this task 
that we now turn. 
functions well perhaps as an inspirational mode, but falls short of providing a programme of action. I am 
agnostic as to whether it will ever be able to produce this. 
37 Healy (200 I) even argues for a 'post-foundational ecology', viewing environmentalism as a cultural project. 
Despite postmodemism's weaknesses, for example, its inescapable relativism that undermines any 'foundation' 
of action, Healy draws on its more positive side, such as the capacity to interrogate the premises underlying 
differing views of 'nature'. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT 
1991-0RIGINS, CONTESTATIONS, AND STRUCTURE 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the theory and literature of ecological rationality and from this 
produced a matrix with three primary expressions of ecological reason. The chapter concluded 
by arguing that there is no unified perspective or approach to ecological reason. Given the 
various 'forms' of ecological reason discernible in the theory, we now focus on the practice 
of environmental decision making, examining the New Zealand Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA), and specifically the resource consent process and a city plan change, in order to 
identify the forms of ecological rationality being expressed through the RMA. 
In this Chapter, I argue that the RMA, like ecological reason, is contested at the philosophical 
level. The RMA contains an internal tension in relation to its purpose that is the result of 
ambiguity and compromise in its construction. This tension plays out in various debates over 
the RMA, but does not do so in isolation; it reflects a similar contestation found in ecological 
reason. The purpose of the current chapter, then, is to explore these issues. 
It begins by introducing the RMA and then outlines some dimensions that are important in 
understanding the way the Act works. The origins and the development of the RMA are 
explored, including some theoretical description of the intellectual climate surrounding the 
Act's evolution. In particular, it examines some of the theoretical debates around the role of 
the state, including the debate over 'rational planning versus the market' in determining the 
distribution of social preferences. Although an extended discussion of rationality took place in 
Chapter Two, this debate over planning fits better here because it is central to the role of the 
RMA. In other words, it says more about the RMA than it does about ecological reason. It 
then explores two significant, but related areas of debate. Beginning with the concept of the 
'natural' environment, the Chapter takes a wide perspective, ranging beyond the confines of 
the RMA and the New Zealand context. The hypothesis is that the term 'natural environment' 
is problematic at a theoretical level, and this ambivalence finds expression in the second issue 
discussed, the 'discontents' of Section 5, the Act's Purpose. This second issue is examined in 
a less theoretical way, and is designed to tease apart some of the fundamental tensions with 
the Act. Finally, the structure of the Act is discussed. Readers familiar with the RMA can pass 
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over this section, because it is descriptive, not analytic. But it is necessary background for the 
analysis that follows. 
Why focus on the RMA? Although New Zealand has a wide range oflegislation that affects 
environmental decision making (see MfE, 1997, p.4.ll), the undisputed heavyweight in terms 
of impact, scope and influence is the RMA. It is the most comprehensive piece of 
environmental legislation ever produced in this country, and represents a 'second generation' 
of environmental law by integrating water, air and land management (van Roon & Knight, 
2004, p.15). For this reason, it is the legislation that directly affects anyone who carries out 
any activity that has an effect on the environment. Therefore, the Act has a significant impact 
on people and the environment. Any forms of discharge into air, water, or onto land, 
subdivision and other land uses, and the erection of any structure, are all covered by the Act. 
Thus, in terms of scope, no other legislation covers such a wide range of activities. Finally, 
the Act has the most significant influence on environmental management through its ability to 
develop national level environmental standards and plans, and regional policies and plans. 
This hierarchical system means that any decision making lower down the chain must 'not be 
inconsistent with' a higher level policy or plan. Given all this, it can be argued that the RMA 
is the site of most environmental decision making (in terms of quantity) and, particularly with 
the district plans and resource consent processes, the sites where ecological reason is (or is 
not) most practiced. It provides significant opportunity to assess the extent and forms of 
ecological reason currently being employed in the day-to-day practices of environmental 
decision making. It is one of the most significant sites where the 'rubber' of policy meets the 
'road' of practice. 
Origins: The Development of the RMA 
The Resource Management Act (1991) is New Zealand's largest andmost far reaching piece 
of environmentallegislation1 (see Memon, 1993). It emerged from a mammoth effort of 
public consultation, resulting in around 3500 submissions. Initiated by the Fourth Labour 
Government in 1988, it sought to bring together what was a wide and disparate body of 
environmental law, into a single and comprehensive piece of legislation. Passed into law in 
1 For various reviews of the history of the RMA see Young, 2001; Randerson, 1997, pp.55-61; Biihrs & Bartlett, 
1993, pp.122-125; Memon, 1993. 
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July 1991 under the new National Government, it repealed over 59 statutes, 19 regulations, 
and amended more than 55 other statutes and regulations (Harris, 1993, p.52). It was the 
culmination of some years of increasing environmental awareness, both in New Zealand and 
internationally. The primary purpose of the Act, sustainable management, was foreshadowed 
in a number of international declarations: The Stockholm Declaration in 1972, The World 
Conservation Strategy in 1980, and, most significantly, the 1987 Brundtland Report 
(Randerson, 1997, pp.56-57). 
According to Simon Upton, Minister for the Environment when the bill was enacted, the 
RMA "is not simply an amalgamation of the current law; it provides a new process for the 
management of land, water, soil, air quality, geothermal energy, pollution control, and the 
management ofthe coast" (Upton, 1991, cited in Young, 2001, p.2)~ The RMA signalled a 
substantive shift in focus away from planning and control of activities to simply controlling 
for effects of activities. The explicit intention, by at least some of the key proponents of the 
bill, was to move to a less regulated regime, where activities were assessed on their 
environmental effects and not by a priori judgements on activities themselves. The RMA was 
seen as enabling legislation that reflected the general shift to a more-market ideology that 
resulted from the reform processes of the Fourth Labour Government. But it was not just this 
neo-liberal turn that underpinned the rationality of the RMA. Coupled with this was a critical 
debate as to the meaning of Section 52 of the Act, and specifically, the role of the cultural and 
social in what is otherwise a biophysically orientated statute. The two other critical features of 
the legislation were the emphasis on sustainability and integrated resource management 
(Randerson 1997, pp.61-67). Together these form the key conceptual framework upon which 
the Act is built. 
There are a number of factors that led to the pressure for change to New Zealand's resource 
management law and practice. Ericksen, Berke, Crawford & Dixon, (2003) identify three 
critical factors. For most of its settlement history, New Zealand had a strong reliance on the 
use of natural resources for trade, especially with Britain. Because of the underdevelopment 
of infrastructure and the lack of private capital available for building this infrastructure in the 
late 19th century, a pattern of significant Government investment and ownership developed 
2 Section 5 deals with the Act' Purpose and states (1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources. 
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(Annstrong, 1994). This pattern of government intervention in economic and social affairs 
was to last well into the late 20th century. The State owned much of the natural estate, such as 
forests and land, and rivers, lakes and the ocean were in the public domain. Due in part to the 
very significant modification of land use patterns in the early and mid-twentieth century and 
the resulting loss of natural heritage (Ericksen, et al., 2003, p.2), legislation was enacted to 
control such development. Much of this was piecemeal, with specific statutes being created 
for specific environments. This process led, by the 1980s, to a large number of agencies and 
statutes that tended to function in a prescriptive, top-down approach (ibid, p.3), in line with 
the strong interventionist pattern of government that had developed over a century before. But 
by the 1970s, significant doubts about this style of governance were beginning to emerge. 
This complex mix of policies and agencies oftentimes created very inefficient and 
contradictory outcomes. Coupled with this were concerns about 'red tape' slowing 
development down, both large and small scale, and a desire from many to speed up resource 
management decision making (ibid). Finally, according to Ericksen et aI., (2003), the 
renaissance of Maori meant that they had an increased interest in natural resource 
management, especially given the claims many tribes were making under the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
Of equal significance were externally generated pressures, particularly in relation to 
sustainability. This emergence of a commitment to sustainability has been described as 
inevitable (Harris, 1993, p.52). There has been increasing concern for environmental 
problems over the last few decades, with the rise of the environmental movements in the 
1960s and, later, the development of international initiatives, beginning most prominently 
with the Stockholm Declaration in 1972. There was increasing emphasis on the desirability of 
integrated resource management. For example, the Stockholm Declaration stated that: 
"in order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to improve the 
environment, states should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development 
planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve 
the human environment for the benefit of their population" (cited in Randerson 1997, p.56). 
Perhaps the most significant moment came with publication, by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, of Our Common Future, or what came to be known as the 
'Brundtland Report'. It brought the idea of sustainability into the mainstream in such a way 
that it is now virtually impossible for governments or businesses to deny the relevance of 
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environmental issues to the international community (Grinlinton, 2002, p.19). This does not 
imply that Governments or businesses act sustainably, but rather that the discourse is now 
well embedded in international and national fora. The growing international concerns about 
environmental problems focused on the principle of sustainable development and integrated 
resource management (ibid, pp.59-60). 
The forces that were involved in the development of the RMA cannot be neatly divided into 
domestic and international influences. Young even suggests that the ideas and thinking have 
come from "sources too numerous to contemplate" (2001, p.5). Nevertheless, there were a 
number of significant developments in New Zealand that provided impetus towards the 
development of the RMA. 
In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEeD) presented the 
results of an audit on environmental management (OECD, 1981). Among other things, it 
identified the need for more open government in improving environmental management. This 
took place around the same time as the National Development Act 1979, which gave 
increased power to central government, and stood in contrast to the recommendations of the 
OECD. This reflects some of the critical debates occurring in New Zealand at the time over 
the appropriate role of government. Buhrs & Bartlett (1993, Chapter 4) characterise these 
developments as a move from 'state vandalism' to a 'market-led' environment. While they 
argue that 'state vandalism' has been 'virtually eliminated' through a series of environmental 
reforms, they are less optimistic about the environmental performance ofthe private sector, 
the principle beneficiaries of the downsizing of government (ibid, p.112). 
Another critical moment in this process was the publication by the Nature Conservation 
Council (to become the National Conservation Authority) (Young, 2001, p.7). Titled 
Integrating Conservation and Development: A Proposal for a New Zealand Conservation 
Strategy, it highlighted some of the key themes that would form the framework for the RMA. 
It promoted the protection of ecological processes and the life-support capacity of ecosystems. 
It argued for the provision of non-material needs, such as culture and spirituality, through the 
protection of natural resources, the protection of genetic diversity, the sustainable use of 
renewable resources and the wise use of non-renewable resources (young, 2001, pp.7-8). A 
feature of this publication was its focus on bio-diversity and the needs offuture generations, 
and it was deeply grounded in the biological sciences (ibid). This publication was, in many 
71 
Chapter Three: The Resource Management Act 1991-0rigins, Contestations, and Structure 
ways, representative both of forward thinking and the influence of ecology in environmental 
policy. But it was only a part of the picture. 
The Fourth Labour Government came to power in the midst of a fiscal crisis, and through a 
series of well documented moves (see Kelsey, 1995; Easton, 1997; Boston, Martin, Pallot & 
Walsh, 1996; Lamer, 1998) proceeded to dismantle much of the existing bureaucratic system 
deemed responsible for the poor performance of the state sector and deregulate much of the 
economy. Central to this 'shift to the market' was a conviction by some in the cabinet 
(although not all) that the market was the most efficient and apolitical means for the 
distribution of social goods, including environmental goods. The emphasis was on 
deregulation and greater personal freedom and choice. There was a strong move away from 
the idea of central control, and decentralising decision-making systems were encouraged (in 
many, though by no means all areas of state activity). This anti-planning approach was 
widespread through policy making approaches in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Meadowcroft (1997) offers a theoretical perspective on this anti-planning orientation, drawing 
on the meta-critiques of Hayek, Wildavsky and Lindblom. Hayek's text, The Road to Serfdom 
(1944), was published in light of the rise of fascism, the antidote to which was a free 
marketplace, the theme that was to dominate Hayek's future writing. Hayek believed central 
planning would fail, for a number of reasons. The 'great problem' in social life is how to 
coordinate that vast sum of collective knowledge which "exists nowhere as an integrated 
whole" (in Meadwocroft, 1997, p.432). A weakness of centralised planning is the 
fundamental problem of coordinating this knowledge. The intelligence requirements are so 
vast as to outstrip the capacity of any bureaucracy. Additionally, the liberal principle of 
individual freedom clashed with centralised decision making; decision makers could never 
respect the preferences of some individuals without violating the preferences of others (see 
Arrow, 1963). However, competitive markets returned such choice back to individuals. Thus, 
spontaneously formed social orders contrasted markedly with consciously designed or created 
orders. Planning for future progress was viewed as 'ridiculous' (Meadowcroft, 1997, p.432). 
Drawing on the early classical liberal tradition (Hayward, 1992), and foreshadowing the more 
recent neo-liberal tum, Hayek argued for a limited state to uphold the rule oflaw, not to 
determine the social good, but to create conditions by which the social good would emerge 
through the un-coerced and spontaneous acts of individuals in a free and open marketplace. 
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Wildavsky also argued against conventional government planning. The reason was, in 
Meadowcroft's words, that "it could not fulfil the grandiose hopes of its proponents because 
the complexity of social life precluded comprehensive control over future circumstances" 
(p.433). The argument by planners that planning could be a rational activity was dismissed by 
Wildavsky in the light of the "overwhelming evidence of failure" (Meadowcroft, 1997, 
p.433). There is, he argued, a fundamental incoherence in the concept of planning because the 
basis of planning, coordination, attempts to coordinate a wide range of contradictory 
orientations. For example, how does one rationally integrate efficiency and reliability with 
coercion? Thus, "the injunction to plan (!!) is empty. The key terms associated with it are 
proverbs or platitudes" (Wildavsky, cited in Meadowcroft, 1997, p.434, exclamations marks 
in original). 
Rational comprehensive planning has also been criticised by Lindblom (1959) who provided 
two key concepts: 'incrementalism' and 'partisan mutual adjustment'. The first concept 
recognises the incapacity of comprehensive planning, and substitutes this for incremental 
shifts in policy over time. Small steps and simplified assumptions formed a strategy for policy 
makers and planners and recognised that complex social problems can never be analysed 
completely (ibid). Rather than chase the chimera of comprehensive analysis it is better to 
"'knowingly and openly' muddle 'with some skill'" (Lindblom, cited in Meadowcroft, 1997). 
The political equivalent of incrementalism was 'partisan mutual adjustment', typically found 
in pluralist democracies. Partly a substitution of analysis for politics, it enables coordination 
to take place between a large number of actors, where the outcomes are being decided upon, 
rather than where they have been decided upon. Not only does this approach curb power, but 
it raises "the level of information and rationality brought to bear on decisions" (Lindblom, 
cited in ibid, p.435).3 
Meadowcroft's focus is not to present a detailed critique of these three anti-planning theorists 
(although we ought to note Lindblom is at the less-anti end of the spectrum), but to look at the 
more recent responses to such challenges. However, he does offer some brief reflections. 
Hayek's antipathy for planning ("planning cannot lead to progress") leads him to an 
3 Kyung-hee Nam (1997, p.lll) observes in an article on ecological reason from an Asian perspective: "The 
task of reason is not to control or overcome the conditions of nature: that is beyond its capacity. The best it can 
do for human beings is to minimize the friction between the human way of life, which is characterized by 
linguistic activity, and the flow of nature, or, better, to maximize the agreement between them". 
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unnecessary antithesis; "'not-planning' is the best guarantee that progress will in fact be 
achieved" (ibid, p.435, emphasis in original). Hayek's separation of rational design and I 
spontaneity is unnecessarily exaggerated; both 'sorts of order' are found in social life and 
every social practice involves both sorts. While it is true that the future can never be predicted 
or controlled, and that planned objectives are rarely (or ever) achieved in full, it is sometimes 
possible to avoid specific unwanted outcomes, and planned objectives can be realised either in 
part or amended form. Prudence suggests the rejection of the hyper-rationalist dream, but does 
not entail the rejection of planning in incremental or bounded form (see Parsons, 1995, p.276-
279). There are criticisms of both Wildavsky and Lindblom's ideas, but I will not discuss 
these because they do not impinge on the conclusion Meadowcroft draws: 
"The adjustive processes to which Lindblom points are potentially of enormous significance to 
the project of planning for sustainable development. They suggest the possibility of 
coordinating complex changes across a range of social spheres (through radically decentralised 
analytical responsibility and encouraging practical interaction) and the potential of a reform 
strategy which emphasises institutional design to re-configuring spontaneous adjustive 
mechanisms to favour sustainable development friendly policy outcomes" ( 1997, p.439). 
It is instructive at this point to recall Dryzek's conclusion to his theoretical work on ecological 
reason (see the previous chapter). The institutional frameworks that are most conducive to 
ecological rationality need to embrace practical reason and decentralised decision making, as 
far as is practical. In his overview of the political science literature, Meadowcroft (1997) 
produces a similar assessment in relation to sustainable development. While there are 
significant problems with comprehensive planning approaches, more recent developments in 
theories of social learning and adaptive management (p.448), for example, point to new 
opportunities for planning: "It is simply not possible at any particular point time to make a 
single set of strategic choices, or to design once-and-for-all a set of institutions which can be 
guaranteed to be best suited to secure sustainable development into the far future" (1997, 
p.449). This verdict applies both to comprehensive planning ambitions and to anti-planning, 
more-market sentiments. 
This debate is still an ongoing one in New Zealand. At the level of discourse there exists a 
tension between two polarities, those who are committed to property rights and the rule of law 
and who see centralised planning as inimical to liberty (and good environmental outcomes, 
for that matter), and those who insist that strong state action through regulation and control is 
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essential to good environmental outcomes. The first view is represented by Roger Kerr, 
executive director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. He summarised a recent analysis 
of the RMA by stating: "The most important message in all this is that the high quality 
environment that we all want to see in New Zealand cannot be achieved with legislation that 
undermines the necessary conditions for achieving that goal - prosperity and well defined 
property rights" (2002, p.12). Kerr cites Upton, arguing Upton took a liberal stance towards 
the legislation:·""What people get up to is their affair"-subject to compliance with "hard 
environmental standards" and "a physical bottom that must not be compromised" ... [Upton] 
saw the RMA as a liberal departure from the older command and control approach" (ibid, 
p.3). Yet, in Kerr's view, this has not been the case in practice. Prescriptive use of the RMA 
by local authorities, the domination of the processes by lawyers, the negative effect on the 
'languishing' economy and problems with lack of policy integration are examples of his 
concerns. The source of the problems lies in two parts. First: 
"[t]here appears to be near-universal agreement that the problems arise in part from a lack of 
expertise and a 'command and control' culture in local government. .. a lack of economic 
expertise in undertaking cost benefit analysis and a lack of experience with, or sympathy for, the 
use of market instruments. Local authorities have also found it difficult to move from the 
regulation of activities to the regulation of effects" (Kerr, 2002, p.5). 
Local Authority inability to focus simply on effects of, rather than control over, activities was 
then traced to a deeper malaise; the fundamental construction of the Act. The lack of clear 
criteria by which to determine tradeoffs between 'diverse and conflicting objectives' created 
difficulties for decision makers. Many of the proposed remedies that surfaced during the late 
1990s (Resource Management Amendment Bill, 1999) focused on ideas of contestability of 
resource consent processes, reducing time frames, reducing the information required and 
increase in non-publicly notified consents. While many ofthese proposals were of the 'more 
market-based' variety, Kerr nevertheless felt that these changes were insufficiently radical, 
because "even an RMA amended along these lines would still undermine worthwhile 
economic development and the rule oflaw .... " (Kerr, 2002, p.7). This theme has previously 
been raised by Pardy (1997), arguing that while the intention of the RMA was effects focused, 
and thereby liberal or permissive, the result has been a new form of 'planning for serfdom'. 
There is a need, he argues, for general legal rules in order to avoid the discretionary nature of 
current Resource Management decisions: 
"Discretionary outcome-specific rules, central planning and public hearings are inadequate as 
the main tools for land use and environmental decisions .... A free marketplace requires 
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knowable objective rules applied by disinterested decision makers. Present planning processes 
do not provide these things" (p.72). 
This limited interventionist, market-focused and property-rights based approach, what Memon 
calls the 'market liberalist paradigm' (2002, p.299), does not necessarily imply that 
proponents are uninterested in a quality environment. Rather, the debate is premised on 
(abstract) principles of justice, on the one hand, including the conviction that this produces 
more efficient and just social and environmental outcomes, and ideals of planning, including 
pragmatic realities, on the other. 
The planning approach can be viewed in a number of ways. Meadowcroft's discussion above 
of the anti-planning orientation, as do critiques of the neo-liberal tum in New Zealand politics 
(e.g., Kesley, 1995), argues that relying on a set of ideological ideals is problematic. There is 
a well developed body of work that deals with market failures and the limitations of pure-
market thought in social choice (see Stretton and Orchard, 1994). The same argument can be 
made against central planning advocates and, again, there is much evidence to suggest 
significant limitations of centralised authorities in social and environmental planning. 
Fukuyama (1992) provides a celebrated, though not uncontested, account of the failure of 
central planning. Planners can also be guilty of what neo-liberals are sometimes charged with; 
ideological blindspots. 
Nevertheless, Memon (2002, p.302) takes issue with what he argues is "a deliberate distortion 
and misrepresentation of New Zealand's planning history" by the 'New Right'. While the 
Town and Country Planning Act, the much maligned forerunner of the RMA, had its share of 
shortcomings, it "provided an essential forum for mediating within the local and regional 
arena community conflicts associated with the development process ... .it was far from a 
dictatorial command and control regime" (ibid). Ball and Bell (1994, p.186) observe that the 
planning system in the United Kingdom became more centralised in the 1980s, but more 
development (market) orientated, as the government sought to reduce the power oflocal 
authorities. Yet they note that the 1990s are seeing a shift back towards local or decentralised 
decision making. While notions of planning have been modified in response to the anti-
planning critique, planning itself has not, nor it appears could ever actually disappear. 
While the planning process may not have been as dictatorial as some of its opponents 
suggested, there was strong support for significant State involvement in managing resource 
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use in New Zealand. Much of this came from environmental groups suspicious of the ability 
of market capitalism to discipline developers along environmentally benevolent lines4. A 
good deal of this opposition opposed the shrinking of the state sector, especially where 
environmental governance was at stake, as well as the privatisation of state assets (Ericksen et 
al., 2003, p.S). 
While the debate between planning/anti-planning was real, the RMA was nevertheless 
enacted in the midst of the neo-liberal tum. In addition to the new market philosophy and the 
inherent tensions this generated, environmental management also underwent some major 
institutional reforms (Blihrs & Bartlett, 1993, pp.l13-134; Memon, 1993. For an analysis see 
Eriksen et al., 2003, pp,4S-60). One ofthe philosophic drivers was a belief that policy-making 
functions ought to be separated from service provision functions, an idea derived from public 
choice theory (Boston et al., 1996, pp.17-18. See also, Stretton & Orchard, 1994). Some of the 
reasons for this were concerns about the lack of accountability, ambiguity and confusion over 
goals, and 'provider capture'. Former government departments, such as the Forest Service, 
were believed to be compromised by the conflicting demands of conservation and commercial 
goals. Clarity of function and accountability demanded a clear separation. Thus, during the 
late 1980s, the Department of Conservation (DoC) was established as an advocate for 
conservation, as were the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) with its national policy 
development function, and the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (PCE). These three legacies of the Fourth Labour Government established 
focused and permanent voices for environmental concerns (see Blihrs, 1991). 
These characteristics together provided much of the backdrop to the development of the 
RMA. Given the complex nature of policy making, especially in environments with multiple 
pressures, and where actors hold diverse views, the Resource Management Law Reform 
(RMLR) process was not bound by rigid expectations about what the end result would be. As 
former MfE Chief Executive Denise Church put it, the review was: 
"A 'back to basics' ... look at environmental legislation, what's stopping us having the kind of 
environmental resource that we want, [asking] 'What's in the way of good environmental 
management?' [There was] a general feeling that environmental legislation wasn't as good as it 
could be" (cited in Young, 2001, p.19, brackets in original). 
4 Ericksen et al., (2003, p.5) note that there are exceptions to this. The Maruia Society has recently embraced the 
role of property rights in dealing with externalities that would otherwise lie outside the market system. 
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In his interviews of key players in the RMLR, Young notes that most of them recall having 
the goal of 'harnessing' the idea of sustainability and developing some integrated approach to 
using it (p.24). Former Labour Cabinet Minister Philip Woollaston believes that the RMLR 
goals were for greater efficiency and less cost in decision-making, an emphasis on 
sustainability and future generations, effects-based decision-making and a system that 
promotes accommodation of interests, rather than a win-lose scenario (cited in Young, 2001, 
p.14). 
These are some of the broader trends influencing the reform process. There were also some 
specific policy and management issues that were identified. The Explanatory Note to the Bill 
(see Randerson, 1997, pp.60-61) comments that previous legislation was "conflicting, 
overlapping and confusing to users", and not all "relevant values were taken into account". 
The Note then lists nine major problems with the pre-RMA system: 
(a) There is no consistent set of resource management objectives; 
(b) There are arbitrary differences in management of land, air and water; 
(c) There are too many agencies involved in resource management with overlapping 
responsibilities and insufficient accountability; 
(d) Consent procedures are unnecessarily complicated and costly, and there are undue delays; 
(e) Pollution laws are ad hoc and do not recognise the physical connections between land, air 
and water; 
(f) In some aspects of resource management there is insufficient flexibility and too much 
prescription, with a focus on activities rather than end results; 
(g) Maori interests and the Treaty ofWaitangi are frequently overlooked; 
(h) Monitoring of the law is uneven; 
(i) Enforcement is difficult. 
(from Randerson, 1997, p.60) 
The RMA was the product of institutional pressures for reform, a major philosophical shift in 
political ideology in New Zealand, international trends in environmental thinking and state 
sector reform, and key personnel in strategic positions. Ideas, such as the requirement for 
economic efficiency, deregulation, public participation, sustainabilityas a central motive, 
integrated resource management and a commitment to economic development, provided the 
context and substance for the emerging Act. However, there was significant disagreement 
over a number of issues, both in the development of the Act and in the subsequent attempts to 
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interpret its meaning. The most significant dispute concerned, and still concerns, the purpose 
of the Act. 
The Act appears very clear on its purpose, which is to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources (S5). However, this statement is the source of much debate, 
because of the ambiguity of the notion of 'natural' resources. This is linked to a larger debate 
taking place over the contested meaning of nature. For example, Macnaghten & Urry (1998) 
in Contested Natures explore the significant ways in which the ideas of what is considered 
'natural' are socially constructed in different places and at different times. This the notion of 
what a 'natural' resource actually is, or more significantly, where the boundaries between 
'nature' and 'culture' are drawn, will have substantial impact on what issues (effects) are 
considered under the RMA. The following two Sections address this issue, the first by 
examining the theoretical debate and the second by examining the academic and legal debate 
over S5 of the RMA. 
Contestations 
The Concept of the 'Natural' Environment 
The meaning of 'environment' is both straightforward and ambiguous. Etymologically, it 
refers to that which surrounds, and therefore strictly speaking includes everything except that 
which is surrounded (Descola & PaIsson, 1996, p.18). Presumably this includes ideas and 
other 'non-material,5 phenomena. However, universal definitions are usually more 
circumscribed in practice. For example, in a recently published textbook, human ecology is 
defined as the relationship between people and their environment and the environment is 
viewed as an ecosystem, "everything in a specified area - the air, soil, water, living 
organisms, and physical structures, including everything built by humans" (Marten, 2001, 
p.1). While acknowledging humans are part of ecosystems, Marten argues that it is useful to 
think of interaction between the social system and ecosystems, or human-environment 
interaction. A slightly more nuanced view is offered (albeit in passing) by van Roon and 
Knight (2004). In their text Ecological Context of Development, they use the term 
5 Ideas are traditionally viewed in the West as non-material, although this is an issue of some debate. See 
Campbell, (1984) for a theoretical discussion of the boundary issues between body/matter or souVrnind. Yet 
ideas are at least mediated through cognitive function, which is 'material'. 
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'environment' as referring to the physical and natural environment "because this is the way it 
has been used historically and colloquially" (p.l1). However, they prefer the tenn 'ecological' 
because environment often includes the "human economic, social, cultural, and built 
environments" (ibid). By inference, 'ecological' excludes these phenomena. This, then, is the 
common view of the natural environment, as something separate from the humans or cultural 
systems. Thus, the 'natural' environment refers to all those phenomena that lie outside human 
culture and society. However, this view has become increasingly problematic in recent years. 
The following section examines some aspects of this debate and its implications for the RMA. 
In 1978, two sociologists issued a call to re-theorise social theory. Catton and Dunlap (1978) 
argued that society could only be adequately understood through their proposed New 
Ecological Paradigm, which argued, among other things, for the inseparability of nature and 
society. In a recent review of this progress, Goldman and Schunnan (2000) argue this has 
turned out to "represent an exceedingly difficult challenge". One ofthe principle reasons for 
this is the historic embeddedness of social theory in the European Enlightenment. Thus: 
"most of the literature treats nature as a discrete and external object of study, one that can be 
known through the application of an objective, dispassionate science. Yet as environmental 
historians, sociologists of science, and environmental philosophers have pointed out, the 
Enlightenment ontology of nature as primordial, autonomous, and mechanistic is highly 
problematic" (2000). 
This theme is taken up by Kyung-hee (1997), who goes back to Hobbes and Locke to trace 
this anthropomorphic orientation and duality between nature and society. In the 
Enlightenment view, reason was given by God to enable humans to use the earth for their 
(our) own benefit. The Cartesian duality ofmindlbody and nature/society separated humans 
from 'nature', and while the instrumental success of the emergent science and technology is 
widely recognised, Kyung-hee argues that the ontological separation is not justified, and 
develops an ecological rationality that is more monist than dualist in character. Through it he 
argues that Western reason seeks to overcome nature, rather than seeing rationality as being 
an evolved (from 'nature') function to mediate between humans and the rest ofthe natural 
world, of which we are a part6• The argument is evolutionary; human beings are not gifted 
with the certainty about how to survive that instinct provides for (most) other species. Rather, 
in the absence of significant instincts, cultural transmission (socialisation) and cultural 
6 This view is not dissimilar to Plumwood's, discussed at length in the previous Chapter. 
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adaptability (reason) are our gifts. Reason, therefore, mediates between us and other 
phenomena; we adapt ourselves to nature (ibid, p.l08). 
"The technological civilization in the twentieth century has been hailed as the decisive evidence 
that the human species has successfully overcome nature with the help of reason, whose 
essence is basically instrumental or prudential. The so-called' success of science 
and technology' implants us with a firm faith in human reason. This overblown confidence in 
human reason is closely associated with the disputable belief in the origin of reason. Certainly 
rationality is unique to human beings. But we should not think of it as something transcendental 
or a priori. It is just a means or an instrument of survival which human beings as a natural 
species have acquired in the process of natural evolution, adapting themselves to the harshness 
of nature" (Kyung-hee, 1997, p.lOl). 
This perspective of Kyung-hee disrupts the established categories between culture and nature 
by challenging one of the major locations of human exemptionalism, the uniqueness of 
reason. Rather, reason is a product of 'nature', an evolved capacity for cognitive reflection 
based on cultural learning. Indeed, humans are not, in fact, unique in this capacity. Evidence 
from primatology, for example, suggests that some primates rely on significant levels of 
social learning and acquire genuine culture, albeit rather rudimentary (Goodin, Pateman & 
Pateman, 1997). This research undermines the radical separation between humans and 
'nature'. 
Anthropology also provides some challenging findings to the nature-culture dichotomy. This 
dichotomy provided a 'central dogma' in anthropology's own disciplinary history (Descola & 
Palsson, 1996, p.2), as well as providing critical analytic tools for inquiry. Much ofthis 
inquiry was antithetical, with some branches taking an environmentally determinist position 
(culture as an adaptive response to genetic or environmental constraints), while others seeing 
culture as imposing itself on nature. However, in recent years, this dualist paradigm has been 
seen as increasingly problematic, hindering a fuller understanding. For example, Ingold 
(1996) argues that micro economic theory, in its conceptualisation of economic-man, 
individuals acting in pursuit of enlightened self-interest, is at odds with traditional 
anthropological studies that use evolutionary ecology in its study of 'primitive' cultures. As 
Ingold puts it: 
"I aim to show that evolutionary ecology is the precise inverse of microeconomics, just as 
natural selection is the mirror image of rational choice. As such, it reproduces in an inverted 
form the dichotomy between reason and nature that lies at the heart of post-enlightenment 
science" (p.26). 
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Why is this a problem? It fails, he argues, to produce a 'truly ecological perspective'. The 
strategies employed by the 'optimal forager' (hunter) are those given by natural selection 
(nature), whereas economic man works out strategies for him or herself (culture). This 
bifurcation underwrites the methods of modern natural science. However, in the case study of 
the Cree hunter, Ingold shows this bifurcation does not fit well, and close examination 
undermines this culture-nature divide. 
Another anthropological example challenges the universality of the human-nature split. In 
Western thought, humans are set apart from the rest of nature, including all other animals. 
Howell's (1996) examination of the Chewong 7 emphasises cultural contingency of the 
human/nature split. Humans are not set aside as separate from other beings, but exist 
alongside plants, animals, spirits, who also have consciousness. The ontology inherent in 
Western thinking, and entrenched in science, is very different from the Chewong, and thus 
challenges the universality of Western ontology. The Chewong do, of course, make 
distinctions, including between 'them' and 'us' (p.141). But these distinctions have both very 
different, as well as fluid, boundaries. Howell notes that dividing reality into 
materiaVspiritual, mindlbody, or emotionslintellect, makes no sense to the Chewong. Reality 
is "endlessly mutually interacting, and fluid beings and qualities" (p.142). 
Such ethnographic studies have contributed significantly to notion that conceptions of nature 
are social constructs. Descola (1996, p.82) suggests the nature-culture dichotomy was an 
inadequate tool to explain the ways people interacted with their environment (see also 
Crumley, 1994). It needs to be noted that the nature-culture dichotomy was at times 
theoretically fruitful in anthropology (pp.83-84), and caution must be shown in not 
downplaying the culture side of the equation (Descola criticises Levi-Strauss on this point). 
Nevertheless, Descola suggests that the conceptual landscape around which our intellectual 
activity takes place could be quite fruitfully restructured in order to take greater analytical 
care of the diverse ontologies anthropologists encounter: 
"Once the ancient nature-culture orthogonal grid has been disposed of, a new multi-dimensional 
anthropological landscape may emerge, in which stone adzes, quarks, cultivated plants and the 
genome map, hunting rituals and oil production may become intelligible as so many variations 
within a single set of relations encompassing humans as well as non-humans" (1996, p.99). 
7 A small group of aboriginal people in the Malay tropical forest. 
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It is not just anthropology that is addressing these challenges. Ecological Marxism, 
particularly through the journal Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, has offered various 
reformulations of the Marxist project to reflect the role of nature alongside capital, and the 
dialectical interaction between the two (Goldman & Schurman, 2000). This dialectical 
interaction is also captured by the social studies of science. Latour (1993), in particular, has 
argued that there is no such thing as pure nature, or pure culture. Rather, we are left with 
nature-culture hybrids which function as quasi-objects and quasi-subjects, blurring the 
tradition Western distinction between subject and object. 
This blurring of distinctions, or categories, is not confined to the nature-culture debate. 
Indeed, there are many other examples where traditional categories are being challenged, not 
because they are 'wrong', but because they are less analytically helpful with the contemporary 
questions being posed. For example, science has recently been dissected in order to 
understand where the boundaries between it and wider society lie. To talk of science suggests 
that we talk of something discrete, embodying clear boundaries, and thus distinguishable from 
'society'. Gieryn (1995) argues there are two perspectives of 'the boundary problem', 
essentialism and constructivism: 
"Essentialists argue for the possibility and analytic desirability of identifying unique, and 
invariant qualities that set science apart from other cultural practices and products, and that 
explain its singular achievements .... Constructivists argue that no demarcation principles work 
universally and that the separation of science from other knowledge-producing activities is 
instead a contextually contingent and interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing 
selectively on inconsistent and ambiguous attributes" (1995, p.393). 
From this he argues that essentialists 'do' boundary work, arguing for, and defending the line 
between, science and non-science. Popper stated this as a primary focus of his writings 
(1998), and Gieryn also includes Kuhn in the essentialist camp. On the issue of boundary 
demarcation, Kuhn's solution is to talk in terms of paradigmatic consensus with scientific 
communities; it is these that distinguish science from non-science. Such boundaries are 
historically contingent, and although within them we can produce "the wonderfully adapted 
set of instruments we call modem science" (Kuhn, 1996, p.172), each new revolution will 
upturn the current theoretical landscape within which we create our science. Even where the 
boundaries between science and non-science are well established, such boundaries are 
primarily sociological constructs of discursive consensus, more than they reflect anything 
'essential' in the nature of science. 
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While essentialists such as Kuhn 'do' boundary work, constructivists 'watch' it getting done 
(Gieryn, 1995, p.394). The sociological study of science look at how boundaries are actually 
drawn, how decisions on inclusion (what activities belong to genuine science) and exclusion 
(what activities do not belong). Gieryn raises the question of where science gets its authority. 
It is not in some essential quality of science, or some recurring and necessary criterion, as we 
have discussed above. There are no stable, non-contingent qualities to rely on. Rather, the 
authority of science lies in the capacity of certain groups or interests to occupy the 
cartographic space that defines science. This contested and historically contingent process is 
"driven by a social interest in claiming, expanding, protecting, monopolizing, usurping, 
denying or restricting the cognitive authority of science" (Gieryn, 1995, p.4D5). On this view, 
science is nothing other than a 'space' that is negotiated and contested. It is a 'spatial marker' 
that has no content until it is filled. Itis this process of filling that gives the boundaries of 
science shape and determines what is scientific: 
"Whatever ends up as inside science or out is a local and episodic accomplishment, a 
consequence of rhetorical games of inclusion or exclusion in which antagonistic parties do their 
best to justify their cultural map for audiences whose support, power or influence they seek to 
enrol. Crucially, the "essential features" of science are provisional and contextual results of 
successful boundary-work, not determinants of who wins" (Gieryn, 1995, p.406, emphasis in 
original). 
Viewed sociologically (and supported by a range of empiricalliterature8), science is a 'space' 
of discursive contestation. Participants in the debate do not begin de novo, but rather start 
from a socialised position and then makes claims as to what is scientific and what lies outside 
those boundaries. Feyerabend (1998) argues, somewhat cheekily, that astrology could be 
admitted, while Thagard (1998) argues more seriously for its exclusion. But these are not 
simply matters for intellectuals; boundary drawing has institutional, financial and symbolic 
implications. The distribution of resources relies in large part on what, and by extension, who, 
is included in the definition of science. This is the crux ofthat matter in relation to defining 
the 'environment'. What is to be included, where the boundaries lie, whose interests are 
reflected in this construction, and, most importantly, what issues and whose interests are left 
out, obscured, or rendered invisible. The literature discussed above draws a very clear 
conclusion; 'nature' is socially constructed. 
8 See Gieryn, 1995, for examples; also Jasanoff, et al., 1995. 
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This does not need to imply that there is no real world out there. As Arne Naess recently 
commented: "Having been taken at least twice by avalanches; I have never felt them to be 
social constructions" (2000, p.335). When earthquakes strike and buildings collapse, rivers 
flood and people drown, cancer cells destroy internal organs, fatalities occur in a series of 
nose-to-tail accidents on a motorway, or innumerable other events that affect human beings, 
such events press themselves upon human experience, independent of the state of those 
human minds. Such physical events do not rely for their existence, or ontology, on human 
consciousness. However, it is correct to say that the meaning of such events is profoundly 
conditioned by human consciousness and personal and cultural factors. But this is different 
from the physicality of these events; death or injury cannot be 'wished' away by acts of 
mind9. The capacity to think about our environment, to conceptualise the world in certain 
ways, regardless of whether these are Kantian categories or culturally relativistic, is 
fundamental to human survival. Without a roughly accurate match between human minds and 
the external (physical) world, human beings would simply not have survived the evolutionary 
process. This is Dewey's argument against Descartes and Russell's question: "How we can 
know the external world exists at all?" (See Diesing, 1991, pp.76-77) Rolston puts it bluntly: 
"All those persons who did not think that 'lion' refers to a real predator lurking in the grass 
are extinct" (cited in Kidner, 2000, p. 345). 
But this argument does not undermine the notion that our experience of external phenomena 
is mediated through culture. For example, Kuhn (1996) argued scientific knowledge is 
constructed through paradigms, and paradigms are, at times, overthrown in revolutions. Kuhn 
describes this process as akin to a gestalt experience (Chalmers, 1999, p.115) where the 
viewpoint of the scientist is radically shifted: 
"[D]uring revolutions, scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar 
instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had 
been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light 
and are joined with unfamiliar ones as well .... What were ducks in the scientist's world before 
the revolution are rabbits afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior of the box from above 
later sees its interior from below" (Kuhn, 1996, p.lll). 
9 Even if they could be, for example through religious miracles brought about by prayer or meditation, I am not 
aware of any empirical evidence that would challenge the argument that we live in a material world, and that that 
world exists independent of human mind. The overwhelming weight of evidence is that the 'laws' of nature bind 
human beings; miracles, read as temporary 'suspensions' of natural laws, if they occur at all, are rare. So even if 
one was inclined to believe in them, this still does not make the ontology of the natural world subject to human 
mind. Most of us do not have this power! 
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Many other leading philosophers of science have also argued that we construct the world we 
see, although we do not construct it simply as we wish (to borrow from Marx). Lakatos's 
methodology of scientific research programmes' (see Nickles, 2000; Diesing, 1991), 
Feyerabend's (1998) methodological anarchy, or Rorty's pragmatism express a shared view 
that 'nature' is not simply out there to be 'read' like a book, but is rather mediated through a 
complex variety of cultural constructs. For example, Rorty argues that "modem science does 
not enable us to cope because it corresponds [with reality], it just plain enables us to cope" 
(Rorty, 1982, p.xvii). 
The nature-culture divide is deeply embedded in Western consciousness and it is difficult to 
think outside these categories. There are also very good reasons to make such distinctions, 
and they prove at times useful analytic tools. My argument here is not that this distinction is 
incorrect, but rather that it is one possibility among others. Given that language produces 
discourse, and discourse embodies power (see Dant, 1991; Dryzek, 1997; Fischer & Forester, 
1993), the critical analyst will seek to investigate the particular constructions of nature-
culture. My interest is in the way this debate is treated in the RMA, and specifically in S5, the 
Purpose of the Act. 
Section 5 of the RMA and its Discontents 
Section 5 of the RMA contains the purpose of the Act and therefore forms a key focus for 
determining how the Act will be interpreted (Pardy 1997, p.70; Memon, 2002, p.303). Section 
5 states: 
Purpose-(l) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources. 
(2) In this Act, "sustainable management" means managing the use, development, and 
protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and 
communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health 
and safety while-
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the 
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) A voiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment. 
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The other significant Section for my purposes is Section 2, where the term 'environment' is 
defined. 
"Environment" includes-
(a) Ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and 
(b) All natural and physical resources; and 
(c) Amenity values; and 
(d) The social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the matters 
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition or which are affected by those 
matters. 
Much debate has taken place over S5 of the Act. 1 begin with a brief review of the history 
leading to the formulation of this Section, before examining more recent critique. Much of 
this history is drawn from Upton (1995a), the former Minister for the Environment, under 
whose guidance the Act the passed. There are those who contest Upton's interpretation ofthis 
history (e.g., Skelton and Memon, 2002; Memon, 2002; Grundy, 1995a, 1995b), but, as Upton 
notes (1995a, p.39) the controversy was still unresolved after the passing of the Act, and, if 
anything, has intensified. Upton also claims some right to comment on what was intended in 
S5: "I am perhaps uniquely aware of what was intended. That is because the drafting ofS5 
was largely mine" (1995b: p.124). My purpose for using Upton here is to trace the evolution 
of S5, because it is highly detailed, drawing from the documentation produced at the time, as 
well as his direct involvement. My purpose is not to declare whose view is correct, although 1 
make some comment below on this. Rather, it is to expose the competing interpretations of 
S5. 
There were four identifiable stages in the evolution ofS5; the initial policy development that 
cumulated in the government discussion paper People, Environment & Decision Making: The 
Government Proposals for RMLR 1988; the Bill presented to the House and reported back 
from the select committee; the Review Group work done after the National Government came 
to power leading to a Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) of 7th May 1991; and further changes 
to that SOP on 2 July 1991. 
The first stage was characterised by disagreement over the purpose of the Bill (Skelton & 
Memon, 2002, p.3). New Zealand was in the midst of a well documented 'policy revolution' 
and therefore such contestation was not unsurprising. Upton refers to the two principle 
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competitors as the 'treasury view' and the 'non-treasury' view (199Sa, p.28}1O. The non-
treasury view, Upton argues, is a 'somewhat vague' list of values, such as individual rights, 
public welfare, needs of future generations etc. (p.29) that required a balancing act on the part 
of decision makers (who needed the 'wisdom of Solomon'). The Treasury view took an 
economic approach, emphasising individual choice and the role of the market in resource 
allocation, as opposed to the problems facing non-market mechanisms. Determining what 
values required support was best left to the market, while the role of statute was to declare the 
principles of the Act. The critical difference was not that one particular value should be 
overriding (there were numerous values that were seen as important), but that the mechanisms 
proposed by each view were different. Upton notes that the idea of sustainable management 
"had not yet appeared on the horizon" (p.30). Also of significance was the emerging focus on 
effects, thus marking a break with the old Town and Country Planning Act. It appears the 
primary focus at this point was to "limit the adverse spillover effects of people's activities, 
and to allocate Crown resources" (p.30). The debate was over the extent to which 
environmental effects would be carried, with Upton suggesting that emphasis was on a full 
and balanced account of factors involved in such decisions. 
The presentation of the Bill to the House produced a sharp division on the wording of SS. The 
majority view preferred the idea of 'good environmental management' with the early focus on 
outcomes, not processes. As Skelton and Memon (2002, pA) put it, "it requires decision 
makers to adopt an integrated perspective for managing natural and physical resources". In 
stark contrast, the Treasury obj ected that the normative term, 'good', was too vague to be any 
use and would leave the definition of good up to elected officials instead of market 
mechanisms. Many submitters had argued for the inclusion of 'fundamental principles', with 
some arguing that sustainable development, implicitly involving ecological, economic, social 
and cultural factors, ought to be the fundamental principle. Treasury argued instead that the 
fundamental goal of resource management law was to ensure "resources are allocated to the 
most highly valued alternative" (Upton, 1995b, p.3I). The government should not therefore 
select its preferred value(s}, but rather allow market mechanisms to drive the allocation. 
IGupton, Atkins & Willis, (2002) elaborate on this in a later publication: "There was a debate ... between what we 
might term the 'Treasury' and 'non-Treasury' world views; but it was, at the outset, less a contest between a bio-
physical 'bottom-line' versus an 'integrative' approach than a contest between the integrative approach and one 
that sought to give pre-eminent status to ensuring that resources (or rights to them) were allocated to the most 
highly valued uses". 
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The issue of the competing perspectives, a "holistic statement of value and a process for 
reconciling individually held values" (ibid, p.32) was 'resolved' by the introducing the term 
'sustainable management' as the Act's purpose. Upton argues that, despite the new term, the 
Section involved "considerations so mixed that the consequences of any particular application 
of the principle were likely to be highly unpredictable" (p.33). 
The Review Group, appointed upon the change of government in 1990, examined, among 
other things, the "relationship between biophysical and socio-economic considerations" (cited 
in ibid, p.34). The Review Group decided not to define sustainable management, but relied on 
the principles included in the clause to shed light on matters to be taken into account to 
achieve the purpose. In a review of its work before its final presentation to government, the 
Review Group made some textual alterations. They discarded: 
"the balancing of socio-economic and biophysical aspects proposed by the Select 
Committee ... and replaced it with a version that "conceive[d] of the biophysical characteristics 
of resources as a constraint on resource use". This preference for measurable, biophysical 
bottom lines was the Review Group's most significant contribution ... " (ibid, p.35). 
One significant intervention by the Minister after the review was presented to the government, 
was to move reference to the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems from 
Clause 5 to Clause 4 (what would eventually become S5 of the RMA), thus emphasising the 
biophysical limits of natural and physical resources. This focus was part of a strengthening of 
the emphasis on effects, towards the treasury position where the government's role was to 
ensure adverse effects were internalised. 
Upton notes there was a last minute attempt to further develop the effects focus by pushing 
towards a "new, trading approach to environmental externalities that had gathered momentum 
over the preceding months" (p.38). However, this 'high tide mark' failed in part because the 
policy development work simply had not been done. 
Finally, on May 7 a Supplementary Order Paper was presented, "stretching the biophysical 
bottom line and sustainable management-in tone, if not in substance" (ibid) as far as it could 
go. He also notes that the "final formula was in fact very close to that initially recommended 
by the review group but which we had temporarily moved away from in our quest for an 
austerely biophysical approach" (p.39). 
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Much of the debate over S5 turns on the conjunction 'while'. Sustainable management 
enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing 
and for their health and safety while (a) sustaining the needs of future generations, (b) 
protecting environmental life-support and (c) dealing with adverse effects of activities on the 
environment. Does this imply a balancing approach between these values (trading off 
between the social and Clauses (a), (b) and (c)) or does it mean there are certain limits 
determined by these clauses? Upton reiterates his argument that Clauses (a), (b), and (c) must 
be achieved, whatever happens regarding social and cultural needs (p.40). He concludes: 
"I cannot deny that it is a philosophically liberal position that endorses the value pluralism of 
contemporary society. We deliberately avoided a definition that sought to define sustainable 
management as a state of social, cultural, economic and environmental well-being. To have 
done so, would, of course, have enabled decision-makers to enquire into the social, cultural and 
economic effects of resource use on people, thereby returning us to a world of 'resource 
allocation by wise planners rather than market participants .... Certainly, the notion of planning 
for the allocation of resources accorded to some centrally determined view of need has no place 
in the sort of market economy on which we rely today" (pp.40-41). 
This, then, is how Upton understands the evolution of S5 ofthe RMA. Others have written on 
this (Memon, 1993,2002; Skelton and Memon, 2002), but much of the debate turns on how 
S5, and the relative roles of biophysical bottom lines and other values (social, cultural, 
economic), is to be interpreted. A significant proportion of the broader critique centres on the 
neo-liberal underpinnings of the Act, the theoretical aspects of which I discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Much of this, it seems to me, is the result of different paradigms at work, 
although it is possible to detect a pragmatic orientation coming through in the practice of local 
authorities (Perkins & Thoms, 2001). 
Memon's (2002) critique is strongly critical of the market liberalist paradigm of 
environmental planning. Tracing the genesis ofS5, he argues Treasury's view is property-
rights based, emphasising biophysical bottom lines developed by local authorities under an 
environmental effects management statute (p.304), not a planning mechanism to resolve 
conflicts over values. "Thus, the purpose of the Act is the sustainable management (not 
development) of natural and physical resources (instead of environment)" (p.305, emphases 
in original). However, Memon argues that a careful reading of 85 challenges this biophysical 
approach and that 85 ought to be best understood in a wider context as: 
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"a decision-making process that should take account of ecological, economic, and social and 
cultural values. The attraction of sustainability defined this way is rather than elevating bio-
physical resources above everything, it ensures the proper consideration of development in its 
environmental context" (p.305). 
He argues that two main perspectives over the meaning of SS have emerged. First, there is an 
integrated perspective (which was the focus of the Labour Government when drafting the 
bill), and secondly, a bio-physical bottom line perspective (Treasury), which only came to the 
fore under the National Government. 
Pardy (1997) goes further, suggesting there are at least three competing interpretations of SS. 
First, the view of Upton and others, which has a strictly biophysical and ecological focus and 
does not require consideration of social and other values. This is the least interventionist 
approach. The second interpretation involves balancing ecological matters with social, 
cultural, health and safety considerations, an approach Pardy claims that currently has favour 
within the planning community (and, it would appear, in case law: see below). According to 
Pardy, on this perspective Clauses (a), (b) and (c) ofSS can be violated ifit is considered 
justified on social or cultural grounds, and also social or cultural activities can be restricted 
even if their effects are environmentally appropriate. Finally, there is a perspective that gives 
priority to ecological factors (Clauses (a), (b) and (c)). Social, cultural and economic 
wellbeing can be evaluated, provided that the biophysical requirements are first met. This 
implies a 'middle ground' between the two, where social, cultural and economic factors can 
be included in a decision. 
This debate is substantial. For instance, Grundy (199Sa, 1995b) takes Upton's interpretation 
of SS to task, arguing it is "ideologically driven rather than based on reason" (199Sa, pAO). 
Upton (199Sb), quite correctly in my view, argues that being ideologically driven does not 
make the argument illogical, and also notes, again correctly, that Grundy's analysis is not 
devoid of ideology itselfll. These points aside, he argues that the market processes (of which 
the Minister, as he was at the time, favours) cannot achieve intergenerational equity, intrinsic 
values of ecosystems, and even sustainable utilisation of resources (PA4). From this and 
similar arguments, he stresses that SS must be interpreted in a balancing fashion, rather than 
II For example, Grundy comments: "It represents an integration of economic, sociocultural, and ecological 
considerations. This is how it should be" (1995a, pAl). This normative statement is entirely reasonable to make, 
but it does reflect a particular ideological orientation. Grundy's argument could be strengthened by taking on 
board the feminist perspective about declaring one's subject position, for no-one has a 'view from no-where' 
(Young, 1990, p.100). 
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simply taking a bio-physicalline on subparas (a), (b) and (c). While the Minister disagreed 
(Upton, 1995b), a similar line is taken by Skelton and Memon (2002), who argue for a broad 
definition of sustainable management with no primacy given to the bio-physical. Rather, it 
takes an "integrated" approach in which social, cultural, economic and ecological values 
are given equal consideration. 
Recent analysis of Environment Court decisions has clarified which of these perspectives is 
considered the correct one. Skelton and Memon (2002) argue the Environment Court has 
endorsed a holistic perspective, that "an overall broad judgement" between the various values, 
is the correct interpretation. They state that this interpretation differs from the one favoured by 
fonner Environment Minister Upton, and also that the RMA is endorsed as a conflict 
resolving statute (p.9). Upton, Atkins & Willis (2002), in their critique of Skelton and 
Memon, come to a similar conclusion about case law. However, they differ in their 
interpretation of what this means. Skelton and Memon consider that clarity has now been 
given by the Court and the onus is now on decision makers to take account of this (p.lO). 
Upton et ai., (2002) argue that the ""clearer policy direction" which Skelton and Memon 
consider the Courts have provided is in fact the substitution of quite a different policy from 
that expressed by Parliament in 1991 ... ". It is clear, then, that agreement over what S5 means 
may have been temporarily settled by the Court, but there is still no widespread agreement 
about what it should mean. For this reason Upton et ai., (2002) suggest that in the absence of 
any higher court ruling, the issue would be best addressed by an amendment like that 
produced by the select committee in the recent Resource Management Amendment Bill, but 
that was ultimately rejected (RMAB, 1999, pp.5-6). 
In summary, the debate over S5 is a debate about the meaning of environment (despite it 
being defined in the Act; see above), as well as about differing visions of how communities 
should make decisions. In respect of the first issue, there are a number of questions. How is 
the environment being defined, and where are its boundaries? On one hand it is viewed in 
relation to the RMA as the biophysical realm, analytically separate from the social or cultural 
worlds. The emphasis on bottom lines is instructive to the extent that it assumes there is a 
workable analytic distinction. On the other hand, environment is seen in an anthropomorphic 
sense as including the social, cultural, aesthetic, economic and ecological. The literature 
examined above, however, crafts these varying interpretations on a more fundamental notion, 
the type of preferred decision making system. Those who prefer a neo-liberal political 
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philosophy tend to, then, see the environment through this lens. The role of liberal 
government ought to be a minimal one, ensuring a baSIC minimum of legal protection for 
individuals and property. The same protection ought to be granted to the natural environment, 
but only to basic biophysical bottom-lines and primarily to protect human interests. To grant 
anything beyond this is to impose some values that may not be shared by all citizens, thus 
violating the principles of liberty. Conversely, those who hold to a more interventionist 
planning paradigm, will expand the definition of the environment to include those elements 
that fit best with their political philosophy. Pluralist democracies require fora for the 
settlement of contested disputes over values, and this is a legitimate role of governments. 
Provided appropriate democratic processes are in place, governments may engage in planning 
processes that reflect public values or interests. 
This may imply it is all ideological. Ideas do structure our practical orientation, although there 
is also much room for pragmatic responses (what works). There is a very real tension between 
the theoretically derived postulates of both extremes of liberalism and central planning, and 
the practical realities, with all their unforeseen complexities and problems. Highly centralised 
economic planning ran into significant problems in New Zealand in the 1980s, leading to the 
search for an alternative governance framework. However, the purist approach to neo-
liberalism was equally problematic at the "coal-face". It can be argued that the practical 
difficulties of a hands-off market liberalist approach, led local authorities to search for ways 
to exercise greater control through planning mechanisms. So while the Act was ostensibly 
anti-planning, the outcome is hardly the elimination of planning hoped for by Kerr (2002), 
and worried about by others (Perkins & Thoms, 2001). 
The boundaries (Gieryn, 1995) that are constructed around different interpretations ofS5 are 
historically contingent and therefore could conceivably be different. This analysis has shown 
the way the social and ecological are dealt with and the particular boundaries around them. It 
is important to note that no-one in this analysis has questioned the nature-society boundary, 
discussed in the previous Section. The assumption is the traditional Western notion of the 
nature-society dualism. There may be a number of reasons for this. First, statutes reflect the 
society which produces them and it ought not to be surprising that the Act does not challenge 
this. Nevertheless, there is an obvious gap here in relation to Maori (or other spiritual) views 
about the ontology of environment. The biophysical construction of environment isa product 
of Western science, but is not the only way of constructing the concept of environment. 
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Plumwood's analysis (1998, 2002) and deep ecology's understanding of the ontology of 
nature-human relationship (Fox, 1988) offer alternative constructions not encountered in the 
literature discussed. The questions posed by this dissertation will provide an answer in 
relation to how ecological reason is constructed within the case studies examined, and also 
shed insight as to the notion of environment implicit in these practices. 
The final Section of this chapter will describe the decision making structure of the Act. This 
will clarify the various responsibilities and processes encountered in the case studies that 
follow. 
The Structure of the RMA 
The RMA is divided up into 15 parts, and unfolds in a systematic fashion to detail the purpose 
and principles of the Act, and then the structure of responsibilities under the Act. This Section 
describes those aspects of the Act of most relevance to the case studies that follow. Because 
the case studies are focused primarily on either the resource consent process or a district plan, 
these Sections will be emphasised. Nevertheless, the overall framework will be outlined12• 
To make sense of the Act's structure I make the conceptual distinction between the strategic 
and operational levels of the Act (Grinlinton, 2002, p.31). I begin with the strategic level by 
looking at the purpose of the Act and Duties and Restrictions under the Act and then tum to 
the primary instruments at the strategic level. I then move to the operational level ofthe 
planning process, regional and district plans, resource consents. A useful analogy suggested 
by Chisholm & Edmonds (1994, p.19) is that the strategic policy level represents the 'bones' 
of the RMA, while the operational planning levels are the 'flesh'. We begin with the 'bones'. 
12 Those readers familiar with the RMA may wish to skip this Section and move to the case studies. 
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Strategic Framework 
Purpose, Duties and Restrictions 
The strategic framework for the Act provides both the purposes for the Act and a clear 
statement on what duties and restrictions are required. Central to these duties and restrictions 
is the idea of 'effects'. PART I of the Act provides a comprehensive definition: 
"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the term "effect" in relation to the use, 
development, or protection of natural and physical resources, or in relation to the environment, 
includes-
(a) Any positive or adverse effect: and 
(b) Any temporary or permanent effect; and 
(c) Any past, present, or future effect; and 
(d) Any cumulative effect, which arises over time or in combination with other effects 
regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the effect, and also includes-
(e) Any potential effect of high probability: and 
(f) Any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact." 
PART I contains only three Sections, the first being the interpretation Section which defines 
the words used in the Act, and the third is the 'Act to bind the Crown'. The second Section on 
effects signals the distinctive role given to the definition of an effect, and emphasises the 
effects based nature of the RMA. This links directly to S5(2)(c) which defines sustainable 
management as including the "avoid[ance of], remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of 
activities on the environment." 
P ART II (Purposes and Principles) states the Act's purpose of sustainable management 
(discussed above in S5), and then declares a number of matters of national importance. Three 
of these are preservation or protection orientated and include the coastal environment, 
wetlands, lakes and rivers, significant indigenous vegetation and habits of indigenous flora. 
The other two matters are primarily cultural resources, and include the protection of public 
access to the coast, lakes and rivers (a traditional right generally taken for granted by most 
New Zealanders), and the relationship Maori have with 'ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi 
tapu and other taonga'. The Act then details eight other matters that authorities must have 
particular regard to: kaitiakitanga; efficient use; amenity values; intrinsic values of 
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ecosystems; heritage values; quality of the environment; finite characteristics of resources; 
and the habitat of trout and salmon. Finally, this Section ends with the duty to take Te Tiriti 0 
Waitangi into account. 
The strategic framework is developed further in PART III (Duties and Restrictions Under this 
Act) where the presumptions relating to resource use are spelt out (MfE, 1991b, p.9). This 
part of the Act deals with land (s 9-11), coastal marine areas (s 12), the beds of river and lakes 
(s 13), water (s 14), discharges of contaminants (s 15), noise (s 16), and adverse effects (s 17). 
The remaining Sections (s 18-23) deal with various procedures and plans, rather than the 
substantive environmental focus of the preceding Sections. 
Under Section 9 persons are free to act as they please (a permissive approach), as long as they 
do not violate a rule in a district or regional plan. If they do, they require a resource consent, 
unless that activity is not permitted. Section 10 deals with certain existing uses of land prior to 
the introduction of the RMA, and therefore does not constitute decision-making in regards to 
my interests here. Section 11 forbids subdivision except where allowed by a district plan or 
resource consent. Section 12 (Restrictions on the use of coastal marine area) restricts activities 
to those allowed under a regional coastal plan or resource consent. Section 13 restricts 
activities to those allowed under a regional plan or a resource consent. Section 14 restricts the 
use, damming or diversion of water to those allowed under a regional plan, resource consent, 
regulation or allowed under S14(3), which specifies exceptions relating to reasonable needs 
for domestic use, drinking water for animals, geothermal water in accordance with tikanga 
Maori, recreational use of coastal waters and fire-fighting needs. Excepting the latter use, all 
these activities must not cause adverse effects. 
Section 15 is restrictive for all discharges, except for those into air or land where 
contaminants cannot enter water, are not from an industrial or trade premise, and where they 
do not contravene a rule in a regional plan. All other cases require a resource consent. Section 
16 may be considered of more social than ecological importance. Nevertheless, it is an effect 
that could, with sufficient magnitude, affect ecosystems by disruption to some species. 
Of note is Section 17 which states that a duty exists "to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse 
effects ... whether or not the activity is in accordance with a rule in a plan, a resource consent" 
or other provision. While Section 17 states that this duty is not enforceable against any 
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person, S 17(3) allows for enforcement orders to be issued by the Environment Court and 
abatement notices to be issued by an enforcement officer. 
One final Section to note is the duty to consider alternatives, assess benefits and costs etc 
(s32). This Section has significant implications for the Environment and Conservation 
Ministers and all local bodies, and requires careful evaluation of any objective, policy, rule, or 
method, including providing information and services, and charging fees. This involves 
assessing whether the policy etc is necessary for achieving the purposes of the Act, the 
alternative means available for achieving the Act's purpose, and a reasons for and against 
adopting a particular policy. Randerson comments that S32 has a number of objectives: 
"The first and principle purpose is to impose a specific statutory requirement for a deliberate 
and rational approach to the exercise of the functions under the Act .... Secondly, it is designed 
to increase the accountability of decision makers .... Thirdly, it allows for the introduction of 
economic instruments as an alternative or additional means of achieving the statutory 
purpose" (1997, p.116). 
The preceding Sections provide a broad set of duties and restrictions on the use of resources. 
They form one half of the strategic framework of the Act. Most of these duties and restrictions 
are to be specified in either a regional or district plan, or resource consent. None of them 
specify exactly what can be done or what restrictions are in place; there is yet no operational 
content specified. In order to produce the specific requirements over the use, development and 
protection of land, water, and other resources, the Act puts in place a set of instruments, a 
regime of policies statements and national standards. Therefore this second part of the 
strategic framework consists of policy instruments. 
Policy Instruments 
The RMA has a hierarchy of policy statements and management plans, in which plans must 
be consistent with higher policy13. At the strategic level there are three policy instruments; 
\3 This hierarchy consists of an interlocking series of instruments designed to produce an integrated approach to 
sustainable management (Hassan & Sargisson, 1996, p.26). National policy statements deal with matters of 
national interest, and New Zealand coastal policy statements concern the coastal environment. Regional policy 
statements must not be inconsistent with national policy statements, New Zealand coastal policy statements, or 
water conservation orders. Regional plans must not be inconsistent with national and regional policy statements 
or water conservation order. Regional coastal plans have a similar requirement and district plans must not be 
inconsistent with all of the above. National environmental standards prevail over regional or district rules 
(Hassan & Sargisson, 1996, pp.26-27). 
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national environmental standards, national and coastal policy statements, water conservation 
orders, and regional policy statements. 
National Environmental Standards 
National environmental standards can be made by Order in Council, and may prescribe 
technical standards that deal with noise, contaminants, water quality, level or flow, air quality, 
and soil quality in relation to the discharge of contaminants (S43). The Minister must 
establish a process that provides adequate opportunity for public comment, requires a report 
and recommendations to be made to the Minister on those comments, and then publicly notify 
the report and recommendation. There are some national environmental standards being 
currently developed. 
National Policy Statements 
National policy statements (NPSs) are designed to "state policies on matters of national 
significance that are relevant to achieving the purpose of this Act" (S45(1)). There are no 
NPSs currently in place, although there is one in preparation14. They provide a means of 
coordinating behaviour and of setting uniform standards where circumstances require this. 
NPSs must have regard to a wide range of effects, including actual or potential effects, New 
Zealand's interests in the global environment, any structure, place or area of national 
significance, anything that potentially affects more than one region, the effects from new 
technology, anything due to its scale, uniqueness, and irreversibility among other things. 
New Zealand coastal policy statements (NZCPS), of which there is to be at least one at all 
times, are the responsibility of the Minister of Conservation. The current NZCPS, approved 
by the Minister in May 1994, "recognises the national priority for preservation of the natural 
character of the coastal environment and the relationship with characteristics identified as of 
special value to tangata whenua" (Palmer, cited in Hassan & Sargis son, 1996, p.28). It 
generally covers the area from the foreshore and seabed from the mean high water springs to 
14 National policy on indigenous biodiversity is currently being drafted, including a NPS on indigenous 
biodiversity. In addition, MfE have developed a work programme for 2005-06 to examine a wide range of 
possible NPSs. 
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the outer limits of the te~itorial sea, although where there are hills behind the coast, it may 
extend to the dominant ridge behind the coast (Randerson, 1997, p.84-85). 
Water conservation orders (WCOs) have a significant role in ecological life-support. They are 
to recognise and sustain outstanding amenity or intrinsic values of waters in their natural 
state, or protect those same values in waters that are no longer in their natural state, but are 
still considered outstanding. The characteristics considered outstanding include its habitat for 
terrestrial or aquatic organisms, its quality as a fishery, for wild, scenic or other cultural 
characteristics, its scientific and ecological values and its recreational, historic, spiritual or 
cultural value, and characteristics considered of outstanding significance in accordance with 
tikanga Maori (S 199). 
Regional Policy Statements 
The final 'strategic' instruments under the RMA are the regional policy statements (RPS), 
designed to achieve integrated resource management of the whole region (S59). Each region 
is required to have, at all times, one RPS (S60). RPSs are designed to provide an overview of 
the resource management issues and concerns of a region (defined by watershed boundaries), 
and can involve policies and methods, but not rules (Hassan & Sargisson, 1996, p.28). They 
are intended to be forward-looking and strategic in focus, formulating and prioritising 
regional management objectives (MfE, 1991a, p.10). They must provide for the matters set 
out in the second schedule to the Act and include the use of water, discharges into water, air 
or land, setting objectives and policies for actual or potential effects of any land use that has 
regional significance, the use of land in relation to soil conservation, the quantity and quality 
of water, including coastal water, avoidance of natural hazards, responsibilities in relation to 
hazardous substances, the introduction and planting of any exotic plant around or in 
waterways, and noise. These matters, however, must first be determined for their regional 
significance and then whether they are appropriate for the circumstances of the region 
(Chisholm & Edmonds, 1994, p.15). Finally, RPS are required to state the significant resource 
management issues of the region and those of concern to iwi authorities, objectives, policies 
and methods along with explanations for why they are adopted, anticipated results and a 
variety of other requirements (S62). 
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Operational Framework 
The operational level is designed to put 'flesh' on the (policy) bones (Chisholm & Edmonds, 
1994, p.19). It is here that rules can be developed specifying what activities are not permitted, 
or the standards required for activities. The operational level of the planning process consists 
of regional plans, district plans, designations, resource consents and enforcement measures, 
although I limit this description here to plans and resource consents, the focus of the case 
studies in the following Chapters. 
The purpose of a regional plan (RP) is to assist the regional council to carry out its functions, 
particularly in relation to integrated resource management. They can apply to the whole, or 
any part of a region. Regional plans are optional, although Randerson (1997, p.ll3) notes that 
in practice, regional councils will be obliged to produce RPs in order to develop rules (S68). 
Rules can be used to prohibit, regulate or allow activities. The Act specifies four types: 
regional rules; rules relating to water quality; rules about discharges; and rules about 
esplanade reserves on reclamation (S68-S71). Councils may produce any number of plans, 
they can contain new regulatory instruments and they can also be based on areas or subject 
matter (MfE, 1991 a, pp.l 0-11). While there exists wide latitude in content and purpose of 
RPs, they nevertheless must be in accordance with the functions of regional councils (S30), 
the issues raised in Part II, and comply with S32. There is a strong presumption in the Act that 
rules and regulation are only to be developed in order to meet the purposes of the Act. 
Regional plans should be prepared in order to address any issue identified within the RPS as 
well as in a number of other circumstances such as resource conflicts, protection of regionally 
significant resources, natural hazard threats, foreseeable resource demands, significant 
concerns of tangata whenua, the restoration or enhancement of deteriorated resources and any 
land or water use activity that has an adverse effect on soil, water or air (MfE, 1991a, p.l3; 
S65). The plan must also identify the issues, objectives to be achieved, statement and 
explanation of policies, methods and reasons for adopting them, information that is required 
for a resource consent, environmental results anticipated and review and monitoring 
procedures, and any additional matters that are required for fulfilling the councils functions, 
duties and responsibilities. 
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Unlike RPs, Regional Coastal Plans (RCP) are compulsory. Their purpose is to assist a 
regional council, in association with the Conservation Minister, to achieve the purposes of the 
Act. Regional councils must prepare a RCP and are then required to submit it for approval to 
the Minister. Where a regional coastal plan forms part of a regional plan, the Minister of 
Conservation approves only that part relating to the coastal marine area. An additional 
requirement is compulsory consultation with the Minister of Transport (over issues of 
navigation and the Marine Pollution Act) and the Minister of Fisheries (fisheries management 
and aquaculture). 
District Plans (DPs) are compulsory and are "to assist territorial authorities to carry out their 
functions in order to achieve the purpose of [the] Act" (S72). In this sense, the statutory 
framework ofDPs 'closely resembles' the framework prescribed for regional plans (Chisholm 
& Edmonds, 1994, p.27). The usual requirements about consistency with higher-level policy 
and plans apply. The principal matters that may be provided for in DPs concern the use, 
development or protection of land and its associated natural and physical resources, including 
the control of subdivision, and managing the effects of the above on the community, other 
natural and physical resources, natural, physical, and cultural heritage sites including 
landscape values, historic places and waahi tapu. DPs are also required to state a similar set of 
requirements as with regional plans, such as the significant resource management issues of the 
district, objectives, policies, and methods. 
The final instrument in the operational framework is certainly not the least. Regional and 
district plans put restrictions on certain activities, and therefore when an activity is not 
permitted as of right, permission, or consent, from the authority is required. This is known as 
a resource consent (Christchurch Community Law Centre (CCLC), 1998, p.2). Resource 
consents have a close connection with S9-S15, Duties and Restrictions under the Act, where 
specified activities are prohibited unless a person has the appropriate resource consent. 
The Act identifies five types of consents. 'Land use consents' are the most common form of 
consent, and the Act deals with land use under S9. Where the use ofland contravenes some 
part of a DP, then a land use consent is required. The exception in relation to land is 
subdivision, which requires its own 'subdivision consent'. A 'coastal permit' is the third type 
of resource consent and concerns activities not permitted under S 12, S 14 and S 15. It deals 
with the coastal marine area and addresses issues of reclamation for the foreshore or seabed, 
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structures and depositing substances on the foreshore or seabed. A 'water permit' is the fourth 
type of resource consent, and deals with the use, taking, damming or diversion of water. They 
are primarily concerned with water quantity (Coutts, 1997, p.l8) whereas the fifth type of 
resource consent, a 'discharge permit' , deals mainly with water quality. Discharge permits 
also control the discharges in air or onto land. Different authorities are responsible for 
different consents, territorial authorities for land-use and subdivision, and regional councils 
for the remaining consents. 
The RMA classifies activities into a number of classes for the purposes of consents. Permitted 
activities are those where that Act or plan states none is required. Controlled activities are 
those that will be granted a resource consent provided any conditions in the plan are met. 
Discretionary activities require a resource consent, but are subject to the full discretion of the 
authority. Non-complying activities concern those that contravene a plan but are not 
prohibited. Finally, some activities are prohibited and no consent can be sought for these 
(Mill, 1991b, p.16). 
There is a standard process for applying for resource consents (S88). Resource consent 
applications must be done in the prescribed form (p.xxxiv from Coutts, 1997) and must 
address the matter specified in the Fourth Schedule. These involve: 
(a) A description of the proposal; 
(b) If there may be a significant adverse effect, then applicants must describe possible 
alternative locations or methods; 
(c) In relation to a discharge permit, applicants must demonstrate the proposed option is 
the 'best practicable method'; 
(d) An assessment of the actual or potential environmental effects; 
( e) Any environmental risk from hazardous substances or installations; 
(f) If a discharge, then a description of the nature of the discharge and likely risks to the 
environment, as well as possible alternative methods of discharge into other 
environments; 
(g) A description of mitigation measures to prevent or reduce actual or potential effect; 
(h) Identification of affected persons, consultation undertaken and the response to that 
consultation; 
(i) If the scale or significance of the effects require monitoring, applicants must describe 
the monitoring procedures that will be used. 
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The critical issue with a resource consent application is the assessment of effects. Section 2 of 
the Fourth Schedule provides a detailed list of matters relevant to assessing environmental 
effects, subject to the provisions of policies and plans. Applicants should consider: 
(a) Any effect on the neighbourhood, including socio-economic and cultural effects 
(b) Any physical effect, including landscape and visual effects; 
(c) Any effect on ecosystems, including on plants and animals, and physical disturbances 
to their habitat; 
(d) Any effect on physical or natural resources that have aesthetic, recreational, scientific, 
historical, spiritual or cultural, or other special value for present or future generations; 
(e) Any discharge of contaminants into the environment, including noise, and options for 
treatment and disposal of contaminants; and 
(f) Any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community or the environment through 
natural hazards or the use of hazardous substances or installations. 
There may be additional requirements that are contained in regional or district plans. 
Once the local authority has received the consent application, and is satisfied no further 
information is needed, it must notify the application no more than 10 working days from 
receipt of application (or from a reply from a request for more information). Some consents 
do not require notification. Controlled activities that are subdivisions, or that the DP allows 
without gaining affected persons approval, or written approval of affected parties has been 
obtained, do not require notification. Discretionary activities also do not require notification 
where the authority has restricted its discretion, the DP expressly permits consideration with 
affected parties approval, or if written approval from all affected persons has been obtained. 
Finally, non-complying activities need not be notified if the authority is satisfied that the 
effects will be minor and the applicant has obtained the written permission of people who 
may be adversely affected. Once consent has been given in writing, the consent authority shall 
take no further account of adverse effects on those people (Coutts, 1997, p.s33-34). 
Once notified, any person (note the continuation of a liberal approach to standing) can make a 
submission on a resource consent, provided it is done in accordance with Section 96. 
Submissions can be in opposition or in support, unlike the previous legislation, the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977, where only opposition could be expressed. It must be in writing 
and state the reason for the submission, the decision requested, the sort of conditions being 
sought (if appropriate) and whether the submitter wishes to be heard. The submitter is also 
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required to send a copy of the submission to the consent applicant. Submitters have a 
maximum of twenty working days to make a submission. As soon as practicable after this 
closing date, the authority must send a copy of submissions to the applicant. 
The next stage in the process is the pre-hearing meetings (S99). Although discretionary, they 
provide an opportunity for clarifying, mediating or facilitating resolution of any matter or 
issue in relation to a consent application. The consent authority can of its own accord, or upon 
request, invite applicants and submitters to meet with each other or any other person as the 
authority sees fit. Any outcome can be reported to the authority and circulated to all parties 
before the hearing. The outcome shall be used as information relevant to the hearing itself. 
If the pre-hearing meeting does not produce a resolution, the application then goes to a 
hearing (S 100-103). Hearings are normally required to be heard no more than twenty five 
working days after the date for submissions has closed. The authority must also give ten 
working days notice to everyone who will be involved in the hearing, as well as all relevant 
details such as time and place. Joint hearings can be held when two or more consent 
authorities are involved. Combined hearings involve one consent authority but two or more 
consents in relation to the same proposal. 
Authorities must consider all the matters referred to in Section 104. Most of these matters 
refer to relevant rules in plans, relevant policy statements and the other requirements ofthe 
Act. Most of these relevant matters have been discussed earlier in the chapter and they form 
the framework in which resource consents are considered. The primary consideration, once all 
the above matters are considered, is the actual and potential effects of the proposed activity. 
Coutts (1997, p.38) says that "additional attention is given when discharge and coastal 
permits are considered", especially in regards the sensitivity of the environment receiving the 
discharge. In relation to a controlled activity, the authority must grant the consent, but can 
impose conditions over matters specified in the plan. An authority is not obliged to grant a 
consent over a discretionary activity,but ifit does, it can apply conditions. A resource consent 
cannot be granted for a non-complying activity, unless the adverse effects of the activity are 
only minor. Conditions on a resource consent can include financial contributions, bonds, 
covenants, administrative charge, or in regards a discharge permit, a condition relating to the 
best practicable option (MfE, 1991b, p.17). 
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Conclusion 
The RMA forms the empirical focus of this thesis, and will be tested against the 'matrix of 
ecological reason' that was developed in Chapter Two. Therefore, the current Chapter 
introduced the RMA and provided an examination of the origins of the Act, the key areas of 
contestation and, finally, an overview of the Act's structure. It focused on the evolution of S5, 
arguably the most important Section in the Act. In tracing this history and debate it also 
explored an important theoretical issue about the boundaries between ecological systems and 
culture. This debate took a decidedly social-scientific tum by drawing on anthropological and 
social studies of science literature. These literatures provided a clear challenge to the 
traditional notions of the Western dualism separating society from nature. Ideas about nature 
are social constructions reflecting contingent cultural locations, not universalisable truths. 
This literature views the definitions of nature/society as products of discursive contestation, 
allowing us to then explore empirical accounts to see what discourses are employed, how they 
are constructed, which dominate and which are rendered invisible. This theoretical analysis 
then turned to the debates over S5, providing a much stronger link between the theoretical 
focus on society/environment, and the RMA. 
The question that remains concerns the link between the 'matrix of ecological reason' and the 
RMA. I argue that the contested dimension of the RMA over the tension between a 
biophysical orientation, and the incorporation of social values, reflects an important 
dimension of ecological reason. A biophysical emphasis in the RMAwould be best 
interpreted in terms of instrumental-technical reason, because the primary focus is on 
ecological bottom lines. This inclines the RMA towards a technical approach. The alternative, 
'balanced' approach opens space for social norms and values, as well as ecological 
considerations. Communicative reason is the most likely fit here. Thus, the philosophy 
underpinning the RMA can be viewed in terms of ecological reason. Although the issue may 
have been settled by the Environment Court,at least in terms of case law, it took nearly a 
decade of debate and contestation to reach this point. This suggests that at a philosophical 
level, the RMA sits within a tension between Technocentric and Discursive Ecologies. 
Whether this is true at the level of practice is the analytic task for the remainder of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BROMLEY WASTE WATER 
DISCHARGE CONSENT APPLICATION 
Situated in the suburb of Bromley on the western side of the Avon/Heathcote estuary is the 
site of the waste water treatment plant for Christchurch City. 
Figure 4.1: Avon/Heathcote estuary 01 low tide lind the suburb of SOlltlt Brighton in the foreground to 
the right. The Oxidatioll ponds are the dark blue sectiollS near the top left of the picture. (Photo 
http://archived.ccc.govt.nz!citysceneI200Zloctoberltideturllil/gol/estua ry. asp) 
Owned and managed by the Christchurch City Counci l (CCC), it operates under various 
pieces of legislation, the most significant being the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). 
Consent to discharge waster water into the Avon/Heathcote estuary expired in 200 I . In 1996 
the CCC initiated a process to secure a long-term consent to discharge waste water. The initial 
application was lodged in 29th March, 200 I and sought continued estuary discharge, but this 
was declined by the Regional Authority (Environment Canterbury - ECan) who, in 2002, 
issued a temporary consent to discharge pending another application by CCc. In 2003 ECan 
granted the CCC a consent extension for continued discharge until 2009. On the 29th July, 
2004, the CCC passed a unanimous decision to construct a 3km ocean outfall pipeline (figure 
4.2). A new resource consent application reflecting this decision then was lodged in 
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December 2004 and is expected to be successful. The City Council plan to begin construction 
of the ocean outfall in 2007 with a completion date for 2009. 
Figure 4.2: Map of the oxidation pOl1ds and the ocean olltfall pipeline route 
(http ://www.ccc.govl.nzlHave Y ourSay/OceanOutfaII/Background.asp) 
This consent process is the subject of my first case study and the focus of this chapter. It 
begins by contextual ising the issues, starting with a description of the physical characteristics 
of the Christchurch waste water management system. I then outline the decision making 
context before turning to the resource consent application process itself. Central to this was a 
wastewater working party (WWP) set up by the CCC to advise the Council of community 
views. After some years of deliberation, the CCC made an unsuccessful application to the 
consent authority (ECan) . This chapter examines both the application and the Commissioners ' 
reasons for their deci sion. The CCC then proceeded to investigate an ocean outfall pipeline 
discharge option. It was at this point that I conducted in depth interviews with sixteen people 
involved in some way with this issue. The rest of the chapter discusses and analyses their 
responses . 
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The Christchurch Waste Water System 
Set by the coast on the edge of the Canterbury Plains, the city of Christchurch covers an area 
of 169.3 square kilometres and currently services a population of around 320,000. Waste 
water is transported via 1,580kms of sewage line and is discharged at an average rate of 
140,000 square meters per day into the estuary/Ihutai of the Avon and Heathcote rivers. The 
Wastewater Treatment Station at Bromley processes the wastewater through a series of filters 
to remove solid wastes. This produces about 20,000 tonnes per year which is used to produce 
gas for electricity generation and then spread in local pine forests as a soil conditioner or as 
capping in the city landfill. The treated water then passes through six oxidation and settling 
ponds before being discharged to the estuary on the outgoing tide (Nichols, 2003; CCC, 
2000). 
Christchurch City and the surrounding satellite towns are undergoing significant population 
increase, estimated to reach 423,000 by 2026 (Hayward, 2000, p.I13) with many of these 
satellites expected to join the Christchurch treatment facility. This means increased strain on 
the capacity of the existing facilities and was one of the reasons the CCC sought to review its 
wastewater options (ibid). 
One significant driver of the review was the need for a new resource consent to continue 
discharge. The CCC was granted permission to discharge under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967, with no expiry date set. However, with the introduction of the RMA 
in 1991, S386(d)(3) of that Act came into effect, which states that permits from existing 
authorities will expire on the tenth anniversary of the commencement of the RMA, that is, 
2001. This 'sunset clause' was one significant reason for the wastewater review (Hayward, 
2000, p.I13). 
Wastewater treatment in Christchurch has been contentious for a number of reasons. 
Hayward (2000) identifies four key issues. The effluent discharge into an estuary system 
raises ecological concerns. Ecological issues form a significant part ofthe Ihutai Management 
Plan (Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai Trust, 2004), recognising that the ecological quality of 
the estuary is currently not acceptable. The impacts of the discharge are, however, complex 
(Lewthwaite, 2000) and there is much debate around these ecological issues (Hayward, 2000, 
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p.115). While water pollution may have caused reductions in fish populations and increase in 
sea lettuce, the higher nutrient levels are thought to attract greater numbers of birds. It is also 
unknown what precise effects the storm water systems of both rivers have on the estuary 
water quality. While some groups had advocated a complete removal of wastewater discharge 
into the estuary, the ecological effects of this are still contested. 
Cultural debates over the management of the estuary go back a number of years with the local 
Iwi, Ngai Tahu, and in particular the local Runanga, Te Ngai Tuahiriri, central to debates 
under the Treaty of Waitangi over ownership and authority over the estuary (Haywood, 2000, 
p.119). While the CCC agreed to "a protocol of consultation under which they recognise the 
authority of Maori with Tangata Whenua status" (ibid), this has had minimal impact on the 
continuation of discharges into the estuary. 
Another significant debate feeding into the question of what to do with the waste water has 
taken place with local residents and recreationists. The estuary has long been a significant site 
for water sports, including sailing, wind surfing and fishing, but does not meet the 
requirements for contact recreation. Faecal coliform counts are higher than accepted standards 
(although there is a significant contribution from the bird population that lives and feeds in 
the estuary), residents and recreationalists often complain about the water quality and smell, 
and because of the high nutrient levels in the waste water, there is at times a serious problem 
with decaying sea lettuce!. The other factor in the social debate concerns the odour emitted 
by the treatment plant. The CCC required a specific resource consent to discharge to air and 
forms one of the five consents applied for. 
The debate, identified by Hayward (2000), concerned treatment alternatives and costs. There 
is a range of options available with different levels of efficacy and economy. They range from 
discharge to land (forests, for example), a range of smaller satellite treatment plants, ocean 
discharge, upgrading to drinking water standard, various options to separate and reuse grey 
water, an ecological engineering approach (the Green Edge plan which will be discussed later 
in this chapter) and the status quo. As Hayward notes (p.122), alternatives were in effect 
constrained by the significant infrastructure investment in the Bromley Treatment Plant. 
I Much of this information has come from my informants, ranging from CCC planners, local residents and 
recreationists involved in the working party, and health specialists. 
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The Decision Making Context 
Activities that have an impact on natural and physical resources in New Zealand are managed 
under the RMA. The structure of this Act has been discussed at some length in Chapter Three. 
Of relevance here is the role of the two authorities, the CCC and the Regional Council 
(ECan). While the CCC manages waste water within the city and owns the infrastructure, 
ECan is the consent authority responsible for the issuing of the consents required by the CCC. 
In the event, six consent applications were made to ECan, four of these coastal permits and 
two discharge permits. The one that generated most interest and controversy was the 
application to discharge up to 500,000 cubic meters of treated waste water per day into the 
estuary from the oxidation ponds. The other applications concerned discharge issues related to 
seepage from the ponds, to reclaim land along the foreshore for development work and 
structure building and, finally, an air discharge consent. 
Due to the significance of the application, ECan appointed four independent Commissioners 
to hear and determine the application. One commissioner was a barrister with resource 
management experience and who was appointed to the chair. Another was a consultant with 
experience working with Iwi and other community groups and had public sector experience. 
The third was a marine ecologist and environmental policy analyst from Australia. The final 
member was a professional engineer, principal of a consultancy firm and a specialist in 
sewage and waste water treatment. The Commissioners were jointly appointed with full 
powers of a consent authority. 
The Resource Consent Application 
The application, lodged with ECan on the 29th of March, 2001, sought permission to continue 
to discharge into the estuary for another fifteen years, but with a programme of increasingly 
higher environmental standards and treatment for the effluent over this period, loosely 
referred to as the 'Green Edge' proposae. In the event, this application was declined by the 
Commissioners, who issued a temporary consent for five years and required the Council to 
consider alternative options. The Commissioners had in mind the advice by the CCC senior 
project engineer that five years was sufficient to develop an ocean outfall pipeline as the 
2 The 'Green Edge', in fact, formed only one part of the application, but it is the most interesting and 
controversial aspect of it. 
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alternative discharge option, although this was not specified as the option. Upon appeal, the 
Environment Court lengthened the Consent duration to six years, with the expiry date in 2009. 
However, this brief description does not adequately describe the particular processes that took 
place in developing this consent application. Although it was known by the Council that a 
new consent would be required by 2001, the process for consent renewal was initiated in June 
19963. Consultation was the first task of the Council, and it began by seeking advice on how 
to best consult with Tangata Whenua and employed professional advice on public 
consultation. The most significant development was the fonnation of a Working Party, 
representative of the community, lead by a trained facilitator, and designed to advise the 
Council of the community perspective and to develop a detailed proposal. The Working Party 
initially consisted in fifteen members (see Hayward, 2000, pp.123-126 for a detailed analysis) 
covering community groups, business interests and recreational groups. However, because the 
focus was initially only on the estuary, beach and ocean users did not become involved until 
May 1998 when the Working Party was focused on an ocean outfall option. Maori were not 
represented on this Working Party; although they were invited, they did not take part. 
However, they did take part in a separate and parallel process of consultation at the request of 
Te Ngai Tuahiriri (Hayward, 2000, p.12S). 
The Working Party, with the assistance of expert input, examined the issues and options 
available. In 1998 the Working Party made a recommendation to the CCC that estuary 
discharge be discontinued in favour of an ocean outfall. This decision was not unanimous, and 
there were differing views within the Working Party, but it did consist of a 'strong majority'. 
Nevertheless, the popular conception ofthe Working Party in the minds of many citizens was 
that it had delivered a very clear direction to the Council4. The Working Party had also 
recommended that the Council continue to investigate both main options (estuary discharge 
and ocean outfall) before making its final decision. According to Hayward (2000, p.12S), the 
Council "resolved to give 'favourable consideration' to the ocean outfall option as 
recommended by the working party". 
3 Most of this information comes from the Commissioners' Decision (Canterbury Regional Council, 2002). 
4 One member expressed frustration to me that many public submissions on the Consent Application erroneously 
claimed the Working Party was unanimous. This led to a view that the Council had simply ignored the wishes of 
the 'community', when the process was not nearly as clear-cut as that. 
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However, unbeknownst to the Working Party was an option that was first mooted by a City 
Councillor in late 1999. Known as the 'Green Edge' concept, it proposed that the western 
edge of the estuary be developed along ecological engineering principles in order to 
experiment with natural waste water treatment proposals. The Councillor responsible for this 
proposal had been inspired by the concept of natural capitalism and had visited the United 
States and had dinner with Paul Hawkins. The proposal was presented to the Working Party in 
November 1999, and was discussed by the Working Party over several months. Tangata 
Whenua also discussed the proposal, and through Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu gave initial 
support for it. It was also discussed at various City Councillor seminars. 
The Working Party reported to the CCC Service Committee in May 2000, with strong 
majority support for an ocean outfall and included specific environmental standards and areas 
where ongoing research was required. When the Services Committee reported to the CCC in 
August 2000, it supported the Green Edge concept and sought a fifteen year consent for 
estuary discharge. There was considerable consternation among a number of Working Party 
members over the fact that the Council had not taken up its (majority) opinion. Nevertheless, 
further consultation was taken by the Council, and in on the 14th December 2000 it confirmed 
its preferred consent application option. This included upgrading the capacity of the treatment 
plant (which was already underway), modifying the oxidation ponds, installing UV treatment 
to achieve bathing quality discharge, a fifteen year consent for continued estuary discharge, 
and creating a 'Green Edge' (CCC 2000b). 
The Commissioners' decision was given on the 30th April, 2002 (after the expiry date of the 
old consent) and in summary, rejected the main thrust of the application for continued estuary 
discharge as a long-term option. The Commissioners were of the view that the environmental 
effects of continued discharge were unacceptable and that the applicant needed to look at an 
alternative discharge option, which they had in mind to be an ocean outfall pipeline (URS, 
2003, p.1-1; Canterbury Regional Council, 2002, p.157). Recognising that it was not possible 
to cease estuary discharges immediately, the Commissioners granted a consent for continued 
estuary discharge for five years. Since this time, the CCC has further investigated the 
development of an ocean outfall and this is now the focus of a new resource consent 
5 Hawkin is one of the authors of Natural Capitalism, published in 1999. 
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application, with hearings due to begin in 2005. In addition, the Council has settled on its 
preferred route for the pipeline. 
In summary, the resource consent application process has been lengthy and protracted, with 
mUltiple processes and consultation, and two significant options. The CCC failed on its initial 
application, and the Commissioners appeared to favour the majority preference of the 
Working Party. The reasons for the Commissioners' decision are complex and difficult to 
summarise briefly. However, it is perhaps helpful to first outline the reasons given by the 
CCC in favouring the Estuary discharge option. 
First, the application focused on increasing improvement in wastewater discharge quality to 
contact recreation standards through the use of ultra-violet (UV) disinfectant, and oxidation 
ponds redevelopment. Second, this approach was flexible, offering greater encouragement to 
continue to improve treatment and disposal. Third, such flexibility was needed in order to 
monitor changes and manage any effects in the best possible manner. Fourth, as technology 
developed, this approach would allow for the incorporation of more effective technology into 
management practices. Fifth, it was cost efficient because even if, in the longer term, an ocean 
or other discharge option was developed, none of the estuary expenditure would be wasted. 
Finally, even if an outfall solution is used, that will take time and water treatment needs to be 
the highest priority for any solution (Canterbury Regional Council, 2002, p.122). In essence, 
the CCC application embodied a rationality of continual research and development and 
incremental improvement in environmental quality. It conceptualised the environmental 
effects within a dynamic system, including better ecological understanding of the estuary and 
ongoing technological development. It could therefore be classified as an ecological 
modernist approach (see Freudenburg & Fisher, (2001) for a useful review of this literature). 
The response of the Commissioners to this is instructive in terms of how they understood the 
role ofthe RMA (and by inference, its inherent rationality). They did not have sufficient 
information to come to a considered view on an ocean outfall option, although they note its 
advantages, particularly in superior dilution rates compared with estuary discharge. 
With regard to continued estuary discharge they had a range of concerns. The level of nutrient 
loading in the wastewater, especially of nitrogen and phosphorus, influences the growth of 
flora and fauna, particularly the nuisance causing sea lettuce (a form of green algae). Overall, 
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this has an adverse effect on the estuary, and may well accelerate with the anticipated increase 
in wastewater volumes. The actual effect on fish in the estuary is uncertain, with a significant 
lack of research on these matters. Fish stocks are considered poor in the estuary, although the 
cause cannot be ascertained with any certainty. The effects on bird life were a little more 
beneficial. High nutrient loading increased the food resources for the birds, and bird numbers 
have increased since the development of the oxidation ponds. However, any effects of nutrient 
reduction in the wastewater were likely to be minor and localised. 
Health risks to the community, and in particular those recreating in the estuary, were judged 
to be 'significant'. While it is likely that UV treatment would reduce pathogen levels, the 
Commissioners were of the view that the levels of uncertainty around the effectiveness of the 
proposed disinfection system, and the health and safety issues around any possible failure of 
the treatment plant, were important factors in their decision. It was noted that birds were also 
significant carriers of pathogens, and so health risks within the estuary system would not be 
entirely removed by better wastewater treatment. 
The Commissioners also believed continued estuary discharge 'offended' the New Zealand 
Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) and that the "the integrity, functioning and resilience of 
various identified natural processes that occur within the coastal environment should be 
protected" (Canterbury Regional Council, 2002. p.146). Wastewater discharges threaten the 
natural movement of sediments, water and biota. Further, the NZCPS requires a precautionary 
approach to be taken when research and understanding of coastal processes are lacking, and 
this was deemed relevant to the Bromley decision. Other significant concerns were the 
potentially insufficient flushing capacity of the estuary and the visual impacts of foaming (due 
to surfactants in the wastewater combined with the turbulence at the discharge point). The 
Commissioners noted that "such daily and obvious pollution of an area rightly described as a 
jewel in Christchurch's crown is inappropriate" (p.131). 
Another factor in the decision was the effect of continued discharge on Maori values. While 
the Commissioners note that the views of various Maori appearing before them were 
sometimes contradictory (p.149), they nevertheless concluded that the discharge violated 
Maori prohibition on discharging human waste into water. In my interviews, Maori 
informants said Maori are, however, pragmatic, realising the waste has to go somewhere. But 
the Commissioners did note the problems for Tangata Whenua with estuary discharge. 
114 
Chapter Four: The Bromley Waste Water Discharge Consent Application 
The Commissioners did recognise that the CCC would be able to improve the quality of 
discharge water, but did not consider these efforts would 'sufficiently' safeguard the values of 
the estuary. They argued that, on balance, the aquatic ecosystem will be adversely affected, 
even with the proposed improvements, Maori values compromised and amenity values not 
significantly increased (pp.151-152). They summarise their views as follows: 
"They are not satisfied that the applicants proposal to upgrade water quality will sufficiently 
avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects which in their view are likely to occur as a result 
of the proposed discharge on the environment ... [or] promote in the medium to long-term the 
sustainable management of the Estuary as a natural and physical resource" (p.163). 
The reason I have discussed the Commissioner's reasons at some length is that the rest of the 
case study draws in varying ways on these very reasons. It is these which engaged my 
interviewees and out of these discussions comes a picture of the forms of ecological reason 
being expressed in this resource consent debate. It is to this that I now tum. 
The Bromley Interviews 
Two of the three case studies considered in this dissertation involved interview with specific 
groups of people. In the Bromley case it was from people involved in some way with the 
Working Party set up by the CCC, or closely associated with the hearing. The research 
methodology does not rely on the particular characteristics or demographics of the 
interviewees, so a detailed description is not needed. However, there are broad classes into 
which interviewees can be grouped, and this is instructive because themes may be identifiable 
among and within particular groups. It also helps to identify the type of interviewee in the 
case studies. The identification schedule used is as follows: 
A: Local Authorities/Government Departments 
I: Planners/Policy 
2: Scientists 
3: Engineers 
4: Decision makers (Councillors, Commissioners, Environment Court) 
B: Consultancies/Commercial 
1: Planners 
2: Scientists 
3: Engineers 
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4: Other 
C: Lay People 
1: Professional background (retired) 
2: Professional (not working in their profession) 
3: Non-professional 
D: NGOs/lwi 
1: Professional 
2: Non-professional 
Professionals are defined as people with professional training, and are involved in the 
Resource Consent Industry or the Bromley case in their professional capacity. In some cases 
people straddle two categories and are identified by the combined designation, for example, 
(AI/3). The designations are used as follows: 
Example: (Bla). The (B) means they are from a consultancy or commercial 
organisation. The (1) means they are a planner or have a policy role (broadly defined). 
Each interviewee is given a letter (a, b, c) to identify which interviewee within that 
group I refer to. There may be more than one, and therefore (Blc) for instance, refers to 
the third interviewee in the B 1 group. 
Interview Methodology 
The primary research question posed for this case study is: "What form of ecological reason 
(if any) is employed in environmental decisions under the RMA?" Given that the concept of 
ecological reason has not yet been widely articulated, any research must be sensitive to the 
forms of reason employed, either explicitly or implicitly, in the decision process. To facilitate 
this, I developed a set of questions designed to probe the forms of reason at work in this case 
study. For a fuller account of this, see the Appendix. I began by asking each interviewee what 
they considered to be the key elements of rational decision making in general, however they 
defined the term 'rational': "If we are going to manage the environment sensibly or 
effectively, what do you consider to be the key elements we need to take into account in our 
decision-making?". This was to establish the interviewee's broad perspective on 
environmental decision making, and was designed to lead into a more focused discussion of 
the Bromley Resource Consent decision. This produced a varied response, although there 
were some clear themes coming through. 
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Turning to the Bromley case study, I used the two dimensions relevant to ecological reason to 
craft the interview question. First, the technical-communicative-dialogic forms of reason refer 
to the degree that goals are unproblematic. If they are not unproblematic, that is, there is clear 
agreement on goals, and on the values implicit in those goals, then instrumental/technical 
communication reason is engaged. If there is not agreement, then communicative reason 
(engaging human actors) or dialogic reason (engaging the interest of other species), or both, 
are engaged. In essence this dimension can be operationalised by considering the forms of 
communication needed in the decision and who is deemed appropriate to be involved in the 
decision. 
The second dimension concerns the explicit value orientation of the decision makers and the 
decision process. Decisions can be crafted in anthropocentric, preservationist or ecocentric 
orientation. Operationalising this dimension involves assessing the degree to which actors 
operate within one or another of these orientations. Anthropocentrism expresses a primary 
concern for human interests and only instrumental concern for non-human interests, and then 
only when these interests have an effect on human interests. A strong anthropocentric position 
can be expressed in economic terms while a weaker position could include other values such 
as aesthetic or landscape values. The preservationist position recognises the (limited) rights of 
other species or ecosystem and allows for the inclusion of such values in human decision 
making. This is a weaker position than the ecocentric position in which all species are 
afforded rights in a primajacia fashion. Such rights cannot be negotiated or balanced against 
human interests to the extent they can in the preservationist position. 
A range of questions was used to tease out the positions each of my interviewees took in 
relation to the Bromley resource consent application. See the Appendix for a more detailed 
discussion. The questions will be grouped, for analytic convenience, around the following 
themes: 
(1) What are the elements of sound environmental decision making? 
(2) What were the goals of the Bromley case? 
(3) Who ought to be involved? 
(4) How did the Bromley Case measure up? 
(5) What is missing from this process? 
(6) Was this 'rational' decision making? 
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This chapter reports what the interviewees said when faced with these questions. Its purpose 
is not analytical, therefore I do not comment to any great extent on what has been said, but 
only to clarify or highlight what the data show. The analysis of these data is left to Chapter 
Seven (Analysis and Conclusions). Finally, I do not report every theme or comment raised in 
the interviews, only the dominant themes. Themes are considered dominant if they meet two 
criteria. First, if four or more interviewees report the same theme, I record it in the discussion 
below. However, if a theme is only raised by two or three, it is considered only if it forms a 
significant component of that interview. In other words, the level of articulation of a theme is 
an indication of its role in the views of that interviewee. These criteria act as rules of thumb, 
rather being strictly objective. Suchjudgements are unavoidable in discursive analysis. 
Question 1: What are the requirements of sound environmental decision making? 
There was a wide range of responses to this question. A minority of interviewees said this was 
a difficult question because it was something they had not specifically thought about until I 
raised it. Even some of the professional practitioners said that this was a very big question, 
with one calling it "a very heavy question". Nevertheless, their responses are still reflective of 
the core perspectives that they bring with them to environmental decisions, although it is 
likely their views would develop with greater discussion6. Some other interviewees had very 
clear ideas about what was entailed. It is important to note that very few interviewees gave a 
systematic account of criteria for sound environmental decision making. Most responded in 
the context of an often far-ranging discussion about the Bromley decision and environmental 
decision making generally, so I kept drawing them back to this question. Therefore while no 
particular response is likely to be complete, collectively these responses are informative. 
There are a number of recurrent themes I identified in the interviews. These themes are (a) the 
role of science and research, (b) environmental assessment, (c) a strong role for the 
community and local knowledge, (d) the role of leadership and political will, (e) risk and 
flexibility and (f) the importance of system design. These themes are not represented in all the 
responses and there are some differences between the interviewees. I discuss these 
contradictions at the end of this section. 
6 Press (1994) demonstrated the role of deliberation in altering people's environmental understanding and value 
orientation. His case studies show that as he and his participants engaged in discussion, their views altered. 
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(a) The role of science and research 
Nearly all the interviewees stated explicitly or implicitly that good science and research was 
fundamental to sound environmental decision making. For some, this was the first theme that 
came to mind, suggesting that it occupies a fundamental place in a rational approach to 
decision making. As one interviewee put it: "Ah, good science behind it ... I think that would 
be most important, to have good science behind it" (A2a). Most interviewees, however, did 
not state it explicitly, but appeared to assume it in the comments they made. For example: 
"Well, the first thing is to actually know the environmental values that are there and are likely to 
be possibly affected .... In big [activities] there will be professional people there. But even in 
those cases there's often not a lot of pressure for them to go back to the basics .... Quite often 
I've advocated for a water extractor who wants to extract from a small water way, to get a 
freshwater ecologist, to just get a half day survey done to get an idea what's there ... " (Alb). 
One interviewee, working as an advocate for a statutory organisation, said they at times would 
avoid a stakeholder process in favour of a science only approach: "We often say we'll just 
take a scientific base for our argument and stick to that point and some stakeholder processes 
we just won't get involved with because it's a waste of our time" (Dla). A number of 
interviewees with scientific training answered this question with lengthy discourses on the 
scientific details of the Bromley case or other cases they were familiar with. While this does 
not exhaust their answer to this question, this scientific focus stood out because of its 
voluminosity. Science appears to hold a central place in interviewees' constructions of 
ecological rationality. 
Science was generally viewed in natural science terms, particularly ecology. While most 
interviewees also felt community involvement was important, one specifically commented 
that sociological studies were an important part of scientific research: 
Question: "Besides the data is there anything else we need to make good rational decisions? 
Response: "The answer to that depends, to me, on what you're going to mean by scientific data 
because scientific data includes sociological data .... Now inevitably that's going to become a 
matter of saying what do the people want?" (CIa). 
This was an unusual response, however, as most interviewees tended to separate the relevant 
sciences (read natural sciences) that provide the baseline data, from the issue of social values, 
for which social sciences were useful. There was a dichotomy, although this was not a strict 
distinction and it was blurred in the responses of many interviewees. 
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One interviewee commented that while New Zealand trained and retains scientists, it "then 
denies itself the use of them, their knowledge, their wisdom, their experience, whatever it is 
and you don't let them ... youjust bar them from contributing to the common good" (Clb). 
This came from an extensive critique of the undermining of the 'public good' role of science 
in New Zealand, largely as a result of the commercialisation of science through the Crown 
Research Institutes. I comment later on this concern, but note that similar comments were 
recorded from other retired scientists, all with distinguished research records. While science is 
still valued by all interviewees, the environment in which it now operates appears to be 
considerably more pluralist than it was when these scientists were being trained. No 
interviewee denied a role for science as a methodology for providing good data for decision 
making. However, there was more variability on whether or not this was a sufficient source 
for such data. But first I comment on the role for environmental assessment. 
(b) Environmental assessment 
A number of interviewees discussed ecologically rational decision making in what are 
effectively environmental assessment terms. First, we must identify the issues or values at 
stake, determine the current state of that environment/ecosystem, identify the impacts from 
the proposed activity, and avoid or mitigate these impacts. This is how one interviewee put it: 
"Well the first thing is to actually !mow the environmental values that are there and are likely to 
be affected .... So once you've got !mowledge on that, the next thing is what is the impact of this 
particular activity and that's quite often hard to judge ... and in a perfect world would require an 
awful lot of work to pin it down. Then I guess the third thing is having !mown the values and the 
ecological impact, is this a case where mitigation measures are appropriate and if so what 
options would it be. Quite often it's a hard nut to crack and you avoid the impact by going down 
to an alternative site or doing something different or just doing a no-brainer, a no-go and its 
turned down" (Ala). 
Another said: 
"Well I think you have to understand the downstream effects of what you're proposing. You've 
got to be able to envisage the probable consequences and I think you need ... to understand that 
the philosophy of the RMA is essentially precautionary. It has that precautionary aspect to it by 
which it says you don't have to be absolutely certain that you'll stuff things up. You just have to 
be able to show that there is a serious possibility that you will do irrevocable harm and I think 
that is enough to cause you to be very, very, very cautious about what you do" (Clb). 
One final example: 
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"I think there needs to have been some good scientific monitoring done in the first 
instance ... because you've got to have a starting point. You've got to know what the current 
condition is, what the adverse effects are at the moment and before you can even address how 
you are going to cure them" (A2a). 
None of the interviewees specifically used the tenn, environmental assessment, but the ideas 
expressed are reflective of its general principles. This is a methodologically important finding, 
as the role of science above acts as more of a general given or assumption for interviewees, 
while the environmental assessment type approach is the assessment framework into which 
science and research fits. These interviewees do not provide a systematic account of 
ecologically rational decision making, but the framework many provide is in the 
environmental assessment fonn. 
(c) The role a/the community and local knowledge 
Support for science was strong, but the results showed two specific modifications to what 
would otherwise be a technocratic approach. While most reported the necessity for 
community involvement as an important feature of environmental decision making, there 
were different reasons for this. One reason concerned infonnation or data gathering, and 
another was the role of community values and input. 
Many interviewees articulated the view that while good scientifically derived data were 
essential in sound decision making, there were other important sources of data. One 
interviewee expressed it this way: 
"You need good science, you need a wide based community information and input from the 
community of interest. ... [My question: Why do you say wide based community as opposed to 
just having good science?] Because good science is only one dimension .. .I mean, again if you 
use the estuary for example. Good science will tell the impact that nutrients will have on the 
estuary [but] won't tell you anything about how the community interacts with the estuary and 
what communities' needs are and how the community perceives the health of the estuary" 
(B4a). 
This argument is, in part, that scientific methods need supplementing by other, non-scientific 
fonns of data gathering. Another interviewee, a retired scientist, makes this point very 
strongly. While he had always measured the value of data by the extent they were produced 
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by a standard scientific method (replicability etc), during the Bromley process he began to 
appreciate the role of local knowledge: 
"Now there's an enonnous difference than [sic] being a visiting scientist. .. and I've got a 
contract job in the estuary, do you imagine for a moment that I'm going down to the estuary on 
a shitty, cold easterly day? You'd have to be out of your brain. I'd come down on a nice wann 
day, okay? So I pick up the .. .indication of reality in that issue. But if I'm walking on the 
estuary everyday, then I start to see a pattern .... That's utterly different. But this is the first time 
in my life which I realised this, incidentally" (CIa). 
The role of local knowledge was not seen as supplanting scientifically derived data, but rather 
as an important supplement. Other interviewees shared this view: 
"[A rational approach to decision making includes] some previous knowledge of similar effects, 
experiential data, it can include scientific data, but not necessarily, it could be observed data just 
as a result of people's experiences" (Alc). 
"Local observations, when they are out there talking to people saying they don't drink this water 
anymore or don't swim there. There has been this change and that change, you can get quite a 
lot from talking to the locals. It's good to have a broad perspective" (AId). 
One particularly instructive example of this was the role of a local recreational fisher who 
kept a diary of his catches over the last three decades. He noted that there was a significant 
drop in catch rates around the time full tidal flushing of wastewater began in the 1970s, and 
the fishery was 'virtually eliminated' (Clb). This same observation was made about the 
shrimp fishery in the estuary which dramatically collapsed at the same time7 (CIa). 
This wider epistemological view appeared to be a more recent development. The older 
interviewees, particularly those with scientific training, noted the value of extending the range 
of data inputs to include local knowledge. This was not something they had been particularly 
conscious of until more recently. Some of the more recently trained interviewees appeared to 
take local input for granted, especially those with recent planning training, perhaps reflecting 
more recent legislative emphasis on public consultation and community participation. This is 
difficult to empirically demonstrate from the interview data, but was certainly the strong 
impression I came away with. 
7 Two interviewees, both from the Working Party and with significant scientific training, argued that it was the 
excessive concentrations of ammonia that entered the estuary when tidal flushing was commenced that was a 
significant contributor to the decline in fish stocks. Prior to this, discharge had been a continuous trickle. But 
there were no studies of this particular impact, nor any systematic investigation of fish stocks in the estuary over 
this period. 
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What is less ambiguous from the interviews is the role of communities in ecologically rational 
decisions. A significant number of interviewees felt that community involvement was 
essential in decision making. There were a number of threads to this view, including the role 
of values. Environmental decisions could not, for most interviewees, be constructed in simply 
scientific terms. While science was important: 
"[There] are difficulties with the concept of ecological rationality because it seems to me that 
while the bones are scientific, generally in all these issues there's a huge bundle of values 
attached to the outcomes either way, and the ecology is almost a vehicle on which those values 
ride. In actually being able to distil down these kinds of disputes to be ecologically rational is 
quite difficult because while you can say scientifically there is discharge in physical terms, you 
will still have ... people saying, I don't like it, I think that this resource should be used for 
something else" (Alc). 
Some saw the role of community involvement simply in terms of consultation by the 
authorities. One interviewee put it like this: 
"The role of consultation is to , well, is to keep the public informed of what is possible, what the 
problems are, what the possible solutions are, costs of the different proposals ... it is to keep the 
people who are going to be affected informed .... So you've got to win the public over in a 
certain way, don't you" (C2a). 
Another was not convinced that community involvement was always necessary or that it was 
always helpful. However: "If you shut people out of the process, they think there is something 
to hide" (Dla). This is a minimalist approach to public participation, if measured by 
Arnstein's ladder8 (1969), focusing on the need to placate the public or win public support for 
what has already been decided. 
Consultation was viewed politically, in a more positive manner, for another interviewee. As 
an elected member of a local authority, this councillor did not have any sort of check list as to 
what the requirements were for sound environmental decisions. Rather, the councillor relied 
on information from council officials, primarily engineers and scientists, and outside 
8 Arnstein focused on the power struggle between the have-nots and power holders. She proposed eight 'rungs' 
in her ladder of participation, with the lowest two, 'manipulation' and 'therapy' describing levels of effective 
non-participation. The next two, summarised as tokenistic, are 'informing' and 'consultation', but provide no 
real empowennent. With 'placation' decision makers take advice but still hold power. Higher still is 
'partnership' where citizens can "negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders". Finally, 
'delegated power' and 'citizen control' allow decision making to rest with the 'have-nots'. 
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consultants. This information gets given to councillors and they then must consider two 
things. First, the legal requirements the council is under, and the: 
"the requirements of the people .... Let's talk, let's get it out amongst the people. There's 
individuals and there's people and there's groups out there that have vast knowledge of the 
value of their lives and [spend] time just studying these sorts of things, and we learn a great deal 
from them and their [input]" (A4b). 
Another view was a little more nuanced. Recognising that we must make value based 
judgements, this interviewee put it this way: 
"You can't talk to the fish and we can't talk to the birds, we have to make some value 
judgements based on science, but we can talk to human beings who are interacting with the 
environment and [are] part of the ecology". 
Question: "So human values and preferences are important?" 
Answer: "Absolutely, absolutely" (B4a). 
This interviewee stated very clearly that humans were a part of the ecosystem and must not be 
conceptualised as separate from it. He made the distinction between conservation and 
sustainability, arguing that humans cannot avoid impacting the environment. "Conservation 
means you lock it up and leave it alone" (B4a). We cannot avoid impacting the environment, 
so we must ensure we are sustainable in how we do that. 
The idea that human values are not just a politically necessary concession to sound 
environmental decision making, but that they occupy a more central place, was reflected in 
many interviews. One interviewee put it this way: 
"Yeah, well I mean there is a lot of science and research around and, I mean, I think the 
community needs to be involved to put some kind of value on the results of this research, and 
there are also compromises. So you can do things that might advantage benthic organisms9, but 
not disadvantage the bird populations, and I think weighing up some of those values really 
should be a community issue ... " (A4a). 
Another put it like this: 
Question: "Why not just leave it to the scientists?" 
Answer: "What are the community values? I think you've got to bring that in .... It's the changes 
in value systems that go on and on, and you can't leave it to the scientists because there is no 
one fact or answer that says this is the best solution. This is why I think you need community 
input to have values systems and to debate about values systems and why you need to have 
9 As defined for the non-ecologist, "That's the creepy crawlies that live in the sand and mud" (AlI3) 
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some flexibility in what you do, as far as possible you don't close off options for the future" 
(B3a). 
These responses indicate a more complex reality than simply dealing with ecological matters 
where humans were not part of the system. Rather, the choices that need to be made are value 
laden. 
Another response considered two dimensions. While acknowledging that biophysical 
sustainability "was at the top of the list" [of decision criteria], he suggested people fit into it 
two ways. First, human health needs are critical: "There's the human health aspect, you've got 
to be certain of every decision you make like the ocean outfall, that human health is not 
threatened through contact with the water that you're putting stuff into, or those who are 
collecting food". The second considered cultural needs, specifically Tangata Whenua in the 
New Zealand context because of Sections Six, Seven and Eight of the RMA. When he argued 
that a rational judgement was needed, I asked whether a rational judgement relies primarily on 
SCIence: 
"Well in the biophysical, yes it does, but I can see in the, if you like, the metaphysical, in say 
the Maori way, if we are dealing with an area of overwhelming importance to Maori urn, say we 
were discharging into areas which were of extreme importance, of wahi tapu of some kind, or 
any area of truly pristine mangi kai food collection areas, then that side of things may rise quite 
considerably in importance. In other areas where there's a more [general] perception, general 
Maori interest, saying these are our principles you should not put waste water into natural 
waters, you should not mix water from different catchments, urn, water, if you put contaminants 
into it you affect its metaphysical properties, its mauri, its waioura, those sort of things. So some 
generalised interests might carry a little less weight in the overall decision making than urn, 
perhaps peoples' needs or perhaps the environmental impact, the actual biophysical impact" 
(Ala). 
It is clear from this interview that a strict biophysical approach to ecological rationality is not 
possible if one takes cultural relationships with the environment into account. The interviews, 
overall, displayed a wide range of interpretations of the appropriate role of values in 
environmental decision making. While some interviewees did not mention the role of the 
community or social values at all, relying on a rather techno centric approach, others (most in 
fact) felt values were important, but for frequently quite different reasons. 
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(d) Leadership and political will 
One finding that was particularly unexpected was the number of interviewees who believed a 
criterion for ecologically sound decision making was the role of leadership and political will. 
One interviewee put it this way: 
Question: "What do we need in order to make a ... decision that is sustainable for ecosystems?" 
Answer: "You need good science, you need a wide based infonnation and input from the 
community of interest and you need leadership that takes into account and can assist the 
community to understand the issues that are involved. Leadership is the key otherwise nothing 
happens ... " (B4a). 
One of the reasons this interviewee believed leadership was so important in ecological 
management was the difficulties with consultation: 
"It's difficult. I mean this is where the whole leadership thing comes in because it's bloody hard 
to consult with communities because they're getting sick of infonnation overload and they're 
getting sick of being surveyed" (B4a). 
He argued there is a difference between governance and management and that sound decision 
making requires clear governance (leadership) and ought to be quite distinct from a 
management role. 
Another interviewee also believed that science a~one is not enough for sound decision 
making. Political will is essential because without it we cannot secure the changes we would 
like to see (C3a). He believed that political will needed to be demonstrated in financial 
commitment and that "the fundamental priority must be to give high priority against other 
spending, such a gyms" (C3a). 
One interviewee talked about the need for commitment as a necessary part of ecological 
rationality. Although a little uncertain about how to answer this question, the first response of 
this interviewee was that we "need commitment for a start" (Dla). When asked to elaborate 
she said: "I mean the commitment would be identifying what the issues are, what's degrading 
it inthe first place, and making a commitment to removing that degradation ... " (Dla). This 
interviewee later explained the frustration of a lack of commitment by a local authority to the 
issues her organisation was concerned with, perhaps in part explaining the focus on 
commitment. 
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Another interviewee was very clear in what makes for a sound environmental decision: 
"I'm saying leave it to the Regional Council, but I think there needs to be more sort of national 
things like the MfE [Ministry for the Environment] moving towards national environmental 
science standards ... so they've got some bench marks they can use" (A2a). 
This suggests a greater leadership role for central government and links up with the other 
comments above. However, the source ofleadership is not clearly developed among the 
interviews and could rely on a wide range of actors. 
(e) Risk and flexibility 
Another dimension raised by a few interviewees concerned the roles of risk and flexibility in 
ecologically sound decision making. Explicit discussions of risk did not occur in many 
interviews, although a number did discuss the precautionary principle as an essential part of a 
decision making framework. One interviewee stated that we need to "understand that the 
philosophy of the RMA is essentially precautionary" (C 1 b), while another included "the 
precautionary principle as well .. .if you minimise the effects now, then as technology 
develops and you find better ways of doing things and science develops, then you've still got 
the opportunities to retain the environment that we needed" (B2a). Another discussed how the 
way decisions were being made was changing, due in part to developing understandings of 
risk. I quote at some length due to the clarity of this interviewee's argument: 
"[Take] a new way of looking at contact recreation standards and how you worked through the 
process .. .it seemed to be that in fact it was moving away from a list of parameters that are 
required in water quality to a consideration of the whole new science of risk analysis which 
doesn't have quite so rigorous a scientific basis ... but it's a matter of interpreting that within a 
broader context, its also moving into what are community expectations. Now, there may be 
different expectations for different parts of the waste receiving waters ... and what might be 
acceptable to people as public recreation in the estuary, they actually expect better when they 
get out to New Brighton 10. So there are community views that come into it. ... It seems to bring 
more flexibility, more room for sound judgement, or demand for sound judgement than the 
previous system. And I think they way I feel about it is that in fact it is wise, because standards 
change so often and the scientific parameters change so often so if you get a new piece of 
information you are actually able to incorporate it into your decision next month, you don't 
have to wait for legislation to be passed ... have we achieved this standard, yes, no, because the 
standard itself is open to debate. And I think that is something which has more applicability 
\0 The ocean-side community as opposed to the estuary community. 
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even ... than some other areas ofland use, when I look at the way, at our lack of understanding of 
groundwater systems, for instance, the degree of uncertainty rises substantially compared 
with ... ocean beaches, because we don't know how the system functions, so how much do you 
allow for precautionary principles to govern, how bold are you in your decision making?" 
This focus on risk and uncertainty, rather than unchanging certainty, leads to a demand for 
greater flexibility in the decision process: "In my view you've got to be fairly humble in your 
understanding of toxicity in human beings, plus the physical operations ofa ground water 
system. Therefore you've got to be a bit more flexible .... " (B3a). When asked about a 'blue 
sky' ideal for environmental decision making, this same interviewee spent some time 
expanding the flexibility theme: 
"I suppose I feel that you need to have some kind of ideal ahead of you, but you're never going 
to get full agreement of what that ideal is. I think you've got to have a community attitude that 
says, well, let's have a dream, an ideal, but how do we get that, we're going to have to be a bit 
flexible. What many of us would have seen as ideal if I go back twenty or thirty years would be 
thoroughly outdated now, which is partly based on research and scientific knowledge and 
understanding of ecology, but its also based on attitudes as to what is an ideal, whereas going 
back twenty or thirty years there was all this emphasis on economic development, kind of 
followed by the green movement of the 1970s perhaps, followed by the economic emphasis .... 
Now days there's more diverse views and I think you've got to feed in a bit of flexibility that's a 
little bit humble about a blue sky ideal cause the shade of blue will change" (B3a). 
Reflective of a post-modem sensibility, this view suggests ecological reason is not a fixed 
point upon which humans can anchor a decision process. It is a contextually sensitive process 
that requires negotiation within communities and what was useful in the past may not prove to 
be so in the future. 
(f) System design 
Most interviewees discussed the role of science and research, as I discussed above, but two 
specifically discussed the philosophy behind human-nature interactions. It could be argued 
that such a philosophy is implicit in the role of good science, that 'science' will guide us in 
our search for ecological rationality, but this interpretation is less plausible in light of the 
strong role of community values present in most interviews. These two interviewees 
responded to this question by emphasising the need to carefully and consciously design the 
way humans impact the environment. One put it like this. Environmental sustainability 
recognises "that human beings are part of the ecosystem and will interact with it and in that 
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context we need to ensure that [this] interaction fits into the natural cycles of nature and any 
consent process ... or any resource utilisation we're involved in recognises that ... " (B4a). 
The other interview in particular was striking due to the emphasis on 'design philosophy'; the 
entire interview was a discourse on the principles of natural capitalism. When asked what 
makes up a sound environmental decision he began: 
"I think decision makers need to get that whole issue of waste water treatment and disposal into 
context. It's the same context as all ecological sustainability issues, which is that we arrive here 
as a population in a place with a natural system .... Our arrival here and growth in 
numbers ... necessarily changes that ecosystem .... So the issue is, if we're going to change the 
ecosystem we should consciously design it, not drift into some result whether unintended [or 
not] .... So the issue for me in the bigger picture is accepting that it is wise to actually design the 
environment in which we live .... And so the starting point is that it can never be what it would 
have been had we not been here because its not possible for 300,000 people for example to live 
over and around two rivers and a number of small streams and next to an estuary and an ocean 
foreshore and have no effect. Weare going to have an effect. We become part of the 
environment. It's a new environment. We have a capacity, unlike other organisms, to design it 
and so the question has got to be what should the design be?" (A4c). 
This interviewee had read Natural Capitalism (1999) and he discussed a meeting he had with 
Paul Hawken, one of its authors: 
"So I was quite influenced by that and thought about it and I came to the conclusion that we do 
need to design what we do and we need to take account of natural systems ... and preserve them 
and try to integrate ourselves into the environment in which we are". 
He went on to explain the colonisation process of human habitation of New Zealand, 
including the introduction of a vast array of foreign species. 
"I mean the history of European settlement in New Zealand, in Canterbury in particular, is that 
you didn't worry what was here. You brought English cultures and practices and dumped it on 
top [of everything that was already here] .... But that's not the right attitude, we've got to tum 
that around now ... the fundamental issue for us is to look at what we really have here ... what are 
its fundamental values, what are the things we must preserve at all costs? What impacts can we 
avoid ... ? The issue is what is in [the water] that wouldn't naturally be there which is going to 
cause a problem for the environment in which we live ... and which we depend on to live? So I 
thought the investment that we should make should be on treatment of the water and not on 
engineering to get rid of it more effectively, even if that meant avoiding damage to the 
estuary ... and I had also wanted to optimise the use of natural systems .... Treat that waste water, 
that's one of the four principles in natural capitalism which I believe in, and the other principle 
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was bio-mimicry, to try and work to replicate, actually use the natural system more than 
replicate it I guess" (A4c). 
Much of this approach to designing the way humans impact on the environment links with the 
need for flexibility and risk discussed above. Working within natural systems requires 
substantial learning about how the system works, and what processes work best in any 
particular context. The learning process was seen as just as valuable as the end product. 
"It requires effort, it requires time, it requires innovation and that's, that's the real value of it. 
That is to challenge ourselves to make ourselves more innovative, to continue to work, to 
continue to improve. That's much more valuable in itself than the outcome" (A4c). He then 
reflects on the resource consent decision: 
"That is the thing I really [am] so unhappy about with the ocean outfall, is that it's a licence not 
to do any of that. We will not be a competitive community and we will not learn to live better 
within our natural environment if we don't challenge ourselves and don't continue to work and 
understand, to change things and improve things" (A4c). 
Summary of the requirements for sound environmental decision making 
The question of what is involved in a sound (rational) environmental decision elicited a range 
of responses from the interviewees. Almost everyone said in some form or another that good 
science and research was essential, and that good data or knowledge about the ecology and 
environment was fundamental. Some interviewees constructed the application of scientific 
data in terms of environmental assessment. This was more explicit with interviewees who had 
a scientific technical background and who were responsible for actually developing consent 
applications or assessing them. The focus of most other interviewees was on principles rather 
than specific processes. There was less agreement on the role of other 'data' such as 
sociological data, local knowledge and social values, but even here most acknowledged the 
importance of these factors. Leadership and political will were viewed by a small number as 
essential characteristics for sound or rational decision making. These comments were made by 
people outside direct statutory responsibility for consent decisions and whose role is more 
advocatory. Risk and flexibility constituted a particularly well articulated finding, and one 
that links with the final category of system design. These two reflect the view that 
ecologically sound decisions take place in a dynamic environment and require significant 
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levels of reflexivity. Most of these issues were summed up in the most carefully phrased, 
systematic articulation of ecological rationality: 
"For me it's so flavoured by the existing institutional arrangements, we're so sort of embedded 
in them in a way. I guess ecological rationality has the elements of. .. independent assessment of 
effects, impact assessment, call it what you will, it has to have an element of strong public 
participation because otherwise it becomes a closed process and then you get regulatory capture. 
It has to rest on the rule of law because without that you get corruption ... ' It has to be founded 
on effective and consistent institutional arrangements ... requires sound scientific 
understanding ... and the outcomes have to be sustainable" (Alc). 
Institutional arrangements were not raised by other interviewees directly in relation to 
ecological rationality and I have not included them as a major theme. However, they were 
raised in other parts of the discussions, particularly in relation to problems and limitations of 
the resource consent process. Therefore I deal with these later (questions 5 and 6). 
There was also a range of other comments that have not been included here. For instance, 
affordability was cited by some as important (C3a; A4c) and the sustainability triangle and the 
need for compromise (B2a, A4a) was briefly discussed by others. One interviewee responded 
by saying a key element in a good decision was to ensure compliance with the law. When 
asked how compliance is gained, the role of good information was discussed (AlI3). This 
interviewee had a statutory role and therefore was necessarily focused on compliance. 
However, the discussion did eventually range more broadly, linking to the themes discussed 
above. 
Question 2: What were the goals of the Bromley case? 
One expression of rational action is the fit between the desired goals and the means used to 
secure these goals. In order to assess how ecologically rational the Bromley case was a clear 
picture of interviewees' understandings ofthe goals is required. All the interviewees were 
asked what they thought the goals of the case were. Their responses were again divided for 
analytic clarity into coherent themes: the removal of discharge from the estuary; reduction in 
the level of pollutants; improvement in recreational wellbeing and public health; restoration of 
the estuary environment; and obtaining a resource consent. Many of these themes are 
overlapping and not mutually exclusive, but it is useful to examine them each because they 
reveal the particular constructions of the problem. 
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Removal of discharge from the estuary 
Some interviewees expressed the view that the only coherent goal was to get rid of effluent 
discharges into the estuary entirely: "We wanted, urn, basically the water system clean .... 
That was our major goal. .. to achieve the removal of the discharge from the estuary was 
basically one issue ... " (C2a). This interviewee also stated there were other goals, such as 
cleaning up the catchment, but overall, removing the discharge was the priority. While the 
idea of an ocean outfall was not mentioned, this was the most explicit statement about 
stopping the discharge. Most other interviewees focused on cleaning the water system in some 
fashion. 
Reduction in the level of pollutants 
One interviewee put it simply: "To remove Bromley as a significant source of eutrophication. 
It's just that simple" (CIa). Whether this required no discharge was a mute point, as there 
were a number of possible solutions, although not all were practical or economically feasible. 
This theme was reiterated by several interviewees. One stated the goal was to "present water 
at bathing quality standards .... And whether it went in through the estuary or into the 
pipeline, that was the objective, to have it to the highest standard that we could get it to" 
(A4b). Another person stated the goal was for clean water, "in fact and perception" (C3a). 
The 'perception' aspect of the goal related principally to recreation and health concerns of 
users of the estuary. 
Improvement in recreational wellbeing and public health 
A number of interviewees expressed this as an important goal. For example: "From our point 
of view I guess [it was] to improve the estuary from a recreational point of view, because 
that's the sort of public health bit, the recreational use of it" (A2a). Another talked in terms of 
general principles, "that the environment not be harmed, the shell fish would be safe to eat 
and it would be safe to swim" (Ala). One interviewee was concerned with the public health 
issues over the diseases potentially in the discharge. For this reason: 
"the key ecological issues were that there were problems about where the freshwater went and 
how it went and how many times the polluted effluent washed and sloshed in and out of the 
estuary. You couldn't predict where it would go as long as you were putting that stuff in the 
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estuary, the estuary really was not suitable as a place for any sort of food gathering, of course, 
and it was not suitable as a place for recreation" (Clb). 
Restoration of the estuary environment 
There was also a wider goal for many of the interviewees, the restoration ofthe ecosystems in 
the estuary. "From the working party's point of view it was improving the estuary ecosystem, 
you know, improving the quality ... , preserving the ecosystem and improving it" (A4a). This 
interviewee noted that there was an attempt to avoid 'end-of-the-pipe' thinking and to try to 
find a long-term sustainable solution, but it was difficult to "tum around overnight". Another 
interviewee believed the ecological goal was to retain or enhance the ecological values of the 
estuary and "manage them as closely as we possibly can to an estuary that doesn't have an 
urban [area] surround[ing it]" (Alb). This focus on retaining the estuary in its 'natural' state is 
reflected by another interviewee, who was concerned with the longevity of values "we have 
always enjoyed ... passing that on to the next generation" (Dla). Retaining or restoring wildlife 
habitat was an important dimension ofthis interviewee's goals for Bromley. 
One interviewee talked in terms of beginning the process of recovery and specified four goals. 
First, begin the process of recovery, because the effluent from Bromley is only one input into 
the ecological degradation of the system. Second, eliminate pollution on the beaches ll . Third, 
ensure the nutrient effluent could be easily absorbed by the environment. Finally, to be "very, 
very staunch" on ensuring the effluent was of the highest quality; it could be nutrient rich but 
must not be "full of bugs" (B4a). 
Obtain a resource consent 
The final perspective considered the goal of the process was to obtain a resource consent. This 
is a necessary legal requirement and was viewed in relation to the requirements ofthe RMA, 
which were "to meet that criterion of minimal effects" (AII3). For this interviewee, the goal 
was "to get a resource consent to discharge waste water". The underlying assumption was that 
the RMA would deliver appropriate ecological outcomes. However, another interviewee 
II The effluent that gets washed out of the estuary can often get washed back onto the local beaches, depending 
on tides and weather patterns. 
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believed that while the goal ofthe process was to get a resource consent, that was actually a 
problem, in that it does not deliver ecologically rational decisions: 
"Getting a resolution [consent] is one thing, but that is not really the issue. The issue is we've 
got to really try to improve, to try and reach an outcome which might not be quite achievable 
right now, but you've got to be going in the right direction so you've got a chance to get there" 
(A4c). 
Question 3: Who ought to be involved? 
The various fonns of ecological reason discussed in the theory chapter express predilections 
towards particular agents as actors in rational action. This concerns who ought to be involved 
in ecologically rational decision making, or, put the other way around, what setls of actors 
make a decision ecologically rational. One dimension of this question concerned who does, or 
ought to detennine what the issues or the values are in any particular case. Therefore, the idea 
of 'involvement' in the question can refer to the right to have input into the decision, from 
identification of issues to decision making. 
There are three rather clear categories that emerge from the interviews: statutory authority; the 
community; and scientific agents. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and are in 
fact mostly constructed as necessary dimensions of involvement. The responses to the 
question vary a little, with some interviewees speaking in very narrow tenns just about the 
Bromley case, while others took a broader perspective, looking at environmental decision 
making more generally. I avoided leading the question at such points, preferring to let the 
interviewees explain the 'who' question without unnecessary editorial direction from me. 
Statutory Authority 
A number of interviewees identified a statutory authority as the appropriate agents for 
environmental decision making. Environment Court judges, ECan and the CCC were 
individually identified by different interviewees. In response to the question of who ought to 
detennine the values of the case, one interviewee said: "Well, whether we like it or not, the 
system is we've got a judge who is experienced in these matters, he hears conflicting evidence 
and he makes his call" (Alb). The pragmatic nature ifthis response becomes clearer with 
elaboration: "It may not be ideal but I often find I've given up predicting outcomes from the 
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Environment Court. It seems to me it's often similar to going to the Casino .. ,," (Alb). When 
asked about an ideal world scenario, he spoke about the value of getting the full community 
involved, like with the Working Party. I discuss this below. 
Other interviewees discussed the role of ECan and the CCC, emphasising the role of consent 
authorities in taking responsibility for determining the values and issues and making the 
decisions. One interviewee focused on the role of the RMA, in particular S 104 and the 4th 
Schedule12, which he argued gives: 
"all the infonnation you need to include in an AEE [Assessment of Ecological Effects], and 
presumably they will have chosen their commissioners adequately, the people with the 
ecological capability and cultural understanding so that all bases will be covered. They're the 
people who decide in the end ifit is adequate or not" (Ala). 
The emphasis, however, does not exclude the involvement of others in decision making, but 
rather simply gives weight to the legal end of the decision process. 
In a similar vein, another interviewee suggested that consent authorities play an important role 
in providing an alternative information source for the community, "an alternative set of expert 
information independent of the applicant. That was very helpful for people with less 
resources, like the estuary association" (Alc). Another interviewee felt the CCC ought to be 
"responsible" to define the issues, but felt that "everyone who thinks that it is an issue has the 
right to say something, anyone whose got an issue with what's going on ... has some role in 
telling the council what they think the problems are" (Dla). This is reflective of most 
interviewees who highlighted the role of statutory authority; the community, in some form, is 
to also have a role. 
Community 
Most of the interviewees believed that the community, defined in various ways, needs to be 
involved in defining the issues and contributing to solutions. There were various positions on 
community involvement. One interviewee stated that while the statutory authorities must 
make the decision, public opinion and input is very important to the process (C2a). For 
example, "the problems, sometimes they come by demand, demand of this growing city and 
one has to assess the situation ... [and] vision enough to see the future what we need to have" 
12 'Matters to be Considered in a Decision' and a 'Schedule of Effects on the Environment', respectively. 
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(A4b). Another went into a lengthy discourse on the role of community participation in 
environmental decisions: 
"At the beginnings of the project [we] say "OK guys, we're going to build an oceans outfall, 
what do you think about that?", and then you have input at the beginning and get community 
buy-in and there's a general understanding of why this is needed .... But then you get the other 
input as well ... that's going to have potentially negative effects ... then the community would 
have a chance to say, "OK, we understand why this project is needed but we want these things 
for. .. our town", and so they get other benefits" (B2a). 
A number of interviewees supported the Working Party concept. One put it like this: 
"Well I think this was one area where this process went really well and that the Working Party 
was left to it, without any binding recommendations ... so that was very much a community-
based assessment based on scientific assessment and all the rest of it, but it was very much 
community driven and it was a good process" (B4a). 
One of the reasons offered for why the community ought to be involved was that "prescribed 
scientific information" need to be understood by the community, "sort of flushed though the 
community ... [take surfers] ... a scientific measurement meant absolutely bloody nothing to 
them. They wanted to know whether it was going to be safe to surf' (B4a). 
One elected representative suggested that while much emphasis ought to be placed on science, 
it was essential to get out and listen to the people. He was talking about democratic 
responsiveness in essence, and suggested that "there are people out there who have had a 
lifetime of experience of studying the oceans and the currents or whatever it may be" (A4b). 
He was referring to non-scientists with this comment, saying "the surfboard riders, the people 
who go out in the waves, you know, they have something to contribute to all of it.. .. " 
One interviewee did not have a particular view on this question, but did advocate for his type 
of group (CIa). This was a community based group of interested people committed to the 
protection of the estuary. A significant proportion of the group were retired academics, 
including some Emeritus Professors who brought critical expertise to the Consent hearings. 
He also felt the working party provided a useful mechanism. While not simply focusing on 
science, he nevertheless emphasised the technical and scientific side of the debate. This 
represents the third group who ought to have involvement. 
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Scientific Agents 
The final response to this question was characterised by reliance on scientific or technical 
expertise. While most interviewees felt that science was important, a small number felt 
science ought to occupy a primary place in the right to be involved. One began by stating 
there 
"ought to be a kind of reasonably impartial group whose job it is to look after the public 
interest. ... They need essentially I think ecological and public health skills and it's the public 
health skills which are generally effective or not. . .in New Zealand at the moment" (Cta). 
He was, however, highly critical of the Ministry for the Environment's scientific capability 
and talked at some length about the commercialisation of science in New Zealand that had 
undermined the capacity of science to speak to public issues. Commercial criteria tended to 
dominate. Another responded without hesitation when asked if science was important: "Yes, 
good science again" (C2a). When asked whether such issues should be left to scientists, 
another said that "to a certain degree I can agree with it, but" (A4b) we need public 
involvement as well. 
This is reflective of a small number of other interviews where science was central, but was to 
be supplemented with community involvement. However, one interviewee, when asked what 
the role of the non-scientist general public ought to be, answered: 
"I think they are mostly irrelevant because they don't know .. .if there was a way they could 
express their gut feelings ... their unhappiness ... but I've seen some crazy gut feelings in my 
day .... We probably live in ... the second most superstitious ages ... but it shouldn't be as hard as 
it is to mount a rational case for something in the public interest" (Ctb). 
With this notable exception, no-one advocated leaving involvement simply to scientists or 
technical experts, and some did advocate a joint combined approach. 
Ajoint approach 
When asked who should determine the ecological issues, one interviewee answered: 
"Probably that consortium I'm talking about of scientists, community and decision makers. I 
don't think any of these groups can do that on their own. I mean, it has to be done together" 
(A4a). This final quote summarises the less well articulated views that emerged in most other 
interviews. It is clear from the interview data that, apart from the obvious statutory authority 
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involvement, the wider community involvement was by far the most consistent response. 
Many of these same interviewees also felt science was important in environmental decision 
making, with only one demonstrating little interest in community involvement. Ironically, this 
interviewee was a part of a community group. 
Question 4: How did the Bromley Case measure up? 
This question is a logical development from the first question on the requirements for rational 
decision making. Interviewees were asked to consider how well the Bromley consent process 
embodied these criteria. The degree of 'fit' between the ideal and the practice suggests the 
degree to which the process was ecologically rational. There are two limitations to this 
'logical' approach. First, no interviewee attempted a systematic response to the question of 
how well the Bromley case measured up to the requirements. They tended to respond to the 
question, which was put in different ways, depending on where the conversation was going, in 
an ad hoc summary of the Bromley consent process. No systematic reflections were given 
based explicitly on Question One. Nevertheless, the responses to Question Four tended to 
roughly parallel their answers to question one. The second is the analytic challenge presented, 
because the 'requirements', discussed in Question One, represent the combined wisdom of the 
interviewees. Because no one individual expressed all the 'requirements', their perception of 
how well the Bromley case measured up is largely determined by the particular 
'requirements' they felt were important. This section simply reports their explicit answers to 
this question. I leave further analysis of this until the final chapter. 
Out of all the interviews, only one person felt the final rejection of continued estuary 
discharge and the subsequent development of the ocean outfall was a poor decision. Everyone 
who commented (a significant majority) felt it was a good outcome, and many linked the 
outcome to the process and people involved. One put it like this: 
"I think that worked really well. With the scientific infonnation, the community and the elected 
representatives who were meant to be on that working party, if that had continued how it was 
set up to work, I think it would have come to an outcome, probably go to a pipeline initially .... 
But the glitch was where a Councillor Committee ofthree, who really didn't engage with the 
working party, took off in the direction they wanted ... " (A4a). 
Another said: "The process itself is good. It did have the luxury of everyone being on the 
same wavelength. It came to a very clear conclusion. The next step is where it went off the 
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rails. Politics came into it, that sort of thing" (Alb). On the same theme: "[T]his process was 
bloody nearly derailed ... [and] nearly ended up with the wrong outcomes .... That's a good 
process ... but I was concerned more about the whole outcome ... the risk of being 
compromised by poor leadership" (B4a). Nevertheless, he suggested that had a few of them 
not said no, the whole process could have been derailed. "That's why this leadership thing 
comes along. Yet another example stresses the need to have the right people involved: 
"Yes, I think it worked out well. We got the right answer at the end of the day. There was a lot 
of blood on the floor, but the right thing came out". 
Question: "And what do you attribute that to?" 
"The people involved .. .it doesn't matter what the rules are if you've got the right people" 
(Cta). 
This comment came from one interviewee involved in the Estuary Association, a group 
instrumental in getting the consent application turned down. Discussing the view of the CCC, 
he recalls a politician telling him that while the Council believed that they had the 'best 
science', they had heard 'better science' since then, and "we now acknowledge that that was 
not a viable option and so wholeheartedly accept ocean discharge" (cited by CIa). While at 
least one interviewee sees this as a political comment (B4a), it does suggest that the role of 
science in this process was highly contested and indeed critical to the final outcome. 
There was a consensus among most interviewees that the right decision had been made at the 
consent hearing to reject continued estuary discharge. The Working Party process was mostly 
commended as an important contributor to the decision, but there were some other concerns 
about the incomplete science used in the initial decision by the CCC (continued estuary 
discharge). One interviewee expressed it like this: "This was an unusual hearing, you didn't 
have the full range of. .. scientific analysis, what was significantly lacking was information on 
marine life" (Alc). One local body decision maker spoke of support for the working party 
idea. Science could tell us some things, but "sometimes the science people don't pick it all up 
because the day-to-day ... things that happen on the beaches ... [the local people] see the 
problems .... So, no, I think the process is pretty good" (A4b). 
One interviewee felt the criteria for good environmental decisions were not well represented 
in the Bromley case: "In that case they don't seem to be very good at all. It was a bit of a 
crazy approach because they [the CCC] chose something completely different, and when it 
went to the hearing they couldn't do what they wanted to do .. .I don't know what their 
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decision was based on .... " (Dla). While the outcome of the consent hearing was acceptable to 
this interviewee, the way the CCC bypassed the Working Party's recommendations was of 
concern. 
When asked whether the Bromley process was a rational one, the interviewee responded that 
the process to get a new resource consent had started in 1996, and it was now 2004 and there 
was not yet a long-term consent. "Now I think the rationale, the process .. .is sound, but there's 
something not quite connecting really (laughs)" (AlI3). 
The one notable exception to this relatively positive framing of the Bromley case does not so 
much take issue with the Working Party concept, but the underlying philosophy of the 
decision: 
"What we wanted to do is to concentrate on finding better ways of treating wastewater so it 
becomes more like the water that would naturally enter the system. Now they said, not 
interested in any of that. ... All we are doing is making a decision right now for what you should 
be doing right now .... And I felt it was a very, very poor decision because if we were interested 
in environmental protection and in making good use of natural resources, then they should have 
looked at the wide picture ... " (A4b). 
For this interviewee, the process did not produce the right result, but neither was the process 
right. He does support community participation: "The process should get the people, all of 
those with genuine interests and make sure they are all properly represented in those 
interests", so he was not referring to the Working Party. Rather, the RMA is "a licence 
giving" process: 
"It gives you a licence to do something, and the way it does it is a contest. It is a contest 
between people who want to do X and the people who want to do Y, or they want X, plus ABC. 
So there is this contest that goes on and there's a panel which declares who the winner is. That 
is not a productive process .... You've got this contest which results in a licence popping out of 
the system and then everyone goes away and you're left with that licence. That is not a good 
process .. .it shouldn't be a contest [and] it should be working together to find the best practical 
solutions. I know that's harder and it probably takes longer but if people knew that nobody was 
going to make a decision here there has to be [cooperation]". 
The philosophy ofthe Natural Capitalism approach does not sit well with this licence giving 
approach because it undermines the incentive to practice ongoing environmental 
improvement. For this interviewee, the Bromley case did not measure up well with his ideal. 
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The first question about sound and rational environmental decision making identified six 
themes. First, the role of science and research was significant in the Bromley case, but was 
identified by some interviewees as a weakness in the initial consent application. Second, 
environmental assessment did not feature explicitly in the answers just discussed above, but 
suffers from the same criticism as science and research. Third, a strong role for the 
community and local knowledge was reflected positively in the Bromley case, with no-one 
suggesting that community involvement was weak. The role of leadership and political will, 
the fourth characteristic, was mentioned once in the interviews and suggests that leadership 
was a little lacking in the Bromley Case. Risk and flexibility and the importance of system 
design, the fifth and sixth themes, were only picked up on in a couple of interviews, 
suggesting that they are not widespread concerns about the Bromley case. Nevertheless, of the 
two interviewees most vocal on this theme, only one felt that the Bromley case failed in these 
grounds. The other did not offer a comment in this respect. 
Question 5: What is missing from this process? 
This question was designed to identify areas of deviation from an 'ideal' or ecologically 
rational decision process. The question was put in a variety of ways, including "what do you 
think was missing from this process?" and "what would you recommend to be done 
differently?" Not all interviewees responded directly to this question, and some of the 
responses are therefore included in the final question below. Most were happy with the 
Bromley process, as discussed above, and therefore did not have much to say on improving it. 
The main comments involve the interference of politics, the need for a broader planning 
framework, habitat restoration and the notion that improvement needs to be an ongoing issue. 
There was significant concern about the way the Working Party's deliberations were not taken 
seriously!3 by the CCc. When asked what was missing, one interviewee said: "The fact that 
they just ignored the stakeholders' views and that they didn't really commit themselves to 
changing anything, it was a band-aid approach" (Dla). Another put it like this: 
"But what I was concerned about is that that's a good process to go through, but what I was 
concerned about more was the whole outcome ... the risk of being compromised by poor 
leadership .... We did all the bloody work, we came to a consensus and they ignored it. What's 
\3 This was the perspective of these interviewees and ought not to be read as my conclusion on the matter. 
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the point? ... And some of us got really angry about it and then it all turned around and there 
were huge sighs of relief' (B4a). 
Another interviewee believed one of the weaknesses was in fact external to this process: "It's 
the absence of a broader planning framework that makes the whole process more difficult and 
I think a lot of effort has to be put into that broader framework" (B3a). While clearer 
standards are being developed by the Ministry for the Environment, lack of planning clarity 
was a hindrance. 
The issue of restoration ofthe estuary was another concern. To make this an ecologically 
rational decision, "trying to figure out what was lost over the years all the time this damage 
was occurring ... would be a huge project. .. cause the whole estuary is taking all the crap out of 
the rivers" (Dla). The notion of restoring habitat was an important theme in this interview. 
One interviewee noted that "it is going to be an ongoing process. As science increases its 
capacity to deal with the issues, it is going to be, well, its not going to fix it forever. And also 
as the size of the city grows, is there the capacity going to always be there to handle it?" 
(C2a). The reflects the notion of flexibility, discussed earlier, and also ties into the criticism of 
one interviewee, discussed at some length earlier, that this decision will act as a 'licence' to 
discharge, but will not assist the more difficult task for ongoing improvement. 
Finally, an interviewee noted that it is difficult to see what to change in the process, because it 
is essentially a balancing act between a genuine role for the community and the need for 
decision makers to make decisions. If a big project goes on too long it becomes very costly 
and "that is not a good outcome .. .it's a difficult balance to streamline it to make it easier and 
yet still let small people, small groups have their say ... " (A2a). 
Question 6: Was this 'rational' decision making? 
This was the final question asked during the interviews. In many interviews, we had, by this 
time, already discussed the effectiveness or value of the Bromley process. Nevertheless, it 
proved instructive to ask the final question directly, and in many cases it brought a direct 
response. I never defined the term 'rational' but left it to the interviewee as to what it meant. 
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The responses were diverse, with no-one making an unqualified positive response. I begin 
first with the most positive responses and then tum progressively to the negative responses. 
The most positive was an interviewee who answered "Yes, absolutely" (A4b). When asked if 
it could be improved he said "Everything can be improved". He then suggested that "the 
science people ... have got to get themselves down to a level that they are prepared to listen. 
Once they've made a decision, it's very hard for them to take on board what's down here". 
He felt the idea of balancing was very important, referring mainly to the views of scientists 
and the rest of the community. He also notes that while the RMA "gets you bogged down" at 
times, "when I look at it, stand aside and look at it, I realise that everyone has had the 
opportunity to participate in it". The rationality implied here is linked to the capacity of the 
process to deal with all relevant information. 
Another felt it was a rational way to deal with ecological issues because "we got the right 
answer at the end of the day" (CIa). The 'right answer' was strongly determined by the 
science for this interviewee, and that was determined by "the people involved". Corroborating 
this line is another interviewee: "Oh, I think ifit hadn't been for the Estuary Association's 
case, those four of five retired scientists14 the [CCC] would have won. I don't think there is 
any question about that. The other people had good heart-felt stuff that was all good emotion, 
but we produced an awful lot of facts that were [not at all] convenient" (Clb). 
One interviewee said he had seen some "pretty irrational decisions come out" ofthe Court 
process. When asked what an irrational decision was, he defined it as where a Tribunal: 
"clearly does not get to grips with the technical issues and makes a decision that was not 
adequately based on technical information. Or coming to a sort of 50150 compromise .... 
[Tribunals] are safety nets when the other processes, the other more rational and interactive 
processes, have gone as far as they can, and you're left with conflict. ... [You] have to have that 
statutory ... process which to my mind are somewhat random as to whether they yield a rational 
decision" (B3a). 
The role of science clearly features in this interviewee's perception of a rational decision. 
14 He noted earlier in his interview that there were two retired Professors and four or five PhDs involved in the 
Estuary Association's submission. 
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The political 'interference' in the process was problematic for a few interviewees, all who 
otherwise felt the process to be rational. One put it like this: "Almost [rational]. And I say 
'almost' because the process was bloody nearly derailed" (B4a). Another said: "Yes it was 
[rational], until the Green Edge came along. Then it became political" (Ala). There were 
other interviewees concerned about the political interference in the process, although they 
didn't specifically comment about the rationality ofthis. The interviewee data suggests that 
this view of rationality is closely linked to the connection these people had to the 
deliberations of the Working Party. While the Working Party did not produce a unanimous 
conclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that the deliberative process was what determined the 
Bromley decision to be rational. 
This view becomes more plausible when other comments are taken into account. One 
interviewee puts it unambiguously: "I think the Working Party processes were rational. . .I 
think the Council process wasn't rational" (A4a). There were two main reasons for this. First, 
the Council view "was really heading in an opposite direction from what the science was 
saying ... from what the community was saying, and the Working Party was the representative 
of the community". Second, the CCC process was lead by one person. "I don't think that's 
rational to have one person leading in that kind of complex decision making". Another 
interviewee put it like this: "I think a working party of some sort of consultation phase is a 
rational way of doing it because it involves the community and creates an opportunity to 
understand each other's point of view" (AI b). Community involvement provides an 
"incentive to search for information or particularly if there is new work needed to get the 
information. Not so sure that this would happen without the push from the community saying 
"What about this?"" 
The next few interviewees were less committal on the rationality of the RMA and the 
Bromley process. For instance, one, reflecting on Bromley, but more commenting on the 
RMA more generally, said: "I think it is [rational] if a good practice is adopted I suppose. 
Different councils implement the RMA in different ways, but under a good practice approach 
it is a good rational approach" (AId). Another commented: "It is resource driven in some 
ways, isn't it. Because ECan can afford to mount a good process for something like Bromley, 
because it's got a big rating base .. .I suspect ECan can afford to operate more professionally 
because they have got a critical mass of staff and a culture that may be absent in the case of 
the West Coast Regional Council" (Alc). This links resources and capacity with the theme of 
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community involvement above, and suggests ecological reason requires sufficient resources to 
develop a sufficiently comprehensive community participation process. 
Another emergent theme concerned the time frame for Bromley. One interviewee pondered 
the time it has taken (1996-2004) and the fact that the Council still don't have a long-term 
consent. When asked to hypothesise the most ideal way of achieving a resource consent, he 
suggested two ways. The first is the current model, where everything is put out to the 
community and consulted, and they gather all the technical data beforehand. This involves 
lots of questioning and going back and reworking the plan. "On the face of it, it would seem 
to be a very good, sound process" (AlI3). The other approach would follow perhaps a more 
private sector model: 
"where they have very short-time periods in which to gather their information and prepare their 
AEE. They put it in front, then make their application and fight the issues in front of Court. And 
it would seem that that way for them is far more cost effective because the Court costs for the 
people who are disaffected by the consent. .. generally has a toll of attrition". 
While not necessarily advocating this view, a rational approach needs to be effective, that is, 
actually achieve the goal (in this case, achieve a resource consent). 
The time resource consent applications can take, especially if they go to Court, was of 
concern to another interviewee: "It can hamstring good proposals by winding them up in 
Courts for too long" (C2a). She was also concerned that communities need the opportunities 
to participate in the process, and she "would hate to throw the ... baby out with the 
bathwater .... It's a great balancing act to get the point right with the legislation". 
Another interviewee did not know if it was a rational way to make environmental decisions, 
but he did reflect concern about the RMA more generally. One-off consents often do not deal 
with the bigger issues. He discusses Project Aqua1S, suggesting that it is not useful to treat 
such large scale consent applications in isolation (C3a). 
15 A controversial and recently withdrawn project of Meridian Energy to divert water from the Waitaki River 
into a series of small hydro plants along a canal, and then return the water to the river several kilometer's later. 
Part of the controversy concerned other claims to the water from irrigators. The absence of a management 
strategy for the water in this catchment, and the resultant uncertainty, was one of the factors in Meridian 
Energy's decision to not go ahead with the resource consent application. The Government is currently working 
on legislation that will produce a water management plan for the catchment. 
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The adversarial process, particularly of the Court, was a significant obstacle to making this an 
ecologically rational process. "I'm not sure that the strictly adversarial process will 
necessarily arrive at the best [ decision] because people are not out to discover the whole 
truth" (C1b). This interviewee was scathing of the role of scientists (though not science), 
because of the difficulty in being impartial: 
"Nowadays the expertise is in the heads of scientists and CRIs [Crown Research Institutes] but 
they're not allowed to open their mouths without a fee. And it's all private property .... These 
people are not, in the words of the old oath we used to swear in the High Court ... , to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It is [now] carefully arranged that you can tell 
only those bits of the truth which are conducive to the success of the application." 
Earlier, in discussing the RMA, he stated that it: 
"is essentially a device for granting consents to people with the longest pockets, because they 
are able to tie up a large proportion of the ... liars, or the ones who can be persuaded to tell a 
partial story ... witnesses ... tell the truth, but only a little bit of it, and that little bit which favours 
the clients case and they are not allowed to tell the whole story". 
This theme of the role of science within the RMA's adversarial process is important and is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
The final comment states the issue starkly for this interviewee: "I think the [Bromley] process 
is a very bad one. It is a process; I'm not talking about the objectives of the legislation" (A4c). 
While accepting the purpose of the RMA, he argues: 
"it is far too pre-scripted. It would be much better as an Act if it was slimmed down to talking 
about what. .. they're trying to achieve with it rather than ... telling you exactly how to achieve 
it. .. [Then, discussing the Environment Court] It is only going to receive a relatively slimmed 
down version of the original hearing, which itself is inadequate .... The [Court does] not really 
focus on the big picture at all and it should. And that's what I'm really trying to say is that these 
processes tend to narrow us down and narrow us down until I feel that we end up in this little 
corner of the room, everything else is painted out". 
This interviewee felt frustrated that the ecological systems design, with incremental gains and 
constant goals to achieve, which he believed would be consistent with Natural Capitalism 
Hawkin et al., 1999), could not be accommodated under an RMA consent process that gave 
'licences', but did not commit consent holders to ongoing improvements. 
Was Bromley an example of ecologically rational decision making? The answer from 
interview data was mixed, and at most provides qualified support for the decision. Most 
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interviewees felt the decision given by the Commissioners was the correct one, with only one 
dissenting voice. However, this interviewee had publicly given his support for the decision, 
but the interview outlines the reasons for his ongoing concerns about the process. Most 
interviewees suggested the process, of which the Working Party was a significant component, 
was a critical element in making this a rational decision. Some made the distinction between 
ecological and political rationality, arguing that political reason nearly derailed the process 
and would have produced an irrational decision. Likewise, many suggested a strong role for 
science was a mark of rationality in the Bromley case, remarkable in particular because of the 
role of the retired scientists' voluntary roles and the concern that without this extraordinary 
community involvement, estuary discharge would still continue. There was also some doubt 
expressed about the rationality of the Court process to deal with technical information. Yet, 
what makes this case problematic, to my mind, is that the primary threat to the rationality of 
the actual decision came from an approach that could also be viewed as highly ecologically 
rational. The Natural Capitalism approach develops a coherent philosophy that seeks to create 
a dynamic and reflexive response to ecological management. According to this interviewee, 
ecologically rational decisions cannot be viewed simply within a narrow context. This, then, 
provides significant challenges for the role of the RMA. This position was stated most 
strongly by only one interviewee, but was reflected in the views of at least two others (B3a; 
B4a). 
To what extent are these views compatible? There is evidence in the data that the response of 
the Working Party to the Green Edge proposal was based on poor communication between the 
two views. While the Working Party did not have a completely unanimous position, it was 
committed to getting discharges out of the estuary, as well as improving the treatment of the 
discharge. The Green Edge proposal was a shock to the Working Party because it had not 
been anticipated, and in essence threatened to undo the work of the previous few years. In 
other words, the communication and deliberation on the proposal came too late, and was too 
brief, to be able to persuade the majority of the Working Party of its merits. In addition, there 
were serious scientific concerns about the capacity of the existing ecological capital to 
achieve the aims of the Green Edge proposal16. Therefore, while the science may have been 
lacking on the Green Edge proposal, a breakdown in communicative strategy occurred, with 
16 One interviewee suggested that the 650 hectares the CCC potentially had available for ecological engineering 
of the wastewater was significantly under the 1400 that information from the USA, UK and Australia suggested 
was required. One scientist also suggested, given Christchurch's winter temperatures, that closer to 3000 
hectares would be required (CIa). 
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the community deliberation process being by-passed in favour of a Council driven plan. In 
terms of the criteria for ecological reason discussed above, this communication failure 
undermined the potential ecological rationality of the decision. It is also reasonable to suggest 
that most Working Party interviewees did not consider the Green Edge proposal to be 
'rational', in part because it undermined the deliberative process they had been engaged in. In 
conclusion, one interviewee sums it up succinctly: 
"The challenge now is to achieve some of [interviewee A4c's] quite visionary ecological goals 
while pursuing the heavy handed solution and the admittedly rather substantially safer solution 
of the ocean outfall pipeline .. " I think the challenge for the community, for the council and the 
community, is to make sure [these visionary goals] are not scuttled" (B3a). 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the Bromley wastewater discharge consent application of the 
Christchurch City Council. It described the context of the application and provided a brief 
history. This was all a prelude to the main aim of the chapter which was to discuss the 
findings from the interview data. I began by outlining the interview questions around which 
the interview data are organised and briefly explained the identification system I used for the 
interviewees. From there I systematically examined each question, the results of which I 
summarise here. The purpose of this chapter is not analytic, but descriptive. The analysis 
takes place in the final chapter, along with conclusions. 
Question 1: What are the elements of sound environmental decision making? 
This question provided a number of coherent and interrelated themes. The data suggest that an 
ecologically rational decision requires a significant input of science and research, with most 
interviewees seeing this as a central element in a good decision. Second, there is a related 
theme of the need for some form of environmental assessment, that is, as a structured process 
for determining what the problems are and for identifying potential solutions. A dominant 
element in all but one interview is the importance of community involvement and local 
knowledge. The latter proved to play an important role in Bromley by providing significant 
data used at the hearing. Fourth, the role of leadership and political will in ensuring 
ecologically rational decisions was deemed critical by a small number of interviewees. Fifth, 
the science of risk and the need for institutional flexibility emerged as another theme. Finally, 
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a small number of interviewees argued that ecologically rational decision making requires 
careful ecological system design. The ideas of Hawkin et al., (1999) were influential with one 
interviewee in particular. 
Question 2: What were the goals o/the Bromley case? 
Therewas a range of perceived goals of the Bromley case and not goals were mutually 
compatible. Some argued the goal was the removal of discharge from the estuary. Others 
suggested it was the reduction in the level of pollutants from the Water Treatment Plant so as 
to reduce, among other things, the eutrophication in the estuary. Some interviewees were 
focused on improvement in recreational wellbeing and public health, while a few believed the 
goal was to restore the estuary environment. Finally, a couple said the goal was to obtain a 
resource consent. 
Question 3: Who ought to be involved? 
This question produced three categories of agents that the data suggest are appropriate for 
inclusion in environmental decision making. Statutory authority is perhaps an obvious one, 
given the legal framework under which the RMA operates, a small number of interviewees 
felt this was the most important 'actor'. In contrast, nearly every interviewee spoke ofthe 
need for community involvement; this was by far the most common response and only one 
interviewee was unenthusiastic about the participation of untrained community members. The 
final group, strongly supported by all the participants was scientific agents. This theme of 
science continued very strongly here, as it did in Question One. Some interviewees advocated 
a joint approach between these three groups. 
Question 4: How did the Bromley Case measure up? 
Most interviewees were happy with the outcome, that is, the failure of the CCC application to 
continue to discharge into the estuary, and most of these felt the ocean outfall was the best 
current option. Most also supported the Working Party concept and were happy with the 
process, at least until what they felt to be the political interference that took place. In their 
view, this undermined the role of community in the decision~ There was some scientific 
debate noted by many participants, not all of whom were happy with the level of scientific 
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analysis and research that went into the initial application. There was one notable exception to 
this positive, although qualified assessment, of how well Bromley measured up to rational 
decision making. The ocean outfall and rejection of the Green Edge proposals was less than a 
rational decision because it focused on issuing a licence, and cannot ensure that ongoing 
improvements occur over time. 
Question 5: What is missing/rom this process? 
The question evoked four main observations. There was considerable concern about the 
'interference' of politics (read, Politicians) into the affairs of the Working Party. The 
dominant perspective the Working Party had developed was bypassed by the Council when it 
finalised its resource consent application, leaving some members of the Working Party angry. 
It also undermined the community deliberation the Working Party was set up to facilitate. 
There was comment on the need for a broader planning framework, particularly more 
guidance from Government. Another was also concern that there was little commitment to 
habitat restoration. Finally, it was noted that wastewater treatment is an ongoing issue and this 
process may let it slip from the agenda once the ocean outfall is in place. 
Question 6: Was this 'rational' decision making? 
There were some diverse views on this question. Some felt it was rational because it produced 
the 'correct' answer in the end. Most gave a qualified 'yes', basing their views on the strong 
role of science and good processes for community involvement. A number felt the process 
'nearly' became irrational because of the intrusion of politics. In this view, political 
interference in a community'S deliberative process undermines the rationality of a decision. 
Some interviewees pondered on difficulties with the RMA, in particular the resources that are 
needed to produce a rational result, the problem of the RMA narrowing down the capacity of 
decision makers to act adaptively and flexibly, and the time it took to make the Bromley 
decision. One was concerned about the role science was playing in an era of commercial 
control of scientific knowledge. The adversarial process means those with deep pockets are 
more likely to get what they want. Finally, and again in stark contrast to most ofthe other 
interviewees, one believed the aims of the process are admirable, but the RMA process is not 
rational because it undermines communities'ability to take a developmental, flexible process 
of ongoing improvement. Granting a long-term consent is akin to granting a licence to act in a 
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defined way for the duration of the consent, with no onus to strive to improve ecological 
management as technology, science and resources advance. 
This chapter has described the findings ofthe research. The implications and analysis will be 
left for the final chapter of this dissertation. For now, we turn to the second case study. 
151 
Chapter Five: The Resource Consent Industry 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESOURCE CONSENT INDUSTRY 
The previous chapter described the fonns of ecological reason at work in a specific resource 
consent application. This chapter focuses not on a specific resource consent application but 
more widely on the Resource Consent industry. The data come from 19 in-depth interviews 
with a range of professionals involved in some way with the resource consent processes in the 
South Island of New Zealand. A range of people was interviewed in order to detennine what 
they considered ecologically rational decision making to consist of, and to assess the extent to 
which they believed the resource consent processes under the RMA are ecologically rational. 
The sample used was designed to ensure a cross-section of professionals, working either 
directly with resource consents, or where resource consents were an important part of their 
work. This includes specialists within NGOs who are employed to deal with consent 
applications of relevance or concern to their organisation. For this case study, I eliminated 
non-professionals from the sample, for two reasons. Professionals are, by definition, those 
with the most experience of the resource consent process, and therefore more useful in 
identifying the degree of ecological reason at work in these processes. Second, these agents 
have the greatest influence in constructing a resource consent application, assessing it or 
making the decision on an application. While it can be argued that other agents influence the 
process, such as political lobby groups and public pressure through the media, this influence 
is nevertheless still filtered through the statutory process, of which resource management 
professionals are the gatekeepers. Therefore, an investigation into the ecological rationality of 
the resource consent process is best served by researching the practitioners and analysing their 
views and practices. 
The tenn 'industry' is used not as a technical phrase to imply some fonn of industrialisation, 
or even that there exists a coherent resource management profession. While there have been 
groups of professionals for s9me years within this broad category, only recently has a general 
purpose resource management professional organisation been set Upl. However, I am using 
I The New Zealand branch of the Environment Institute of Australia and New Zealand (EIANZ) was created in 
February 2003. Its purpose is to facilitate interaction among environmental professionals, promote 
environmental knowledge and awareness, and advance ethical and competent environmental practice. It is open 
to all environmental professionals whether working as consultants, policy analysts, economists, planners, 
academics, researchers or students (See www.eianz.org). There are a number of more focussed professional 
organisations such as the New Zealand Planning Institute (www.nzplanning.co.nz). the Resource Management 
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the tenn as short-hand to refer to any professionals or organisations with regular involvement 
in resource management decisions. The only group that potentially could have been included, 
but was not, were lawyers. I did not interview any lawyers, on the basis that their speciality is 
the legal process, and they do not deal directly with either making consent decisions or 
providing the technical input into a decision. My assumption was that legal rationality means 
lawyers seek to (a) uphold the law, and (b) help their client get what they want. The role of 
those I interviewed is generally different, as the interviews make clear. Most are interested, 
either professionally or through statutory obligation, to seek sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources (Section 5 of the RMA). That goal is, in principle, their 
priority. For this reason, I focused on those with this interest and responsibility, because I 
believed this would provide a much more useful test of ecological reason under the RMA. 
The Resource Consent Industry Interviews 
The Interviewees 
There is a range of professional contributors to any resource consent application. For small 
projects most applicants do not employ professionals to develop their application, but will 
often draw on the advice of consent authority staff. Larger and more complex applications 
will often engage outside consultants to prepare the application. This may involve planners, 
scientific specialists, for example, ecologists, engineers and social scientists, or Maori liaison 
units in local lwi, who may deal with consultation issues. When applications are presented 
they are assessed by consent authority staff including planners, scientific and engineering 
staff. At consent hearings applicants may draw upon professional evidence, as may objectors. 
Decisions are made by the Authority, usually by Councillors or, for major projects, 
independent Commissioners. Decisions can be appealed in the Environment Court. One final 
category of agents in the consent process is compliance officers who monitor applicants' 
compliance with resource consent conditions. The last group who indirectly influences the 
consents process are policy analysts who develop the rules under which resource consents 
take place. 
Law Association (www.nnla.org.nz) and the Institute of Professional Engineers New Zealand 
(www.ipenz.org.nz). 
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This provides a range of actors who contribute to the consents process and therefore fonned 
the framework in which I selected my interviewees: 
Consultants: Planners, Scientists, Engineers; 
Consent Authorities: Policy Analysts, Consent Officers, Scientists, Engineers, Compliance 
Officers, Councillors, Commissioners; 
Environment Court: Judges and Commissioners; 
NGOs: Consent Specialists. 
This list provided the basic categories of practitioners who I sought to interview. I used the 
snowball method of sampling (see Appendix). Starting with the contacts in the 'industry' that 
I already had, I asked for recommendations of others in these categories. By this method, I 
developed an increasingly wide range of people from which to contact. In the end I was able 
to conduct nineteen in-depth interviews ranging in length from forty five minutes to one and a 
half hours. 
The sample was drawn mainly from Christchurch, with a small number from Dunedin2. Most 
of my initial contacts were made in Christchurch and many of the recommendations I 
received were also in that city. I did receive some suggestions of people in Dunedin, and was 
able to conduct some interviews there as well. 
Following the identification schedule in the previous chapter, I use the following system to 
identify the category into which the interviewee fits, while retaining their anonymity. 
E: Consultants 
1: Planners 
2: Scientists 
3: Engineers 
F: Consent Authority 
1: PlannerslPolicy/Compliance 
2: Scientists 
3: Engineers 
4: Decision makers (Councillors, Commissioners) 
G: Environment Court 
2 The second 'major' city in the South Island, lying three hundred and fifty kilometres south of Christchurch. 
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1: Judges/Commissioners 
H: NGOs/Iwi 
1: Iwi 
2. NOOs 
(Note: The letter designations (E, F, etc), follow on from those used in the Bromley 
interviews (A-D). 
The designations are used as follows: For example (E2c). The (E) means they are from a 
consultancy. The (2) means they are a scientist. Each interviewee is given a letter (a, b, c) to 
identify which interviewee I refer to. There may be more than one scientist in the (E2) 
category, and therefore (E2c), for instance, refers to the third interviewee in the E2 group. 
Where someone straddles two categories, they are identified by the combined designation, for 
example (E2/F4) is both a consultant scientist and a commissioner or councillor. 
Interview Methodology 
The approach in this case study is similar to the methodology of the Bromley case study, 
except that I replaced the explicit focus of Bromley with a broader focus on the resource 
consent process (see the previous chapter for more information on the methodology and also 
the Appendix). A range of questions was used to tease out the views of each of the 
interviewees. I began, as in the Bromley case study, by asking about their general views on 
what makes sound (rational) environmental decision making: "If we are going to manage the 
environment sensibly or effectively, what do you consider to be the key elements we need to 
take into account in our decision-making?" A more open question was also sometimes posed: 
"To what extent do these criteria reflect the environmental decision making you are familiar 
with"? This question was oftentimes followed up with similar, but differently, phrased 
questions later in the interviews, adding to the details of their answer. 
From this point the question focus was on their role in the consent process. I did not ask all of 
these questions in every interview, but drew on them when they seemed relevant to that 
particular interviewee. Most of these questions did not address a specific case, although at 
times, when an interviewee was discussing a case they were involved with, the questions 
referred to those cases. The questions follow the same methodological pattern as in the 
Bromley case. They were designed to investigate the forms of communication, as well as the 
forms of rationality employed in the consent processes by the interviewees. 
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However, this case study differed from the Bromley case in providing an opportunity to 
investigate the role of experts (which includes consultants, scientists, engineers and planners) 
in influencing a consent decision. Because this was a sample of resource consent specialists, I 
wanted to understand their roles and influence in producing a consent decision. Therefore I 
asked some questions in relation to this. 
The questions used are as specified in the Appendix, and therefore will not be repeated here. 
As in the Bromley case, these questions will be grouped, for analytic convenience, around the 
following themes: 
(1) What are the elements of sound environmental decision making? 
(2) What is the role of experts in resource consent decisions? 
(3) Who is or ought to be involved in the consent process. 
(4) What are the weaknesses of the consent process? 
(5) Is this 'ecologically rational' decision making? 
As with the previous chapter, this chapter reports what the interviewees said when presented 
with these questions. Its purpose is not analytical and therefore I only comment to clarify or 
highlight what the data shows. The analysis of what this all means is left to the final chapter. 
Finally, I do not report every theme or comment raised in the interviews, only the dominant 
themes. First, if four or more interviewees report the same theme, I record it in the discussion 
below. However, if a theme is only raised by two or three, it is considered only if it forms a 
significant component of that interview. In other words, the level of articulation of a theme is 
an indication of its role in the views of that interviewee. As with Bromley, this criterion acts 
as a rule of thumb, rather being strictly objective. 
Question 1: What are the elements of sound environmental decision making? 
This question produced a similar scope of answers to the Bromley case study, but there were 
some interesting differences. A number of interviewees stated that they did not understand the 
question. For some, the issue was the distinction between ecological and environmental 
issues, the former being the preserve of ecology and the latter much more broadly interpreted, 
but sometimes in terms of physical resources rather than ecosystems or particular species. 
Overall, there appeared to be a greater sensitivity to this dimension of the question than in the 
Bromley case. Some also felt it was a very difficult topic to articulate, due in part to the 
complexity. One even exclaimed: "Oh no, I'm just thinking 'oh my God'!" (FIe). 
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Nevertheless, the following themes appeared in the interview data: (a) the central role for 
science; (b) the use of an environmental assessment framework; (c) good 
information/avoiding emotion; (c) importance of consultation; (d) the role of local and 
traditional knowledge; and (e) the role of values. These themes are similar to Bromley3, but 
with some notable differences. One difference is the emphasis on consultation, rather than 
participation. Another, the theme of good information/avoiding emotion, expresses a 
particular emphasis on the types of knowledge required. Local and traditional knowledge 
requires its own discussion, rather then just including it in the role for the community. Finally, 
there is much discussion in the interviews on the role of values, so that gets highlighted in this 
section. 
(aJ The central role for science 
Nearly every interviewee highlighted the centrality of science in rational environmental 
decision making. The centrality of science was easily the most unquestioned assumption that 
emerged in these interviews. This does not mean there were no critical attitudes to it, or 
critique of it, but even its strongest critics were quick to allay fears that they were 'anti-
science'. Much of the criticism comes under the theme 'traditional knowledge', discussed 
below. 
One interviewee put it like this: "I see it as good quality scientific information .... One of the 
things you rely on a lot is the technical documents, whether they are guidelines, national or 
international work that has been published" (E21F4). One of the reasons for this emphasis is 
because "you need to justify quite carefully ... any conclusion or recommendations made" 
(ibid). This theme reoccurred several times in these interviews, both explicitly and implicitly. 
Being able to rationally justify recommendations or decisions was largely the role of good 
science. For example, one interviewee expounded at length the way he goes about a scientific 
evaluation for a consent application. He says that his speciality, ecology: 
"could still be an art as far as the [biologists or zoologists] go, simply because it is even harder 
than the old classics which were debated as science, to gain empirical repeatable data ... I've 
always thought ecology and the social sciences marry really well in some ofthose aspects" 
(E2a). 
3 To remind the reader, Bromley's themes were (a) the role of science and research, (b) environmental 
assessment, (c) a strong role for the community and local knowledge, (d) the role of leadership and political will, 
(e) risk and flexibility and (t) the importance of system design. 
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He nevertheless reaffirms that ecology "follows the scientific method", and much of the 
interview expands on this methodology. 
Another interviewee is quite explicit about what sorts of information are required: 
"But you know, the best ecological decision is made on the best infonnation you can get. So 
that would be chemical infonnation about water quality, surveys of biota, and preferably over a 
period of time. And then the effects of that to be given some sort of analysis in an application, 
and when you get experts agreeing, then that is the best outcome" (Flc). 
Although I discuss this below, this interviewee goes on to argue that public participation does 
not add to this process to any significant degree. For this interviewee, good environmental 
decisions are directly related to the quality of the science. 
Most interviewees felt that science, although essential, was only part of the story. One said: 
"We need strong scientific input, but science is not infallible, it always changes" (Glb). 
Another, from an NGO, put it like this: "I think we need a good body of scientific knowledge 
from professional scientists. 1 think for example, [about] certain wetlands, we don't [know] 
enough about the values before we can make a decision about whether to allow that wetland 
to be drained" (H2a). When asked how we can make a sound decision, the answer was 
straightforward: "I think you need sound scientific evidence, and you need local views and 
values" (H2a). The two latter themes are discussed later in this chapter. 
The responses about science from this case study are interesting, not for the expected 
endorsement of science, but for the strong underlying assumption of the value of science per 
se. This endorsement comes over even more strongly than in Bromley, which also gave 
science a pre-eminent position. Yet, this is not simply a positivist response, in any sense, to 
the issues of environmental decision making. Other values have been added to the 
requirements of rational decision making, while at the same time not devaluing science itself. 
Much of that has to do with the role of the public, social values and traditional knowledge in 
decision making. These are discussed below, but ought to be viewed, at least in the context of 
this case study, as supplements to science, rather than challengers to science. The 
methodological questions about how to balance these dimensions of decision making are not 
resolved, but science is clearly still largely unchallenged in its central role, at least for this 
group of professionals. 
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(b) The use of an environmental assessmentframework 
Reflective of the Bromley case, developing a framework by which to assess a resource 
consent, was a strong theme in these interviews. One responded to the question as follows: 
"Okay. There are two things. First, what decision has to be made, and what has already been 
made, and therefore, what is the legal framework in which I'm making the decision ... ? So, in 
other words, what is the scope, and secondly what is the change in the ecosystem that will 
result ... ?" (F3a). 
Another argued that we need "a good ecological framework and good ecological basis" (E2d) 
for decision making. One interviewee put it like this: 
"We need a baseline of the environment, we need to know a lot of the details about the activity, 
and I think we need to know about the costs ... what the environment can sustain in the way of 
contaminants into it or anything taken from it, and still be left in a state that's acceptable .... " 
(Fld). 
All these interviewees work within the RMA processes and therefore some of their thinking 
reflects that. Nevertheless, this is a prevalent theme in the interview data. The particular 
approach to assessment varies, as one interviewee explained: 
"No, I don't have a structured approach to any of that sort of decision making. I know there are 
systems and templates out there, and it's pretty much every case on its merits, although I tend to 
identifY what are the key issues and then focus on giving good resolution to those key issues, 
and not worry about the minutiae and other details ... " (E31F4). 
This was not a typical response, but came from someone in their role of decision maker, 
rather than someone who produces information for decision makers. 
(c) Good information/avoiding emotion 
The role of 'quality' information in the decision process has already been implied under the 
science requirement, but this was expanded by some interviewees suggesting, quite explicitly, 
that good information requires an unemotional or impartial attitude. There were two 
dimensions to this. The first refers to the differences between the technical capacities of 
various sciences. This was alluded to above by one interviewee referring to ecology as 
perhaps more akin to an art than a science (he was himself an ecologist). On this another 
interviewee stated: 
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"The difficulties that we have with some of the resource consent processes are that we tend to 
have what we call quite sound engineering or hydrological information, but the ecological 
environmental information is usually not as good as ours. So there's not a balance there in terms 
of the quality of information that we see coming into the consent process" (E3a). 
The technical quality of information, then, is one issue. The second concerns a lack of 
understanding of technical issues that results in wrongheaded consent submissions: 
"We tend to see, from an ecological or environmental side of things, more emotive arguments, 
you know, than technicaL ... Now a lot of people that put in submissions on [groundwater takes, 
for example] don't understand the mechanisms or technical information that you need to make 
good decisions. So they put in submissions that are largely emotive, and some of the groups are 
the sort of groups related to [for example], sea fishing or sometimes Iwi, don't understand that 
what we are talking about really doesn't have any relevance to some of these other issues. 
There's a whole pile of groups that submit on these things that really are doing it, I think, on 
purely emotional grounds ... they don't have an understanding of the science and I don't know 
whether they don't have access to it or they choose [not] to" (E3a). 
This interviewee discussed the problem that science has not yet well documented many of the 
sites where issues are raised by resource consent applications. Nevertheless, the focus still 
ought to be on quality science in decisions. When a consent is publicly notified, it goes to a 
hearing: "And those guys, if they are doing their job, are dealing with facts, not emotions. 
And I don't know if you've been on any of these Environment Court hearings, but it's just, I 
get really annoyed" (E3a). 
Another interviewee said that "sometimes it comes down to the science as being the key 
aspect. We get this a lot with, you know, science versus perception" (Flc). This interviewee 
recounted a consent application for an established goldmine. A local Estuary Care group, 
which does a lot of voluntary work in the area, argued that sediment must be entering local 
water ways, and presented to the hearing with that view. Yet there is no evidence that there is 
any significant (more than minor) leakage, despite the widespread perception that there must 
be. 
On a similar theme, another interviewee said of a rational decision: "Well, [it is] one that isn't 
fanciful, [that is] based on reality, I mean, people do have fanciful ideas about the 
environment" (G la). This interviewee then explained the difference between irrational and 
rational thinking. The fears people may hold about some environmental concern may be very 
real, but may in fact be rational on the basis of the information those people had available. 
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"Now the industry used to argue with us that these were irrational ramblings of people 
without any knowledge, but what we said was that the fears were reasonable, but they were 
not well founded" (Gla). This rather more generous response to the views of some non-
scientific based arguments nevertheless makes a distinction between well founded, and not so 
well founded, arguments. Indeed, decision making is actually a judgement because: 
"you can never say ... in environmental decision making that you've got the right decision in an 
absolute sense, because in the end you are applying ajudgement, a rational judgement based on 
reasoning, but nevertheless ajudgement, rather than a scientific equation" (Gla). 
Ecologically rational decisions, for these interviewees, must be based on well-founded 
arguments, not emotional arguments. Emotional arguments, presumably, ought not be rejected 
out of hand by decision makers, but be tested by scientific evidence. 
(c) Importance of consultation 
Overall, these interviews produced a comprehensive statement that consultation is an essential 
part of ecologically rational decision making. That is not surprising, particularly in light of the 
Bromley case study, which showed a similar trend. What is perhaps more surprising is the 
focus of consultation, and the purposes to which it is put. There is a significant theme that 
constructs consultation (as opposed to participation) as an opportunity to educate the public. 
First, the role of consultation is taken for granted by some interviewees: "I think the first thing 
is widespread consultation ... even without the RMA, you need to consult the community. I 
think people need to have a say .... " (Fla); In ideal decision making, "most certainly the 
community is involved" (E2d). When asked what the value was of social input into a 
decision, one interviewee said: "Yeah, absolutely essential" (F3a) in order to determine the 
significance of the issue the consent is dealing with. This response ties into the issue of social 
values, to be discussed a little later. Another interviewee reflected on the changes that have 
taken place in the last ten years: "We've moved in the last ten years quite a long way from the 
purely empirical standpoint" (E2c). He went on to discuss the increasing role his organisation 
is taking in consulting with stakeholders, a development for his scientific research 
organisation. 
The more interesting result from the data is the reasons for consultation. There is some 
caution expressed about the role of the public. For instance: "I think the RMA has got the 
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right idea to involve the community and let the community make the decision to a point. 
[But], I think we need to set some baselines" (Fld). These base lines protect against irrational 
decisions: "[By] allowing communities to make decisions, which seems a good idea, the 
communities can be too focused on ... affluence [for example, and] drive people beyond what 
it can do for the environment". When asked if we would be better off with a eco-scientific 
elite governing all environmental decisions, he responded: "Yes, I agree, I think. That's 
assuming there is good science out there, but on that assumption, yeah, I think that's where 
we should be heading". Another interviewee responded to the same question: "Ideally, yes, 
that would be right. Ideally scientists will make calls. Some scientists can be wrong though, 
but a group of scientists would sit down and make calls that benefit the environment" (FIa). 
However, this was qualified by the fact that we necessarily make impacts on the environment, 
and communities need to be involved in sorting out the balance. This interviewee saw 
scientists at one end of the spectrum (protection), developers at the other (development), and 
the community in the middle (balance). 
An alternative view was also expressed about whether it is best to let scientists make such 
decisions: 
"And I don't agree with that. I mean, from an environmental point of view, we'd probably come 
out better off if we let the scientist decide. But from a public process point of view, I have 
concerns about relying on science, and science is not value free you know ... I still think 
[science] is really incredibly valuable and important but it's not all knowing and all seeing" 
(H2a). 
When asked how important the community was in defining ecological issues, one interviewee 
responded that: 
"they are the ones that do define the issues and they sometimes define them in strange ways. 
Public health is a key issue for the Christchurch outfa1l4• The public are saying you must have 
UV disinfectant, so that's how they are expressing their concerns about public health issues. So 
they leap to the only solution they are going to accept. .. so then you've got to work with them to 
(a) understand what the issue is and (b) what the real risks are and lead them to a position where 
in actual fact you know what is unacceptable so maybe we don't have to have UV treatment, for 
example .... The consultation is very important in defining that. Every now and then you will get 
an environmental nutter that will choose some esoteric aspect of science and try to create a big 
4 This interviewee has some knowledge of the Bromley case but was interviewed in relation to his broader 
involvement in resource consent decisions. 
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issue .... Environmental nuttters, they lose perspective of what you're trying to achieve .... " 
(E31F4). 
Another responded with the following view. While acknowledging public input makes the 
process more robust, easy access to the internet can cause difficulties for hearing committees: 
"They will put in, say, carbon monoxide and get 30,000 [hits] and a lot of data which is not 
really that helpful. .. and doesn't necessarily add a lot of value to the process" (F3a). 
This response expresses the tension inherent in much of the interview data for this case study. 
There is a clear acknowledgement of the need for consultation, but also the need for an 
expert-led process, where the public are helped to understand the issues from the expert's 
point of view. Another interviewee expressed a similar view: "The community has to be 
involved; they have to be informed as well. They often have a lot of pre-conceived ideas 
about what effects are likely to result .. ,. So I think informing and educating people on what 
effects could take place is important" (E2/F4). He also questions how important consultation 
always is: "Some applicants have had a running consultation and will go to great lengths to 
involve people and give information. Often it doesn't seem to make any difference". 
When asked what changes were needed with the RMA, one interviewee said: 
"I think that it needs to be less public participation, myself, because I think ... the criticism of the 
RMA is that it takes a long time and it can be very expensive. And the things that make it take a 
long time and cause it to be expensive is really the increment of people who don't know what 
they are talking about. And its fair enough for people to be able to write letters to the editor 
expressing their views, buts it's an entirely different matter when you are actually causing an 
applicant time and money when you're just wrong, or its none of your business in the first 
place .... " (FIc). 
This expresses well, the tension some in the consent industry have with the process. 
(d) The role o/local and traditional knowledge 
As with Bromley, these data reflected the importance of local and traditional knowledge. The 
Maori interviewees tended to focus more on the term, 'traditional knowledge', while other 
interviewees most often talked about local knowledge. For example, one interviewee argued 
for the importance oflocal views: "Locals can contribute scientific information that because 
they are on the ground, they see it every day ... " (H2a). While science is essential, "local 
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views, local concerns and general values, as well 1 think nationally, like, not just locals ... " 
(H2a). Another put it like this: 
"[We need] people's own knowledge, local knowledge of an area and situations. 
But ... something strange [may happen], they might know that over the 30 years that they've sat 
there ... you get 100 millilitres of rainfall up there, three days later this happens here .... 
[Scientists] may not make the connection between the 100 millilitres up there ... " (FIe). 
Local knowledge is also important to another interviewee, but he stresses that is must be 
"presented in an unbiased way .... Pretty often it's not that difficult to see whether a person is 
genuinely presenting information or an argument, or they are being very selective ... [or] 
whether they are pulling the wool over your eyes or not" (E21F4). 
Traditional knowledge was also viewed as important, although no-one explicitly discussed the 
differences between the two terms. One interviewee said: "I guess 1 have quite a broad view 
of that knowledge, that science ... for instance, 1 would include traditional knowledge" (E2c). 
A Maori interviewee put it this way: 
"[The District or Regional] plans ... have to be based on good environmental 
knowledge .. .including traditional knowledge, but also local knowledge that's there at the 
moment, the fishermen, the farmers and Fish and Game5 and all that, they're ... people that are 
really important, even though we argue with them sometimes over certain things, but we know 
that they're out there and looking at the rivers everyday ... " (HI c). 
While this quite suggests there is a perceived difference between local and traditional 
knowledge, for some interviewees the terms appear to mean the same thing, with traditional 
knowledge being local knowledge that gets passed down from previous generations. One 
Maori interviewee put it like this: 
"I suppose as a community 1 would think that those that have an association with that resource, 
as well as the community that has got a more contemporary relationship with the resource, 1 
would say that they will be pretty involved in the development of the process ... about the 
resource, equipped with the best knowledge that might be around" (HI b). 
This suggests both a historic or contemporary relationship is valid, with the emphasis on an 
association with the resource. 
Another interview put his view this way: 
"There's got to be acknowledgement that Maori knowledge is important for the 
environment. .. because that culture that lived here before Europeans arrived worked a bit of that 
5 An organization with Statutory responsibility to manage freshwater recreational fisheries and game resources. 
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out ... yes, these people lived here for, say, a thousand years, they've learnt a bit about the 
country and hey, let's use that knowledge" (HIa). 
Traditional knowledge in this context refers to the accumulated understandings of local 
ecosystems being passed down the generations and is seen as an essential source of 
knowledge for environmental decision making. 
The more problematic dimension of traditional knowledge relates to world views. Traditional 
knowledge, as just discussed, forms another source of empirical information. However, when 
traditional knowledge is expressed in terms of world views, it is not always compatible with 
the dominant scientific system under which the consent processes operates. One interviewee 
refers to this as community based understandings: 
"Sure you need scientific evidence, but that needs to be matched and balanced with community 
based understandings and knowledge .... I think the first step is allowing it into the door [of the 
council or decision maker] ... the second step is to try and dismantle the privileging of any of 
those systems .... That would mean a collaborative approach to defining what a bottom line is, 
what we might mean by rational in this time and place .... All the terms have flowed around and 
this universalism about them, but in fact they're not, but are highly politically, socially, 
culturally constructed, often to the disadvantage of those that lack power ... the role of the 
decision maker is to help to equalise the process" (HIa). 
I discussed with another interviewee, the argument of Simon Upton, former Environment 
Minister, that the RMA ought to, ideally, simply prescribe biophysical bottom lines and leave 
cultural values out of the equation: 
"That's a problem though, because for us it is cultural, but it's also those other things as well, it 
is ecological, it's everything ... it happens to be that our culture is put out here on the side and 
said, you're like a culture that's got a culture ... but really its not, it's a normal part of life" 
(HIc). 
Another responded this way: "If you're not going to count the cultural values, i.e., Maori 
cultural values in the Act, then all you're really going to do is to perpetuate the status quo. 
The only interpretation of any biophysical stuff is going to be the status quo, which is not 
Maori" (HI a). 
Incorporating alternative value systems in environmental decisions can be challenging. While 
acknowledging that there is not a single Maori view on cosmology, especially given 
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significant differences between I wi, one interviewee nevertheless argued that being Maori 
implies a particular form of ethics: 
"The concept of Maori is important. I would think that other species, if you accept that ... and the 
whakapapa connection, ethically the next step is that you accept a duty of responsibility - what 
is responsible interaction with other species? I think there is a duty of care and responsibility, 
and I think that view is a Maori view potentially because of its origins and Maori creation 
stories, for instance .... You then get to the nature of that exercise of that duty becomes a matter 
of that culture's perceptions of how best to do that. So that might mean, for instance, a Maori 
view about harvesting ... might be quite different to the view of a scientist who has done a lot of 
work [in that area]" (Hlb). 
These differences were not elaborated on by the interviewee, but he did note his concern 
about cultural universalism that can be present in Western arguments about nature. 
The interview data indicates that traditional and local knowledge are both important in 
ecological reason, and Maori interviewees were especially sensitive to the role culture plays 
in constructing perceptions of the environment and, ipso facto, perceptions of ecological 
reason. The use of local knowledge in decision making, whether from contemporary or 
traditional sources, appears relatively unproblematic in the data. The use of traditional 
'knowledge' based on cultural world views that deviate from the Western model, however, 
does not get widespread support in the data. This may be because I did not explicitly raise this 
issue with interviewees, and therefore it did not appear at the forefront of most interviewees' 
thinking, with the obvious exception of Maori interviewees. 
(e) The role of values 
Social values were seen by a number of interviewees as very important in ecological reason. 
Once we know what the science is saying, one interviewee suggested, the next question is, 
"Who cares ... does it really matter?" (P3a). Assigning significance to the findings of science 
is the role of public input, to express what is valued. Another put it as follows: 
"To make sound environmental decisions requires two things. First of all establishing values, 
levels of protection. So the first one is, 'Where are the goal posts on the playing field?' The 
second one is, 'How high is the cross bar?' .. , We were being asked to make a decision on 
what's good ... [but] science is not here to make decisions ... [that] is a social and economic 
process" (E2c). 
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One interviewee felt that the RMA included values in the decision making framework (H2a). 
When asked if science can be used to make tradeoffs between species, the reply was: "No, 
that's a role for values. I think people shy away from values, but they make decisions based 
on them all the time. All the time, and we should be honest about what we're doing" (H2a). 
Another said that scientists can find out what is there, for example, how abundant a species is, 
"but they cannot tell you what significance they have or what value is placed on them by 
different people and different groups in the community" (Fla). One interviewee was 
particularly forthright about this issue: 
"Science can't add any value to that process and I get very irritated when I see white coats cross 
the line between the science and then [start] telling you whether or not its okay or not to cause 
that kind of adverse effect or that kind of change to the ecosystem, because that's something the 
community must decide ... and it decides and codifies its value statements in the form of 
policies ... " (F3a). 
Science must not make value judgements, and in any case, ecological values are not always 
known to decision makers. This means that consultation is an essential part of ecologically 
rational decision making: 
"[You] just don't know what the ecological values are until you have talked to people, because 
you can read aU the books on it. .. but everyone looks at ecological values differently. Like Iwi 
have specific ecological values in specific areas and DoC does and so does Fish and Game ... " 
(Fla). 
What people meant by values varied, although it was not usually specified. It is best summed 
up in the question quoted above: "Who cares?" Ultimately, it is human values that drive a 
decision in a particular direction. One interviewee was quite forthright. Social values are 
"absolutely critical in driving the outcome we as a people desire .... Although it may sound 
crude, ultimately the values that are attached to the ecosystem are ultimately imputed by people. 
We don't like calling it anthropocentric, but in reality it probably is and therefore all the 
processes end up driving towards outcomes that the community has prescribed or is seeking" 
(F3a). 
Anthropocentric views were not, however, the only ethical perspective reflected in the data. 
As discussed above, Maori perspectives embraced less anthropocentric positions, especially 
through the concept of Whakapapa: "Birds, fish, everything, are related to us. So in one sense 
they are also our cousins" (Hlc). This interviewee pointed out that Maori were also pragmatic 
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in their use of natural resources. Nevertheless, this position is not as anthropocentric as the 
dominant Western positions. 
Question 2: What is the role of experts in resource consent decisions? 
The role of experts in consent decisions is important because they are the primary source of 
data and knowledge relevant to many resource consent applications. While I had hoped for 
more personal reflection on their own practice, interviewees tended to talk more broadly 
about the expert role6, and usually in relation to other experts. One of the common responses I 
received from non-experts in the Bromley case was that resource consents could be bought. In 
other words, is this 'science for hire' or is the contribution of experts a balanced, objective 
endeavour? To what extent can experts stretch the data and interpret it in ways favourable to 
their client? These questions are important because of the argument that experts are motivated 
to please their client, and therefore will modify the science accordingly. 
The link with this and ecological rationality is important. Because science and good 
knowledge (two criteria discussed above) are viewed as critical to sound environmental 
decisions, anything that undermines this presumably undermines ecological reason. If expert 
input is subject to the vagaries of the market, and aims of consent applicants, good science is 
undermined. There were slightly different perspectives on this issue, although overall most 
interviewees do not believe science gets compromised, at least for these reasons. Is science 
for hire? I address this question under two headings; 'maybe' and 'not really'. 
Is science for hire? Maybe 
Some interviewees were cautious about the ways expert knowledge can be manipulated. None 
said outright that science can be bought in the market place, but they did suggest that data can 
be bent in certain ways. While there are legitimate disagreements over data, one interviewee 
suggest that "more often than not I think they [experts] interpret the data or they bend the data 
to match the outcome that they want, which is why we have jobs to audit them" (Fla). 
Another suggests some experts are selective in what they use, and "they give the client what 
they want to·hear" (Olb). Yet another, himself one of these experts, said: "Well, I think that 
6 It became clear to me that, despite my initial prompting, most interviewees preferred to reflect on professional 
practice generically, or on others' practices, rather than their own practice. 
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science does direct the outcome, but certain experts can provide a certain science to lean to a 
direction on a decision .... " (E3a). This interviewee went on to explain that "it's probably 
more a case of what you don't say, rather than what you do say". While experts seek to be 
neutral most ofthe time, in a hearing they are lawyer directed, and can only testify on the 
questions they are given. As one of the Bromley interviewees put it, they are not instructed to 
deal with "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" (C1b). 
When asked if being hired to oppose an application meant that an expert looked more closely 
at the problems, one interviewee said: "Yes, and that's part of the process and that's a good 
thing ... " (E2a). He then argues that the problems ideally should have come out in the pre-
hearing discussion, but if they don't, this acts as a check on the process. In essence, this 
suggests there is some latitude (in some cases) for varying emphases on the data. 
One final comment suggested that 'shonky' experts can appear occasionally, and the system 
will pick them out, but "it takes a lot of time" (E2c). This view leads into the more commonly 
expressed view that 'science for hire' is not really that likely. 
Is science for hire? Probably not 
One interviewee suggested that experts can be bought, but his organisation puts a lot of 
emphasis on professionalism and making it clear to clients the stance they will take, even if 
this means not accepting work (E2c). I had similar comments from another large consultancy. 
One of the main reasons for this is the importance for a good reputation, especially in a small 
county like New Zealand. One local government interviewee put it like this: "In a community 
like New Zealand, you can't be a scientist and have a compromised position, or else you don't 
get hired again" (Flc). The other side of this is that reputation means that consent authorities 
are much more likely to trust your work: 
''Now what is interesting and probably quite a nice bit of natural justice in a way is that the 
consultant that develops a reputation with ethically sound [practice], honesty ... , over two, there, 
four, five, twenty applications, you get to a point where you need to do less and less checks and 
so you arrive at a point where their applications can be processed very, very quickly" (FIb). 
When I asked one interviewee if experts were not simply 'hired guns', he said: 
"It's not true. That's a very interesting perception and we notice it, and at. .. we might be at the 
upper end of the game ... [but] most people realise that New Zealand is a small place and we 
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know mostly each other, no, most people are not guns for hire, at all. There's a couple who 
everyone knows ... and of course by default they suffer in the clients they get. At the end of the 
day if you haven't got your integrity, you haven't got anything in this business" (E2a). 
A number of interviewees spoke of the need to maintain a good reputation. One explained that 
at Council Hearings, submitters can tell all sorts of lies but cannot be cross-examined, apart 
from questions of clarification: 
"I have seen it many times when people stand up and give evidence and it's just absolute 
rubbish, yet asa professional ... [I have] a value basis that there is nothing that anyone in this 
office can say in front of the hearing that they are not going to repeat in the Environment Court 
under oath and able to be cross examined. That is the fundamental guiding principal that we 
work by. But submitters don't work by those principals so we are very constrained in what we 
can and what we can't say. We can't mislead, we can't direct in terms of the way we frame our 
evidence to try and achieve an outcome .... It really works against us" (E31F4). 
The next issue concerns the relatively few consent applications that fail: 
"There is often criticism of the RMA that ... hardly any consents applications are declined. But 
there is a very good reason for that, because people wander in here with all sorts of strange ideas 
and we say, you are not going to get anywhere with that ... , don't waste your time in lodging it" 
(FIc). 
They are then forced to go away and work on the application, mitigate effects, and come back 
with a renewed application. 
Yet another argument that came up in the interviews concerns expert neutrality, and the 
appearance of a relationship between the amount of resource available to an applicant and 
their success in getting a resource consent. One interviewee responded in this way: 
"Dead right, if you've got enough money, you'll get your resource consents, but that's not 
because the richest guy wins and just grinds everyone to the dust, it's because you can get a full 
and proper understanding of what the effects will do and therefore discover what the appropriate 
mitigation methods are and you need resources to do that. .. and have the commitment to find 
those solutions. Example - we want to flood a valley, irrigation, fifty metre high dam, complete 
environmental destruction, no doubt about it. We know in this valley there are mud fish, we 
know that it is most likely that eel is likely to populate, they eat mud fish, and [the] fish are 
special. On the face of it, you would have to say, this is not a good idea, but when you start 
working with the scientists, and saying mud fish are precious, what can we do to create habitat? 
What can we do to protect mudfish maybe somewhere else? Are there ways we can creatively 
go about it? And therefore, now, the solution is not only to build a dam, but also enhance 
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mudfish habitat somewhere else. Now that's an expensive process, if you really want to engage 
with the scientists, (a) acknowledge that there is a problem and (b) look for a solution. My 
experience is that you do find solutions" (E31F4). 
This lengthy quote is important because it illustrates the rationale of many consultants. They 
have to find solutions for clients before they submit their consent applications. In other words, 
the work prior to application is essential, and the role of a consultant expert is to tell the client 
if an application will not meet the standards set by the RMA: 
"We go back to the client and say, 'we believe this must happen, you need to change this, that 
and the other', and they have nightmares about more costs ... [but it's] the responsible thing to 
do. Sometimes we have to bully and blackmail them, 'Oh, the Regional Council won't let that 
through unless we .... ' Then you go to the Regional Council with this application, hopefully 
with most of the concerns raised, solved" (E2a). 
One of the problems that arises from the relatively small size of New Zealand is the limited 
pool of experts readily available. Does this create difficulties for applicants or opponents in 
consent hearings? One interviewee believed that it can be problematic. "Project Aqua, 
Meridian7, tied up big names in aquatic environment, so it was pretty hard for some people to 
find credible witnesses, experts in the area ... " (E2/F4). One interviewee who was involved in 
that project agreed that it was problematic, but that was the only example he could think of. 
One related problem is that experts can be conflicted out of a case. The interviewee just 
referred to told me his organisation could do no more work on a Ministry for the Environment 
water allocation project in the Waitaki because of their previous involvement with the 
Meridian project. This removes some of the key New Zealand experts from being involved: 
"It shouldn't make any difference to an expert in the Environment Court, it should not matter 
who they are representing, and it shouldn't change the evidence. The perception thing is why 
there is a problem-the perception that we are Meridian scientists so therefore we can't be MfE 
scientists because there is a conflict of interest"g 
Being conflicted out can also happen on purpose by consent applicants who hire the expert for 
a task on a bigger project, thus rendering them ineligible, at least in ethical terms, to work for 
any future opponent. "So it's different from buying them out and almost the person whose 
been conflicted out it's a case of either being hoodwinked or not being smart enough, rather 
7 A major energy company in New Zealand. 
8 I have chosen not to identify him by the designation to ensure protection of identity, given the reference to a 
specific case. 
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than money whipped ... if you know what I mean. They get tricked into being conflicted out" 
(E2a). This expert talked about the need to assess ajob before they commit to it so as to 
ensure the job falls within acceptable ethical boundaries. Occasionally they will reject work. 
Another, albeit less common view, was concern that some Consent Authorities do not have 
the resources to adequately deal with some of the more complex consent applications. In 
reference to a Regional Council, one interviewee offers the following view: 
"[The Regional Council] has been involved in quite a lot of Environment Court [hearings]. 
Their success has been poor .... They've lost a lot of good cases. Now, why is that? Either they 
have been poorly advised by their own experts, or they hadn't presented the right information, 
or they were making the wrong decision from the start. Now the people on the other side ... the 
applicants, had put huge resources into fighting those cases. Examples are [a large subdivision 
development], okay. Their big development involved a lot of money and really it makes you 
wonder whether [the Regional Council] put enough resources into it, or whether the applicant 
just had more resources in it and were willing to go right to the end" (E3a). 
The financial capacity to produce the right mix of expertise provides an advantage in pursuing 
a consent application. Many of the arguments above suggest that this means an applicant can 
deal adequately with any adverse effects before heading to Court and is therefore more likely 
to meet the test of the RMA. On the other hand, the role of a consent hearing and Court is to 
test the evidence. In the Environment Court, this relies on an adequate adversarial system, but 
where one party is weaker, it is more difficult to adequately test the evidence. As one 
interviewee from a NGO put it, to apply to the Environment Court is "cheap .. .it's only $55, 
but it would cost you $8000 for a witness .... It's paying the witness which is a huge cost 
which we don't have the money for" (H2a). 
The scientific literacy of decision makers also appeared to be significant from the data. One 
interviewee gave this observation: 
"I've been in a hearing where in essence the submitters were saying water would flow up hill, 
when you sifted through the scientific argument of what they were saying, that is what would be 
needed to produce the environmental outcome they were describing. They were very hard to 
understand, the commissioners didn't understand it and their decision essentially supported the 
fact that water would flow up hill, scientifically it was that stupid. But there's nothing you can 
do about it" (E31F4). 
However, this does not imply all decision makers need to be scientists: 
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"I don't think that they need to be scientifically trained, because you can end up with some very 
wise people that don't necessarily have a science background yet can contribute ... if you look at 
a hearing committee having the balance of a lawyer, ecologist, or somebody from the 
community is a good way to do it, where you don't get the whole decision making process 
hijacked by strong environmentalists. Because you have a lawyer reminding [you] that the 
framework you are working is governed by the RMA and the RMA doesn't say that all 
decisions must be totally ecologically friendly, and given from the perspective of the Green 
Party .... The system we have ... is that you must make a decision based on the information ... put 
before you, you shouldn't. .. bring too much of your own bias and your own idea of what is the 
right solution, into the process. But you do need to have the skills to know if someone is telling 
porkies, which will effect the decision that you come to" (E31F4). 
Another interviewee agreed: "I don't think: you have to have a science degree, but Dudges] 
should have the intelligence to be able to understand it" (H2a). 
One final observation comes from the critical role of experts in hearings and in Court. One 
expert, experienced in Court work, suggests it is akin to 'theatre': 
"It all relies on the person who is saying it and how well, and I hate to say it, there is a lot of 
theatre involved. It is how well that person conveys their interpretation in a dramatic sense .... 
That's where it comes down to the judge making the decision ... to the credibility of the witness, 
the experience of the witness, the credibility of the evidence ... that is all made by the theatre, 
how well you are speaking, how good is your graphic and presentation, how good is your 
diction, how good is your spelling, how rational are your arguments, how well you handle cross 
examination. That all comes to make the package as to how the judge perceives your side, that's 
all it comes down to" (E2a). 
Another interviewee shared a similar view. Court decisions must be made on evidence and 
judgement is necessarily involved: 
"And that itself involves a process of rational reasoning to a large extent, but there is also the 
impression that you gain from listening and watching the witness and how they react to a cross-
examination, how they look when they are giving evidence. Are they comfortable or look 
comfortable, or sweating profusely? .. it may mean they are naturally nervous or 
inexperienced ... [but if not] you put it down to the fact that they are propounding something that 
they don't altogether believe in" (G la). 
Access to quality expertise, then, is an important part of the resource consent process. The 
criticism that experts are biased, serving up science at the bidding of those who pay, is "a very 
cynical approach" (G1a), and although it "happens occasionally" (G1a), it appears to be the 
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exception, according to this data. Nevertheless, the capacity to retain the services of 
appropriate experts is an important issue in the resource consent process. 
Question 3: Who is or ought to be involved in the consent process? 
Legitimate involvement in environmental decisions is an important part of the forms of 
ecological reason developed in Chapter Three. In this case study, involvement was considered 
in broad terms to refer to any input into problem deflnition, agenda setting and decision 
making. The data on this question were more difflcult to extract, because many of the 
interviewees tended to talk about consultation (discussed above) and did not always directly 
address this question. Nevertheless, those who did, the majority, tended to interpret the 
question in terms of the RMA, that is, who has 'standing'. This is unsurprising because of the 
close association many have with the RMA consents process. 
Generally, the public were seen to have the right to be involved with the consents process, 
although there were clear limits expressed on this. In very broad terms, this involvement takes 
place through the legislation, seen as a reflection of broad social values. One interviewee 
expressed it in terms of Section 7(h), the protection of trout and salmon habitat. In discussing 
the effect of water extraction from a river, he asked rhetorically, "Does it really matter if one 
year in ten, all the trout die? Oh yes it does, because [of Section 7] .... Society must decide, 
and it decides and codifles its values .. .in the form of policies ... and that becomes my 
reference point" (F3a). 
The next level of involvement is a little more direct. When asked who ought to deflne 
ecological issues in any particular situation, one interviewee expressed it this way: "I think all 
those who feel they have an interest in ... ecological issues ... " (FIe). This person did say that 
she and her colleagues (planners) would develop a policy, and then pass it on in an informal 
submissions process to get feedback. This process was not deflned under the RMA, and was 
voluntary. She expressed the difflcult balance involved in deflning the problems; present 
something to the community, a blueprint perhaps, and risk setting the agenda unduly, or go 
out with a blank slate, which many community groups flnd too vague to respond to. 
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The most comprehensive response was in terms of the notification process for a consent. The 
Act guides decision makers on who ought to be involved. One put it this way: 
"Yeah, that's an interesting question. My argument would be, if you are having any effect on 
the environment outside your boundary 1 guess, it's a problem. But there are plenty of people 
that argue that if it's not being used or it's not affecting humans as such, then what is the issue? 
You know, there is no issue, move on. We take a ... dim view of that, but that's what we fight 
against all the time" (Fld). 
Who ought to be involved appears, in this view, to be determined by the nature of the effect. 
Another interviewee expressed the difficulty, as a consents officer, in deciding when to notify 
a consent. When a consent is publicly notified, then anyone has standing and can present a 
submission. It becomes more problematic with non-notified consents: 
"We always encourage people to consult widely with Runanga, DoC, Fish and Game, Forest 
and Bird, whichever parties we think are appropriate. Now, we can't force people to consult. So 
people can say to us, "Right, no, we don't think that they're important, so we're not going to 
consult them". And it's up to us to decide whether ... these people may have an interest in the 
area" (Fla). 
This represents the pragmatic end of decision making, because it is here particular interests 
are included or excluded, depending on the overall framework of the RMA, and then on the 
micro-level decisions of consent officers and decisions makers. One of the ways such micro-
level decisions are made is determined by the type of effects: 
"You might not need the views of all people that are interested in rivers [for example] ... 1 think 
before you need the data you need to find out what's there and need to find a description of the 
environment and the values associated with it, and then from those values ... you can probably 
pick out what people may be affected .... But it's our discretion to have our best endeavours to 
notify everyone who could potentially be adversely affected, and if our best endeavours don't 
turn up someone ... then basically, you know, we try our best to notify it" (Fla). 
One interviewee commented on the role of DoC in advocating for a particular native fish that 
was potentially adversely affected by a consent application on a stream bed: "DoC themselves 
are doing studies at the moment trying to figure out what the best thing is to do for this fish, 
and once everyone has figured that out, we'll probably have like a mini catchment thing for 
that particular stretch [of river]" (Flc). Although this comment does not address the question 
above explicitly, it does suggest that the interests of other species are taken into account in 
consent applications. Obviously, the fish do not have a formal role in the process, but they 
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have representatives who engage in the process. This observation aside, no-one suggested that 
other species ought to have a say in consent decisions9• 
This theme is picked up, however, by one interviewee who argued for the Maori perspective 
that humans have an ethical responsibility to other species beyond their instrumental value 
(HI b). He questioned the social construction of the right to make decisions: 
"Who has the right to make a decision in the end? Who determines what is valid knowledge 
[that ends up being] placed attheir disposal to make that decision ... ? Scientific knowledge is 
always privileged over uninformed knowledge .... There's a whole range of understandings, all 
social constructions. The question is, in my mind, what are the dominant social constructions at 
the moment and what are the implications of them? What is left out of the picture?" (RIb). 
This question is not asked by any of the other interviewees, but answers are not difficult to 
detect in the data. The dominant social construction of valid decision making seems to be that 
of reasoned judgement that takes its direction primarily from science. When asked who ought 
to determine the baselines to be used in environmental decision making, one interviewee 
responded: "I think that if you are talking about ecological baselines they need to be set by 
pure science, supposedly objective scientific data without any political or social or economic 
decisions in amongst the baseline, [it] should be set purely on ecological scientific data" 
(Fld). 
Question 4: What are the weaknesses of the consent process? 
Interviewees were asked what they would like change about the consent process. While a 
small number of them appeared more focused on the legal side of getting a consent (the 'goal' 
being a successful consent application), most were more interested in making quality 
decisions. I questioned them about problems and hindrances in the consent process that 
undermined the capacity to secure quality (ecologically rational) decisions. Three broad 
themes emerged, the lack of strategic planning through regional plans, the consent process 
taking too long and being too costly, and a range of concerns about the hearings, particularly 
the Environment Court. 
9 This is not as far fetched as it might appear. Christopher Stone argued as long ago as 1972 for legal standing to 
be given to certain natural objects. 
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Strategic Planning 
One recurring concern about the value of the resource consent process was the lack of 
strategic planning at the regional level. Regional Policy Statements are compulsory under the 
RMA but Regional Plans are not. While a number of Regional Councils are currently 
developing plans, this lack of clear strategic direction adversely impacts consent decision 
making. One interviewee said, "I can't see how you could ... do really effective resource 
management without a plan" (FIe). She then relates a story that illustrates the point: 
"I walked down a paddock the other day with some guys and it was very interesting because one 
chap ... held me back and obviously didn't want anyone else to hear him ... he said, 'Oh, I was 
just wondering, my consent comes up at the end of the year, I've got to apply for a new one, 
what's that going to be like?' You know, feared and scared. 'This whole bloody million dollar 
dairy farm rests on a ground water extraction and here you are talking about red zones [being] 
fully allocated. I'm in the middle of a bloody red zone. What's going to happen to me?'" (FIe). 
She explained that he would be better off under the imminent RP, and then commented to me 
that it would halve the consenting time, "or less ... Those provisions need to be tested against 
what the community thinks ... [but] that means he's got some certainty .... " Part of the 
attraction for this interviewee is that it is about "making the system work". 
Another interviewee saw the issue this way: 
"Most of the resource consent hearings that I go to, when you're writing your submission and 
when you're listening to everyone else talk you figure out that the solution isn't really a 
resource consent thing, its always a plan thing, and there's not any avenues for ... initiating 
planning variations per consent decision, which of course would be pretty much unworkable, 
but that's in reality what needs to be done .... It's got to go above consents level and it's got to 
be plans. You've got no chance of making good decisions without a making a plan" (RIa). 
This view is reflected in another interview. In discussing the failure of Project Aqua to put 
together a viable consent application, he had this to say: 
"The real problem with Project Aqua is that there wasn't a water plan in existence ... The 
Regional Council were allocating a scarce resource by resource consent, which is not the way to 
go, never had been, they shouldn't have done it and the net result is that in the Canterbury 
Plains they have over allocated, and they've allowed the resource to become contaminated .... 
The problem with Regional Plans is that they are not compulsory ... and I always thought that 
was a mistake .... [Some argued] that it was difficult to say you shall have one Regional Plan, 
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you might want to have more than one. I've said the answer to that is to say that there shall be at 
least one Regional Plan in every region" (G la). 
The main reason for the lack of plans is political, because they are "very controversial 
matters". 
However, a more sceptical view believed 
"it is starting to head too far that way. I'm not convinced that the national environmental 
standards are a good thing, because it's a bit like one size fits all and we've tried it in New 
Zealand in the past and I think that people have forgotten some of the attempts that have existed 
and that they didn't work. It's a bit of a trade-off. In one sense you get policy certainty, for 
applicants, developers and the community. The real question is the process .... But there are 
advantages once it is established" (E31F4). 
While policy certainty is an advantage, there is some concern that a 'one-size-fits-all' 
approach can produce the best environmental decisions. One interviewee expressed his 
technical concern that lack of site specificity can lead to irrational outcomes, because not all 
'similar' environments can be, or ought to be treated the same (E2d). Another expressed 
support for National level guidelines but had this caveat: "I think there's a place for [them] 
but it's just how ... where they are put and maybe the legal framework as to how much weight 
they should have. When it comes to a specific bit of research on a place that can overrule that, 
then that should be listened to .... " (Hlc). Overall, there was significant support for increased 
strategic planning, with recognition that this involved trade-offs. 
The consent process is too long and costly 
A number of interviewees commented on the time and cost of procuring consents. One 
interviewee explained it as follows: 
"Ultimately I think the outcomes are good. The end point I think is good. I probably don't hear 
much in the way of criticism from some environmentalists and some industrial people about the 
end point. I think there seems to be quite an acceptance of the final outcome but the way of 
getting there is definitely criticised. The way of getting there is slow and expensive, it is not fair 
and it's not fair at times in terms of the applicant nor sometimes in terms of submitters, 
especially at the counsel hearing level" (E31F4). 
The reason for the lack of fairness has been discussed above, and refers to the lack of cross-
examination at consent hearings where anyone can submit and they tell whatever "lies" they 
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want. Applicants who employ reputable consultants do not have that freedom. Another 
interviewee even suggested that the issue of standing needs to be 
"sorted out. ... I think that there needs to be less public participation myself, because ... the 
criticism of the RMA is that it takes a long time and can be very expensive ... and the things that 
cause it to be expensive is really that increment of people who don't know what they are talking 
about. And it's fair enough for people to be able to write letters to the editor ... but it's an 
entirely different matter when you are actually causing an applicant time and money when 
you're just wrong" (FIc). 
One interviewee felt that while the process "is time consuming and expensive and I have 
frustrations with it, it also serves as an educating role and that local communities can come in 
and discuss the issues that are important to them, be informed by ecologists and businesses 
and they can be informed by the local community concerns .... " (H2a). This adds a balancing 
note to the frustrations discussed above and reflects different points of view. The first two 
examples were from a consent processor in a local authority and from a consultant to 
applicants, while the last comment is from an environmental NGO perspective. It is therefore 
not surprising that the different views reflect different priorities and responsibilities. 
One final observation came from an interviewee who argued the ecological rationality of the 
process is undermined by the cost-recovery policy of a Consent Authority. Because applicants 
get charges by the regulator it creates an environment in which the consent officer may under-
assess a consent: 
"But as far as rational decision making goes, in the back of my mind whenever I'm working on 
an issue, I know I'm charging this joker $85 an hour. .. and he has no say over whether I come 
and see him or not, I dictate that and I am looking through a report and I'm thinking, 'that's ok, 
[but] I really need to do another hours work on here, but it looks okay, [so] I'm not going to 
because I don't think I can justify charging another $85 to this guy" (FId). 
The pressure to keep costs to a minimum is not conducive to ensuring thorough enough 
checks are always done. He suggests charging a flat fee per year for all notified consents 
would be one way around the problem. 
Consent Hearings 
There were a number of concerns expressed about the hearings process, including the work of 
the Environment Court. Most of these centred on the analytic or scientific skills of Hearings 
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Committee members and even Environment Court Judges. The overall sentiment was that the 
ecological rationality of the consent process was at times undermined by low quality 
decisions. When asked what the key faults of the consents process were, one commented as 
follows: 
"It's the rigour in interpreting all of it and it's the rigour in producing all of it. Ok. .. there's an 
awful lot of infonnation required, an awful lot, cost a [lot] of money to do. Conversely on the 
other side there needs to be an awful lot of review. The Regional Council spends an awful lot of 
the applicants money doing that, and still they cannot come to an agreement for some reason, 
and its usually over a couple of things, some fundamental things ... quite often fifty experts can 
say something and Forest and Bird can say, no, we don't think that's right. Without any expert 
evidence! And they can take it to the Environment Court and you can spend another half a 
million dollars going through the environment court because one person in F&B said no" (E2a). 
The argument here was that lack of scientific rigour in assessing the application in the first 
place. One interviewee suggests where the problem lies: "Well. .. as far as the consenting side 
of it goes 1 see some big problems in the people who make the decisions, [the] Councillors, 
elected members. They're not experts by any stretch of the imagination and so ... the decision 
swings on a good argument rather than science .... " (Fld). The point has been recognised in 
recent Government moves to strengthen the training for Councillors running consent hearings, 
but was nevertheless an important theme in these data. Another interviewee, reflecting on the 
consent process and the role of the RMA, said, "If it works properly, there's got to be checks 
and balances on the way. Ijust don't think they have expertise in some areas. If people don't 
like the decision they can always appeal it" (E21F4). 
Appeals are heard in the Environment Court, but it also received its share of concern. When 
asked how well the Court deals with scientific information, one interviewee answered: 
"My pet gripe would be that they have to rely at times too much on qualifications and 
experience and not enough on deconstructing somebody's argument to find out which parts are 
valid and why and therefore [assess] a science, is it good science or bad science ... [The Court 
tends to rely on credentials and] ... how eloquent they speak and not enough drilling down and 
saying, ... 'why do you say what you saying, what is it based on? Let's look at that bit of paper, 
let's look at your field notes .... " (F3a). 
This interviewee does acknowledge that the Environment Court is far better than any other 
court he's seen or experienced, and that judges varied in their capacity to deconstruct an 
argument. Another interviewee shared this concern, and had some suggestions: "I think 
sometimes [the Court] lacks confidence. It's not really their fault; they just don't get a grasp 
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on it and make the wrong decisions. The only way around it is to have commissioners in each 
_of a specialist area, an ecologist and so on" (E2/f4). 
The link here is between the need for good science and the institutional difficulties in ensuring 
the right processes and people are in place to enable this to happen. Resourcing of science was 
a recurrent theme with many interviewees noting the costs of producing appropriate data 
meant the scientific work in many consent applications has simply not been done (many of 
these comments have been made earlier in this study). 
The final theme briefly to note is the debate over the adversarial system as a means for 
producing sound ecological outcomes. For instance, one interviewee calls it "just a huge 
waste of effort" (E2c). Explaining he has seen some very poor expert evidence and that this is 
costly, he suggests all parties negotiate a 
"really good set of data that everyone agrees to, high quality data ... rather than divide and 
rule .. .! will develop a platform for data sharing long before to goes to any formal hearing 
stage ... what it's doing is to allow the facts to drive the process ... and often what's happening is 
there's quite strong misunderstandings on either side about the science that is pushing them to a 
particular stance, and I often find myself disagreeing with both sides and putting the facts on the 
table". 
Another interviewee argued that there needs to be "adequate sharing of information between 
the stakeholders" (G1b). This view was also shared by another who argues: 
"There has to be a mind shift about the type of system we have which is not antagonistic ... a co-
operative one that ensures all these guiding lines and principles and rules and stuff ... are worked 
through, not 'I'm taking the opposite view and your taking that view, lets go [and see] who is 
going win'. It's not about that, it should be, and that's where the mind shift has to be ... you have 
the Regional Council. .. and you have the applicant. So we really need to make it more of a 
distinct three way triangle rather than a two way .... and we've got this thing called consultation. 
It's viewed in different ways ... as a necessity, its main purpose is to get [the consent application] 
signed off. From the applicant's point of view it's an evil you must go through. You reveal as 
much as you need to and you strive to get sign off. And once you've got sign off you can ignore 
it. ... Instead, what I think needs to happen is that rather go to consultation to get sign off you 
should go ... to meet [with affected parties and it] should be ... an opportunity to be positive, 
not. .. negative. It is nine times out often viewed as an opportunity to be negative, which I think 
is going in with the wrong mindset anyway. Conversely ifthe applicant has also got a negative 
attitude of mind because of history in consultation, then he should be going into it with a 
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positive attitude, 'We're going to learn something about somebody else's perspective on the 
effects' .... We [consultants] are the middle guys, we are ultimately looking for a win-win 
situation, as much as 1 hate that bloody clique" (E2a). 
He later reflects on why this problem exists, referring to: 
"this complicated system we've talked about that has built this system of paranoia, 
uncooperativeness, that anybody can jam up the system ... so there's a lot of that over the last ten 
years of fear of how the system works, and a fear that 1 won't get a fair deal, on either side. 
Each side thinking they are not going to get a fair deal, they have built strategies to treat the 
system as a war, and this is this combative thing. So, in your war you want squirrel your 
resources, keep your cards close, keep your powder dry and all that crap and only let out as 
much as necessary and do it the minimum way while pocketing away anyone who might hurt 
you." 
While lengthy, these quotes get to the heart of some of the concerns about the adversarial 
process found in the data. The adversarial approach undermines the capacity of the consent 
process to be rational. Rather, it becomes strategic, seeking to maximise one's own gains and 
minimise one's costs, rather than seeing the RMA is a neutral arbitrator of ecological values. 
This argument refers primarily to the role of science and expert evidence, and does not 
address the social value dimensions of environmental decisions discussed above. 
Some interviewees thought positively of the adversarial system: 
"I am an advocate of the adversarial form of decision making where there is a genuine conflict 
... I'm an advocate for mediating disputes as well, where that is possible, but not all are able to 
be mediated. And there are some down sides .... Now lots of people don't like adversarial 
because they think they're confrontational. Well, they are deliberatively confrontational; they're 
testing the metal ofthe people who are giving the evidence. There's nothing better in my view 
in getting as close as you'll ever get to the true position" (G la). 
In summary, a range. of concerns about the consent process were reflected in the data. The 
need for strategic direction through the use of Regional Plans, the costs· of lengthy consent 
hearings and the problems of inefficient process because of the current rules of standing, and 
the capacities and skills of Consent Authorities and the Environment Court were all cited as 
problems. The recent Amendment Act to the RMA (2003) seeks to redress some of these 
concerns; the aim of this chapter is to simply describe the issues that arose in the data. These 
views were not found in every interview, and there were alternative views expressed on 
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occasions, but most of these have already been covered or will be discussed in the section 
below. 
Question 5: Is this 'ecologically rational' decision making? 
This question is, in one sense, the penultimate question raised in this dissertation. Although 
the answers given here are only part of the picture, and need to be analysed in relation to the 
rest of the data above, they nevertheless provide an interesting 'snapshot' of the views of the 
interviewees. Some interviewees were unclear about what was meant by 'rational'. I avoided 
defining it in most cases, insisting they express their own response to the question. One did 
offer a definition, suggesting "a rational decision is a ... logical decision made based on all the 
facts" (FIa). The merging of empirical evidence and commonsense appeared to be the basis of 
a rational decision. Another did not believe he could define it: 
"Because ecology, when you're talking about ecology you are talking about a very wide subject 
and I, (long pause), I'm not sure myself what it means, actually, ... I have great difficulty with 
that term ... and I wonder whether its (another long pause), there is a satisfactory definition of 
that term. I mean we all know in philosophical terms what rationality means ... [Perhaps] a 
common sense understanding" (Gla). 
In both cases, common-sense was offered as a default position for defining ecological 
rationality. The question of whose common sense was not answered. 
There are broadly three answers to this question; yes, maybe and no. While over-simplistic in 
terms of anyone's actual answers, it provides a simple means of organising the responses. No 
answer could sit in the yes/no categories without modification. The positive responses were 
few, with most falling into the 'maybe' camp, and this tended to be spread between the 
principle/practice split. I begin however with the most positive responses. 
Yes 
One interviewee suggested it is rational because decisions which are "logical, sound, robust" 
win out over "a thousand [that] weren't. ... So I think by [that standard,] they probably do 
make rational decisions" (FIb). Another responded: "Yes, on balance, yes. It would be a great 
shame to chuck it out because I don't know if we could replace it with anything better" 
(E3/F4). Asked what its core strengths were, he said: "It's permissive. Fundamentally you 
183 
Chapter Five: The Resource Consent Industry 
must protect the environment. In my mind that's the half of it, because then you can say, if I 
want to do something, as long as I am not damaging the environment, then I am able to do 
it .... So I think what we have is quite good". 
These were the most directly favourable responses. While many interviewees were positive, 
most of their answers were conditional. The absence of an unambiguous declaration that the 
RMA consent process produces ecological rational decisions may not be surprising, on the 
basis of the data in the questions above, and is instructive as to what, then, would make the 
process more rational. 
Maybe 
According to a few interviewees, the process is rational in principle, but not necessarily in 
practice. One suggests that it is rational "in principle, yes, but the vision [of the RMA] got lost 
along the way" (Glb). Another puts it this way: "I think the intention is very rational, but I 
think that's not the reality at all" (Fld). He explains that the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) 
syndrome, introduces a large number of submissions that are not based on scientific evidence, 
but rather on attitudes "towards certain manufacturers 10 ..• house values, land values and that 
seems to be what drives them more than the actual effect on the environment .... So that's a 
rational decision, but I don't think it is an ecologically rational decision" (F 1 d). The role of 
the community here, appears to undermine the environmental focus of decisions, but also 
perhaps expresses some confusion about the role of the RMA (See Chapter Three's discussion 
on the intention of the Act)ll. 
Another response suggested that the Act has resulted in decisions that have "been very 
variable and inconsistent. There's been decisions made that have really surprised me in terms 
of [the fact that] they've actually granted consents" (E3a). He then clarifies that the decisions 
referred to, generally deal more with notification issues. Forthe consents his organisation has 
taken to hearings, "generally, I think the decisions have been reasonably good". When asked 
if the process overall was good, he said: "Not necessarily. Again it depends on what 
information has been presented and by who [and] how well it has been presented" (E3a). The 
10 'Certain manufacturers' refers to manufacturing companies who applied for renewal of various discharge 
permits, but were stridently opposed by the local communities for various reasons, such as concern about house 
values. 
11 In her analysis of the Kate Valley landfill consent process, Dever (2004) shows that the local community had 
learned to avoid appealing to issues that could be categorised in terms of NIMBY. Thus, there was a tendency to 
avoid appealing to the devaluation of property prices, and more focus on adverse effects such as noise. 
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need for good infonnation was also suggested by an interviewee, just cited above. He argued 
there is a difficulty in getting good infonnation, and this process "does not work too well" 
(GIb). Another interviewee stated his view that the process is rational "if it works properly. 
There's got to be checks and balances on the way. Ijust don't think that they [consent 
authorities] have the expertise in some areas" (E2/F4). One more example suggests the RMA 
would be rational "if we had more knowledge about our own environment .... " (FIc). The 
emergent theme is the role of good infonnation needed for an ecologically rational decision, 
and some doubt the RMA consents process delivers this to an adequate level. 
Concern as to whether the framework was rational, infonned the views of one interviewee: "I 
think the resource consent process ... is rational under the guidelines that have been set down. 
We've got plans to work under, and within that framework 1 think it is rational. Whether that 
framework is rational is another question" (FIa). When asked if the Regional Council makes 
rational decisions, this interviewee said that those working within the Council on consent 
application do make rational decisions because they: 
No 
"understand the criteria on which you can make a decision .... I think a lot of times when things 
go to hearings and commissioners decide, I don't think they are rational decisions. I think 
sometimes you are swayed by experts and by facts and numbers .... [Commissioners] see things 
different to auditors though" (Fla). 
Finally, some interviewees were significantly more sceptical of the rationality of the process 
than the interviewees above. One was quite forthright: "I think the lack of certain 
environmental bottom lines makes it irrational. ... 1 think a lack of national planning makes it 
irrational. 1 think that, for such a small country, we can actually make decisions about our 
resources .... It seems to me that the [move] away from planning hasn't resulted in sound 
environmental decision making" (H2a). The resource consent process cannot produce sound 
environmental decisions because of the lack of clear guidance in plans (HI a). For this reason 
it is not rational decision making. This theme of strategic planning was articulated by others, 
and has been discussed under Question Four above. 
When asked if the consent process was a particularly rational way of doing things, one 
interviewee answered: 
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No, going back to what we were talking about. 1 think you need the three independent tiers, the 
regulatory authority, the applicant and the community .... You take these three groups 
together ... and the first premise must be positive, and must be looking for an acceptance that 
everything changes and that human development is natural. ... Humans are part of the natural 
world and everything we do is an animal doing resource use, and waste product comes from 
this ... Get over that, and then say, everything is not eviL ... Does it have adverse effects and to 
whom? Then it's simply a case of the community saying, yes, we accept that counter measure 
and that counter measure .... As long as you get 90% buy-in, that's fine, and everyone must just 
accept that. Some people are just not going to accept it. .. , There must be integrity and reliance 
on the experts because, 1 had this in a consultation the other day, when someone said, "well I'm 
not an expert, but 1 don't like this", and 1 said, well, if you're not the expert and you don't 
understand it, as you've just said, then you must rely on the experts to do it, and if you don't 
understand it, that's why they're the experts, ... yet there's too many people who said, "I know 
you are the expert, but I'm not going to believe you" .... Personally 1 don't think [this process is 
rational], 1 think there has to be some pretty big changes in a number of levels, not the least, or 
the most, the perception of the climax in the broader sense, by everybody, it's the human 
condition" (E2a). 
In other words, change is natural, and humans will have impacts on their environment. What 
we must do is avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse effects. For this interviewee, the problem in 
producing ecologically rational decisions is fundamentally attitudinal. The RMA embodies 
the correct intent, but changing the way communities think about resource use has not 
significantly altered under the RMA. 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the second case study for this dissertation, the Resource Consent 
Industry. This study is broader than the Bromley case study, focusing not on a specific case, 
but on wide ranging discussion with nineteen professionals involved in some way with the 
resource consent process. The interviews covered similar themes to the Bromley interviews, 
with the overall aims to describe the forms of ecological reason at work in the consent 
processes and to investigate how ecologically rational the resource consents processes are. 
Five questions were used to organise the data from these interviews: What are the elements of 
sound environmental decision making? What is the role of experts in resource consent 
decisions? Who is or ought to be involved in the consent process. What are the weaknesses of 
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the consent process? and, Is this 'ecologically rational' decision making? I briefly summarise 
the answers to these questions. 
Question 1: What are the elements o/sound environmental decision making? 
There were six clear themes revealed by the data for this question. Similar to Bromley, 
science was a central value in ecologically rational decision criteria, almost an unspoken 
assumption. Again, the use of an environmental assessment framework was considered by a 
number of interviewees to be a requirement. There was also emphasis by a number of 
interviewees on good information, with the emphasis on adequate scientific data. This theme 
emerged as very important, with several interviewees concerned that environmental decisions 
are often compromised by poor information. The second part of this theme was the desire by 
some to avoid emotional arguments, and to keep to 'reality' or facts based analysis, at least 
where empirical issues were at stake. The role of consultation was important, but there was 
generally less emphasis on democratic arguments and more on educating the pUblic. 
Consultation was considered important where social values were at stake, but more of a 
hindrance when scientific issues were at stake. This did not apply to the next theme, the role 
of local and traditional knowledge. The former was considered a useful, if not a necessary, 
adjunct to professional science, while the latter was considered necessary if it fulfilled the 
same function. However, only Maori interviewees argued that the world-view differences 
matter, and suggested that such recognition was essential to good environmental decision 
making. In other words, they presented a challenge to deconstruct the Western science-driven 
notion of ecological reason. Finally, the role of values plays an important part in ecological 
reason. Human decision making is anthropocentric and while science can tell us what will 
happen, it cannot tell us what should happen. Therefore human values are an integral part of 
ecological reason. 
Question 2: What is the role of experts in resource consent decisions? 
The primary question tested here was whether science was for hire, or whether experts were 
acting relatively neutrally in their presentation of evidence. There were two broad answers to 
this question; maybe, and probably not. 
187 
Chapter Five: The Resource Consent Industry 
Science maybe for hire, but this is subtle. Data can be interpreted within limits, and its more 
an issue of what is said, as opposed to what is not said. Overall, the view that scientists can be 
bought was not held by the interviews, although there was recognition in the ways data can be 
manipulated. In other words, expert advice is not easy to 'hire', that is, buy the result you 
want. This was clearer in the second group, who argued that science is 'probably not' for hire. 
The primary and widespread argument was that professional reputation is critical. In a small 
country, such as New Zealand, one cannot afford to be seen to be acting unprofessionally. The 
other key argument was that money can buy a consent, on the basis that few consents fail. 
This, however, was dismissed by some interviewees who argued that good advice means poor 
consent applications get weeded out before they get presented. Overall, the role of experts 
was seen largely as essential and relatively neutral. 
Question 3: Who is or ought to be involved in the consent process? 
There were a range of answers here, but generally, the public were seen to have the right to be 
involved with the consents process, although there were clear limits expressed on this. There 
was no clear view of standing under the Act (that is, who has the right to submit), with views 
ranging from anyone who has an interest, to science experts (in the case of clear ecological 
concerns). In many cases, context was considered a determining factor, with some emphasis 
on being pragmatic; decisions have to work in the end. 
Question 4: What are the weaknesses o/the consent process? 
Three broad themes emerged from this question. The first was the lack of strategic planning, 
with particular reference to regional plans. Many interviewees felt the lack of central guidance 
was a hindrance to rational decision making, although there were a few concerned about the 
potential irrationality of decisions that were not context sensitive. Second, a number felt the 
consent process took too long and was too costly in time and money. In a word, it was 
unnecessarily inefficient and this waste did not contribute to the rationality of decisions. 
Finally, there was a range of concerns about consent hearings, particularly in the Environment 
Court. There was concern about the capability of elected politicians at the local level to 
understand the oftentimes complex resource management issues that emerged in hearing, and 
the scientific rigour of the process. Some even felt that the Environment Court suffered, at 
times, from a lack of rigour due to a deficiency of expertise in the required areas. The value of 
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the adversarial system was contested, with a number of interviewees arguing it cannot 
produce the best environmental decisions because it is fundamentally competitive. The 
assumption here was that science is empirically grounded, and ought not to be a discursive 
competition for competing truth claims. Others argue the 'pressure cooker' process of an 
adversarial system is the best way to rigorously test the claims of applicants. 
Question 5: Is this 'ecologically rational' decision making 
The answers to this penultimate question were divided into three simple groupings: yes, 
maybe, and no. Very few gave unconditional positive responses to this question, although on 
balance they were very positive that it was fundamentally rational. The next group were more 
contextual in their responses, with a number arguing that it is rational in principle, or intent, 
but not always in practice. The irrationality, for most of these interviewees, resides in poor 
practice, much of which related to the issues raised in question four. Finally, a small number 
expressed scepticism about the rationality of the processes. Lack of guidance from Regional 
Plans was cited, as well as the adversarial tendencies of the participants, expressing the lack 
of internalisation of the goals of the Act. In some cases, the Act is viewed as something to get 
around, or bargain one's way through, rather than accepting the fundamental need to sustain 
the natural environment. Thus, the problem is attitudinal as much as it is structural. 
The resource consent industry case study produced data that is similar to the Bromley study, 
but with different emphases and concerns. These results will be analysed in Chapter Seven, 
and some conclusions drawn from this analysis. The remaining task now is to discuss the final 
case study in this trilogy of investigations into ecological reason under the RMA. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE MONTGOMERY SPUR REZONING 
APPLICATION 
The previous two case studies focused on the resource consent process as the site of 
ecologically rational decisions. This case study differs in its focus by examining a zoning 
change application made to the Christchurch City Council (CCC) in 1998. The decision was 
finally delivered in May 2000. Montgomery Spur is the last undeveloped spur on the west 
side of the Port Hills in Christchurch. Developers applied to the CCC for a change in the 
zoning of a large section of the undeveloped spur from Rural H to a new Living HC zone. 
This would have enabled residential development to take place on what was rural land. The 
application caused considerable consternation among a wide section of the community, and 
was vigorously opposed. The Council's decision in May 2000 was to decline the application 
on the basis that it would cause unacceptable adverse effects on the environment. This 
Chapter investigates this decision from the perspective of ecological reason and seeks to 
determine what forms of ecological reasons were employed in the decision. 
This study also seeks to add to the evaluation of the ecological rationality of the RMA by 
offering the third in a triangulation of case studies. The first was a site specific resource 
consent application (Bromley) and the second was a more generalised examination of the 
resource consent industry. This chapter forms the third leg of the triangulation and takes a 
different approach from the previous two case studies. First, it is not a resource consent but a 
proposed change to a District Plan. The developers needed the change in order to apply for 
resource consent to enable them to subdivide the land in question. Under the District Plan, the 
proposed development would have been a non-complying activity and no resource consent 
could be granted. This thesis has, to this point, only investigated the ecological rationality of 
the consent process. This case study enables this investigation to be broadened to look at the 
previous step in the resource management decision process, district plans. 
The Montgomery Spur Case was chosen, not because it represented an issue with high 
ecological values, but because it did not. A planning issue involving, for example, a wetland, 
or air or water discharge, and involving a large number of 'ecological issues', would have 
risked stating the obvious and 'discovering' a high degree of ecological reason. However, of 
more value is a study where such 'reason' is not quite so obvious at the outset. The 
Montgomery Spur case cannot be characterised as having an overtly ecological focus, 
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although this was not entirely absent. But it is, nevertheless, a decision based on the 
requirements of the RMA and therefore presents a useful site to examine the role and forms of 
ecological reason at work. This provides a more balanced picture for this study of the RMA 
and avoids overt bias l in selecting case studies potentially predisposed to express ecological 
reason. 
The third major difference between this and the previous chapters is the analysis of a written 
document, the Council Decision: Montgomery Spur (no date2). This also produces a 
triangulation of method, with this textual analysis adding to a site-specific set of interviews 
and a broader study of an 'industry'. This helps establish the validity of the combined results 
of the three studies. I discuss the specific methodology for this current study below. 
An Introduction to Montgomery Spur 
Christchurch City is located at the edge of the Canterbury Plains and at the feet of the Port 
Hills, a series of extinct volcanoes that form a significant backdrop to the city. Most of the 
hills are protected from urban encroachment, although a significant proportion of the lower 
slopes are already urbanised. Much of the Port Hills is farmed and there is also some forest 
regeneration work going on. The Port Hills form an important visual and recreational asset for 
the city, and the housing that does exist is very popular and consists of some of the most 
expensive housing areas in Christchurch. Most of the Port Hills housing is above the smog 
line during the winter months, when Christchurch air pollution is at its worst. The added 
attraction is the sweeping panoramic view across Pegasus Bay and over the Plains to the 
Southern Alps. This combination of values means that there is ongoing pressure to develop 
more residential sites on the Port Hills whilst at the same time considerable public pressure to 
avoid any further encroachment on highly valued visual and recreational 'natural' space. 
In 1998, three submissions were presented to the Christchurch City Council seeking to have 
the land known as Montgomery Spur rezoned from 'Rural Hills' to 'Living Hills' in the CCC 
Proposed District Plan. This would allow for the land to be developed for housing. Council 
planning staff recommended that the upper section of the land be retained as open space, and 
I I call this 'overt' bias, because if bias is a 'predisposition or prejudice' (Oxford Dictionary), then I do not 
assume I can ever be entirely free from bias. The intention in this study is to minimize the chance that it affects 
the analysis and to acknowledge what bias remains. 
2 Referenced from this point on as Council Decision (CD, p.l or 2) 
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that the balance be re-zoned to 'Living Hills' (MfE, 2000a). The open space was to be gifted 
to the CCC as a reserve to protect the ecological values in the area. In effect, only part of the 
proposed development would become residential. 
The application was notified in early 1998, but a group of residents, who did not make any 
submissions, complained to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment about the 
development. The CCC also received some complaints about the notification of the 
application and the call for submissions, arguing that there was confusion as to the location of 
the site and therefore some people were excluded from the submissions process. The CCC 
went to the Environment Court to seek a declaration on this matter and the Court found that 
the rezoning application needed to be renotified (Data Services Ltd, 1999). Nine hundred and 
fifty submissions were received, with thirty five in support of the application, and the Council 
Hearing went ahead in 2000. The Council's decision was to reject the application for rezoning 
and to retain the current status of the land under the current District Plan. 
The structure of the CD is as follows: 
Comments on reports presented by the Council Officers (these cover a range of 
potential effects): 
• Land drainage issues 
• Transportation issues 
• Landscape issues 
• Recreation and Open Space assessment 
• Urban Design issues 
• Botanical assessment 
• Water Supply 
• Planning issues 
Next The CD outlines: 
Comments on evidence presented by submitters supporting the application 
Comments on evidence by submitters opposing the application 
Committee comments on evidence in opposition (they note there were many 
submissions and therefore chose to comment by issue, rather than on each submission): 
• Landscape issues 
• Traffic issues 
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• Existing school facilities 
• Recreation matters 
• Conservation values 
• Agricultural use 
• Land stabilitylDrainagelFlooding 
Finally, the Committee explains the reasons for their decision: 
• Section 5 - The purpose of the Act 
• Section 6 - Matters of national importance 
• Section 7 - Other matters 
• Section 75 - Contents of district plans 
• Section 85 - Compensation not payable in respect of controls on land 
• Decision 
The Decision, therefore, provides a logical structure from which to analyse ecological reason. 
Methodology 
This case study requires a different methodology from that used in the previous two chapters. 
The data set consists of the fifty four page decision text produced by the Council. This 
outlines the evidence given in the consent hearing, the decision and reasons for this decision, 
providing concise and clear boundaries for this study. Much supporting evidence was given in 
the hearing and there are one hundred and forty two pages recording the names of submitters3 
attached to the decision. However, this supplementary material is not required in this analysis 
because the focus is not on the rationality ofthe decision (that is, is it a good decision?), but 
on the forms of reason employed in the decision by the decision makers. Whether or not their 
analysis is correct is irrelevant; what is relevant is the way they produced the decision. For 
this reason the decision text becomes the analytic focus here. 
The theoretical foundation for the methodology is the same as the previous two case studies 
and discussed in Chapter Two and in Appendix One. To briefly recap, the two dimensions of 
ecological reason concern the appropriate forms of communication and the foundations of the 
3 There are approximately 7000 names appended in lists, although most names appear a number of times. The 
vast majority did not support the application. Most of these consist of signatures gathered in opposition to the 
development. I recall being asked to sign a form submission while recreating on an adjacent walking track prior 
to the hearing. Everyone who passed was similarly requested to record their opposition. 
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values systems that inform social action. I used these two dimensions to develop a set of 
analytic questions to be investigated in the text. The communication dimension involves three 
broad forms of social action. Technical/discursive/dialogic forms of reason refer to the degree 
that goals are problematic. If they are not problematic, then instrumental/technical 
communication reason is engaged. If there is no agreement over goals, then communicative 
reason (engaging human actors) or dialogic reason (engaging the interests of other species in 
addition to humans) are engaged. In essence this dimension can be operationalised by 
considering the forms of communication needed in the decision, and who is deemed 
appropriate to be involved in the decision. The second dimension concerns the explicit value 
orientation ofthe decision makers. Decisions can be crafted in anthropocentric, 
preservationist or ecocentric orientation. Operationalising this dimension involves assessing 
the degree to which decisions reflect these value orientations. 
In a similar manner to the previous two case studies I pose a set of questions that reflects this 
theoretical framework. The text is then analysed for data that sheds light on these questions. 
The first question I posed in the previous case studies was about the requirements for sound 
(ecologically rational) decision making. This approach is appropriate when using the 
interview method, but cannot be done to a text unless the text addresses this question. Seeking 
to discover the requirements of ideal environmental decision making through textual analysis 
here is problematic. First, the CD must deal with the legal and institutional circumstances as 
they actually are, and does not have the luxury of ruminating on different approaches. In 
contrast, the interviewees were able to propose what they thought would be ideal. Second, the 
text of the CD does not defend or explain its rationality beyond appealing to the requirements 
of the RMA and evidence from submitters. While it may be possible to draw some inferences 
from its decision making process, this does not represent an adequate account of necessary 
criteria for ecological rationality. In contrast, interviewees were able to purposively reflect on 
this question and provide as full an account as they wished. 
An alternative methodological approach is to draw on the data from the previous two chapters 
in order to analyse the extent to which these criteria are present in the CD. This has two 
implications. First, the previous two case studies provide data on the requirements for 
ecologically rational decision making. However, this case study would not contribute to that 
research question. The second broad question concerns the forms of ecological reason 
employed in each case study. This question can be addressed in this chapter. The remaining 
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issue, then, is the appropriateness of drawing data from part of the research to create a 
framework to analyse another part. 
The analytical framework for assessing the forms of ecological reason comes from the 
theoretical analysis provided in Chapter Two. From this, critical dimensions of ecological 
reason were proposed and it is these that provide the framework for most of the analytical 
questions addressed in the thesis. In order to assess the forms of ecological reason employed 
under the RMA, the ideal requirements of rational decision making were also addressed. This 
enabled analysis of the theoretical framework in comparison with the ideal framework 
proposed by interviewees. Analysis of the theory and the empirical data provides a richer 
picture than either on their own. In addition, the interviewees are also asked to assess the 
extent to which to which practice matches their ideal decision making. Turning again to this 
chapter's contribution, it will not add to the empirical data on the 'ideal' rational decision 
making requirements, but it can be assessed against the ideal proposed in the previous two 
chapters. This provides three case studies of comparisons with 'ideal' ecologically rational 
decision making, but draws on the 'ideal' from two case studies. Given the validity of the 
interview data used to assess the (ecologically rational) performance of the previous two 
studies, there is no reason that data cannot be used to assess the (ecologically rational) 
performance of this current case study. This provides a triangulation of results that strengthen 
the overall conclusions of this thesis. 
This approach has implications for the flow of the analysis in this chapter. Introducing the 
criteria for ecological rationality here means that some analysis of them is required. One 
option is to place this analysis at the end of the previous chapter. However, this would make it 
more difficult to follow the rationale for how the analysis in this chapter takes place. 
Including some analysis of the criteria as it is required, makes it easier to follow the way I 
approach the analysis of the Decision Text. Thus, this chapter will contain some discussion of 
these criteria, including some explanation on how they are operationalised in this case study. I 
now tum to these 'ideal' criteria. 
The Bromley case and the Consent Industry each produced six criteria for an ecologically 
rational decision process. Combined, they came to nine criteria. 
1. The central role for science (Bromley and Consent Industry) 
2. The use of an environmental assessment framework (Bromley and Consent Industry) 
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3. The importance of consultation (Consent Industry) 
4. Role of local and traditional knowledge (Bromley and Consent Industry) 
5. The role of values (Consent Industry) 
6. The role of leadership and political will (Bromley), 
7. Risk and flexibility (Bromley) 
8. The importance of system design (Bromley) 
9. Good information/avoiding emotion (Consent Industry) 
There are of course some crossovers between these categories. Furthermore they are 
essentially didactic devices, rather than highly empirically grounded distinctions. I leave 
further analysis of them to Chapter Seven. For now it is sufficient to briefly assess the extent, 
if any, to which these emphases are found in the current case study. 
There is a significant lack of precision with these terms and this means there will be some 
subjectivity in the assessment. One approach to avoid this would be to carry out a discourse 
analysis, such as using NUDIST software4. This would mean analysing the interview texts for 
the recurrence of terms that may imply some significance. However, this approach on my 
interview texts is problematic because the interviews were an informal presentation of the 
views of those interviewed, not a carefully constructed position statements. More importantly, 
the way ideas were expressed provides insight into the emphasis intended by the interviewee, 
an emphasis that is not always apparent when simply reading the text. The analysis of 
interviews relies on the analyst'S interpretation as to what is significant. While it would be 
possible to apply a NUDIST approach to the Council Decision, the data used to determine 
what is discursively significant is drawn interpretatively from the interviews and summarised 
by me into coherent categories. However, these categories are my interpretive constructions 
and were I then to use them in a discourse analysis I would in effect be analysing my own 
language, and not that of the interviewees. For this reason I determined it was more useful to 
use an interpretive approach, whilst acknowledging the potential loss of precision of 
interpretation. 
The method used in this analysis is a manual examination of the CD text to determine if the 
criteria discussed above appear in this text. The same approach then applies to the questions 
4 NUD*IST (Non numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing) 
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stated below. Given that the CD is only 54 pages and has a very clear structure as outlined 
earlier, this method is quite manageable. 
Above, I outlined the criteria for ecologically rational decision making derived from the 
previous two case studies. After examining these, I then tum specifically to the two 
dimensions of the theoretical framework and the question set used for the previous case 
studies. Here is a modified list of questions I will use in this analysis: 
• What are the ecological or environmental issues in this case? 
• What means/mechanisms are being employed to achieve these ends/goals? 
• Who determined what the ecological/environmental issues are? 
• What are the dominant values driving this decision? 
I have dropped the questions that apply to interviewees where opinions were sought, and only 
used those which do not require a respondent's opinion. These remaining questions do not 
rely on opinions, but on the substantive text of the decision. While the substance ofthe text 
may well record opinion, it is treated as objective data in the same way the interview texts 
were treated as objective data. This provides a solid basis for the analysis. 
The Montgomery Spur Decision Text Analysis 
What forms of Ecological Reason are expressed in this Decision? 
This analysis begins with the four questions about the forms of ecological rationality, and 
then examines the extent to which the criteria for ecological rationality are employed in this 
Decisions. 
What are the ecological or environmental issues in this case? 
There is a range of issues at stake in this decision, from landscape and open space issues, to 
water supply and planning issues. All of these are, broadly speaking, environmental, in that 
they affect the natural, built and social environments. The issues vary, depending on who is 
defining them. For instance, traffic concerns and pressure on local schools were concerns of 
5 Unless otherwise noted, all references from this point refer to the Council Decision and are referenced only 
with only a page number. 
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some submitters (pp.3S-39). Ecological issues, in the strict sense, are significantly less 
prominent. I briefly examine what there were. 
A report by a Council botanist indicated that the proposed reserve contained species "of high 
botanical value" (p.12) and was recognised in the District Plan (the Plan) as having ecological 
heritage area status. The report noted that few native plants remained in the proposed 
development area, but that the development would reduce the buffer between the subdivision 
and the protected site, increasing the potential for invasive weeds. That was the extent of the 
Council's report on botanical values. Submitters in opposition raised these and some 
additional issues, including the impact of domestic cats and dogs on local bird and reptilian 
populations, although no studies have been done on this (PAl). Some conservation values 
were raised, such as the protection of some relatively rare silver tussock, which was also 
viewed as part of the city's cultural heritage (PAl), as well as a rare xerophytie fern (p.42). 
The CD accepts most of this evidence as an effect on conservation values (p.48). There is no 
other significant comment on ecological issues per se. Other environmental issues include 
water supply, drainage and agricultural potential, which are briefly discussed but are not 
important factors. Transportation effects are significant, but the dominant 'natural 
environment' issue is landscape and open space values and, in particular, the impact of the 
development on visual amenity: "The Council noted that the effect of the proposed rezoning 
on landscape issue is central to this particular decision" (p.8). 
These are the issues the Council grappled with, but they do not tell us what the goals of this 
decision are. The goals are stated in the broad terms of the RMA and are specified in the 
"Reasons for the Decision" (ppAS-S4). All the evidence was weighed up against what was 
considered to be the most relevant sections of the Act. There was a range of issues to 
consider, including the content of District Plans and its consistency with Regional Policy 
Statements and Plans (S7S) and Other Matters, (S7). However, the two most emphasised 
sections in terms of the number of pages dedicated to them were Purpose (SS) and Matters of 
National Importance (S6). 
With regards to SS the CD discussed the role of activities to enable communities and people 
to pursue their wellbeing. Both the submitters and opponents could claim some level of 
wellbeing from the decision. More decisive in the decision was the requirement to avoid, 
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remedy or mitigate adverse effects. The most significant effect was on landscape values 
(p.46). There was a consistent line given in evidence that Montgomery Spur was part of a 
significant natural landscape and similar evidence in relation to recreational values of the 
open space provided by the Spur. 
Section 6 covers Matters of National Importance, which includes "the protection of 
outstanding natural features and landscapes inappropriate to subdivision, use and 
development". This proved to be a critical goal of this case because the Council decided that 
"the natural landscape of Montgomery Spur was outstanding in terms of. .. the Act, and as 
such was required to be protected from inappropriate subdivision, use and development" 
(p.50). It also commented later that "the amenity values of Montgomery Spur are those 
associated with its open space, natural and unspoiled landscape, wilderness experience, and its 
visual amenity. In this regard the Council concluded that residential development of the spur 
would destroy these values" (p.51). 
In summary, ecological issues do not rate very highly, either for submitters or objectors, and 
are not significant in the decision. For example, there is no mention given to S5(2)(b), 
"safeguarding the life supporting capacity ofthe air, water, soil and ecosystems". However, 
environmental issues, specifically the protection oflandscape and recreational amenity values, 
are decisive. The goal, derived from the RMA, is to safeguard these particular values. 
What means/mechanisms are being employed to achieve these ends/goals? 
The way of ensuring this goal is achieved is, in essence, to deny the application, thereby 
disallowing any residential development of the Spur. This goal is very easy to assess, because 
it contains no ambiguity; no residential development means the open space values are 
protected. The effect is clearly measurable. 
The more interesting dimension here is the mechanism to achieve the goal. The Hearing 
process is used to assess the issue and the level of effects. The question that follows is the 
capacity of the decision maker to ensure compliance with the decision. The mechanism is the 
District Plan. Section 11 (Restrictions on Subdivision of Land) states that "No person may 
subdivide land ... unless that subdivision is-( a) expressly allowed by a rule in a district 
plan .... " Given that the Montgomery Spur case is an application to change the existing 
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zoning, so long as the plan does not change, subdivision is not allowed. Compliance with such 
rules in this case is unproblematic. Any developer breaching the rule would face court action. 
Who determined what the ecological/environmental issues are? 
The capacity to define an issue is an important part of the communicative dimension of 
ecological reason. In this case study, there are various levels of definition going on. At the 
level of statute, the RMA provides the legal parameters as to what mayor may not be defined 
as an issue. We have discussed some of those above. Any issues definition, therefore, is 
bounded by the larger legal (and ultimately social) framework in which it functions. While 
there were other issue definitions offered by some submitters, for example, equity issues, 
where it was argued only the wealthy could afford to buy the proposed sections, such 
definitions were rejected because they did not have relevance under the RMA (CD, p.lS; 
p.27). There were three main and somewhat interrelated contributions to defining the issues: 
the framework of the RMA and its interpretation, submitters and the Hearing Committee. 
The RMA largely determined what could or could not be legitimately considered an issue. 
The relevant parts of the framework have been discussed above, but what is yet to be 
examined is whose interpretations of the Act determined how it would be interpreted. I limit 
this analysis to the central consideration in the decision, landscape values. Transport effects 
were considerable, but were not considered definitive in the decision. The Council, drawing at 
times from case law, noted that there was "agreement between all the witnesses that 
Montgomery Spur was a distinctive landscape of at least regional significance" (p.29). They 
also noted with surprise that the submitters (developers) did not call a landscape architect to 
give evidence (p.17). The submitters did comment on the landscape features through their 
planning expert, who argued from case law that the Spur did not fall under S6(b) of the Act 
(The protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, 
use and development). He did suggest that it mayiaH under the less rigorous requirements of 
S7, which requires authorities to "have particular regard to" such issues (p.IS). The other 
source of support for the developers' proposal came from the CCC's Landscape Architect, 
who noted in his evidence that urban development could take place without adversely 
affecting amenity values. When asked his view by the Committee, he stated that Montgomery 
Spur was not of national significance, but its landscape values are important from a local and 
200 
Chapter Six: The Montgomery Spur Rezoning Application 
regional perspective (p.9). A Council Planner also gave evidence that the proposal was not 
inconsistent with the Regional Policy Statement (p.16). 
In its decision, the Council took issue with these conclusions, aligning itself with the 
collective view of all the landscape architects who presented evidence that the Spur was at 
least of regional significance. It then drew the inference that the Spur requires protection from 
inappropriate development. In addition, the vast majority of submissions in opposition also 
sought the protection of the Spur from further development for landscape and amenity reasons 
(pp.28-29). The Committee specifically note that "the Resource Management Act is not about 
counting heads. Rather, decisions have to be made on the quality ofthe evidence put before 
the Council" (p.47). In relation to who determined what the issues were, at one level the 
Council made the call as to what was considered an issue of significance and what was not. 
Institutional power grants this right. However, the Council 'hears' evidence and it is on this 
basis that the decision was made. The dominant line of evidence was presented by landscape 
architects who maintained a high level of agreement about the significance of the Spur, even 
though there was disagreement about its final status. While this view was also supported by 
most of the non-expert submitters, the role of expert evidence cannot be underestimated. The 
weight and general persuasiveness of the evidence that the Spur was an outstanding landscape 
was a critical determinant in the decision. Nevertheless, the Council had to weigh up a range 
of issues, including whether the offer of reserve land was sufficient to compensate for the 
adverse effects (p.54). The issues, then, were promoted primarily by experts, and it is they 
who in effect determined the environmental issues of this case. 
The role of non-expert submitters is much more difficult to assess. The Committee was aware 
of the wide spread public feeling, but as noted above, resource management decisions are not 
about head counting (p.47). However, the CD also notes both the Council Planner and the 
Submitters' Planner stated that public views can be considered in a decision, but that it is a 
balancing process (pp.15; 17). Furthermore, the Council Landscape Officer acknowledged the 
weight of public opposition and suggested this creates a clear mandate to preserve the Spur as 
a rural landscape. While there is little clear evidence that the weight of public sentiment 
swayed the decision, it is difficult to draw a solid conclusion, because the psychological or 
political processes that influence decision making are beyond the purview of this study. What 
the available evidence does indicate is a minimal role in the justification for the decision. Of 
the seven and a quarter pages devoted in the decision to the views of submitters in opposition, 
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just over one and a quarter pages are devoted to seventeen non-expert submitters, with the 
remaining six pages devoted to four landscape experts and (briefly) one planner. This adds 
support to the more significant role of experts and suggests less weight is given to the non-
experts. 
Defining the amenity and landscape issues around Montgomery Spur is acknowledged as 
somewhat SUbjective (p.27). While landscape architecture does rely on decision and 
assessment criteria, for example, the terms used by one landscape architect to categorise the 
Spur (p.33), there is more reliance on a collective value judgement rather than an empirical 
bottom line. Supporting this view, the Decision, in its most lengthy quotation, cites an 
Environment Court Decision (Wakatipu Environmental Society v Queenstown Lakes District 
Council- CI80/99) which states: "The answer to the question where the outstanding natural 
landscape and features end is not a technical one. It is a robust practical decision ... " (p.33). In 
such matters, the persuasiveness and plausibility of the arguments will have more bearing on a 
decision than they would in a case more clearly defined by empirical standards. In this case, 
what adds to the plausibility of the argument is the high level of agreement among the 
landscape experts. 
In summary, the environmental issues were broadly determined by the RMA framework and 
some recent case law, and more specifically by the role of experts who presented in this case. 
Non-expert views were considered, but appeared to have less weight in the decision. 
Ostensibly, the weight of public interest did not disproportionately affect the decision, but 
what is unknown is the role political pressure played in driving this decision. Given the high 
levels of public concern, it is plausible there was some political risk attached to this decision, 
but offsetting this is the acknowledgment by the Committee that "the Resource Management 
Act is not about counting heads. Rather, decisions have to be made on the quality of the 
evidence put before the Council" (PA7). 
What are the dominant values driving this decision? 
One dimension of the theoretical framework on ecological reason is the explicit value 
orientation ofthe decision makers. Decisions can be crafted in anthropocentric, 
preservationist or ecocentric orientation. In essence, they reflect differing sets of interests. 
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This section examines the values expressed in the CD and which of these value orientations 
they reflect. 
There is a range of values discussed in the CD, with the widest range appearing before the 
final decision section. At the most cursory level is the mention of the impact on spiritual 
values (unspecified as to whose), and the loss of property values, along with the comment that 
these are not relevant considerations under the RMA (p.lS). One of the developers gave 
lengthy evidence in favour of the zone change and stated that some of his values, such as 
"providing a high standard of 'well being' for my family, our neighbours, future neighbours, 
and the wider community ... [and] encouraging the eco-system and improving the bio-diversity 
through the creation of reserves, with extensive plantings and water features" (p.2l). This was 
the only mention ofthe term bio-diversity in the CD, and represents two important sets of 
values to this submitter. 
There was a brief discussion of botanical and conservation values, with most botanical 
interest in the proposed reserve (p.l2). The Decision discusses conservation values and notes 
that the spur is an important representative of low altitude tussock grasslands (p.48). It was 
also considered that these tussock grasslands were part of the city's cultural heritage (p,4I). 
One submitter noted that the line oftrees on the spur was not important; it was the open space 
that was important (p.28). However, the weight given to these values is relatively modest 
considering the overall size ofthe CD. 
Transport issues were raised throughout the decision, and were second in importance to 
landscape values in terms of space allocated to their discussion. While there was no explicit 
discussion of transport 'values', they were implicit, in particular the value of safety. 
Ultimately this is a reflection of social values of the local human community. 
The next most prominent value expressed was in relation to recreation. A number of 
opponents to the development made it clear that they valued the recreational opportunities of 
the open space provided by the undeveloped spur. The Council noted its awareness that a 
number of people "value the wilderness recreational experience of the Port Hills ... [and the 
Council] was ... concerned, like the further submitters, that the development would affect these 
values" (p,47). 
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Finally, by far the most dominant set of values in the decision was landscape amenity. A 
number of submitters, as well as the Council, stated the central issue of this case was 
landscape (pp.9; 13; 27-3S; 47; 49-S0). In evidence, the City Council's Landscape Architect 
stated that landscape "always represents the outward expression of values put upon it by 
society" (p.8), and that there is "no right or wrong landscape outcome for Montgomery Spur 
as long as it has high amenity" (ibid). Another submitter made the similar point that "the 
significance ofthese values lies in society, not in landscape" (p.33). It was also noted that the 
values placed in the landscape of the undeveloped Spur are indicated by the number of 
submissions in opposition. The Council also reiterated this point by stating "it was in no doubt 
from the evidence presented .. .in opposition that the rural landscape of Montgomery Spur is 
highly valued by a number of people in Christchurch" (p.46). It concludes that development 
would destroy the landscape values of the Port Hills (p.SO) and makes a final comment in the 
second to last paragraph of the Decision: "The Council was of the opinion that given the 
Spur's landscape significance that any further development on the Spur was contrary to the 
Purposes and Principles of the Act" (p.S4). 
The dominant, substantive values driving the decision clearly relate to landscape amenity. As 
noted, this is a social construct whereby society, or the vocal and agenda setting groups within 
society, place a value on a particular natural resource. Montgomery Spur is valued for a 
number of things, some of these values being incompatible with each other (such as housing 
development and open space on the same site). The Decision; however, is based on a set of 
amenity values about the presence of open space. These are anthropocentric in orientation and 
therefore this expression of ecological reason is largely anthropocentric. The relative paucity 
of values based on the requirements of eco-systems or bio-diversity suggests that either these 
issues simply were not empirically relevant or that they do not reflect the forms of reason 
dominant in this RMA driven process. It is reasonable to assume that there were no significant 
ecosystem values at stake here, and therefore the dominant issue was human amenity values. 
There were voices raised on behalf of ecological values, both at the institutional level through 
the City Council botanist, as well as through objectors with concerns about other species. 
While these were perhaps less centrally important, they were considered by the Council and 
therefore can be considered to have played a role in the final rejection of the developers' 
submissions. In other words, it is possible to see some expression of preservationism in 
relation to the ecosystems affected by this decision. One submitter, for instance, noted with 
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concern the feral cat population's predation on local reptiles (p.41). Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to conclude that anthropocentric values dominated this case. 
Is this Ecologically Rational Decision Making? 
The final section in this analysis turns to the question of the ecological rationality of the 
Decision. The Decision is evaluated according to the criteria developed from the data in the 
first two case studies. In those studies, interviewees were asked what they considered to be the 
necessary requirements of sound or rational environmental decision making. These answers 
produced a set of nine requirements or criteria. It is these that are used to assess the extent to 
which this decision reflects ecological reason. Some of these criteria require operationalising, 
or at least clarifying what they mean, as discussed in the methodological section ofthis 
chapter. 
The central role for science 
Ecological reason has a strong role for the methods and evidence of science. The issue of 
what science is, exactly, has been long debated and is no closer to being resolved in any 
definitive way. I take a pragmatic approach here by drawing on the judgement of the 
Environment Court over this question. In seeking to clarify the weight to be given to various 
sciences (and thereby expert testimony), the Court argued science can be viewed on a scale 
between soft and hard (NZRMA, 1999, pp.1 08-1 09). In clarifying the role of expert evidence 
it subsequently described different 'levels' of science. First it defined expertise in the 
following terms: 
1. the strength of the qualifications and the duration and quality of the experience of each 
witness; 
2. the reasons for each witness' opinions (and their consistency, coherence and 
presentation); 
3. the objectivity and independence of each witness and the comprehensiveness of their 
evidence-for example whether they have identified and taken into account matters 
which do not favour their opinion; 
4. there is an identification of and general acceptance of the science of methodology 
involved; and 
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5. Especially for "hard" science-the research or papers referred to by the witnesses in 
reaching their opinions, with respect to whether: 
• the techniques used are reliable; 
• the error rates are known and published (and the research is known to 
be statistically significant); 
• the research or papers have been published; 
• the research is subject to peer review; 
• the research is repeatable (and has been replicated). 
(NZRMA, 1999, pp.l08-109) 
The Judgement goes on to distinguish between science in the 'softest sense', such as town 
planning, for which factors 1-3 above apply, social sciences and ecology, where factor 4 
comes into play, and the traditional 'hard' sciences, for which all criteria apply. I use this 
categorisation to make distinctions between the 'types' of science in the Montgomery 
Decision. 
Montgomery Spur does not generally involve 'hard' science as defined above and was not a 
case where scientific data and methods were critical to the decision. Most of the reports 
referred to in the Decision were descriptive of various aspects of effects and were engineering 
based. These include a land-drainage assessment, transportation analysis, recreational 
assessment, and land stability. Some of these may meet the criterion of level 5 above, but they 
were secondary to the main issue of landscape. Landscape assessment made up a significant 
component of the decision and is not reliant on hard science, but rather is in the same category 
as planning. 
The most' scientific' dimension was the botanical assessment. This was primarily descriptive, 
not predictive, simply describing the botanical status of the area and drawing attention to the 
more valuable species. Overall, science played a rather minor role in the Decision and there 
was little 'scientific' evidence produced, except in the softer sense of expert opinion. The 
reason for this is less likely to be a devaluation of science than the nature of the case that 
hinged primarily on public amenity values. Supporting this view is the heavy reliance on 
expertise in the Decision, discussed above, suggesting expert knowledge is still the 
cornerstone of decision making. 
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The use of an environmental assessment framework 
This criterion is related to the role of science and research in developing a systematic 
investigation of the issues. Broadly speaking, it begins with scoping the values that are 
present, identifying the issues and developing options to avoid, remedy or mitigate the 
adverse effects. In this case, the Decision scopes the range of values attached to the 
development proposal, outlines the various issues and discusses the range of options to avoid, 
remedy or mitigate. There are three primary expressions of an environmental assessment 
approach. The City Council, through various officers, presents its assessment of the issues. 
The eight categories it covers have been specified at the beginning of this chapter. Only the 
Planning Officer goes beyond a presentation of the values and potential effects by offering a 
judgement on whether the zoning change is warranted (he argues it is). 
The other submitters took a variety of approaches, some which fall into the environmental 
assessment approach, but many are advocating a particular effect or issue, and not presenting 
a 'balanced' or 'complete' assessment. The more 'expert' a submitter was, the more likely 
they were to do the scoping, effects assessment and mitigation analysis. In conclusion, there is 
evidence that the Committee was presented with an overall account that falls into an 
environmental assessment approach. 
The importance of consultation 
Consultation with affected parties proved to be a significant issue in this case. I examine the 
legal process first and then examine the extent to which the Decision reflects the importance 
of consultation. 
This case was heard twice, first on February 19th and 20t\ 1998, and then again in mid-April 
1999 (MfE, 2000a, p.8). The second hearing was the result of a challenge in the Environment 
Court over the accuracy of the original notification. The Court held that the City Council had 
incorrectly notified the hearing and ordered re-notification to take place. As a result, nine 
hundred and fifty additional submissions were received by the CounciL This case attracted 
widespread coverage in the local papers and a very large number of submissions, most in 
opposition. At a structural level, the role of consultation has been taken very seriously. There 
is no evidence that the original notification was an attempt to deceive the public or to 
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minimise opposition. The Decision notes that Mr Annstrong, whose property was the site of 
one notification: 
"stated a number of times in his evidence that it was not his intention to deceive submitters by 
using the term 'Montgomery Spur' in his original submission. The Council wished to record in 
its decision the sincerity that Mr Armstrong demonstrated on this issue at the time of the 
hearing" (p.19). 
Without evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to conclude that consultation was 
considered an important part of this structure of this decision. Furthermore, there was 
significant opportunity for community members to record their opposition. I was asked to sign 
a submission6 while recreating on an adjacent walking track to the proposed development by 
members ofthe local group opposed to the zoning change. They informed me they had been 
there each weekend for some weeks prior to the hearing and had huge support. 
A large number of people made submissions to the Hearing Committee. The Committee note 
they were not able to comment on every individual submission, but "this does not mean that 
this evidence has not been taken into account" (p.27). The final part of the Decision, the 
"reasons for the decision", records the evidence heard from a wide range of submitters, 
indicating that not just experts' views were considered. Whether or not the consultation was 
sufficient is difficult to assess. The Decision does not comment on any absent affected parties 
or unrepresented interests (although, this is not in fact its role). In summation, consultation 
was, in the end, wide and institutionally supported and all submitters appear to have been 
taken seriously, even if their views did not prevail or were not considered relevant. 
Role of local and traditional knowledge 
Much of the evidence given was, in effect, local knowledge. Landscape amenity values were 
central to this Decision and the evidence for this came not just from professional landscape 
architects, but also from the large number of people providing evidence that they valued this 
landscape. This is 'local knowledge', albeit of a more SUbjective variety. But as already noted, 
landscape values are necessarily reflections of socially imputed values. Therefore, local 
knowledge was particularly important in this case. 
6 This was a considerable time prior to my selection of Montgomery Spur as a case study for this PhD. 
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Traditional knowledge, defined here as local knowledge that gets passed down from previous 
generations, was not easily apparent in this Decision. There was no mention of, for example, 
Maori values, and although there was one brief discussion of 'spiritual values', these were 
never defined. There appear to have been no issues of particular interest to Maori in this 
Decision, and no reference to other forms of traditional knowledge. In summary, this criterion 
appears to have been met by the important role of local knowledge. It could be argued, 
however, that this case is particularly suited to local knowledge of this type, and may not be 
reflective of the wider role of local knowledge in resource management cases. 
The role of values 
This dimension refers primarily to the role of social values in shaping a decision, in contrast 
to the role of scientific or empirical evidence. If a decision reflects scientific evidence and 
places less importance on community values, particularly where they conflict with scientific 
recommendations, then we can argue social values playa minimal role. The role of values 
also is expressed in the distinction between the 'facts of the case' and 'what should be done', 
that is, between empirical evidence and social norms. Put in other terms, science can tell us 
the facts of the situation, or what is likely to occur under various scenarios, but it cannot tell 
us what we should do. The 'should' is the normative role of social values. It is this particular 
role for values I examine here. 
The Decision notes that "decisions have to be made on the quality of evidence put before the 
Council" (p.47) and not on the sheer weight of public opinion (social values). This suggests a 
widespread social value about a particular issue ought not to take precedence over evidence 
from experts. In this case, there is a mixture of expert opinion and strong and clear social 
value preferences, both of which are mutually reinforcing. While the reasons given by the 
Council for its decision rely heavily on landscape experts in particular, these same experts 
draw on socially constructed values from the community about landscape and open space. 
The key evidence is not scientific in the strong sense discussed above. Rather, social valuing 
of this resource is what the argument turns on (within the confines of the RMA's notion of 
effects). Therefore, there is no clash between scientific findings and social values, because 
science was less relevant to the issues at stake, and science, that is the 'soft' version practiced 
by landscape architects, came to the same conclusions as the non-expert evidence. At one 
level of analysis, this convergence of discourses means that a specific role for social values as 
209 
Chapter Six: The Montgomery Spur Rezoning Application 
a normative guide for action is difficult to distinguish from the directive role of science. At 
another level of analysis, this whole Decision is founded essentially on a set of social values 
about open space. On this view, social values played a significant role in this decision, 
primarily due to the particular nature of the case. 
The role of leadership and political will 
Ecologically rational decision making at times requires leadership and political will to ensure 
commitment to particular goals. There is little evidence that this requirement has much 
expression in this Decision. It may be noted that the Decision came out on the side ofthe 
objectors, one of who stated: "This development is NOT ABOUT COMPROMISE. The only 
solution is to preserve the last rural backdrop to the city by retaining the rural classification" 
(p.29, emphasis in original). This is the only semi-direct reference to the need for leadership. 
There was also no indication that any particular individual was more influential than any 
other, or that the Council exercised any leadership beyond its mandated role under the RMA. 
This aspect of ecologically rational decision making has no expression in this decision. 
Risk and flexibility 
Ecologically rational decision processes need to deal with risk assessment, particularly where 
science is either uncertain or the issues involve high levels of complexity. Due to the relative 
lack of scientific input, this criterion is not very relevant to this Decision. There were few 
scientific issues of note and none characterised by any significant level of uncertainty. There 
was some variation over the expected numbers of vehicle trips each day in the proposed 
development (p.47), but this was the only 'dispute'. 
The theme of flexibility refers mainly to the notion that social values will change, and with it 
standards for environmental management. Flexibility is a structural requirement of ecological 
management and may be expressed through adaptive management practices. This Decision 
has little opportunity for flexibility because it produces a permanent outcome. Once 
residential housing is built, the Decision noted, it cannot go back to its original state, whereas 
alternative uses, such as horticulture, would have only transitory effects (p.35). In summary, 
the criteria of risk and flexibility appear to have had little place in this decision, although 
again this may have been due to the nature of the case. 
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The importance of system design 
This criterion was inspired by the concept of natural capitalism and the role ecological 
engineering can play in designing energy, productive and waste assimilative systems for 
human communities. Given that the primary issue of Montgomery Spur was landscape values, 
there was minimal focus on productive or waste systems. The Decision contained discussion 
on issues such as land stability, the productive capacity ofthe undeveloped land7, water runoff 
and engineering concerning road widening. The proposed solutions to these potential effects 
were all couched in engineering terms and issues were examined independently of each other. 
There was no integration of problems into a systematic solution design and no indication that 
such a design ought to use the principles of natural systems in their design solutions. For this 
reason the Montgomery Spur case does not meet this criterion. 
Whether or not there was sufficient latitude to design integrated systems to deal with these 
issues is an important caveat. Adverse effects, such as water runoff and land stability, would 
be dealt with according to the current infrastructure in place, such as the existing storm water 
system. Developing a systems approach to one development site within a wider city system 
could only work insofar as the newly created system could be integrated into the existing 
infrastructure. Local site design, in accordance with ecological principal (Natural Capitalism 
or some other ecologically based approach), could be done, but the Decision contained no 
reference or inference to such an approach. The Decision did clearly state that a series of 
mitigation measures and good design principle were proposed for the development, but it did 
not specify what these were. The decision to reject the application makes these redundant. If 
the Commissioners accepted the application, then the Decision should reflect the mitigation 
measures in much more detail. It is reasonable to conclude that such details were considered 
unnecessary to include in the Decision, because once the Commissioners had made their 
decision, these details were no longer relevant. 
Good information/avoiding emotion 
The final characteristic concerns the quality of information and is linked to an unemotional or 
impartial attitude. Decisions need to be based on well founded arguments that can be 
7 The CD records that the land is poor for grazing unless it is used for highly valued livestock, but possibly 
economic for horticulture (p.53). 
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rationally defended. Montgomery Spur is a potential site for emotional arguments. However, 
while the Decision recorded a range of values attached to the Spur, and the Port Hills in 
general, it did not record any particularly emotional pleas or arguments. Most of the 
comments were more focused on the status of the Spur, and even though these were value 
judgements, for example, "some things are beyond price" (p.28), there were no overtly 
emotional appeals. Such appeals may have been made in the hearing or in submissions, but 
they are not recorded. This suggests the Committee did not find such appeals helpful in 
coming to a decision. 
An emotional appeal is defined here as an argument based primarily on one's emotional state 
concerning an issue, while minimising any empirical evidence. Ironically, this Decision is 
based to a large extent on the collective emotional state of a number of submitters. Landscape 
values reside in the collective social values of the community, rather than in an external 
objective referent such as scientific data. The Committee noted this, and came to their 
decision on the basis of the objective evidence supporting the claim that Montgomery Spur 
was highly valued. This evidence did not consist of emotional appeals, but rather, of carefully 
stated reasons for the uniqueness of the Spur. Some of this was 'objective', in other words, 
able to be falsified, to use Popper's terms. For instance, the claim that this was the last 
undeveloped spur of its type in the area can be SUbjected to objective analysis. Other claims 
were more reliant on the emotional states of individuals, such as the idea that the Spur was 
highly valued in the community. However, this claim itself can be objectively assessed by 
surveys or other social science methods. In effect, the Committee was confident that 
'objective' evidence existed to support this claim and make no mention of explicitly 
emotional arguments. I conclude therefore that the Decision meets this criterion to a 
reasonable extent. 
Summary 
Montgomery Spur presents an interesting case because although it produces a strongly 
technocentric orientated decision, due to the heavy emphasis on professional and expert 
evidence, the case is fundamentally about social values. The Decision appears to meet the 
8 The general strategy offered by Popper was to produce conjectures and then attempt to refute, or falsify them 
(1998). By a process of testing, through attempts to falsify our conjectures, we can get closer to the truth by 
correcting errors. 
212 
Chapter Six: The Montgomery Spur Rezoning Application 
relevant requirements for ecologically rational decisions, with a strong emphasis on science 
(mostly of the soft variety). It also had significant levels of public involvement, and this lead 
to the important input of local knowledge and the expression of social values. While the 
public valuing of this landscape had an important role to play in the decision, it must be borne 
in mind that the statutory framework of the RMA guided the decision, especially in relation to 
Section 6, the protection of outstanding natural features. It is probably more accurate to say 
that the public input confirmed the technical assessment of this landscape as 'outstanding'. 
This case was low on ecological issues, unlike Bromley, but high on amenity issues. Thus, it 
presents a useful contrast to the previous case studies. Just what it all means for ecological 
reason, however, is the task of the final chapter. It is to this task we now tum. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ecological reason has been the focus of this thesis because it potentially offers new insights 
into ecological and environmental management. With this in mind, this thesis has sought to 
accomplish a number of tasks. First, it explored the literature on ecological rationality in order 
to understand how the concept was being constructed within that literature. It then developed 
a theoretical framework for understanding the broad forms of ecological reason found in the 
literature. At this point the analysis turned to the Resource Management Act because, given 
its recent development, it is a likely site for the expression of some formls of ecological 
reason. Drawing on the forms of ecological reason discerned in the literature and developed in 
the theoretical framework at the end of Chapter Two, it sought to investigate the forms of 
ecological reason employed in decision making under the RMA. To this end I carried out 
three case studies. Two examined resource consent processes under the Act using a semi-
structured interview method. The first examined a site specific resource consent application 
concerning the Bromley Waste Water Discharge. The second was not site specific but rather 
'industry' focused and involved interviews with professionals working across a variety of 
roles dealing with resource consents. There were two distinct aims of these two case studies. 
The first was to investigate what interviewees considered were necessary criteria for sound 
ecological or environmental decision making, in other words, the necessary criteria for 
ecologically rational decision making. Second, in line with the theory developed in Chapter 
Two, I investigated the forms of ecological reason being expressed in decision making, both 
within the Bromley case and then more generally within the consent industry. The third case 
study, Montgomery Spur, was a little different in that it (a) did not involve a resource consent 
but rather an application for a zone change to a district plan, (b) used the Council Decision 
text as the data source instead of interviews and ( c) used some of the findings from the first 
two case studies to analyse the ecological rationality of the case. 
All this has produced four primary sets of findings that now require analysis: (1) The 
requirements for ecological rationality; (2) The forms of ecological reason in the case 
studies; (3) Ecological rationality under the RMA; and (4) Hindrances to ecological reason in 
theory and practice: some reflections. This last finding discusses a range of issues. These are: 
a) The relationship between the Criteria and the Forms of ecological reason; b) Is science for 
hire? c) Does public consultation help the RMA produce ecologically rational decisions? d) 
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Making the consent process more eco logically rational; and e) Attitudes and effectiveness of 
the RMA . These are the analytic aims of this chapter. Finally, some overall conclusions will 
be draw n about the usefulness of the tellTI eco logical rationality and on the 'ecological 
rationality' of the RMA along with some observations about opportunities for future research . 
1: The Requirements for Ecological Rationality 
Interviewees were asked what they considered to be the requirements for sound 
environmental decision making. This section examines the answers that emerged from the 
interviews and critically assesses the limitations of the findings . Only the first two case 
studies are relevant here because the third, Montgomery Spur, did not consist of interviews 
and was not designed to address this question . The Bromley case and the Resource Consent 
Industry each produced six criteri a for an ecologically rational decision process, expressed 
below (Figure 7. 1). 
The first point to note is that some of these requirements appear in s li ghtl y different fomls 
between the two case studies, indicating a di fferent emphas is in the interviews. For example, 
while science may well imply a research function , the term ' research' was used much more 
Figure 7. 1: Requirements jor ecologically rational decisiollmaking: a comparison between Bromley 
and the Consent Industry 
Good lnfomlationiAvoiding Emotion 
An environmental assessment Framework An environmental assessment Framework 
Rolc for Community & Local Knowledge Role for Local & Traditional Knowledge 
The role of Consultation 
The Role of Values 
Leadership and Political Will 
Risk and Flex ibility 
System Design 
Note: The shaded lilies indicate a criterion that was produced in BOTH case studies. 
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prominently in the Bromley case than in the Consent Industry case. Bromley's community 
and local knowledge is a close parallel to the Consent Industry's emphasis on local and 
tradition knowledge, although Bromley did not deal with traditional knowledge. The last 
different emphasis is the link between the role of the community in Bromley and the role of 
consultation within the Consent Industry. While both endorsed the need for consultation, the 
emphases were different. These differences will be explored in this analysis, and for that 
purpose the following set of criteria are used: 
1. The central role for science (Bromley and Consent Industry) 
2. Good information/avoiding emotion (Consent Industry) 
3. The use of an environmental assessment framework (Bromley and Consent Industry) 
4. The role of the consultation, community involvement and local knowledge (Bromley 
and Consent Industry) 
5. Traditional knowledge (Consent Industry) 
6. The role of values (Consent Industry) 
7. The role ofleadership and political will (Bromley) 
8. Risk and flexibility (Bromley) 
9. The importance of system design (Bromley) 
The main change from the original list is the separation of the Consent Industry's 'local and 
traditional knowledge' into two distinct categories. While there is a close relationship between 
'local' and 'traditional' forms of knowledge, they are distinct enough to warrant independent 
analyses in this chapter. The second change is the conflation of Bromley's 'community and 
local knowledge' with the Consent Industry's 'local knowledge' and 'consultation'. While 
there are differences in emphasis, these requirements are closely related and therefore it 
makes better sense to analyse them collectively. 
The first question to consider is how accurately these represent ecological reason. The answer 
to this depends on the definition of ecological reason. Because I have not imposed a 
definition, the responses reflect the understandings of the interviewees as to what makes a 
sound decision. The question I generally posed (it varied somewhat depending on the context) 
was, "What did they consider to be the necessary requirements of ecologically sound decision 
making?" Occasionally I used the term 'rational' decision making, but was trying not to 
influence the answer by introducing the term ecological rationality too early in the interview. 
Interviewees had their own perceptions of what sound decision making was, as well aswhere 
the boundaries were located between the terms ecology and environment. While a small 
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number overtly differentiated between the two, the majority did not. For this reason, the idea 
. of ecological reason refers to a wide concept of sound environmental decision making 
partiCUlarly where it involves ecosystems. 
Turning specifically to the criteria, three were expressed in both case studies; the role of 
science; environmental assessment framework; and consultation, community involvement and 
local knowledge. The other criteria were only represented in one or other of the case studies. I 
begin with the shared criteria. 
Three Shared Criteria of Ecologically Rational Decision Making 
The Role of Science 
The dominant feature of both the Bromley and Consent Industry case studies was the role of 
science, appearing de facto as an axiom of good decision making. It was the most commonly 
discussed criterion and there was no one who suggested science was not necessary. It was 
seen to be important in providing the methods for understanding the environment as well as in 
rationally justifying recommendations or decisions. Science was generally viewed in natural 
science terms, particularly in ecological terms. However, with the exception of ecology, and 
occasionally chemistry and biology, the particular forms of science were not specified by the 
interviewees. Science was presented largely as an unproblematic, coherent and unified 
acti vity, one far from the sociology of science view (see discussion in Chapter Three). There 
was also some acknowledgement that the social sciences were important. Most interviewees 
tended to separate the natural sciences, which provide baseline ecological data, from the issue 
of social values for which social sciences were considered useful, although this dichotomy 
was not a strict distinction and was blurred in many interviews. 
Science was almost invariably considered in terms of Western science, confirming the 
powerful role that science exerts in environmental management. This commitment was only 
challenged, in differing degrees, by the three Maori interviewees. They presented some 
scepticism about the capacity of science alone to fully understand environmental issues 
because of its epistemic limitations (my term) in accounting for traditional knowledge. Such 
traditional knowledge was not considered separate from science, and indicates that the 
boundaries between facts and norms (to borrow from Habermas (1998)) are not discrete in 
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Maori thinking. However, all Maori interviewees were quick to point out that they did not 
dismiss the role of science and felt it was essential. 
There were two important limitations or qualifiers on the value of science noted in the 
interviews. The first was, again, the epistemic limitation of science that moves out beyond the 
laboratory, that is, beyond controlled experiments. The types of science used in environmental 
decisions often suffer from a lack of comprehensive data, and sometimes from limited theory 
development. Part of the reason for this appears to be cost. Under resource consent processes, 
environmental assessments must be presented as part of an application. As an application 
increases in complexity, and adverse effects multiply, more research is needed. Much of this 
is site specific and dependent on the resources of the applicant (and for that matter, any 
objectors). Local knowledge, therefore, becomes an important source of information that 
supplements, though will never replace, knowledge derived from formal science. 
The weight given to these different forms, however, strongly favours formal science, 
especially in the Environment Court. Formal science is identified primarily through the 
qualifications of the witness, rather than the quality of science itselfl. As the interviews 
indicate, the level of expertise in hearings committees and the Court varies, thus increasing 
reliance on formally recognised witnesses. Furthermore, in the Bromley case, even though 
there was a wide amount of local knowledge presented at the Hearing, the crux of the decision 
rests on the environmental effects of continued discharge. Critical in this was the role of 
ammonia that was presented by an Emeritus Professor with a well recognised background in 
this field (see Chapter Four). Similarly, the evidence that appeared to be given most weight in 
the Montgomery Spur case was aIso from expert witnesses. Therefore the actual role of local 
knowledge in these decisions appears somewhat ambiguous compared with the still central 
role of scientific evidence (I discuss this further later when addressing the criterion of 
consultation). 
The only other limitation on science recognised by the interviewees was the notion of risk. A 
small number of interviewees noted that some forms of scientific knowledge change over 
time, especially ecology (see Barbour, 1995). Scientific fashions can (and some argued will 
1 The 'quality' of the science is directly related to the 'qualifications' and 'experience' of the expert witness in 
the Environment Court, and in part the ability to appear confident and appear to know what you are talking about 
(See NZRMA, 1999, pp.lOB-109). This view was also presented to me by a former Environment Court Judge in 
conversation as well as in some of my interviews. 
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continue to) change, and therefore reflexivity and adaptation needs to be built into decision 
making processes. Risk analysis is becoming more important and the interview data suggests, 
ironically perhaps, the answer to this is not less science but more science, that is better 
science, but science crafted in humility, ready to adapt. The practical outcome of this may be 
greater reliance on the precautionary principle under the RMA2. 
Environmental Assessment 
This criterion reflects the use of environmental assessment in much contemporary resource 
management. It is perhaps not surprising given that the RMA mandates the use of a form of 
environmental assessment in the Fourth Schedule (Assessment of Effects on the 
Environmene). Environmental assessment is a set of rationalised methods for information 
gathering and decision making and it forms an important part of the scientifically managed 
approach to environmental issues .. 
Consultation, community involvement and local knowledge 
The role of science could be seen as simply a technocratic exercise if it were not modified by 
the third major criterion. Science offers particular forms of highly valued knowledge, but is 
only one source of knowledge. Both sets of interviews strongly endorsed the role of the 
community, for two main reasons. As briefly discussed above, consulting with the community 
acts as a form of additional data gathering. Local knowledge is a powerful tool in ecologically 
rational decisions because it ensures a wider range of knowledge is included in the decision. 
This was acknowledged in both case studies, although it was elaborated at greater length in 
the Bromley interviews where it formed an important part of the final decision. 
The second role of consultation is in establishing the social values over a resource or about a 
development or plan. Where social values are complex or conflicted, community consultation 
enables clarification and negotiation to take place. The interviews acknowledged that while 
2 Yet the interviews provided no clear understanding of exactly what precaution looks like. What is pre-caution 
to one is post-caution to another, and there appears to be no commonly developed understanding of this. 
3 'Assessment of Effects on the Environment' in the RMA version of environmental assessment. 
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science and even local knowledge can tell us the facts of the case, they cannot tell us what is 
valued, and therefore what we should d04. 
Consultation was treated with more caution, and at times scepticism, in the Consent Industry 
study. In contrast, there was a greater acceptance of the community's input in Bromley. One 
reason may be that Bromley interviewees were primarily from the Community Working Party 
and therefore reflected their enthusiasm for community involvement. In contrast, most caution 
in the Consent Industry study came from Consent Authority interviewees (although not all of 
them) and from some experts dismayed with what they considered to be the poor handling of 
scientific data in decisions. Much of this caution was pragmatic, reflecting the difficulties of 
managing large scale and contentious consent applications and the concern that the extra time 
and costs did not always produce better decisions. Most interviewees believed community 
involvement was essential, even though a small number were warm towards the idea that 
better decisions would emerge out of a scientific elite, rather than widespread consultation5. 
Unlike science, the role of community or the public appears to inhabit an ambiguous space in 
these case studies. There is significant enthusiasm for community involvement on the one 
hand, while at the same time a degree of reluctance to fully embrace that role. Only a couple 
of interviewees felt community involvement was not helpful, with most being highly 
supportive. Yet it is the meaning of community involvement that is unclear. What sorts of 
involvements beyond providing local knowledge and clarifying value preferences, should 
engage the community? One instructive view to emerge primarily out of the Consent Industry 
interviews was the notion of education; involve people so that they might be educated in the 
facts of the matter. The strong institutional reliance on science as the clarifier of fact and its 
juxtaposition with the community produces a tension-filled picture of consultation. The RMA 
specifies the requirement for Local Authorities to justify their decisions (S32). The most 
secure way to do so is to invoke the authority of science, particularly where quantification can 
be employed. It is much more difficult to contest numbers than values. Yet, the RMA also 
provides wide standing for communities and individuals over Plans and resource consents. 
4 Theoretically, this fits in with the Discursive Ecology approach, where social action is preceded by social 
discussion over collective goals and values. 
S This view sets aside the political difficulty in doing this. In practice, virtually all interviewees believed 
consultation was needed, but in some cases this was more a response to the legal and political requirements (that 
is, community expectations about being consulted) rather than a philosophical commitment to consultation. 
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Here lies the tension between a participatory ideal and a technical assessment of effects. The 
RMA can be viewed as producing a hierarchy of principles, beginning with National Policy 
Statements clarifying the values to be protected, with each level below becoming more 
specific and technical6. Resource consents are the most site-specific and technical, stating 
exactly what can or cannot be done. The role of consultation becomes socially (and 
institutionally) important, in part I suggest because of the Act's empowerment of 
communities and the growing expectation that people can have their say. Democratically 
elected Local Authorities must be responsive to public opinion. On the other hand, the data 
suggest that community input does not always advance a technical environmental decision. 
Many of the interviewees were concerned about the costs involved in a decision where an 
uninformed public was involved. 
This ambiguity was a subtle but significant finding. Although largely supportive of public 
involvement, this group of interviewees also expressed the view that consultation often did 
not advance the ecological robustness of the decision, measured in scientific terms. This 
suggests more work is needed to clearly identify the relationship between community 
involvement and decision making. More may not be better when it comes to public 
involvement. Yet, clearly the role of the Estuary Association in the Bromley case was 
significant in the final decision, although it needs to be kept in mind that the success of the 
Association was through high level scientific input, suggesting again the overarching 
importance of science. 
Other Criteria for Ecologically Rational Decision Making 
The previous criteria discussed emerged from both sets of interviews. I now turn to other 
criteria that only emerged from one or other of the case studies. While not as broad (widely 
shared) as the criteria above, they are nevertheless significant findings within those case 
studies and require analysis .. 
6 Generally, the higher the 'level', the more 'general' the value position. One exception to this are National 
Environmental Standards which specify acceptable social values in terms of specific technical standards, for 
example in water quality. 
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Traditional Knowledge (Consent Industry) 
The criterion of traditional knowledge emerges primarily, although not exclusively, during the 
Maori interviewees. This presented the only significant challenge to the views discussed 
above; that the role of science is producing 'knowledge' and the community is clarifying 
'values'. There is a strong interrelationship between knowledge and values in Maori 
traditional knowledge. The Western dichotomyofa (relatively) clear separation between 
'facts' and 'values' is problematic in traditional Maori thinking, where this dichotomy is not 
nearly so active. Science is valued, but is only one harbinger of the truth. Yet there was some 
ambiguity here as there appeared to be a blending of traditional and scientific approaches, 
with no analytically distinguishing criteria to determine what should be used where and when. 
What was very clear was the resistance among the Maori interviewees towards science as 
being the only means of producing truth about an environment. Traditional knowledge was 
both of practical and cultural relevance. It helped the local community to survive by passing 
down the knowledge about ecological processes that had been learned over time, but it also 
represents a world-view that differs quite markedly from the wider Pakeha community. This 
cosmological difference meant that the value base on which decisions are made differs at 
times from the dominant scientifically driven process. Two things stood out as important for 
the Maori interviewees. First, the need to 'dismantle the privilege' granted to Western science 
and second, the development of a collaborative approach to environmental issues where both 
Maori traditional knowledge and world view were seen as legitimate components of 
decisions 7• 
Justice was an important reason for these claims, thus linking these arguments quite clearly 
with aspects ofEco-social Ecology. The universalising discourse of Western science is 
viewed as colonising the space in which other alternative knowledge systems can be 
expressed with the result that alternative voices are marginalised. This was the underlying 
concern in these interviews. The degree to which these views (and they are the views of only 
three individuals) fit into the Eco-social Ecology position is less clear. The Maori view is not 
anthropocentric when viewed in terms of Whakapapa; humans have a duty of responsibility to 
7 Much of this commentary was focused on the consent process. However, it is important to note that key 
Government research agencies are already promoting collaborative research frameworks between Maori and 
other groups. For example, see the Foundation for Science, Research & Technology web site (www.fsrt.govt.nz). 
The extent to which 'privilege' is granted to Western science (or the extent to which it ought to be) lies outside 
the analytic focus of this thesis. 
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other species. But the extent to which other species are to be represented or granted their own 
voice is less clear in the interviews. 
The role of consultation, then, becomes increasingly complex when presented with competing 
claims as to the nature of knowledge. Maori knowledge stands as an important challenge to 
consultation under the RMA because it challenges not the legitimacy of science itself, but its 
sole authority to declare what the truth of the matter is. Ultimately this declaration is a social 
jUdgement arising from collaboration between these two knowledge systems8. How this is to 
work in practice lies beyond the scope of this thesis, and the extent to which it can work, 
without undermining science, is unclear. 
The role o/values (Consent Industry) 
This criterion was expressed explicitly in the Consent Industry, but only implied in Bromley. 
There was a strong commitment in the Consent Industry to ensuring that environmental 
decisions are governed by social values. This is also reflected in the consultation criterion 
above, but came across much more forthrightly in the Consent Industry. Social values were 
essential because of the recognition that science cannot make value judgements for 
communities. It can only say what is there, or what will happen, not how important it is or 
what we should do about it (although it may present alternatives). This strong commitment 
was to ensuring these social values were clarified. 
There was ambiguity in the data, however, with some interviewees stressing the role of social 
values while others felt an elite group of scientists may be the best way to make important 
environmental decisions. This suggests two things. First, there is evidence that the role of 
values is underestimated by some interviewees. In other words, the value base of science 
8 This may be a controversial point, but all I mean here is that the collaboration between these two systems is 
itself a social act. The extent to which scientific principles can be relativised depends very much on what 
principles one refers to. Newtonian Physics have proven their reliability and therefore are more than a social 
construct; their truth is not dependent on the observer. Newton's Mechanics are still used to send cameras to 
Mars, even though they have been 'overthrown' by the relativity and quantum revolutions (Nowotny et al., 2001, 
pg.195). While this is not the place to expand the point, science is a complex social phenomena, value laden and 
socially constructed, but at the same time cannot be reduced to simple social relativism. Kuhn (1996), of course, 
opened this debate four decades ago, but also see Nowotny et at., 2001, Re-Thinking Science: Knowledge and 
the Public in an Age of Uncertainty, for a more recent examination of these themes. In essence, I suggest we 
need a view of science that does justice to its primary aims (accurately understanding the physical and biological 
worlds), that takes seriously the argument from the social studies of science that science is embedded within, and 
reflects particular social values. That leaves us with a conception of science that is both objective and socially 
constructed, albeit not in a uniform fashion (see Latour, 1993, p.6 on this). 
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itself is oftentimes not widely understood. The growing literature on the social studies of 
science attests to the subtle but significant way values lie hidden within an ostensibly neutral 
process of analysis. For some interviewees, science was not viewed as being value-laden and 
therefore represented a neutral approach to decision making9• This was not the dominant view 
perhaps, but was an important view expressed. 
The second issue concerns the tension between these two forms of decision making. 
Environmental decisions are valued based, favouring one scenario over a range of others. 
Exactly who should make these value decisions was a source of tension. Some felt 
professionals (including scientists, engineers and planners, etc) were in the best position to 
make these as they understood the consequences better than most and often had the bigger 
picture in mind. They could interpret the science accurately and not jump to unjustified 
conclusions. Yet this view was not accepted by a larger number of interviewees who felt it 
ought to be the community who makes value judgements, but on the basis of a good 
knowledge base. And again, here was the rub; consultation is both part education and part 
information gathering, with a tension between how much latitude to give the public in a 
consultation process and how much to ensure good science is behind the decision. In the 
Discursive Ecology ideal, the community clarifies and specifies its set of value preferences 
and then technical experts, under normative community guidance, work out a means of 
achieving these values. Yet, in practice, the relationship between values and ends is much 
more reflexive. Genetic modification technology, for example, produces completely novel 
opportunities for human preference development, that is, technology and scientific 
advancement can produce new social values. Therefore the relationship between scientific 
experts and the community is a difficult one that needs to be managed contextually, 
depending on the issue at hand. Science and social participation are two entrenched values in 
the RMA, but their relationship is tension-ridden. 
The values expressed in the interviews are primarily anthropocentric, with little attention 
given to the idea of intrinsic rights. Most interviewees represented local government or their 
clients, with some representing various community groups. Therefore, the interests expressed 
9 This picture of science has been severely criticised for being conceptualised as a-social, disembedded from the 
worlds of economy, politics and culture and therefore somehow deluded as to its inbuilt (and invisible) biases 
and partiality (Kuhn, 1996, 1998; Harding, 1991, 1993, 1998; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2001; Plumwood, 
2002). These biases about science's immunity to the social, and the associated claim that it produces a socially 
and ideologically undistorted account of the nature world, leads its critics at times to argue that science is itself a 
major cause of the environmental problematique (Hay, 2002, pg.122). 
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were primarily narrow in focus and human-centred. However, there was a competing set of 
expressed values that fall much closer to preservationist value position but these were clearly 
in the minority. 
This criterion for ecological reason suggests a commitment to Discursive Ecology (A) (see 
Figure 7.2 later in this chapter), given the need to clarify social values and the primarily 
anthropocentric orientation. This picture is strongest in the Consent Industry Case but again 
this can be overemphasised. There is still a degree of ambiguity in the data over this role. 
The role of leadership and political will (Bromley) 
This criterion does not fit into the forms of ecological reason theorised in Chapter Two. It 
represents a functional requirement for effective decision making rather than defining the 
nature of that decision making. It is the institutional capacity to make and implement 
decisions and in principle could facilitate any of the forms of ecological reason. In part it is a 
response to 'information overload' (Interviewee, B4a) that the pressure to consult produces, 
where a balance is needed between 'getting things done' and participatory decision making. 
The role of leadership, therefore, serves an important social function required to initiate or 
support particular institutional structures in the service of ecological reason. The most 
passionate advocate for this function was also committed to public involvement in 
environmental decisions, thus blunting the potential criticism that strong leadership is 
antithetical to discursive or dialogic forms of communication or values clarification. Strong 
leadership can impose parochial values on a community but could also be the vanguard for 
more ecologically rational decisions and programmes. In other words, leadership is a neutral 
function vis-a-vis any particular form of ecological reason and therefore does not qualify as a 
necessary requirement for ecological reason. 
Risk and flexibility (Bromley) 
Although only mentioned in a small number of interviews, this was a highly articulated 
theme. Dealing with the complexity and dynamics of both social and ecological systems 
requires ongoing risk assessment and adaptive decisions. Both technical and social value 
changes need to be factored into ecological rational decision making. First, scientific 
development may render a particular practice redundant or highly problematic. Second, social 
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expectations about society's relationship with the environment changes and evolves. This 
parallels Dryzek's criterion of flexibility (See Chapter Two). However, rather than being a 
peculiar quality of ecological rationality per se it is a necessary quality of decision making in 
any dynamic system. As one interviewee put it, we need to be "a little bit humble about a blue 
sky ideal because the shade of blue will change" (B3a). Highlighting flexibility as a criterion 
for ecologically rational decision making is reasonable, given the increased emphasis on 
uncertainty and risk (see Beck's work (1992, 1995, 1998) on this). 
What is less clear is why there was not greater discussion or recognition of risk or flexibility 
in most of the interviews. One possible reason is that the focus was on the RMA, and in 
particular the resource consent process. Most interviewees constructed their decision making 
requirements within the confines of the RMA, even though I attempted to start the 
conversations much more broadly than this. The framework may not only constrain the actual 
decisions that are made, but also construct interviewees' vision or understanding of ecological 
reason. In other words, it may act as a socialising agent in regards to appropriate 
environmental management. Most interviewees felt the RMA overall was a very rational 
framework and no one could suggest anything better, some minor adjustments 
notwithstanding. Yet the RMA represents a major shift from the previous planning legislative 
framework, one that some have argued was still the dominant mindset for several years after 
the RMA was introduced in 1991 (Young, 2001, pp.84-90). My interviewees were on the 
whole very supportive of the aims and processes of the RMA. This suggests the socialisation 
of the last twelve years under the Act has produced a set of actors that have largely 
internalised the Act's purposes and processes 10. However, a small number of interviewees 
were thinking outside (beyond) the RMA square. This is well reflected in the last criterion to 
be analysed. 
The importance of system design (Bromley) 
Drawing on the work of Hawkin et aI., (1999), this requirement takes to heart the challenge of 
ecological sustainability by purposively designing energy, production and waste systems to 
reflect the principles of natural systems; working with nature rather than seeking to overpower 
10 I comment later in the chapter on the relative lack of internalisation of the purpose of the Act among much of 
the population. One of the reasons has to do with a lack of familiarity with the purpose and principles of the Act 
(which requires an attitude shift towards valuing the environment), something most of my interviewees did not 
suffer from. This may help explain why the interviewee group had internalised the norms of the RMA. 
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nature. This provided a powerful philosophical principle from which to conceptualise the 
design of ecological solutions. This criterion reminds us to consider natural systems. 
According to this view, we ought to challenge the anthropocentric dimensions of technocracy 
that constructs environmental problems in terms of power. The answers to such problems lie 
in human creativity and power. Ipso jacto, if we generate sufficient power, we can overcome 
all our problems. The 'system design' criterion takes issues with this, arguing that brute 
expressions of human power are insufficient.· The capacity to design systems leaves humans 
with an unavoidable choice; we cannot avoid environmental impacts, but we can choose the 
way we design those impacts. This notion of system design provides a challenge to draw 
philosophically from 'natural' principles and has the advantage of orientating us away from a 
strict anthropocentrism. 
The limitation of this as a criterion for decision making is that it came from only one 
interviewee. Its inclusion is therefore questionable, but I did so for the following reasons. 
Before I interviewed this particular individual, I had been informed by a number of other 
interviewees that he was responsible for the rejection of the Bromley Working Party 
recommendations. For this and other more historical reasons, he was not presented in a 
particularly favourable light. It was with this background that I came to the interview and was 
very surprised (to be methodologically transparent here!!) with his views. He came across as a 
highly thoughtful and visionary individual who was recently converted to the principles of 
Natural Capitalism and was very keen to implement comprehensive environmental planning 
in the City. As discussed at length in Chapter Four, he believed that end-of-pipe thinking was 
too narrow, and instead wanted to institutionalise ongoing environmental improvements in 
environmental management. He was aware that if an ocean outfall was put in place, then 
political pressure for further improvements would dry up. It was this single issue approach 
that he was trying to avoid. Thus it struck me as high ecological rational because (a) it placed 
environmental improvements at the heart of policy development, (b) was focused on imitating 
natural processes and (c) was reflexive (ongoing and increasing in its capacity to improve the 
environment). For these reasons I felt it needed to be represented in the criteria. 
11 The more sceptical (cynical?) person might suggest that he was simply doing what politicians do, that is 
persuade as to the value of his views, and that I am therefore simply a victim of a slick presentation. Maybe. 
(How can one defend against such an assertion? It cannot be falsified, in Popper's sense). However, I think that 
is an implausible interpretation, given the interview data I have. While I was personally impressed (to be 
analytically transparent), this is less relevant than the arguments he presented, and of which large portions are 
cited in Chapter Four. I refer the sceptic to these. 
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So why is this view not more widely reflected in the data? I suggest that the overall frame of 
reference is different between this interviewee and most of the others. Although the 
interviewee was a Councillor, and thus subject to the usual statutory requirements and duties 
(to act within the law), he was also a visionary as attested to by another interviewee (see 
Chapter Four). His view of his role was one ofleadership or governance, as opposed to 
management: "People who get elected should have to think about leadership rather than being 
popular and ... [the voters] need to elect people who are good at governance rather than who 
are good at making them feel good" (A4c). He was thinking outside the box of the RMA and 
consistently recorded his frustration with his view of it as just a licence granting system (via 
consents) rather than ensuring on-going improvements in environmental practices within the 
life of a consent. In contrast, some interviewees believed that the goal of Bromley was to get a 
consent granted. Most interviewees were working within the RMA framework and their 
thinking reflected this. 
Another more fundamental issue is the clash between legal and ecological rationality. Legal 
reason, according to Diesing (1962; see also Bartlett, 1986; Dryzek, 1987a) seeks to produce 
clarity in the rules that govern and order human affairs, resolving disputes through consistent 
and detailed requirements. The reduction of ambiguity is a cornerstone of good statute 
making. This, however, is complicated, as Dryzek (1987a) shows, in dynamic, unpredictable 
and non-reducible ecosystems (see Chapter Two). While legal clarity will offer the 
environment protection, it is unable to adapt rapidly as technological capacity or 
environmental circumstances change. This is the fundamental concern of this interviewee. 
The rationality of the RMA framework is generally unquestioned in the data (see the analysis 
below on this), but there is some concern about its ability to provide and analyse the necessary 
quality of information. A more reflexive consent process could allow for this, but it is a risk. 
In the Bromley case, the Commissioners were faced with a potentially improved environment 
in the longer term, but with much greater short term risk. They argue that the RMA directs 
them to deal with adverse effects now and that they cannot act in a way that risks the current 
environment. The Council argued in response that the consent conditions could include clear 
targets and time frames that would ensure the Council stayed on track, but, given the 
uncertainty of the science, the Commissioners were not prepared to take the risk. Thus, the 
ocean outfall will be put in place, but the other wider ecological improvements that the Green· 
Edge proposal may produce are very unlikely to eventuate. In essence, we have two 
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competing forms of ecological reason; the requirements of a legal system and a relatively 
novel adaptive management process. Both have their strengths and risks, but the RMA takes 
the route of ensuring greater certainty in the immediate situation, even though it may result in 
lower environmental outcomes in the longer term than an adaptive, incremental, approach 
might achieve. It also looks at the single issue before it and is unable, at Consent Hearings, to 
move strategically beyond a single issue focus. The same problem was criticised with regard 
to the water allocation process in the Waitaki River where Meridian Energy was forced to use 
the resource consent process to gain water rights (see Chapter Five). It has since been 
recognised by the Government that this is a strategically inappropriate way to deal with such 
resources. A solution may rest in the employment of Regional Plans or National Policy 
Statements, and this is also discussed later in the Chapter. 
To summarise, the tension is between legal clarity and reflexive adaptation, between a single 
issue framed within a wider set of policies and plans, and a more comprehensive and strategic 
approach to environmental management. 
2: The Forms of Ecological Reason in the Case Studies 
One of the aims of this thesis was to investigate the forms of ecological reason employed, 
either implicitly or implicitly, in the case studies. The typology developed in Chapter Two 
builds a picture of ecological reason based on two dimensions. The first concerns the action 
dimension, or the practices experienced by actors in decisions. ill other words, this addresses 
communicative action rather than beliefs. How people act produces one dimension of 
ecological reason. The second dimension is expressed in terms of values, what people believe. 
ill highlighting the relationship between how people act and what they believe, this approach 
allows me to explore and explain any dissonance between the two dimensions. This section 
analyses each of these dimensions in tum and then examines where each case study fits in the 
'matrix of ecological reason'. To remind the reader of how each oftheseJorms is constructed, 
the 'matrix' is reproduced here (Originally Figure 2.2, but renamed here as Figure 7.2). It will 
provide a useful reference for the discussion below. 
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Figure 7.2: A Matrix of Ecological Reason 
x x Eco-social Ecology 
Discllrsive Ecology Discllrsive Ecology Discllrsive Ecology 
(A) (P) (E) 
The Action di mension invo lves three broad fo rms of social acti on. Teclmical, di scursive and 
dialogic forms of reason refer to the degree that goals are problematic. If they are not 
problematic, then instrumentaVtechnical communication reason is engaged. If there is no 
agreement over goals, then communicative reason (engaging human actors) or dialogic reason 
(engaging the interests orother species in addition to humans) are engaged. In essence thi s 
dimension can be operationalised by considering the forms of communication needed in the 
decision and who is deemed appropriate to be involved in the decision. 
The re levant questi on is: Who was/ought to be involved (who has the righl 10 sp eak) ? 
Bromley 
It is clear from the interview data that apart fro m the obvious consent authority invo lvement, 
the wider community involvement was by far the most consistent response. Many of these 
same interviewees also felt science was important in environmenta l decision making, with 
only one demonstrating little interest in community involvement. Ironicall y, thi s interviewee 
was a part of a community group. Finally, local knowledge, viewed as a form of community 
involvement, was considered important. In summary, the legi timate voices in environmental 
decisions consist of: 
• Wide community invo lvement 
• Science/Experts 
• Consent AuthoritieslRMA Framework 
• Local Knowledge 
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Consent Industry 
There were a range of answers here, but generally, the public were seen to have the right to be 
involved with the consents process, although there were clear limits expressed on this. There 
was no clear unified view on standing under the Act (that is, who has the right to submit), 
with views ranging from 'anyone who has an interest' to 'science' (in the case of clear 
ecological concerns). In many cases, context was considered a determining factor with some 
emphasis on being pragmatic; decisions have to work in the end. In summary, the legitimate 
voices in environmental decisions consist of: 
• Science/experts 
• The public 
• Consultation with other interests but with limitations--emphasis on technical experts 
• Ethical responsibility to other species 
• Local and Traditional knowledge 
Montgomery Spur 
The environmental issues were broadly determined by the RMA framework and some recent 
case law, and more specifically by the role of experts who presented in this case. Non-expert 
views were considered but appeared to have less weight in the decision. Ostensibly, the 
weight of public interest did not disproportionately affect the decision, but what is unknown is 
the role political pressure played in driving this decision. 
• RMA framework 
• Experts (emphasised) 
• Non experts (lesser role) 
Summary of the Action dimension 
This question produced a range of answers, but one unambiguous answer is the role experts 
play in decision making. In each of the three cases, experts were seen to be an indispensable 
component of environmental decisions. This reinforces the role that science was seen to play 
in ecologically rational decisions; experts are an external expression of science. The other 
(unexpected) finding was the role of the Consent AuthoritylRMA. Whether this was simply a 
pragmatic response to decision making under the RMA ("it is here so we must live with it") 
or a necessary dimension for decision making (a legal framework reflecting social norms) is 
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more difficult to assess. Consu ltation with the ' public' featu red, but tended to be tempered by 
reli ance on expert s. Nevertheless, the public was seen to have a role to play in all three case 
studies. 
I summarise these results in Figure 7.3, placing each 'result' within the Theoretical 
Framework on the fo llowing basis. Science/Experts, authority and local knowledge are more 
likely to reflect teclmical knowledge, whereas community or public involvement is more 
li kely to reflect di scursive or nonnati ve knowledge. Their placement in Figure 7.3 provides an 
indication as to the fonns of reason expressed in these findings. 
Figure 7.3: Summary of Results: Who has the right to be il/volved in decisiol/makil/g? 
Consent Industry Montgomery Spur 
• Eth ical responsibility 
• WIDE • Eth ical rcsponsibility 
COMMUNITY to other species 
INVOLVEMENT • Consultation with 
• Joint approach Public 
• Traditional 
• Local Knowledge • Local Knowledge 
• CONSENT • SCIENCE/ 
AUTHORITY EXPERTS 
• SCIENCE/ 
Note: CAPS represent greater emphasis in the interview data 
Lower case represents less emphasis in the interview data 
• Non experts 
• RMA 
FRAMEWORK 
• SCIENCE/ 
EXPERTS 
Both communicative and instrumental-technical fonns of social action (communication) 
feature strongly in the Bromley case, with the Consent Industry featuring most strongly in the 
instrumental-technical reason, but having a wider spread than either Bromley or Montgomery 
Spur. Finally, Montgomery Spur is notable for its very strong reliance on instrumental-
technical reason. 
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The Value Dimension 
The value dimension concerns the explicit value orientation of those involved in a decision. 
Decisions can be crafted in anthropocentric, preservationist or ecocentric orientations. 
Operationalising this dimension involves assessing the degree to which decisions reflect these 
value orientations. One of the ways to assess this is to find out what the goals or aims of a 
decision or case are. Interviewees in the Bromley case were asked what goals they believed 
the Council ought to be seeking to achieve. In the Montgomery Spur case, the analytic 
question was: "What are the dominant values driving this decision?" Answers can be 
evaluated to determine where in the value spectrum they fit. The Consent Industry case was a 
little different because there was no particular case around which to explore the goals or aims. 
I do not use this case study here, but will 'triangulate' the results from the Consents Industry 
through the use of other questions below. 
Bromley 
The relevant question is: What were the goals or aims o/this case? 
There were five main aims of the Bromley case that came from the data: removal of discharge 
from the estuary; reduction in the level of pollutants; improvement in recreational wellbeing 
and public health; restoration of the estuary environment; and obtaining a resource consent. 
These aims tended to overlap at times but they indicate the primary drive of the interviewees. 
Some of these aims could be viewed as means rather than ends. For example, removing 
discharge from the estuary would reduce the level of pollutants. (We can perhaps put aside the 
last goal, which represents the formal responsibility of local government rather than a specific 
environmental outcome). 
There are two broad sets of aims here. The narrower one is concerned with the health and 
recreational effects of continued discharge and is focused on the removal of pollutants. This 
clearly represents a strong anthropocentric orientation. The second broad aim seeks to move 
beyond just cleaning up the estuary to restoration of the ecosystems, returning them to their 
natural state or as close to that as can be done within an urban setting. There was some 
concern with restoring habitat and wildlife, although the focus here was on the human 
enjoyment of recreational and sporting opportunities that would (re)emerge from a restored 
ecology. Given that the estuary was described as a 'jewel in the crown' of Christchurch City, 
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there is a strong desire to clean it up. The principle values underlying this approach appear to 
be either anthropocentric or preservationist. The weight of concern was with human health, 
with the next level of concern being the recreational and aesthetic, and some concern about 
the health of the ecosystems, though this latter concern is most accurately viewed in tenus of 
direct human interests. 
Montgomery Spur 
The relevant questions are: 
What are the ecological or environmental issues in this case? 
What are the dominant values driving this decision? 
This case is notable for the relative absence of significant 'ecological' issues affecting either 
particular species or ecosystems. They are noted, but do not feature highly. Rather, the 
dominant value was the protection of landscape amenity and, to a lesser degree, recreational 
amenity. The open space of the landscape was what was of most importance to most people. 
This was represented in a number of ways, including some rather vague reference to spiritual 
values, but was notable in that any utility ofthis Spur was of an intangible kind, the aesthetic 
rather than economic. Recreation values were slightly more tangible, but were also less 
dominant in the Decision. 
There was considerable economic and social benefit to be gained by the developers and the 
construction industry and those who would have eventually lived on the Spur had it been 
developed. However, this was considered to be of less value than what the Spur 'represented' 
in the minds of many residents. Because there were no compelling ecological issues per se, 
this Decision is notable for its social values. There was little evidence that these values were 
non-anthropocentric, but they did not express economic utility values to any degree. Their 
'utility' was in enabling an aesthetic appreciation of the open natural spaces of the 
undeveloped Spur. Montgomery Spur is also considered to be an important remanent of a 
landscape that has been lost in recent times. For these reasons these values clearly fall into the 
preservationist camp. 
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Summary of the value dimension 
The enviromnental goals or aims express the underlying values in the Bromley case and the 
Montgomery Spur Decision states the overarching values on which the decision was made. 
These are summarised in 7.4 below. Most of the values fall into the anthropocentric camp 
with the obvious exception of Landscape Amenity values. There are some expressed values 
that are also in the preservationist camp. What is most notable is the absence of any 
expression of ecocentric values. 
Figure 7.4: SUIIIIIIWY of Results: What are the values expressed intlzese cases? 
Montgomery 
Spur 
• HUMAN 
HEALTH 
• RECREATION 
SAFETY 
• Aesthetic Appeal 
• Habitat 
(Sporting) 
LANDSCAPE AMENITY 
VALUE 
Note: CAPS represent greater emphasis in the interview data 
Lower case represents less emphasis in the interview data 
Summary of the Two Dimensions 
In order to get a clear picture of the forms of ecological reason that emerge from each case 
study, Bromley and Montgomery Spur are represented in Figures 7.5 and 7.G to provide a 
visual representation of the results. The results are represented by two categories, Dominant 
and Secondary fonns of ecological reason. The Dominant category represents the strongest 
findings in the case studies and is represented by a D. Likewise, the Secondary category (S) 
identifies other findings that need to be included because of their role in the case studies, but 
are not primary or dominant. While this is a rough guide, it is only designed to illustrate in a 
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visua l way the relative weig ht of the fonns of ecologica l reason found in the case stud ies. (I 
address the Consent Industry later in thc chaptcr.) 
The Bromley Case Study 
Figure 7. 5: Dominalll (D) alld secolldary (S) forms of ecological reaSOIl ill Bromley 
X Eco-social Ecology 
D s 
Technocentric Ecology Technocentric Ecology (P) x 
D s 
The role of values was strongly anthropocentric in Bromley, but there were two dominant 
fomls of social action. Therefore the fomls of ecological reason cannot be neatly categorised 
into one position; the data are more appropriately reflected in Discursive Ecology (A) and 
Technocentric Ecology. However, some expression was found of two other fonns of 
ecological reason, but these are morc appropriately treated as secondary fonns. The reason [or 
this mixed picture is because the data are derived from the interviews and not from the final 
decision, as is the case with Montgomery Spur. This means that the differing perspectives of 
the interviewees achieve prominence. 
The Montgomel'y Spur Case Study 
Figure 7. 6: Dominant (D) alld secolldOlY (S) forms of ecological reason ill Montgomery Spur 
Ecology 
Discursive Ecology 
s 
Ecology (P) X 
D 
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Montgomery Spur is clearly dominated by Technocentric Ecology (P), although due to the 
important but subsidiary role of the non-expert public, it is also represented in Discursive 
Ecology (P). 
With the incomplete account of the Consent Industry notwithstanding, we now have a useful 
summary of the forms of ecological reason found in the two case studies. These conclusions 
were reached by deduction from the information given to some of the research questions. But 
to what extent do the interviewees themselves consider the consent process to be ecologically 
rational? This is the next question to be examined. To this point, the analysis has applied the 
theoretical framework to the case studies. However, there is another set of data that can also 
shed light on the question of ecological reason under the RMA. In both Bromley and the 
Consent Industry I was able to ask interviewees whether or not, or to what extent, they 
considered the resource consent process ecologically rational. This next section examines 
these findings. This question was not possible with the third case study, Montgomery Spur, 
due to the different data set available and methodology used. For this reason I took a different 
approach to Montgomery Spur and used the criteria for ecologically rational decision making 
derived from the first two case studies to 'test' how ecologically rational Montgomery Spur 
was. I therefore add that conclusion to the discussion below. 
3: Ecological Rationality under the RMA 
Interviewees were asked to consider the extent to which the Bromley consent process or the 
consent process more generally, was ecologically rational (however they defined that term). 
They were asked the question: "Is this ecologically rational decision making?" Because 
Bromley was a specific decision, interviewees were also asked to what extent Bromley 
measured up to the aims or goals. Because Montgomery Spur did not involve interviews, the 
decision text for Montgomery Spur was analysed to assess the extent to which it met the 
criteria for ecological reason that were derived from the answers given in the first two case 
studies. 
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Bromley 
The first relevant question is: How did the Bromley Case measure up? 
This question was posed near the end of most interviews to glean reflections on the extent to 
which the process met the criteria discussed earlier in each interview. I compare each criterion 
for sound decision making with the assessment of how well Bromley met these criteria. 
(a) The role of science and research: Identified as a weakness in the initial consent 
application. 
(b) Environmental impact assessment: Did not feature explicitly in the answers, but suffers 
from the same criticism as science and research. 
(c) A strong role for the community and local knowledge: Reflected positively. 
(d) The role of leadership and political will: Some suggestion that leadership was a little 
lacking in the Bromley Case (a minor quibble overall). 
(e) Risk and flexibility: No widespread concern about these criteria, but they also did not 
feature highly in the concerns of most interviewees. 
(f) System design: One interviewee felt-very strongly that Bromley failed on this ground. 
The second relevant question is: Was this a rational way to make decisions? 
There are two parts to this question. First, was the correct decision made? The data at most 
provides only qualified support for the actual decision, although most interviewees felt the 
decision of the Commissioners was the correct one. 
Second, was the best process used? Most interviewees felt the Working Party was a critical 
element ofthe process, making this a rational decision. Rationality here is strongly linked to 
the process used. This is perhaps not surprising because most of the interviewees were 
members of the Working Party and therefore had a significant investment in the success of the 
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process. They were part of the detailed discussion on the issues, values and technologies 
involved in the case. 
The strong role of science was viewed as a mark of rationality in this case, and there was 
some concern that without the involvement of the retired scientists, estuary discharge would 
still continue. There was concern that not enough scientific data was available to make this a 
rational decision, indicating the importance of science in rational decisions. Coupled with this 
was doubt about the rationality of the Court process to deal with technical information. 
Science is critical but there was a discernable lack of confidence in this case that such science 
was available. 
Finally, the distinction between ecological and political rationality was raised, along with the 
suggestion that political reason nearly derailed the process and would have given an irrational 
decision. The irrationality of the 'political' decision (see Chapter Four for the details) lay not 
so much in the science but in the process whereby the Working Party was overruled by the 
City Council. While the science was considered to be lacking at this point (I come back to this 
later), the main concern was with the consultative process. Ecological reason is process as 
well as substance. 
Summary of Bromley 
Was this an ecologically rational decision? The decision was considered rational but not the 
actual consent application made initially by the City Council. The potential irrationality lay in 
the process where carefully reasoned community input was sidelined. The second concern 
was the incomplete scientific data. Whether or not these concerns are empirically correct is 
not my concern here, but rather the clear link made between process (community 
involvement) and science, and ecological reason. This strengthens the role of science and 
community involvement, suggesting both Technocentric Ecology and Discursive Ecology (A) 
are the dominant forms of ecological reason emerging here. I place these two criteria (science 
as Technocentric ecology and community involvement as primarily Discursive Ecology) in the 
anthropocentric position based on the data discussed earlier. 
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Consent Industry 
The relevant question is: Is the resource consent process an ecologically rational way to make 
decisions? 
There were mixed views on this question, but most felt that it was a fundamentally sound 
approach. In other words, the process and framework were sound, and few could suggest any 
fundamental improvements to it. The process gave opportunity to produce sound 
environmental decisions while protecting people's right to use the environment. 
The most common response was that the Act is rational in principle (as above) but becomes 
irrational in practice because of the problems of poor information and public involvement. 
Widespread public involvement introduces too many irrelevancies into the hearing, taking 
away from the focus on ecological wellbeing. But poor provision of scientific information as 
well as a variable capacity by decision makers to interpret and understand this information 
undermined the ecological reason of decisions. Coupled with this was concern about the 
adversarial system that pitted applicant against objectors, forcing people to act strategically 
(not always sharing information, for example), and needing to rely on how well one's case 
was presented in the Hearing or the Court. This is not to suggest all or even most consent 
applications suffer from this, but where consent applications have significant adverse effects 
or attract public interest, these issues may apply. 
Some interviewees felt the process was not rational in essence because of the lack of strategic 
guidance through Regional Plans. This lack of a comprehensive approach produces ad hoc 
decision making that resulted in the problems faced by Meridian Energy's Project Aqua (see 
Chapter Five). 
What does all this mean for ecological reason? I suggest two things. First, the role of 
discursive ecology is problematic because it is both perceived as undermining the 
effectiveness of the ecological (read scientific) dimensions of decision making and as 
essential in the provision of plans. Producing strategic direction (setting the values and goals 
in place) is a necessary function of discursive ecology via the community. While difficult, and 
this is the reason most cited for the lack of Regional Plans, it nevertheless suggests discursive 
deliberation needs to be mostly focused at the strategic level. This may help clarify the 
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problems of resource consent decision making, granting more technical guidance and 
providing less normative discretion at the consent level. The flow-on impact ofthis may be to 
reduce the less productive dimensions of public involvement in consent hearings. Recall, 
public consultation is viewed as a criterion for ecologically rational decision making 
(although 'consultation' is less inclusive that 'participation'), thus is essential in most 
interviewees' accounts. However, interviewees saw the most legitimate role for public 
involvement as being the provision of additional information that formal research processes 
cannot provide, as well giving expression to public values12. At the same time they wished to 
ensure that public opinion does not drive the decision. Rather, good scientific information is 
what most interviewees believed should drive decisions, not political or social concerns. 
The second issue concerns this provision of good information for decision makers. The 
adversarial process gained mixed reviews in the interview data, and thus it is difficult to 
produce any definitive conclusions as to whether or not it assists the task of ecologically 
rational decision making. I discuss this in more detail below. What is clear is that 
Technocentric Ecology is the dominant form of ecological reason reflected in the views of the 
interviewees. While there is no suggestion by interviewees that the discursive dimensions be 
eliminated, the main problem faced in consent decisions is on ensuring that good information 
is supplied and interpreted correctly. This implies a stronger role for science, but primarily in 
provision of good data and quality interpretation. Some interviewees expressed concern about 
the capacity of smaller Local Authorities to handle large scale or complex consent 
applications. This may require better resourcing of consent authorities. Given the adversarial 
style of the consent process, it is also difficult for some opponents to afford the necessary 
research to test the claims of consent applicants. 
In summary, there are some doubts about the ecological rationality of the consents process, 
based mainly on the ambiguous role for Discursive Ecology and a strong (implicit) preference 
for Technocentric Ecology. This poses an interesting tension discussed earlier between 
enthusiasm for wide spread public consultation and the need to ensure decisions are not 
swayed by public opinion, but only by the criterion of good science. Thus, we are again faced 
12 It is perhaps useful to keep in mind that different consent applications require different mixes of information 
and values clarification. While Montgomery Spur was not a resource consent, the primary focus was on public 
values associated with the application. Bromley on the other hand was much more reliant on a scientific 
assessment of ecological effects. 
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with the competing notions of Discursive and Technocentric Ecologies in the resource 
consent process. 
Montgomery Spur 
The relevant question is: To what extent are the criteria for ecologically rational decisions 
met by the Montgomery Spur Decision? 
Assessing the ecological rationality of the Montgomery Spur decision relied on a reflexive use 
ofthe criteria for ecologically rational decisions from the first two case studies. The 
Montgomery Spur Decision was assessed for the extent to which these criteria were employed 
in the Decision. The results indicated a similar pattern to the other two case studies. First, the 
role of expertise was taken much more seriously than the role of public consultation, although 
this featured significantly also. The weighting given to (albeit soft) science was much greater 
overall than that given to the non-experts. But public participation was wide and extensive, 
with the data from this confirming the social value of the Spur's landscape that was testified 
to by the expert witnesses. Local knowledge was unproblematic because it simply expressed 
the concern local people felt about the Spur. These are the main results from this analysis and 
suggest that the primary criteria (science, consultation/local knowledge) were a central part of 
the process and decision. 
Summary: The Ecological Rationality of Decisions under the RMA 
This question in this section was how rational the interviewees considered the consent 
processes under the RMA to be. This is a different question than that attempted for the 
Montgomery Spur case. Measuring the extent of ecological reason of a decision or process is 
more difficult than assessing the forms of ecological reason found in a decision or process. 
Both of these questions are summarised here. 
First, the Bromley analysis suggested that because the 'right' science had won in the end, this 
was a rational process. The process was rational, but it consisted of more than just 
consultation. It involved normative and technical deliberation by the Working Party. The 
implicit criterion being expressed here is the central importance of good science and 
appropriate consultation where deliberation and learning can take place. This suggests either 
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Technocentric Ecology or Discursive Ecology (A) or (P) as the most likely expressions of 
ecological reason. I am ambivalent on which of these is primary because of the strong focus 
on science in the hearing/decision, but also the highly deliberative Working Party process. 
The process suggests Discursive Ecology as the most accurate expression while the outcome 
suggests Technocentric Ecology. 
Second, the Consent Industry expressed a noticeable preference for Technocentric Ecology, 
primarily to ensure the provision of quality information for decision makers. It was very 
supportive of a role for the community, especially in local knowledge and clarification of 
social values, but this must only supplement quality scientific decision making and not 
override it through populist democracy (my term). 
Third, both Bromley and Montgomery Spur were analysed to see the extent to which the 
criteria for ecological reason were expressed in their respective cases. Bromley was weak on 
science and research, although this weakness referred to the alternative consent application 
the Council put in and is in contrast to the actual decision by the Consent Authority which 
relied on some new scientific information presented at the hearing. The community's role was 
viewed positively, reflecting the results in the previous paragraph. The criteria were partly 
met, with the main weakness being the lack of quality scientific data and the rejection by the 
Council of the results of the intensive deliberative process of the working party. While the end 
decision was considered rational, the process outcome was less rational than it could have 
been. Montgomery Spur reflected a very positive role for experts (soft science) and 
community consultation. The role of expertise appeared dominant and it met all essential 
criteria for a rational environmental decision. 
4: Hindrances to Ecological Reason in Theory and Practice: Some 
Reflections 
So far I have provided a picture of the forms of ecological reason employed in the case 
studies, analysed the criteria produced by the interviewees and assessed the cases to see how 
ecologically rational they were. There are a number of other questions to explore. First, what 
is the relationship between the criteria for ecological reason and the forms of rationality 
produced by the theory? Second, given the importance of science and research to ecological 
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reason, and the concern expressed about the adversarial process, I address the question of the 
neutrality of science. Is science for hire? Is ecological-reason undermined by those with 
resources buying the answers they want? Third, given the ambivalence in the data about 
consultation, I examine whether public consultation helps the RMA produce Ecologically 
Rational Decisions. Fourth, what are the weaknesses of the consents process? To what extent 
do these undermine ecological reason? The interviewees made a range of suggestions about 
how to improve the consent process and I analyse these next. Finally, the question of the 
extent to which attitudes about the RMA are related to its effectiveness is examined. 
The relationship between the Criteria and the Forms of Ecological Reason 
The relationship between the theoretical framework and the criteria for ecological reason 
derived from the interviews raises an important question. What, exactly, does each express, 
and in what ways are they related? 
First, the theoretical framework specifies the forms that ecological reason could potentially 
take. Ecological reason in general terms refers to the development of perspectives that began 
to theorise the role of the natural environment in human endeavours. In other words, the 
'environment' emerged in Western thinking in the middle oflast century as a serious issue. 
The forms of ecological reason developed in this thesis are derived from two dimensions, 
values and action. Both of these are important notions in environmental literature which seeks 
to analyse the relationship of humans and the environment and assess the health of this 
relationship. The overall aim, it could be said, is to improve this relationship. However, this is 
where any agreement ends. The picture is therefore of multiple analyses and 
recommendations as to how to achieve this. I attempted to provide a broad overview of the 
major polarities within this discussion and from this developed a typology of the possible 
forms of ecological reason. Given that there is no single or agreed perspective on what makes 
a decision ecologically rational, we are left with this range of possibilities. Understanding the 
formls of ecological reason employed in a particular decision or process sheds light on the 
assumptions employed. 
The second source of understanding is the criteria for ecologically rational decision making 
derived from the interviewees. These provide insight into (a) the elements considered 
necessary in good environmental decision making and (b) the expectations of practitioners as 
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to what a rational decision consists of. It would be expected that these views more narrowly 
reflect the dominant assumptions of society rather than the wider intellectual investigations 
that academics have the freedom to engage in. These criteria can be usefully assessed in terms 
of the forms of ecological reason provided by the theory. So we have two questions. First, 
how do the criteria relate to the forms of ecological reason? Second, what forms of ecological 
reason do these criteria express? 
(1) The relationship between the criteria andforms of ecological reason 
The criteria for ecologically rational decision making are each placed in a category where 
they could potentially fit in order to assess any pattern. 
a) The central role for science (SCIENCE): This fits in the Technocratic-Instrumental 
spectrum because it is fundamentally a technical, not a discursive activity. 
b) Good information/avoiding emotion (RATIONAL): This fits into either the 
Technocratic-Instrumental or the Communicative spectrum. Emotions play little part 
in scientific or technical analysis, and are not a formal part ofHabermas's force of the 
better argument theory. They could potentially be part of a dialogic approach where 
alternative forms of communication are embraced. 
c) The use of an environmental assessment framework (EA): This is a technical, not 
discursive function. 
d) The role of the consultation (CON): This aspect is not technical but discursive and 
therefore fits best in one ofthe Discursive Ecology positions. 
e) Local and traditional knowledge (LIT): This knowledge can be both 
technicaVempirical as well as normative. Therefore it fits in with both Technocratic-
Instrumental and Communicative reason. 
t) The role of values (VALUES): Values are the concern of both Communicative and 
Dialogical Reason. However, to be expressed in terms of Dialogical Reason they must 
be ecocentric in value orientation. Given the fact that almost all social values 
expressed were anthropocentric or preservationist, and virtually none in terms of 
ecocentrism in these studies, I have not included it in under Eco-social Ecology. 
g) The role ofleadership and political will (LEAD): This does not fit into any of these 
particular categories. As explained earlier, leadership represents a functional 
requirement for effective decision making rather than defining the nature of that 
decision making. Therefore I ignore it in respect of this analysis. 
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h) Ri sk and fl exibility (RISK): While there is a discursive side to risk assessment 
involving valuation, ri sk assessment is mostly a technical process. 
i) The importance ofsystem design (DESIGN): Likewise, design is a teclmical 
assessment process. 
The results of this assessment are summarised in Figure 7.7. 
Fig ure 7.7: Where the criteria for ecologically rational decision makingjit into the forms of 
ecological reason 
x 
Discursive Ecology 
RATIONAL 
CON 
VALUES 
ur 
Technocentric Ecology 
SCIENCE 
RATIONAL 
EA 
ur 
RJSK 
DESIGN 
x 
CON 
VALUES 
ur 
Technocentric Ecology (P) 
SCIENCE 
RATIONAL 
EA 
ur 
DESIGN 
Eco-social Ecology 
RATIONAL 
CON 
ur 
VALUES 
x 
First, an important interpretive note: Discursive Ecology is compatible with technical-
instrumental reason. The criterion of 'science' tends to fit best into the Technocentric Ecology 
posi tion, but thi s does not imply that the inclusion of science eliminates a decision from being 
best characterised as Discursive Ecology. Where decision making minimises Communicative 
Reason and emphases Technical-Instrumental Reason, then it can be said to express 
Technocentric Ecology. On the other hand, where both Communicative Reason and 
Technical-Instrumental Reason (including science) are emphasised, then I would interpret this 
as Discursive Ecology because Discursive Ecology still requires technical means to fulfil the 
collective norms it establishes. In other words, there is a hierarchy at work. Strong science 
without Communicative Reason is expressed as Technocentric Ecology, whereas both 
together are classi fi ed as Discursive Ecology. 
Returning to thi s analysis, and with one notable exception, it appears the criteria for 
ecological reason are broad enough to apply to any of the [onTIs of ecological reason. What is 
excluded is Eco-social Ecology. While Eco-social Ecology may be a radical position, the 
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almost (though not quite) complete absence of the critical aspects of this form of ecological 
reason is instructive. Eco-social Ecology requires the convergenceofecocentric values and 
dialogic reason. Ecocentrism can accommodate the criteria above, but the critical determinant 
is the absence of dialogical reason. In other words, they may be considered necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for ecological rationality. Thus, the absence of dialogical reason suggests 
that there is very little knowledge or interest in the idea that the non-human world ought to be, 
or even could be, included in dialogue. Bromley was a potential site for such a discourse, 
given the strong ecological values, but this did not eventuate. While there was some 
discussion of ecocentrism in the Consent Industry, this was a minority position and was cast 
in terms of human responsibilities rather than communicative rights for non-human species. 
Such issues were not raised and unlikely to be raised in Montgomery Spur due to the nature of 
the issues. The conclusion is that Eco-social Ecology is yet far from an imminent arrival in the 
practice of ecological reason. 
Why? There are undoubtedly many reasons for why this is the case and I can only offer some 
tentative suggestions here. Ecological reason is itself a relative newcomer on the public and 
political agenda, representing arguably the most recent major social concern. The fact that 
sustainability is being taken seriously on the political agenda is evidence for this. But it 
arrived into an intellectual and political environment still dominated by technocentrism and, if 
no longer an unconditional belief in objectivity, then at least significant respect for the relative 
objectivity of science. Coupled with the cultural dominance of anthropocentrism, the 
intellectual and ethical space for Eco-social Ecology is rather narrow. While intellectual and 
ethical changes are taking place, there is little evidence from my data here that Eco-social 
Ecology is about to crack the anthropocentric paradigm any time soon. 
In conclusion, the criteria prove useful in that they are, for the large part, relevant to the forms 
of ecological reason developed in the theory. In addition, they reflect the dominant forms of 
ecological reason found in the case studies, thus strengthening these earlier findings. 
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Is Science for Hire? 
The data have shown that science lJ (and the quality information it provides) is considered a 
fundamental part of rational environmental decision making. The question for consideration 
here concerns the extent to which science is a neutral servant of the truth14. The role of 
experts has come under scrutiny because of the concern that, as one interviewee put it, the 
RMA "is essentially a device for granting consents to people with the longest pockets, 
because they are able to tie up a large proportion of the .. .liars" (Interviewee, Clb). In a 
statistical analysis of the role of expertise in the Environment Court, Su (2000) argues that 
"[I]ndividuals and public interest groups have a much greater chance of convincing the court 
of their argument and consequently winning if they have experts presenting evidence ... the 
likelihood of losing is far greater for the party with fewer experts" (p.4S). Coupled with this is 
the concern that very few resource consent applications fail (FIc), leading some to the 
conclusion that the RMA process is fundamentally flawed because it is biased towards 
resource rich interests. 
I address only one part of this issue, the implication that if those with money can get the 
results they want, largely speaking, and expertise is essential to this process, then these 
experts are nothing more than hired guns, and science becomes less than objective. Another 
argument suggests that, because experts rely on their clients for their livelihood, there is a 
perverse incentive to come up with data or interpretations that support the client's goals. At a 
superficial reading this appears to be supported by Su's (2000) research findings 15 . Therefore, 
I pose the question: "Is science under the RMA for hire?" 
In a trivial sense the answer is obviously yes, in the sense that scientific experts can be paid to 
perform a scientific function (research, analysis, present evidence and so forth). But the 
deeper question remains; to what extent can scientific research be 'bent' to fit the 
requirements of the client? 
13 I use science here in a broad sense, as code referring to the rational production of knowledge by socially 
approved means, subject to critique by other experts. The term is epistemic in the way I employ it. 
I This is not a philosophical question on the neutrality of science but an empirical question about the influence 
of experts. 
IS Su's research was on the Environment Court, not the pre-Court consent process. But it is the effect of experts 
that I am interested in, and I suggest Su's research has similar implications for consent hearings. 
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There was quite a strong consensus in the Consent Industry study that experts (consultants) 
act professionally in terms of the information and research data they provide. So why do most 
consent applications succeed?16 A number of interviewees argued that the ability to hire 
experts means that a thorough assessment of the effects of an application can be made. If the 
consultants do not consider the application to meet the requirements of the Act, they suggest 
changes (more research, alter the application). To quote one interviewee, the 'richest guy' will 
get the consent not by "grinding everyone to the dust, [but] because you can get a full and 
proper understanding of what the effects will do and therefore discover what the appropriate 
mitigation methods are and you need resources to do that. .. and have the commitment to find 
those solutions". The reason most consents do not fail, on this argument, is that substandard 
applications are weeded out before they get presented. 
This argument is predicated on the professionalism of consultants. To what extent can 
consultants risk bending the data to suit the client's wishes? The data suggests that most 
consultants believe that professional integrity is essential to their role, especially in a small 
nation like New Zealand. Reputation is everything. One local government interviewee made it 
very clear that when a consent application comes in from a trusted consultant, less time is 
spent checking the details because the consent officers know from experience the data 
presented are reliable17 . The converse is also true. In a small professional community, losing 
one's reputation means losing business, and especially the quality work that goes to 
companies with high standards and reputations. 
An alternative argument is that consultants are paid by clients, and this creates pressure to 
give the client what they want, even ifit means manipulating data or some other unethical 
practice. My data suggests this interpretation is unlikely (although not impossible of course). 
For most interviewees, it was not only the client-consultant relationship that mattered. First, 
most interviewees were members of a profession which has a code of conduct and normative 
expectations about the role of their members. Second, most belonged to consultancies which 
had established clear environmental principles and aims to which they were committed. Third, 
16 The fact that both applications studied here (only one was a consent application, the other a zoning change 
application) actually failed is incidental to the overall reality that most do not. I did not choose these cases 
because the applicants failed to get the consents they were after, but on other grounds (see Appendix). 
17 One interviewee related to me an occasion when he was to present evidence at a consent hearing. The morning 
of the hearing he was checking the report he had prepared, but which the client had printed, only to discover that 
the client had changed some data unbeknownst to the expert. He told the client that he would not present that 
data until it was reprinted. It was, immediately. The consultant has refused any more work with that client. 
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these consultancies had national and sometimes international reputations to protect. 
Substandard work, which might well be exposed in the rigour of cross-examination in the 
Court, would undermine this. Most experts interviewed saw their role as assisting clients to 
avoid adversely affecting the environment, while at the same time seeking to enable their 
development to succeed, which was also how most ofthem interpreted the aim of the Act. 
Some interviewees even vet clients to ensure that they are ethically comfortable with the 
application proposal. 
It may be objected that all this is simply the self-justification of those with interests in 
maintaining the illusion of neutrality. After all, my conclusions are only based on what the 
interviewees told me. I suggest this criticism is overstated, for three reasons. First, I spent 
considerable time (nearly two hours in one case) discussing these and related issues with the 
interviewees, and gained the very clear impression of a group of professionals committed to 
improving environmental quality and producing quality data and analysis. I consider it 
implausible to suggest that, in all of these discussions where I probed and pushed over these 
issues, the interviewees were strategically acting in a deceptive fashion. I have no reason to 
suggest a position of distrust is justified. Second, I interviewed a range of other professionals 
who dealt with consultants on a regular basis, and their assessment was of a committed group 
of professionals (generally speaking; there are deviants in every social group, of course). 
Third, the argument that experts can simply twist the data to meet the client's needs is 
implausible. I examine this more below, but suggest that there are very real constraints on the 
extent that experts can do this. For example, to lose the trust of judges and commissioners is 
to lose professional credibility and, ultimately, work. These sociological factors I suggest go 
someway to undermining the argument that science is simply for hire under the RMA. 
However professional experts might be, they are limited by the adversarial system under 
which the consent process works. Technically, experts are witnessesfor the Court and are 
used to clarify matters of fact. In this sense, they are expected to be neutral vis-a-vis the 
outcome of the case and true to the facts 18. But they are paid for by one side and must act 
according to their client's instructions (usually the lawyer leading the application or 
objections). However, the lawyer's role is to obtain the best outcome for the client, not to 
18 I do not assume 'facts' are simple and non-ambiguous. All facts are subject to interpretation, but I refer here to 
the use of well accepted scientific methods to produce the facts, where replication is possible (at least in 
principle) and where generally accepted criteria for analysis are used. 
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determine the adverse effects of the application19. To this end they have a different motive 
from the expert. They therefore may instruct experts as to the scope ofthe evidence they want 
presented. While the expert will speak the truth to the best of their knowledge, it may only be 
that portion of the truth for which they are asked their opinion. Consent Hearings or the Court 
are not inquisitorial processes, they are adversarial processes20. Evidence is tested by the 
opposing parties rather than by the Commissioners or Judges (they may seek clarification, or 
request more information, but this is not the same as an inquisitorial function). As one 
interviewee put it, "it's probably more a case of what you don't say, rather than what you do 
say", and another noted that experts are not instructed to deal with "the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth" (Clb). In this way, experts can be used strategically by legal 
council to present those aspects which are most favourable to their client's case. This is a 
rather different claim than suggesting experts simply construct evidence to suit their client. 
Finally, I asked some interviewees whether or not the fact that experts could be hired to 
oppose an application suggested that the original application was scientifically flawed. In 
other words, if science is a relatively objective and neutral process, how can experts take 
opposing positions? Overall, the interview data suggested that such clear cut scientific 
disagreements were, in fact, quite rare, and therefore not particularly significant. Most 
disagreement came from people speaking outside the sphere of their competence21 . On 
occasions where there were competing scientific frameworks, most believed that 
communication between experts would clear up the vast majority of differences. The small 
number of genuine 'scientific' disagreements, therefore, did not have a significant impact on 
the effectiveness of the Act. There was a more positive side to employing opposing experts as 
it enabled rigorous testing of data and analysis to take place22 . Mistakes do happen, and the 
possibility of alternative interpretations does not always mean one must be right and the 
others wrong. Scientific analysis is more complex than this in most cases. 
19 Although they must ensure the application is rigorous enough to ensure a successful decision at the hearing. 
20 This point was made to me by a former Environment Court Judge in discussion about the processes of the 
Court. 
21 As an aside, the use of the internet for 'research' by lay people to 'prove' some position, for example, that cell 
phone towers were unsafe, or to quote some expert or another, proved commonplace. Yet, as one of my 
interviewees pointed out, they could not demonstrate any actual understanding of the issue beyond their appeal 
to a selected expert, quoted out of context. 
22 One interviewee related an incident where an internationally recognised expert in a particular field was 
brought to New Zealand to present expert evidence on behalf of an applicant. The technical data was complex 
and the opposing parties brought in their own expert who, after detailed analysis, discovered a significant flaw in 
the calculation. The overseas expert returned home to redo the calculations, before returning with the revised 
data (and some embarrassment). This illustrates the positive role of subjecting data and analysis to critical 
scrutiny. 
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Is science for hire? The data here suggest that, for the greatest part, it is not, but the consent 
process does force it through a particular set of obstacles that shape the data and analysis. But 
there is one other area that requires analysis because of its influence in the types of decisions 
that are made. 
The RMA recognises that environmental decisions take place in a social context and therefore 
will be contested. Because ecological reason cannot be reduced simply to a technical 
approach, which would ostensibly remove all social considerations, the Act is designed to 
manage conflict by providing a forum for contesting claims about environmental effects. This 
process has inbuilt biases, because an adversarial system, where opponents present claims and 
seek to undermine the claims of others, advantages those with the capacity to do this well. As 
this thesis has argued, the capacity to present a scientifically based case is one of the 
foundations for ecologically rational decisions. Parties that can marshal such evidence 
through the use of experts stand a very good chance of winning the case (Su, 2000), although 
not through manipulating experts. The capacity to contest claims under the RMA has been 
well argued (Metcalf, 1999; Ross, 1996; Wilson, 1996) and focuses on the role of justice 
(Young, 2001, p.75). The extent that the adversarial approach enables equality of participation 
is questionable. The interview data produced both positive and negative interpretations of this 
participation. 
The consent hearing process is less adversarial than at the Court level. Cross-examination by 
one party of another is not permitted, and evidence therefore is tested only through the 
presentation of one's case and the hope that sufficient clarity is produced to undermine any 
perceived false claims by other parties. Some interviewees expressed frustration that anyone 
could stand up and say what they wished at a hearing without being called to justify their 
claims. The result, then, depends very much on the scientific literacy and analytic ability of 
the hearing panel23 . 
The Environment Court differs fundamentally, because cross-examination is permitted and is 
in fact one of the tools used to 'test' evidence. Experts must defend their evidence under 
considerable pressure at times from the opposing council, and the Court looks very carefully 
to see how they handle the 'heat'. The ability to 'perform' well in such an environment is 
23 This is less problematic when commissioners are used, as in the Bromley case, because relevant professional 
expertise can be called upon. 
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crucial to one's evidence being viewed as reliable. Where Judges and Commissioners have no 
particular expertise in the field of science being presented, they necessarily rely on other 
'cues' as to whether the witness is telling the truth. For this reason, the well resourced have 
the capacity to hire the good performers, thus tilting the balance in their favour. 
The flip side of the adversarial approach is where environmental decision making turns into a 
competition between different interests. In principle, science works by incorporating norms of 
openness and testability (or falsification) of claims. One of the Mertonian24 norms under 
which science functions, states that science needs to be considered as belonging to the whole 
community (what Merton called the norm of 'communalism') where scientists publish and 
share their work, thus improving it through criticism. Although empirical studies of Merton's 
norms have shown life is not quite as straightforward as this (Diesing, 1991, p.160), it does 
suggest that this is how science ought to work. Science can become dysfunctional (Merton 
was a committed functionalist) when these norms are betrayed. The interview data show 
concern that this adversarial system works against data sharing: 
"Each side, thinking they are not going to get a fair deal. .. have built strategies to treat the 
system as a war. ... So, in your war you want to ... only let out as much as necessary and do it the 
minimum way while pocketing away anyone who might hurt you" (Interviewee, E2a). 
In terms of quality science, it is questionable whether this strategy produces the best 
decisions, because the fundamental rationality at work is strategic. The goal is to win and in 
the process information is marshalled in support of one's own position. In such a process, 
information quality is less important than the strategic utility of information. Therefore the 
capacity to muster the adequate resources is an essential part of who wins. If science is 
essential to rational decision making, as the data suggest, this competitive system does not 
bode well for ecological reason. 
But, and this is an important but, the above analysis takes place in the abstract. There is a 
range of countervailing pressures that mitigate this scenario. First, experts (at least those in 
my data set) appeared committed to professional values and environmental quality. Second, 
the requirements of the RMA are still the biggest determinant of a decision. Third, such 
fundamental conflicts may not be very common. Therefore, science might not be as 
vulnerable as the analysis above suggested. But all this is to speak in generalisations. For 
instance, in cases of high public interest, such as the aborted Project Aqua consent 
24 Referring to the work of sociologist Robert Merton; see Diesing (1991, pp.149-180) for a critical treatment. 
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application, social and scientific conflict was the dominant public face of this issue. Therefore 
we must be careful when generalising, recognising that in each conflict,a particular set of 
circumstances is at work. 
Ecological reason is compromised under the RMA because of competing tension between 
social conflict over the use of resources, and the potential for scientific resources to be used 
strategically. Ecological reason needs the 'best' science. If ecological problems could be 
conceived of as simple technical processes to be decided by experts, then the RMA process 
could produce consistently rational decisions with a few modifications (the use of expert 
commissioners rather than untrained lay people, for instance). Yet social conflict over 
resource use, a fundamental assumption behind the participatory dimensions of the Act, 
means that quality information is not assured, primarily due to strategic behaviour and the 
difficulty in ensuring quality opposition in consent hearings. 
This suggests two competing strategies for ensuring ecologically rational decisions are based 
on the science criterion. First, strengthen the adversarial process to ensure greater equality of 
checks and balances. Stronger opposition (primarily through ensuring equality of resources) 
and/or greater expertise on hearings panels would ensure greater robustness of scientific 
information. The weakness of this first approach is the probability that scientific information 
would be duplicated by competing sides, greatly increasing the costs of obtaining a consent. 
Alternatively, the adversarial approach could be altered by developing a more cooperative 
assessment of effects25 . This would require, at a minimum, the establishment of a set of 
technical requirements or standards for environmental quality, thus removing significant 
social conflict from the decision making. 
This might deal with the issue at the consent level, but does nothing to solve the higher 
strategic level, which was in part what the public consultation criterion was about. This brings 
me to another critical question for analysis: How does the role of public consultation fit into 
ecologically rational decision making? 
25 This issue is also addressed later in this chapter under the heading of Attitudes and Effectiveness of the RMA. 
-
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Does Public Consultation help the RMA produce Ecologically Rational Decisions? 
The participatory nature of the RMA enables anyone with an interest to have input into 
decisions. Yet this is not viewed as simply a case of democracy where weight of public 
opinion wins the argument. The RMA is set up as a 'rational' means of determining when an 
activity constitutes an adverse effect. As has already been argued, this produces a set of 
contradictory impulses that are not resolved and only function in an uneasy tension. On one 
hand, public consultation was welcomed by most interviewees, and on the other it was viewed 
as complicating decision making, adding to the cost but not always the quality of decisions. 
On the positive side of the ledger are the contributions oflocal knowledge derived from an 
open decision process and the clarification of social values and preferences26• These were 
outcomes of the Bromley Working Party, a successful process in the view of most 
participants, producing a deliberative open process that generated a clear (although not 
unanimous) proposal. The contributions of the community more generally helped clarify 
social preferences and, more importantly to the final outcome, provided significant local 
knowledge that was missing in the scientific record. Similar contributions were made in the 
Montgomery Spur case where the clarity of public opinion confirmed the unified view of 
experts. Consultation was useful in educating the public about resource management and 
ecological matters. There are pragmatic reasons to involve the public beyond epistemic 
contributions and value clarification, for example, generating political support as well as 
fulfilling the legal requirements of the Act and the social expectations of the public that 
consultation will take place. 
On the other side of the ledger are concerns about time and costs of consultation and whether 
consultation adds to the ecological quality of decisions. If science, not popular opinion, ought 
to drive environmental decisions, then only selective consultation will advance this. In other 
words, only where non-experts can contribute specific local knowledge or help clarify value 
choices should consultation take place. Beyond this it adds to the costs ofthe process without 
adding to the quality of decisions. The Bromley Working Party was an example of such 
specific consultation. While it represented a wide range of interests, it nevertheless facilitated 
the aims of consultation specified above: it produced local knowledge, clarified social 
26 I do not include political support here although that is a pragmatic requirement. 
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preferences and facilitated group learning. If traditional knowledge is added to this mix, it 
greatly compounds this tension because traditional knowledge does not simply make 
empirical observation. It does so in a philosophical and normative environment that can be 
quite at odds with the dominant practices27• 
This tension is inevitable. The data here show that while there can be practical 
accommodation of science and public participation, the boundaries between them are not, and 
can never be, clearly delineated; there will always be ambiguity between the two. Some 
science may be clear and unambiguous and some social values may be easily identifiable but 
the incursion of social preferences into scientific space and vice versa (see Nowotny et al., 
2001) is inevitable. The subtly stated desired for the rule of scientific reasoning by some 
interviewees cannot occur because of the necessary role values play in ecological reason. 
The bigger question was stated at the start of this section: "Does public consultation help the 
RMA produce ecologically rational decisions?" The answer to this depends of the form of 
ecological reason being employed. Technocentric Ecology could function without 
consultation beyond a small group of experts, but even here local knowledge is essential. For 
Technocentric decision making to eliminate the need for public consultation would require 
values clarification to have taken place at some prior level and time. Yet, given the dynamic 
nature of ecosystems, it is inevitable that normative issues would arise. Discursive Ecology is 
predicated on community deliberation driving decision making, although ideally only by 
setting the normative framework that technical decisions are then made within. Thus, public 
consultation is deemed essential to ecologically rational decisions. Eco-social Ecology takes 
public involvement as axiomatic and extends this to non-humans and alternative values 
systems. 
Conflicts over the role of participation then are linked to visions of ecological reason. The 
RMA, in this analysis, sits within a conflicted position somewhere between Technocentric 
and Discursive Ecologies, being unable to fully embrace either position. This is what the 
analysis of the forms of ecological reason in the case studies demonstrates. Therefore, the 
result is a compromised and contested political process, but one I argue that is unavoidable, 
27 It is not just traditional knowledge that does this; all knowledge is crafted within a particular philosophical and 
nonnative environment. Traditional knowledge, however, is usually at odds with the dominant framework under 
which environmental planning takes place, which is the reason the Maori interviewees stressed this point. 
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given the social milieu and the commitment of the Act to scientific reasoning and strong 
public involvement. 
Making the Consents Process more Ecologically Rational 
What could make the consents process more ecologically rational and what does this teach us 
about ecological reason? Interviewees who answered this question proposed three broad 
issues: (1) the need for strategic direction through the use of Regional Plans, (2) the costs of 
lengthy consent hearings and the problems of inefficient process because of the current rules 
of standing, and (3) the capacities and skills of Consent Authorities and the Environment 
Court. I examine the link between ecological reason and each issue. 
Strategic planning gives decision makers clarity in both technical and normative matters. Lack 
of such strategic guidance forces consent decisions to address these issues, but without clear 
guidance. This ambiguity opens up greater opportunity for conflict, provides less certainty for 
the competing parties and more motivation to act strategically. As discussed above, this 
undermines ecological reason by inhibiting the flow of quality information. In essence, the 
tension between science and public involvement discussed above is exacerbated by a lack of 
strategic planning. On the other hand, high level policy must remain sensitive to context, 
something a number of interviewees were concerned about. Too much prescription will 
produce irrational decision making in situations where ecological context is significant. 
Again, the tension between scientific context and social preferences is acute. 
The second issue is perhaps more of a practical problem, but it does reflect the open 
participation process and the contestable approach of the RMA. People are permitted to have 
their say, but the lack of limits on who is permitted to participate means the process can 
become lengthy and costly without necessarily improving the 'ecological' outcomes. While 
some limits may be able to be put on the scope of participation, this clashes with the more 
discursive forms of ecological reason. Any boundary drawn in respect of levels of 
participation will offend one version or another of ecological reason. 
Finally, the capacities and skills of Consent Authorities and the Environment Court were also 
considered problematic. Training local body politicians and others involved in consent 
hearing decision making would boost the technical understanding of the Act as well, 
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increasing the capacity of decision makers to recognise quality evidence and deal better with 
public input. 
The Resource Management and Electricity Legislation Amendment Bill (2004) currently 
before Parliament (January, 2005) addresses a number of these concerns. It has yet to 
complete the select committee process, and there is no certainty that all of the Bill's 
provisions (or the Bill itself) will survive this process. Nevertheless, it is worth noting some 
of the Bill's key provisions, because they potentially affect some of the issues raised in this 
thesis. In his speech during the first reading (Benson-Pope, 2004), the Associate Minister for 
the Environment states that the purpose of the Bill is to "increase certainty, reduce delays and 
costs, and ensure consistency of processes". The intent appears to be to create greater 
certainty of process, although not of outcome. 
These aims are summed up in two of the stated public policy objectives of the Bill: 
• Enable central government to better express the national interest so as to provide 
decision makers with clear guidance on how to take these matters into account; 
• Enable approval processes to be undertaken in a manner that is effective and efficient, 
and that provides certainty of process for applicants while ensuring appropriate public 
participation and the meeting of environmental objectives. 
The Bill proposes to strengthen both national policy statements as well as giving greater 
strategic importance to regional policy statements. One of the ways it proposes to achieve this 
is through increased 'call-in' powers for the Minister. It also seeks to increase the capacity of 
hearings panels by ensuring a majority of members are 'accredited' for hearing resource 
consent applications. In addition, it seeks to improve the 'inquisitorial' powers of hearings 
panels. At the other 'end' of the decision making spectrum, there are some provisions to 
ensure local participation in plans and consents. 
Much effort has gone into ensuring quality decisions are produced, with most of the focus on 
strengthening the technical capacity of local authorities and decision makers. Increased 
central government input into plan development and national guidelines, more specialist 
training for decision makers and increasing the inquisitorial ability of hearing panels, suggests 
a more techno centric approach to the consent process. There is no obligation for councils to 
consult on consent applications, other than notifying affected parties of the application. This 
suggests a narrowing of the participation focus. 
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On the other hand, there is more emphasis on pre-hearing meetings, with some proposed 
sanctions to ensure attendance. The aim of a pre-hearing meeting is to establish an agreed list 
of issues and to determine and agree upon the evidence that is required for the hearing. While 
participation appears more restricted in this Bill, it is also more focused, and thus potentially 
more effective. Pre-hearing meetings could also be more discursive than they are currently, 
and may produce a culture shift around conflict over consents. Some of my interviewees 
suggested that many consent applicants expectto go to the Environment Court, and therefore 
do not take pre-hearing meetings seriously. This proposed amendment, therefore, has much to 
recommend it from the perspective of Discursive Ecology. 
However, the tension between Technocentric and Discursive Ecologies that have been 
developed in this thesis, are discemable in this Bill. It is, of course, too early to anticipate the 
outcome, and the critical factors will be in the detail, especially the procedures and processes 
the final Act contains. Nevertheless, the Bill will most likely be expressed more strongly in 
either Technocentric or Discursive forms of ecological reason. 
Attitudes and the Efficacy of the RMA 
In his review of the efficacy of the RMA, journalist David Young (2001) argues that the 
dream of sustainable management embraced by all New Zealanders has yet to happen. He 
asks whether attitudes have changed (pp.51-56) and presents a mostly, although not entirely 
pessimistic answer. He suggests the sector to have most clearly embraced the philosophy of 
environmental sustainability is industry, especially "big corporates, who do their homework 
and are largely comfortable with the legislation" (p.53). For many others, the RMA is still 
viewed as an obstacle to get around, or remove. A number of large organisations have joined 
a campaign against the RMA, most notably the New Zealand Business Roundtable (Kerr, 
2002) but also Federated Farmers, the New Zealand Tourist Board and the Manufacturers' 
Federation (Young, 2001, p.55). Young links the struggles ten years on with the RMA to a 
number of things, but principally the implementation of the Act. He concludes by arguing: 
"In the end, it will be the harnessing of good science and visionary leadership together that will 
also assist in developing the climate of opinion that gets New Zealanders behind the RMA .... It 
is winning people over to the idea that the environment, for reasons at least as much to do with 
the future of humanity as the future of the environment, needs to have full standing when 
environmental decisions are made. That shift in thinking, away from the traditional blind justice 
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and its balancing scales, towards an unwavering inclusion of the environmental factor in 
decision-making, is a big one. We have not got there yet" (p.88) 
This view, with clear ecocentric overtones, suggests New Zealanders' attitudes need serious 
reVIew. 
There are some important links between Young's analysis and the data in this thesis. One 
interviewee articulated this point carefully: 
"There has to be a mind shift about the type of system we have which is not antagonistic ... a co-
operative one that ensures all these guiding lines and principles and rules and stuff ... are worked 
through, not 'I'm taking the opposite view and your taking that view, lets go [ and see] who is 
going win'. It's not about that, ... and that's where the mind shift has to be" 
The core of this argument, as I read it, is concerned with the competitive milieu within which 
the Act functions. The RMA has facilitated this to some degree because of the tension I have 
discussed on a number of occasions. A participatory system where consultation is the norm, 
coupled with a strong reliance on science to determine adverse effects, and little guidance 
from Central Government or Regional Authorities in terms of Regional Plans, created a 
relative vacuum which attracted conflict. Resource Management is political in that it is about 
who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1958). In addition, ecological reason does not come 
in a tightly defined package, but rather is a contestable site. If there is conflict over ecological 
systems, which are grounded in the biophysical (and relatively 'objective' world), then 
putting private property rights, commercial, social and spiritual agenda into the mix would 
create conflict. The RMA, therefore, is a site to contest competing claims involving economic 
motives, social preferences and scientific and ecological values. All this takes place in a 
milieu in which there is not yet a unified commitment to the principles of the Act. 
A change of attitude is required to undermine these competitive dimensions. Competition 
does not assist ecologically rational decision making because it works against the production 
of quality information and blurs the normative deliberations that, as Habermas reminds us, 
require an 'ideal speech situation' (Habermas, 1976, p.1 08; see Chapter Two). Two things 
would assist this, without greatly affecting any of the forms of ecological reason. First, shift 
the majority of normative deliberation to a higher level of Plans, National Policy Statements 
and National Standards. Politically this is a difficult and costly task (Young, 1991, pp.88-89), 
but it would remove many of the most contentious normative debates from the consents 
process. Normative deliberation can then take place in a closer approximation to the 
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discursive ideal ofHabermas28 without having to deal simultaneously with technical and 
scientific detail. There would still be normative issues in many decisions, given the contexts 
and dynamics of ecological systems (Dryzek, 1987), but the rules of the game would be 
clearer, potentially reducing strategic behaviour, enabling more open and thereby improved 
analysis of data. 
The second change is an increased inquisitorial role for consents hearing panels. Relying on 
an adversarial process to deliver quality information is problematic when dealing with 
unequal resources between parties. One interviewee suggested the use of pre-application 
mediation for significant projects where the main parties or interests would agree on 
methodology and standards for scientific research and interpretative frameworks for data in 
order to remove some of the conflict later in the process. Agreement over these allows a more 
rational or objective environmental assessment process to occur. Inquisitorial processes are 
reliant on skilled decision makers, but allow for more probing and searching for the 'truth' 
than simply relying on the capacity of the various parties to ensure the data and arguments are 
robust and reliable. Although Consent Authorities can call for more information (RMA, S92), 
the process does rely largely on submissions to test the evidence, particularly in more 
complex applications. Increasing the inquisitorial powers of hearings panels would improve 
the quality of information that many interviewees considered was lacking. 
It could be argued that these suggestions are biased towards Technocentric Ecology with its 
instrumentalism, technocracy and objectivism, falling into the trap of disembodied reason 
criticised so severely by Plumwood (2002). This criticism would be valid if normative 
deliberation was sidelined or minimised in this process. But that is not what is being 
proposed. All that is being questioned is the most appropriate location for normative 
deliberation, not its elimination in favour of a Technocentric decision process. The RMA is 
predicated on local decision making as much as is possible; communities are empowered to 
come to their own decisions. Yet, the highly contested process of developing City and District 
Plans and the virtual absence of Regional Plans and national level guidance suggest that what 
was a very noble ideal (local democracy) and was perhaps even philosophically coherent 
28 I consider Habennas' theory only as an 'ideal type' and am not implying that it can be fully achieved in 
practice. Rather, it provides a direction to aim for and will encounter all sorts of difficulties. For more on this, 
see Kerr, (1995, Conclusions). 
261 
Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusions 
(neo-liberalism29), has not produced the culture shift towards sustainability that was expected, 
nor has produced a less conflicted decision process. Because the consent process is strongly 
linked to social outcomes and economic realities, conflict is inevitable. Yet, conflict occurs in 
situations where there is no common acceptance of legitimacy (see Habermas 1998 on this), 
and where there is uncertainty. Because the norms around the RMA are still not deeply or 
widely internalised in the community and there is often lack of clarity (policy guidance), 
unnecessary levels of conflict occur. Altering the forms of participation may help mitigate 
this. 
Towards Further Research 
Before the final conclusions of this thesis, I offer some brief suggestions of profitable avenues 
for future research. 
First, there is an interesting theoretical question of how the quite different perspectives on 
ecological reason ought to be dealt with. While not suggesting there is some unifying 
foundational concept to be found, the competing assumptions make theoretical development 
problematic, unless one keeps to one or another of the perspectives. I touch on this only 
briefly in the conclusion. 
Second, how can the twin roles of science and participation be better handled in practice? 
This issue provides both theoretical and empirical opportunities for fruitful investigation. At 
the theoretical level, the different epistemologies behind science and discourse require 
analysis. This might help clarify the theoretical question of their relationship. Empirical 
investigations could fruitfully investigate how these two dynamics are managed in practice. 
Third, this thesis suggests, implicitly, that there are limits to participation, beyond which the 
payoff in terms of decision quality becomes too costly. How much participation is required? 
Where are these limits? Are there any useful rules that could guide decision makers? Again, 
this has both theoretical and empirical possibilities. In particular, the results of such a study 
would be of considerable interest to decision makers. 
29 I am not suggesting that neo-liberalism (Le., a reformulated classical liberalism - see Hayward, 1992; Lamer 
1998) cannot be criticised, but rather that it is internally coherent. If one accepts its postulates, then it tends to 
make sense. 
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Finally, the aims of this thesis could be extended to other case studies and other forms of 
environmental decision making, in order to 'test' the findings here. 
Conclusions 
I posed two hypotheses at the beginning of this thesis. The first was that if the Western world 
has witnessed the development of ecological forms of reasoning, most prominently since the 
1960s, then we could expect to see ecological reason manifested within the most significant 
forms of environmental legislation. The second hypotheses followed logically from the first: 
Because New Zealand is a Western society, and it has a range of significant environmental 
legislation, it is therefore possible to test for the manifestation of ecological reason in New 
Zealand environmental legislation. Both of these hypotheses have been demonstrated in 
Chapters Two and Three, and this, in essence, was what this thesis set out to do; test the 
manifestation of ecological reason in New Zealand environmental management. Specifically, 
it addressed these two questions: 
• "How is ecological rationality constructed in the literature? " 
• "How is ecological reason manifest in the New Zealand Resource Management Act?" 
The broad answers have already been given to these questions. The first was captured in the 
'matrix of ecological reason', while the second is expressed in various ways throughout this 
chapter. There is now a need to draw aU these parts together to form some overall conclusion. 
What does all this mean for environmental problems? What can we learn that might be 
instructive for decision makers? 
There is at least one thing that is certain. There is no single and uncontested form of 
ecological rationality. Rather, there are mUltiple forms of ecological reason. This is perhaps 
more true of the diversity of views in the literature, for it expresses a contested intellectual 
terrain that shows no sign of resolution. Although formerly unchallenged, anthropocentric 
thinking has come under considerable challenge due to the emergence of ecocentrism since 
the late 1960s, and with the growing emphasis on intrinsic rights (as institutionalised in the 
RMA, for example). Nevertheless, it still appears to hold a dominant place within the 
practices of resource management, particularly as it is expressed in terms of ecological 
modernisation. 
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The development of increasingly discursive forms of environmental decision making 
(Eckersley 2004; Dryzek, 1990; 1997) is perhaps the primary institutional innovation that is 
challenging Technocentric Ecology. The influence of this ought not to be minimised, 
particularly in relation to the RMA, as the data from the case studies demonstrates an 
entrenched role for the community. An important role for community participation is also 
found in the Local Government Act, 20023°, and can be interpreted as a discourse that 
exercises significant influence in public affairs. But, as noted on a number of occasions, the 
relationship between Technocentric Ecology and Discursive Ecology is uneasy. A strong role 
for the community can undermine ecologically rational decisions, ifit lowers the quality of 
scientific analysis. On the other hand, a strong role for the community can add to the 
ecological rationality of a decision. Bromley was an example of this, but it was the form of 
participation that was most significant. The discursive basis for deliberation also enabled 
good quality scientific data and analysis to be discussed. This 'closed' process assisted the 
deliberation and helped 'manage' conflict. Without such a tightly defined process, such 
discursive processes can become much more problematic (see Kerr, 1995). Therefore, the 
philosophy of the RMA, which is to rely on science and to have a highly participatory 
process, makes sense, because both are important. But, it is problematic in practice. 
Can this be resolved? There are two dimensions to any resolution here, one theoretical and the 
other practical. Resolution at the theoretical level implies the development of a coherent and 
accepted paradigm (to borrow from Kuhn, 1996). The extent to which these different forms of 
ecological reason will converge, is difficult to predict, but I offer two perspectives. The first 
suggests that such a convergence of the three forms, as they have been identified in this thesis, 
is highly unlikely. The primary reason is that, as the theories are currently postulated, the 
assumptions are incommensurate. This is particularly true of Technocentric Ecology and Eco-
social Ecology. Anthropocentrism divides them, and even if Technocratic Ecology (P) could 
challenge the hard anthropocentrism of Technocentric Ecology, it still could not embrace 
ecocentrism. By definition, Technocentric Ecology is anthropocentric. Both the action and 
value dimension of the theoretical framework are drawn as polarities; one cannot be both 
anthropocentric and ecocentric at the same time, at least in relation to the same issues (it was 
30 Section 3 (Purpose) states: "The purpose of this Act is to provide for democratic and effective local 
government that recognises the diversity of New Zealand communities .... " Among the provisions is the 
requirement to establish a long term community plan (S93) and the Act provides clear guidance on consultation 
(S82; Principles of consultation). 
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noted earlier that people may hold contradictory positions, but this does not to apply to sound 
theory). 
A second perspective suggests that a convergence between Technocentric Ecology and 
Discursive Ecology is more plausible. Empirical evidence for this is suggested in this thesis. 
Both these forms of ecological reason are well represented in the case studies, as well as in 
the criteria for ecologically rational decision making. The emphasis on participation was an 
important dimension of the ecocentric perspective that emerged in the late 1960s, yet it 
appears that only this part of the ecocentric project has gained widespread acceptance. 
Although ecocentrism, as a whole project, is failing to capture the political agenda, the 
participatory dimensions of it have actually done so, at least to the extent that the role of 
public participation has been granted formal recognition. But the problematic area is how to 
theoretically link the role of empirical, objective, ecological sciences with wide-spread 
participation. The analytic separation of social norms and preferences from scientifically 
produced facts is difficult, and at times impossible, to achieve. As discussed earlier, norms 
and facts are often tangled, and their boundaries murky. 
Any convergence between Technocentric and Discursive Ecologies cannot be a simple 
addition of the two. Technocentric Ecology conceptualises environmental problems 
positivistically and instrumentally, where environmental problems are understood through the 
application of scientific research techniques and are seen as being best resolved through the 
application of technology and policy that is informed by scientific research. Therefore, 
Technocentric Ecology would have to modify the 'centrist' dimension of its motive. In other 
words, technology is essential, but not the positivistic version. Ecological reason cannot be 
simply the product of science and the application of technique; there were no empirical data 
suggesting Technocentric Ecology was sufficient as a description of ecological reason. Thus, 
convergence would take a technological/discursive form, without one dominating the other, 
and each functioning in its own sphere. Participation must not override the scientific 'facts of 
the case' and science and technology must be harnessed to social norms. This may also mean 
that the traditional anthropocentrism of Technocentric Ecology would be able to be 
challenged by preservationist or ecocentric norms. That, at least, is a theoretical perspective. 
The separation of technique from norms may be practically easier than a theoretical 
separation, so long as we do not expect analytically clear or stable boundaries. In other words, 
265 
Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusions 
a pragmatic response may be the most useful. Such a proposal has earlier been suggested; all 
key actors (or their representatives) meet before a consent application is made, in order to 
establish the scientific methods and analytic framework to be used. This is, essentially, a 
normative agreement before the empirical work takes place. The other example is the 
Bromley Working Party, which was a successful deliberative process that satisfied the 
discursive dimensions of ecological reason, without sacrificing the scientific dimensions. As a 
number of theorists have argued (Dryzek, 1990; Eckersley, 2004), innovative discursive 
processes may be the way forward in a post-technocratic (though not post-technologicae1) 
society, but they will also need to learn how to be scientifically literate, and learn how to 
incorporate the production of guiding norms into the overall process. 
The evolution of participatory forms is, in my view, likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future. Even if some major ecological catastrophe does occur, and governments are forced to 
exercise strong control over the events that follow, such as occurred during the two World 
Wars, it is unlikely that the continuing institutionalisation of the right for community 
participation, or the concomitant social expectations for involvement, will be easily set 
aside32. The pressure on this 'uneasy' relationship will come from both sides though, not just 
from the demands for participation. The growth of commercial and corporate science (see 
Beder, 2000, for a critical perspective; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2001, for a more 
sympathetic treatment) creates new challenges for managing science. Science and technology 
produce new, and oftentimes unanticipated, issues and opportunities for which public 
understanding lags behind. The pressure to develop new technologies risks outstripping the 
social capacity to produce sound and effective deliberative judgements on these technologies. 
The hotly contested and divisive debate in New Zealand over genetically modified foods is 
merely one example (Hindmarsh, 2002). Developing the processes for managing this tension 
between social norms (or the lack of them), and the ever increasing possibilities for 
technological intervention in social life, is therefore urgent. Although resource consent 
processes do not usually deal with these cutting-edge debates, the issues are fundamentally 
the same. 
31 No human society can be post-technological; human's capacity to survive is founded on cultural learning and 
adaptation and the use of techniques that are not instinctual. 
32 Dryzek (1997, pp.l45-147) notes that the prospects for Democracy are somewhat dependant upon the role 
capitalism plays. The concern is that democracy, under conditions of globalised capital, will be 'shallow' (to use 
Barber's (1984) tenn). However, the degree to which participation is 'authentic' (Dryzek, 1997, p.5) is not the 
issue here, but rather the 'scope' of participatory decision making, which is one ofDryzek's criteria of 
democratisation. 
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Ecological reason needs both science and community participation. Without science, 
ecological problems, which are manifested in biophysical systems, cannot be addressed 
objectively. Without participation, normative guidance cannot be exercised over what is 
otherwise a narrow form of rationalism. When beginning this thesis, I was inspired by 
Dryzek's contribution to the idea of ecological rationality. Although Dryzek cannot be 
considered a techno centrist, the idea of a rational means of managing the environment was 
very attractive. Carefully researched and scientifically validated knowledge about human 
impacts on the environment is essential. However, the idea of ecological 'reason' potentially 
has a darker side, one that was not initially obvious (to me, at least). The early work on 
ecological rationality was functionalist. Drawing on Diesing's (1962) early work on the 
rationality of society, economy, law and politics, the link was made to ecology and ecological 
systems. Bartlett, referring to Diesing, argues that "ecological rationality [is] ... a requisite of 
functional social rationality" (1986, p.235). Mixing the terms, 'ecology' and 'rationality', 
however, may suggest "the existence of a precise, scientific basis for formulating standards of 
human conduct and societal structures, whereas ... [it is] plagued by vagueness, uncertainty 
and inconsistency" (Buhrs, 1991, p.22). Buhrs even considers the term to be 'dangerous'. 
While perhaps an overstatement, the implication of impersonal, scientific analysis 
determining human behaviour is a reference back to Weber's 'iron cage' and the potential 
rationalisation of the life-world that Habermas has written of (see McCarthy,1978, p.22; see 
also Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972). This is where the theories of reason elaborated by both 
Habermas and Plumwood, act as antidotes to rationalisation of ecology. As Plumwood bluntly 
states: 
"We better not try to understand ecological rationality or, as I shall show, any of its main 
supporting concepts, in a rationalistic way that links it to the doctrine of the separateness and 
supremacy in human life ... Ecological rationality brings into question ordinary forms of 
rationality" (2002, p.69). 
This, then, is a warning not to allow ecological issues to be 'rationalised' in the form of 
Technocentric Ecology. Rational ecology, to borrow Dryzek's term, needs to be both 
scientifically robust and socially focused. Only this way will it avoid the trap of rationalism. 
One other significant issue addressed in the thesis concerns whether or not the RMA is 
ecologically rational. By the standards of Eco-social Ecology, it is clearly not. The influence 
of ecocentric thinking has yet to capture widespread public and political interest. Whether this 
can become a majority opinion and effect changes in environmental decisions is still an open 
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question. Yet, only a few decades ago, most people viewed whales as an economic resource to 
be rightfully exploited. For many people today, whales have intrinsic values that override any 
anthropocentric utility (Dryzek, 1997). Such deep seated changes take time, and are not 
impossible. But the data in this thesis does not lend much support to the imminent emergence 
ofEco-social Ecology. 
Judged on the basis of the case studies, the RMA is ecologically rational. Both Technocentric 
and Discursive Ecologies are highly represented in the data, although overall, Technocentric 
Ecology dominates, especially in its anthropocentric mode, while preservationism is 
represented as well. However, if Discursive Ecology is viewed as a more rational expression 
of ecology (this would probably be Dryzek's view), then the RMA struggles to be consistently 
rational. 
The RMA expresses the recent development of ecological reason. Beginning from a strict 
Technocentric view prior to the 1960s, and the emergence of ecocentric forms of reasoning in 
the decades that followed, the principle development was the emergence of Discursive 
Ecology. Coupled with this was the development of less anthropocentric values. The RMA 
expresses all of these, but stops short of moving beyond this to a more thoroughly ecocentric 
view. Even though dialogic forms of communication are highly problematic in practice, 
ecocentrist views could be incorporated into environmental decision making. This is hinted at 
by Young (2001, p.88), when he argues for a "shift in thinking, away from the traditional 
blind justice and its balancing scales, towards an unwavering inclusion of the environmental 
factor in decision-making .... " This more radical step is possible, but requires leadership, as 
some interviewees argued. 
Finally, predictions about the future are always gambles. Espeland (1998) argues that the 
National Environmental Protection Act 1969 reshaped the decision making landscape "in 
ways that neither legislators nor judges nor bureaucrats had expected" (p.90). This is also the 
view of Bess (2003), who argues that the way France has adapted to the environmental 
challenges since the emergence of ecocentric thinking in the late 1960s, was not anticipated. 
Calling it the 'Light-Green Society', he argues that the response by industry to embrace 
ecological modernisation was simply not foreseen as a realistic potential future. Yet, this is 
what Bess claims has occurred. The future shape of ecological management in New Zealand 
is uncertain. 
268 
Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusions 
All I can say for certain is what my data tell me, which is that ecological reason is not an end 
. point, but a continual· struggle between competing visions of rational environmental decision 
making. It is also clear that the relationship between the two dominant forms of ecological 
reason is uneasy, at both the theoretical and practice level. This tension underpins the 
competing visions of the RMA as a scientifically driven process and as a community process. 
This tension does not provide for a secure marriage of these two visions. As for Ecocentrism, 
it is the distant runner in the practice of environmental decision making. It has not (yet) lost 
the battle, but if it is to be the preferred future, as it is for many green scholars, then much 
work needs to be done. 
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APPENDIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This appendix provides details of the methodology used in this thesis and justification for the 
methods chosen. Although the main text contains a significant amount of methodological 
detail, for reasons of continuity, it was not appropriate to include a full discussion. This 
appendix fills in the missing gaps. 
There are two main parts to the research methods in this thesis: the theoretical investigation of 
ecological reason in the literature, and the empirical investigation of ecological reason as it is 
expressed in the RMA. The process by which the theoretical investigation was carried out is 
evident from the arguments in the thesis text, and does not warrant repeating here. Therefore, 
this appendix focuses on the empirical research. 
In the introduction, this thesis poses two research questions: 
"What are the necessary requirements for ecologically rational decision making?" and 
"What forms of ecological reason are being employed in environmental decision making 
under the RMA? " 
Answering these questions requires a research design. Implicit in this design are a number of 
questions that I use to structure the remainder of this appendix. 
(1) How will the 'forms' of rationality be measured? 
(2) What sorts of data would best answer these questions? 
(3) How will the data be gathered? 
(4) How will the data be analysed? 
Each of these questions has another set of questions attached to them. Each main question, 
therefore, is dealt with below. 
How are the 'forms' of ecological rationality measured? 
The 'forms' of ecological rationality are derived from the theoretical analysis in Chapter Two. 
The three primary forms of ecological reason are derived from a wide variety of literature, but 
required some 'analytical referencing'. This 'referencing' task was provided by the two 
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spectrums, detailed in Chapter Two: the action and the value dimensions. These provide a 
reference point for determining where each 'form' sits in the matrix, and also where to locate 
the forms of reason expressed in the case studies. The decision to place a case study in one 
position on the matrix or another is fundamentally a qualitative judgement, as opposed to a 
quantitatively based, objective technique. The only way to avoid such a judgement is to craft 
the research process in quantitative terms, where numerical values are assigned to each 
characteristic. This, then, removes the need to make analytic judgements. This approach could 
work well with the right data, but my thesis questions were fundamentally discursive. That is, 
the data gathered (see below) came from semi-structured interviews, and, methodologically, 
the 'interviews needed to be open. The data were not predetermined, except in a very broad 
sense (I asked a similar set of questions in each interview), and the responses were not 
designed to fit into a quantified framework. 
The Research Data 
There are two main data sources used in this research: interviews and a decision text. 
Interviews are part of a larger methodology of survey research (Singleton, Straits & Straits, 
1993, p.246; Babbie, 1999, p.233-234). Interviews are chosen for this research because of the 
types of data sought. I wanted to know what people believed about environmental decision 
making and the role of the RMA, and the best way was to talk to them. This improves the 
response rate (compared with using mail-out surveys), enables the researcher to follow the 
lead of the interviewee when necessary, and provides an opportunity to note the non-verbal 
responses of the interviewee. This, arguably, provides a richer set of data than other forms of 
surveying (Singleton, et al., 1993, pp.260-261). 
The second set of data came from the Montgomery Spur Hearing Decision text. Gathering this 
data, therefore, was unproblematic; there was a copy in the Lincoln University library. 
Operationalising the Questions 
Research questions need to be operationalised, that is, logically connect the questions to the 
data, so that the data accurately reflect the concept being researched (Babbie, 1999, p.117; 
Singleton, et al., 1993, p.103). The two primary empirical questions were: "What are the 
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necessary requirements for ecologically rational decision making?" and "What forms of 
ecological reason are employed in the cases?" 
Operationalising the first question is straightforward. Asking interviewees what they consider 
to be the necessary requirements for sound decision making, provides the necessary data to 
answer this question. To ensure there was a clear understanding of what I meant, I asked the 
question in various ways, depending on the interviewee. I began by using the term, 'sound 
decision making', or, 'how to get the best environmental decisions'. In most cases, I 
concluded this part of the interview by referring to the term 'ecological rationality', in order 
to see what the term meant or implied to them. 
The second question is more complex. Operationalising this question began by drawing on the 
two dimensions of ecological reason produced in the theory chapter, action and value. 
The action dimension deals with the forms of communication at work, whether instrumental-
technical, communicative or dialogic. These forms of communicative action can be 
empirically identified by finding out who is entitled to speak in a decision situation. The logic 
here suggests that if only, or mainly, technical experts, such as scientists, are granted the right 
to be involved in the decision, the/orm of communicative action is instrumental-technical. 
Likewise, if the community at large is entitled to participate communicatively, then this 
suggests a discursive form of communicative action is being expressed. Finally, if 
communicative opportunity is opened up to non-human species, then dialogic reason is being 
expressed. Therefore, the action dimension is operationalised through these questions: 
• Bromley: Who was/ought to be involved in this case (who has the right to speak)? 
• The Consent Industry: Who ought to be involved in resource consent decision making 
(who has the right to speak)? 
The question was repeated in different ways, depending on the interview context, but the 
emphasis was on who (or what) had the right to speak. The data from this question was then 
used to locate this aspect of ecological reason on the matrix. 
Montgomery Spur was left out of this part of the analysis because there were no interviews. I 
deal with this below under the heading of 'triangulation' . 
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The value dimension deals with the degree to whieh anthropocentrism is central to decision 
making. Operationalising the anthropocentrism/preservationism/ecocentrism spectrum 
required understanding the goal s, values or issues of each case. Goals, values or issues refl ect 
the value orientation of the case. For example, if the goa l is to safeguard human drinking 
water supp lies, this would constitute an anthropocentric value orientation. If, on the other 
hand, the goal is to protect the ecological value of the water supply, then this suggests an 
ecocentric value orientation. Therefore, the following questions were used to operationalise 
thi s dimension: 
• Bromley: What were the goals or issues of this case? 
• Montgomery Spur: What are the ecological or environmental issues in this case? What 
are the dominant values driving this decision? 
The challenge here is to ensure there is sufficient clarity about the goals and values to enable 
ecological reason to be located on the value spectrum. At times, thi s required careful , open, 
questioning of interviewees to get them to explain the bas is of the values that were being 
inferred. 
The Consent Industry interviewees were not asked such specific questions because they were 
not being interviewed about a specific case. This results in an incomplete account of 
ecological reason, but is dealt with below under the heading of ' triangulation' . To aid clarity, 
Figure 8/ I records the operationalised questions employed to tills point. 
Figure 8.1: Operationalisation olthe Research Questions belore Triangulation 
Case Study Is the Action Is the Value Are the Requirements 
Orientation Orientation for Rational Decision 
Operationalised? Operationalised? making 
Operationalised? 
Bromley Yes Yes Yes 
Consent Industry Yes No Yes 
Montgomery Spur No Yes nla 
Filling in the Gaps: Triangulation 
Triangulation of data (Singleton, Straits & Straits, 1993 , p.391-394) is a method by which the 
research question is approached in various ways, or from different angles, in order to confirm 
the validity of the data (it does not mean that only ' three' ways must be used; multiple 
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methods can be used, but three would be a minimum). Because the three case studies were 
quite different, and it was not possible to use exactly the same questions or methods in each 
case, I used a variety of questions and methods in order to ensure a richer data set. 
The value orientation of the Consent Industry 
The value dimension of the Consent Industry required a different approach. I could not ask 
the Consent Industry interviewees about the goals of a specific case, because, unlike Bromley, 
they did not share any specific case. Therefore, I needed another means for establishing what 
values were being employed in their understanding of environmental decision making. I asked 
them: Is the resource consent process an ecologically rational way to make decisions? This 
question was asked near the end of the interview to ensure I did not bias the initial question of 
what makes sound decision making. While this question did not directly address the question 
of values, I used a variety of versions of this to elicit responses. The data provided a useful 
picture of where the values of the interviewees lie, as becomes clear when reading the case 
study chapters. 
The action orientation of Montgomery Spur 
Because there were no interviews with respect to this case, the only data that could be used 
were those recorded in the text. I could not ask about who has the right to speak, but only 
determine who did speak in this case. Therefore, I asked the question: "Who determined what 
the environmental issues are?" The answers identify who did speak, and this indicates that 
these speakers are entitled to participate. Of course, there may be others who are entitled to 
speak, but who were not involved in this case. This is where the triangulation principle helps 
by drawing on the other case studies to build a richer picture of the action dimension. The 
Montgomery Spur case does not establish the spread of entitlement, but does help verify the 
findings from the other two studies. 
Figure 8.2 (below) records the operationalised research questions after triangulation. 
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Figure 812: Operationalisatiol'l of the Research Questions after Triangulation 
Case Study Is the Action Is the Value Are the Requirements 
Orientation Orientation for Rational Decision 
Operationalised? Operationalised? making 
Operationalised? 
Bromley Yes Yes Yes 
Consent Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Montgomery Spur Yes Yes nla 
Interview Questions 
The original questions were pre-tested in five interviews with profcssional people, similar to 
my eventual sample group. This enabled substantial refinement of the questions, sharpening 
their focus, as well as some initial insight into how the future interviewees might be likely to 
respond in interviews. 
Below is a sample of the final question list I used. There were small variations with this, and 
after the first three or four interviews I rarely referred to it, except to ensure that I had covered 
the key points. In essence, it acted as a guide for me, until I became more conversant with the 
interview process. I did not ask all these questions, fo r some repeat themselves in various 
ways, but they formed an initial prompt for me if I was unsure of how to phrase a question. 
Interview Ouestion List 
• Ifwe are going to manage the environment sensibly or effectively, what do you 
consider to be the key elements we need to take into account in our decision-making? 
• What about this case? (If there was a specific one to talk about) 
• From your perspective, to what extent do yo u think the decision makers are acting 
rationally in relation to the environment? (Not used for 'decision makers') 
• To what extent do you have any latitude in determining what sorts of data/analysis are 
relevant? 
• Do you frame the data or present them in any particular way, depending on the 
situation? 
• To what extent do you see yourself/your role as neutral in the decision process? 
• What do you consider to be the environmental goals in (a particular) case? (Self 
defined) 
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• What means/mechanisms are being employed to achieve these ends/goals? 
• I'm interested in what it means to have a rational approach to environmental decision-
making. Do you think that these means/mechanisms are a good or effective way of 
achieving environmental goals? 
• To what extent are ecological issues a priority in this case? 
• What else ought to be considered in order to be able to say this case takes a rational 
approach to environmental matters? Is there anything missing? 
• What do you think are the key ecological issues in this case? 
• In this case, who actually gets to determine what the issues are? 
• Who do you consider ought to determine what the ecological issues are? 
• Is this an effective or efficient decision-making process? 
• Is this a rational way to make environmental decisions? 
The reflexive use of findings to assess Montgomery Spur 
The first research question, "What are the necessary requirements for ecologically rational 
decision making?" required a reflexive use of the data. Montgomery Spur did not involve 
interviews and so this question could not be asked. Similarly, I could not ask how 
ecologically rational the case was without a set of criteria by which to assess this. Therefore, I 
used the findings from Bromley and the Consent Industry to assess how rational the case was. 
Altogether, this provided a form of triangulation between the different questions, methods 
(interviews and textual analysis), types of case studies, which enables a rich picture to be 
developed in the final analysis. Chapter Seven details this analysis and the triangulation 
becomes apparent. 
Data Gathering 
Interview Sample 
Once the case studies were determined, it then became necessary to select the interview 
samples for Bromley and the Consent Industry. Accurate sampling is critical to providing 
valid statistical results. However, because statistical analysis was not part of my 
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methodological approach, I used non-probability sampling (Babbie, 1999, p.173). In other 
words, I was not trying to statistically project from these cases to all resource consent cases. 
Rather, I wanted to study these cases, in depth, in order to understand how ecological reason 
was being employed in a qualitative sense. 
Selecting the samples in each case was a little different. In the Bromley case, I was already 
aware of the range of people involved, especially via Hayward's (2000) work, and was able to 
establish a list of categories and names through my existing contacts. This data was gathered 
from the public literature on the case, including the public submissions, from inquiries with 
Hayward, and from others involved who I already knew about. This list covered the following 
groups: 
• Christchurch City Council staff; 
• Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee; 
• Waste Water Working Party; 
• Environment Canterbury; 
• Consent Hearing Commissioners; 
• Canterbury Public Health; 
• Research and Monitoring Group, Avon Heathcote Estuary Ihutai Trust; 
• Independent Consultants; 
• Surfers; 
• Fish and Game; 
• Department of Conservation; 
• Ngai Tahu. 
Some of these categories produced double-ups. For instance, Canterbury Public Health was 
also represented on the Working Party. In some categories I had a number of contacts, the 
Avon Heathcote Estuary Ihutai Trust being one example. I contacted these groups, mostly by 
an initial letter, and then with a follow up phone call. I was not able to contact everyone, but 
many responded. Where I was having trouble ensuring a good spread of interviewees, some 
inquiries usually produced the required contact. With one exception, there was a good spread 
of interviewees, covering the applicant (the Council), the decision makers (Regional Council), 
the Working Party and a number of submitters to the Consent Hearing. The one difficulty was 
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contacting Ngai Tahu. Although Ngai Tahu were not involved in the Working Party (see 
Chapter Four), they did make a submission to the Consent Hearing. However, I was unable to 
contact anyone who had been directly involved with Bromley, but did, somewhat belatedly, 
manage to talk with two people who have been involved with resource consent work for N gai 
Tahu. They are discussed in the Consent Industry case. I conducted a total of sixteen 
interviews in the Bromley case study. 
In the Consent Industry case, I began with the contacts I already had, and then used a 
snowball technique (Babbie, 1999, p.174) to locate others I could potentially interview. This 
process was a little more straightforward than Bromley, because the basic criterion was to 
select individuals who worked professionally in some way in the resource consent industry. I 
did not have to investigate submissions and scientific publications, as was required for the 
Bromley case, but I did have some representative categories in mind by which to guide my 
search. These were as follows: 
• Consent Planners; 
• Compliance Officers; 
• Policy Analysts; 
• Consultant Planners; 
• Consultant Scientists; 
• Consultant Engineers; 
• Tangata Whenua; 
• Environmental NGOs; 
• Consent Hearing Commissioners; 
• Environment Court. 
I was able to obtain at least one interviewee from every category, and in some cases, a number 
of interviewees. In most interviews, I asked for recommendations for other contacts, and carne 
up with a substantial list of potential interviewees, not all of whom were able to be 
interviewed. I interviewed nineteen people in total in the Consent Industry case. 
The most obvious omission from this group is resource management lawyers. Although I 
considered including some lawyers, I decided that, while lawyers are experts on the law, their 
278 
Appendix: Research Methodology 
role is to serve the interests of their client; that is, to obtain a resource consent (or whatever 
the case is). Their aim is not to produce an ecologically rational decision, but to win the case, 
within the constraints of the law. Of course, I am not suggesting that lawyers are unconcerned 
about ecological well-being, but rather that their role in decision making is different from the 
others in the list above. Professionals working for consent authorities must meet the purpose 
of the RMA. Consultants must provide professional evidence on the facts of the case. 
Environmental NGO's represent environmental interests, and decisions makers must weigh it 
all up in light of the Act and the facts of the case. It is the groups listed above that can shed 
most light on ecological reason under the RMA. One lawyer I talked to informally stated that, 
while he knew much about the RMA, he did not know anything about ecology, because he 
was a lawyer. This convinced me that the list above would be profitable for my research 
without adding lawyers to it. 
As with Bromley, each contact was either sent a letter of introduction, inviting them to 
participate in the research, or, in a few cases, were approached directly by phone. Most 
contacts responded favourably. 
In total, between the two case studies, I interviewed thirty five people. 
Interviews 
Interviews were carried out at a location convenient to the interviewee. Most were done at 
their places of work, some in private homes, two in my office at Lincoln University, and three 
in cafes. Most interviewees received a statement of the research purpose before we met, 
although this did not occur in every case. In these exceptions, I explained by phone or email 
(or both) the general focus of the research. However, I did not use the term ecological reason 
at this point because of concern that it would bias the data. Rather, I explained that I was 
investigating what sound environmental decision making consisted of, and whether or not the 
resource consent process was considered sound decision making. The usual ethical standards 
were adhered to as required by the norms of ethical practice and the requirements of the 
University. I sought permission to record the interview, when making my initial appointment, 
and did so again at the beginning of each interview. No one refused. Only one interviewee 
accepted my offer to send a draft of the interview back to the interviewee so that they could 
correct any errors, or change anything they felt uncomfortable about. In the event, everyone 
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appeared to enjoy the opportunity to share their thoughts, with some talking non-stop for long 
periods of time. A couple even asked me- to return at a later date so they could talk more! 
I recorded all the interviews on a digital data recorder) , except for one, where the batteries 
expired and I was forced to resort to pen and paper. The interviews were all transcribed 
verbatim, and these notes became the source of most of the empirical data. 
The interview form was semi-structured, that is, I had a basic list of questions I wanted 
answers to, but tried to ensure that the interviewee did most of the talking. After general 
introductions, I usually asked them to clarify their role. From this I let the discussion roam 
where it went, occasionally quietly redirecting the discussion back to my questions. I was 
very careful not to comment in anyway that would bias interviewees' answers, and stayed 
relatively neutral while they explained their views. Usually, a carefully phrased question was 
sufficient to get them talking about issues of concern to the research. For example, I used 
phrases like, "That is interesting, can you tell me more?" They usually did. 
Data Analysis 
This is detailed in Chapter Seven, and will not be duplicated here. 
I The digital recorder, about the size of a cassette tape, was a great icebreaker at the beginning of each interview. 
We were able to have a brief conversation about how technology had changed, as very few had seen a digital 
recorder before. 
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